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The present dissertation concerns cognitive psychology—theories about the nature and
mechanism of perception and thought—during the High Middle Ages (1250–1350). Many
of the issues at the heart of philosophy of mind today—intentionality, mental represen-
tation, the active/passive nature of perception—were also the subject of intense investi-
gation during this period. I provide an analysis of these debates with a special focus on
Durand of St.-Pourc¸ain, a contemporary of John Duns Scotus and William of Ockham.
Durand was widely recognized as a leading philosopher until the advent of the early
modern period, yet his views have been largely neglected in the last century. The aim of
my dissertation, then, is to provide a new understanding of Durand’s cognitive psychol-
ogy and to establish a better picture of developments in cognitive psychology during the
period.
Most philosophers in the High Middle Ages held, in one form or another, the thesis
that most forms of cognition (thought, perception) involve the reception of the form
of the object into the mind. Such forms in the mind explain what a given episode of
cognition is about, its content. According to what has been called the conformality
theory of content, the content of our mental states is fixed by this form in the mind.
Durand rejects this thesis, and one of the primary theses that I pursue is that Durand
replaces the conformality theory of content with a causal theory of content, according to
ii
which the content of our mental states is fixed by its cause. When I think about Felix
and not Graycat, this is to be explained not by the fact that I have in my mind the form
of Felix and not Graycat, but rather by the fact that Felix and not Graycat caused my
thought.
This is both a controversial interpretation and, indeed, a controversial theory. It is
a controversial interpretation because Durand seems to reject the thesis that objects are
the causes of our mental states. In the first half of the present dissertation, I argue that
Durand does not reject this thesis but he rejects another nearby thesis: that objects
as causes give to us ‘forms’. On Durand’s view, an object causes a mental state even
though it does not give to us a new ‘form’. In the second half of the dissertation I defend
Durand’s causal theory of content against salient objections to it.
iii
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1Introduction
Most philosophers in the High Middle Ages (1250–1350) subscribed to, in one form
or another, what has come to be known as the conformality theory of content, according
to which the contents of our mental states are fixed primarily owing to the fact that
such mental states either are or at least involve ‘forms’ in the mind.1 This theory can be
cashed out in a variety of different ways, but the basic idea is that my thought is about
cats rather than dogs because it either is or at least involves the ‘form’ of cats rather
than dogs. Durand of St.-Pourc¸ain (†1334) rejects this thesis without reserve, and one
of the primary aims of this dissertation is to show both why he came to be dissatisfied
with the conformality theory and what he replaces it with.
Called the Doctor Modernus and the Doctor Resolutissimus, Durand was viewed as
an important thinker by subsequent generations of philosophers, and as a controversial
figure during his own day.2 William Courtenay claims that Durand was “one of the most
frequently cited Dominicans of the century” (Schools and Scholars, 182), and Leen Spruit
notes that Durand held “a surprisingly high position in the philosophical firmament of
those days” (Species Intelligibilis I, 281).3 A Durandian chair was eventually established
1. See, e.g., Peter King, “Rethinking Representation in the Middle Ages: A Vade-Mecum to Mediaeval
Theories of Mental Representation,” in Representation and Objects of Thought in Medieval Philosophy,
ed. Henrik Lagerlund (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), 81–100 and Robert Pasnau, Theories of Cognition in
the Later Middle Ages (Cambridge: CUP, 1997).
2. Elizabeth Lowe, The Contested Theological Authority of Thomas Aquinas. The Controversies be-
tween Hervaeus Natalis and Durandus of St. Pourc¸ain (London: Routledge, 2003), 72: “But his titles
Doctor resolutissimus and Doctor modernus are perhaps more indicative of his personality than of his
metaphysics. Indeed, Durandus’s contemporaries remarked upon his clear thinking, tenacious memory
and eloquence but recognized his impatience with doctrines which conflicted with his own.” She goes
on to (mis)quote the following passage from Iacobus Que´tif and Iacobus Echard, Scriptores Ordinis
Praedicatorum, 2 vols. (Paris, 1719–21), vol. 1, f. 586b: “Vir fuit ingenii praestantia clarus, omni scien-
tiarum genere excultus, tenacio memoriae, facili praeditus eloquio, quo mire ac feliciter mentis conceptus
exprimebat: Sed qui tantis dotibus fretus, priuatis suis sensis nimium adhaesit. Vnde relicta quam in
scholis imbiberat S. Thomae doctrina, hoc fraeno coerceri non patiens, genio se totum permisit suo.”
3. To cite but one example, on April 29, 1400, Jean Gerson, chancellor of the University of Paris,
wrote a letter from Bruges recommending the works of Durand to his younger associates at the College
of Navarre. Oeuvres Comple`tes (ed. P. Glorieux), vol. 2, letter “Iucundum est. . . ” 30–5: “Iuuant
quaestiones Doctorum super Sententias et praesertim illorum qui purius et solidius conscripserunt, inter
quales meo iudicio dominius Altissiodorensis, Bonauentura, et Durandus utique resolutissimus numerandi
uidendi.”
2at Salamanca in the 15th century,4 and the views of, as Leibniz calls him, “le celebre Du-
rand”,5 especially in the domain of philosophy of mind, were a favorite topic of discussion
well into the early modern period.6 Durand defended distinctive claims in this domain.
His theses were a direct challenge to the Aristotelian synthesis in cognitive psychology
exemplified in the writings of his more famous confrere Thomas Aquinas, and intended
as such. Indeed, he rejected almost every entity thought necessary by Thomas Aquinas
in order to explain the mind.
Durand was a highly critical thinker and often blunt in his assessment of others’
views. His philosophical method is largely negative: he establishes his own position only
after the careful destruction of the alternatives, based upon their internal incoherence
and, quite often, appeals to experience and parsimony—but never based upon appeal to
authority. Indeed, Durand writes:
However, the way we should talk and write about other matters, which do not
touch upon matters of faith, is to depend upon reason and not the authority of
any given doctor, no matter how famous or solemn, and to pay little attention
to all human authority when, through reason, the truth reveals the contrary.
(Sent. C Prol. n. 12)7
4. See H. Mu¨ller, Die Lehre vom verbum mentis in der spanischen Scholastik. Untersuchungen zur
historischen Entwicklung und zum Versta¨ndnis dieser Lehre bei Toletus, den Conimbricensern und Suarez
(Ph.D. Dissertation, Westfa¨lische Wilhelms-Universita¨t, 1968).
5. Essais de The´odice´e I.27. Leibniz declares that Durand was a party unto himself (“qui faisoit assez
souvent bande a` part”). See Essais de The´odice´e II.330 and III.361, 381.
6. Between 1508 and 1594 the third redaction of Durand’s commentary on Peter Lombard’s Sentences
was reprinted no less than fifteen times. Durand’s views concerning cognitive psychology were discussed
by inter alia John Capreolus, Peter Crockaert, Francisco Sua´rez, Francisco Toletus, Thomas de Vio
(a.k.a. Cajetan), John of St. Thomas, Thomas Compton, Peter Hurtado de Mendoza, Raphaele Aversa,
Emanuel de Goes, Agostino Nifo, and Gassendi. For more on Durand’s legacy in the 15th and 16th
centuries, see the references in Serge-Thomas Bonino, “Quelques re´actions thomistes a` la critique de
l’intellect agent par Durand de Saint-Pourc¸ain,” RT 97 (1997): 99–128, Leen Spruit, Species Intelligibilis
II: From Perceptions to Knowledge. Renaissance Controversies, Later Scholasticism, and the Elimination
of the Intelligible Species in Modern Philosophy, Brill’s Studies in Intellectual History 49 (Leiden: E.J.
Brill, 1995), and Mu¨ller, Die Lehre vom verbum mentis.
7. See also ibid., “[. . . ] omnis homo dimittens rationem propter autoritatem humanam incidit in
insipientiam bestialem ut comparatus sit iumentis insipientibus et similis factus sit illis.” See also Sent.
C Prol. q. 1 n. 6: “[. . . ] quia naturalis philosophia non est scire quid Aristoteles uel alii philosophi
3As a result of both his doctrines and, no doubt, his attitude and personality, Durand’s
writings found immediate censure—twice—by his own Dominican order,8 and Durand’s
views were frequently cited by his contemporaries usually in order to refute them.9
Durand himself operated during a period of intense philosophical investigation into
the mind.10 As a student, he was in Paris when John Duns Scotus was in Paris refining his
famous distinction between abstractive and intuitive cognition.11 Duns Scotus together
senserunt, sed quid habeat ueritas rerum. Vnde ubi deuiat mens Aristotelis a ueritate rerum, non est
scientia scire quid Aristoteles senserit sed potius error.”
8. In the fall of 1314, having received his copy of the list of censured theses, Durand produced a (now
lost) Excusationes, wherein he calls the commission a bunch of ‘carping critics’ and their objections
‘insidious, twisted, and deceptive’. See, e.g., R. Martin, La controverse sur le pe´che´ originel au de´but
du XIVe sie`cle. Textes ine´dits (Leuven: Spicilegium sacrum lovaniense, 1930), 390: “Quantum autem ad
hoc quod dicit, quod uerba sua sint accepta insidiose, peruerse, et captiose[. . . ].” ibid., 385: “Quantum
ad primum dicit, quod illud dicit recitatiue tantum secundum stilum Magistri, nisi quod minus caute
loquutus est quam Magister, non credens quod uerba sua insidiose caperentur.” Durand’s Excusationes
can be partially reconstructed from Hervaeus Natalis’s Reprobationes excusationum Durandi. Durand, in
general, isn’t afraid to declare his opponent an ‘idiota’ and a given argument ‘asininum’. See, e.g., Sent.
I-C 34.4, Sent. II-C 31.1, and Sent. IV-C 11.1. For discussion of Durand’s combative rhetoric, see Josef
Koch, “Die Magister-Jahre des Durandus de S. Porciano O.P. under der Konflikt mit seinem Ordinem,”
in Kleine Schriften, ed. Karl Bormann, 2 vols., Storia e letteratura. Raccolta di studi e testi, 127–8
(Rome: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1973), 7–119. On the censures, see ibid. On Durand’s conflict
with his order see Isabel Iribarren, “L’antithomisme de Durand de Saint-Pourc¸ain et ses pre´ce´dents,”
RT 108 (2008): 39–56, Isabel Iribarren, Durandus of St. Pourc¸ain: A Dominican Theologian in the
Shadows of Aquinas (Oxford: OUP, 2005), Isabel Iribarren, “Durandus and Durandellus: The Dispute
behind the Promotion of Thomist Authority,” Akademievortra¨ge (Bern) 11 (2004): 15–28, and Lowe,
The Contested Theological Authority (which improves on Elizabeth Lowe, The Dominican Order and the
Theological Authority of Thomas Aquinas: The Controversies between Hervaeus Natalis and Durandus
of St. Pourcain (Ph.D. Dissertation, Fordham University, 1999)).
9. On cognitive psychology issues alone, see, e.g., Peter Auriol, e.g., Sent. I 35.1, Peter of Palude,
e.g., Sent. II 3 (whose Sentences contains an almost verbatim copy of either Durand’s first redaction or
second redaction), Hervaeus Natalis, e.g., Quodl. III.8 and Quodl. II.8, Nicholas Medensis, e.g., Evid.
I.4 and II.8–12, Gregory of Rimini, e.g., Sent. II 7.2–3, Henry of Lu¨beck, e.g., Quodl. I.23, and Thomas
Wylton, e.g., Quaestio “Quod in intellectu. . . ”. Russell Friedman, “On the Trail of a Philosophical
Debate: Durand of St. Pourc¸ain vs. Thomas Wylton on Simultaneous Acts in the Intellect,” in PDP,
ed. Stephen Brown, T. Kobusch, and T. Dewender, STGM 102 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 2009), 433–464 and
Thomas Jeschke, Deus ut tentus uel uisus. Die Debatte um die Seligkeit im reflexiven Akt (ca. 1293–1320)
(Leuven: E.J. Brill, 2011) discuss some of the contemporary reaction to Durand’s views on, respecitvely,
his thesis that the intellect can have but one act at a given time and his thesis that a reflexive act and
a direct act aren’t distinct.
10. As Claude Panaccio puts it (Claude Panaccio, “Mental Representation,” in Cambridge History
of Medieval Philosophy, ed. Robert Pasnau, vol. 1, 2 vols. (Cambridge: CUP, 2010), 354): “The early
decades of the fourteenth century are often credited with a major revolution in philosophy of mind, and
rightly so.”
11. See Sebastian Day, Intuitive Cognition: A Key to the Significance of the Later Scholastics, Kather-
ine Tachau, Vision and Certitude in the Age of Ockham: Optics, Epistemology and the Foundation of
Semantics 1250–1345, STGM 22 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1988), 68–75, Stephen Dumont, “Theology as a Sci-
ence and Duns Scotus’s Distinction between Intuitive and Abstractive Cognition,” Speculum 64 (1989):
4with Durand’s erstwhile teacher, Hervaeus Natalis, can be credited with establishing the
psychological notion of intentional existence, or, as Franz Brentano called it, intentional
inexistence.12 This is also the period of William of Ockham, famous, of course, as one of
the earliest advocates of the language of thought hypothesis, a theory that anticipates
certain contemporary theories of the mind such as Jerry Fodor’s.13
579–99, and Robert Pasnau, “Cognition,” in The Cambridge Companion to Scotus, ed. T. Williams (Cam-
bridge: CUP, 2003), 285–311. In Duns Scotus see Ord. I 1.1.2 nn. 35–36, Lect. II 3.2.2 n. 285, Quodl. 13
n. 8, and Quaest. Meta. VII.15 n. 18. It is interesting to note that H. Mansel, who collected William
Hamilton’s notes on Thomas Reid, writes: “To the above anticipations of Kant’s doctrine may be added
that furnished by the scholastic distinction between intuitive and abstractive cognition, some account of
which has been given by Sir W. Hamilton. The definition of Durandus [. . . ] nearly resembles one of those
above quoted from Kant.” The reference is to Sent. C Prol. q. 3, which, in fact, is simply Durand’s way
of putting Duns Scotus’s distinction! Sent. C Prol. q. 3 n. 7: “[. . . ] distinguunt duplicem cognitionem,
scilicet abstractiuam et intuitiuam. Vocant cognitionem intuitiuam illam quae immediate tendit ad rem
sibi praesentem obiectiue secundum eius actualem existentiam, sicut cum uideo colorem existentem in
pariete uel rosam quam in manu teneo; abstractiuam autem uocant omnem cognitionem quae habetur
de re non sic realiter praesente in ratione obiecti immediate cogniti.” The passages from Kant that H.
Mansel has in mind are Logik §1—his translation: “All Representations relative to an object are either
Intuitions or Conceptions. The Intuition is an individual representation (repraesentatio singularis); the
Conception is an universal or reflected representation (repraesentatio per notas communes, repraesen-
tatio discursiua). The Conception is opposed to the Intuition, for it is an universal representation, or a
representation of that which is common to a plurality of objects; therefore a representation in so far as it
can be contained in several things.”—and Kritik der reinen Vernunft §11 (1799 edition, 377) where Kant
defines Intuition as a representation “which is related immediately to an object” and Conception as re-
lated to objects “mediately”, i.e., by means of Intuitions. See William Hamilton, The Works of Thomas
Reid (Edinburgh-London: Maclachlan-Stewart-and-Co. / Longman-Brown-Green-and-Longmans, 1863),
987.
12. Franz Brentano, Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt (Leipzig: Duncker / Humblot, 1874). At
least in the case of Hervaeus Natalis, this claim isn’t even that much of a stretch. Franz Brentano,
“Geschichte der kirchlichen Wissenschaften,” in Kirchengeschichte, ed. J. Mo¨hler, vol. 2, 2 vols. (Re-
gensburg: [s.n.], 1867), 570 actually mentions Hervaeus and some of his works: the Treatise on Second
Intentions, his Quodlibeta, and his Sentences. On this point, see John Doyle, “Hervaeus Natalis on In-
tentionality: Its Direction and Some Aftermath,” in Brown, Kobusch, and Dewender, PDP, 262 (which
is a version of John Doyle, “Hervaeus Natalis, O.P., (d. 1323) on Intentionality: Its Direction, Context,
and Some Aftermath,” Modern Schoolman 83 (2006): 85–124). For discussion on the notion, the classic
article is Armand Maurer, “Ens Diminutum: A Note On Its Origin and Meaning,” Mediaeval Studies
12 (1950): 216–22. For recent discussion of the notion in Duns Scotus, see recently Peter King, “Duns
Scotus on Mental Content,” in DSP, ed. O. Boulnois et al., Textes et e´tudes du Moyen Aˆge 26, 65–88.
13. See Claude Panaccio, “Semantics and Mental Language,” in The Cambridge Companion to Ockham,
ed. P. Spade (Cambridge: CUP, 1999), 53–75 and Claude Panaccio, Ockham on Concepts (Aldershot:
Ashgate Press, 2004). Towards the end of his career, Durand was chosen as the head of the commission
established to investigate his works for signs of heresy. See Auguste Pelzer, “Les 51 articles de Guillaume
Occam, censure´s en Avignon, en 1326,” Revue d’histoire eccle´siastique 18 (1922): 240–70, Josef Koch,
“Neue Aktenstu¨cke zu dem gegen Wilhelm Ockham in Avignon gefu¨hrten Prozess,” in Bormann, Kleine
Schriften, 275–366, C. Brampton, “Personalities at the Process against Ockham at Avignon, 1324–26,”
Franciscan Studies 26 (1966): 4–25. C. Brampton notes, incidentally, that Durand used his status as
chair to omit the fatal word ‘haereticum’ from the first report; and in any case, he was a dissenting
voice on several articles. There have been a few suggestions of an influence of Durand on Ockham,
5Thesis and Outline
In the present dissertation, I intend to limit myself to three issues. Put as questions,
these are: (1) What are the causes of mental acts—acts of seeing, hearing, thinking and
so on—and what sort of cause are they? (2) What sorts of items are mental acts? (3)
And what explains the aboutness, content, or intentional character of mental acts? I will
tend to focus on what we would nowadays call perceptions—mental acts directed at or
about sensible features of the world—although I will sometimes address other forms of
cognition. I choose to focus on perception because it is in some ways a less complicated
form of cognition, thus allowing us to acquire a clearer grasp of what is distinctive about
Durand’s views; I choose these three issues because, I think, Durand’s answers to these
questions constitute the most distinctive and to my mind the most interesting aspects of
his philosophy of mind.
The primary thesis which I pursue is that Durand defends what we would nowadays
call a causal theory of content, according to which the contents of our mental states are
fixed by the causes of those mental states. My thought about cats, say, is about cats
rather than dogs because it was caused somehow by cats rather than dogs. This is a
controversial interpretation, indeed a controversial theory. It is less of an issue, however,
that Durand defends a theory of content which is very different from the theory of content
that most of his contemporaries defended, namely, the conformality theory of content,
although little indication of an influence in the other direction. Jeschke, Deus ut tentus uel uisus, ch. 5,
§7 does an expert job in tracing Durand’s views on the nature of a so-called ‘reflexive act’ and fruitio to
Ockham across la Manche. Girard Etzkorn, “Ockham at Avignon: His Response to Critics,” Franciscan
Studies 59 (2001): 9–19 argues that Ockham’s Quodl. V was written by Ockham while at Avignon as
a kind of reply to his critics. Walter Chatton, famous of course for his interaction with Ockham, cites
Durand by name in Rep. I 4.1. And, of course, Ockham would have read Peter Auriol’s works or at least
some of them—he seems to have left a blank page in Ord. I 27 dedicated to the chance when he might
get his hands on more of Auriol’s works (Brampton, “Personalities at the Process against Ockham at
Avignon, 1324–26”); and Auriol’s works contain quite a number of references to Durand. Part of the
issue here is that we’ve lost (thanks to certain happenings in England vis-a`-vis their monasteries) many
a witness to what the English Dominicans were up to during this period. For some discussion on the
mysterious English Dominicans, see Lowe, The Contested Theological Authority, 61 and Hester Gelber, It
Could Have Been Otherwise: Modal Theory and Theology among the Dominicans at Oxford, 1310–1340,
STGM 81 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 2004), 32–46, 57–71.
6according to which the contents of our mental states are fixed not primarily by their
causes but owing to the fact that such mental states either are or at least involve the
‘forms’ of other things. Durand rejects this thesis and there is little doubt about this.14
What I aim to show in the present dissertation is that he replaces it with a causal theory
of content.
One reason this might seem to be a controversial interpretation is because Durand
is famous not just as one of the earliest to abandon the so-called doctrine of species
(forms) and the conformality theory of content associated with it, but he also rejected a
doctrine which I will call Affectionism. What is affectionism? Sir William Hamilton,
the 19th-century editor of Thomas Reid, writes:
Durandus, I may notice, seems to deny, like Reid, [. . . ] absolutely and without
reserve, the affection of sense by the agency of the object. He requires only
the mutual approximation of the sense and its object; and then ensues the
sensitive perception, simply because the one is capable of perceiving, the other
capable of being perceived. [. . . ] This doctrine is only correct if limited to the
primary qualities; but it is a nearer approximation to the truth than, before
Reid, was accomplished by any modern philosopher. (The Works of Thomas
Reid, 958b)
Affectionism, then, is the doctrine that perception (at least) is a matter of the affection of
the senses by the agency of the object. To say that the senses are affected by the agency
of the object is to say at least that those objects are in some sense causes of perceptive
states. Durand rejects this doctrine. But it would seem that if Durand is to endorse the
causal theory of content then he must endorse affectionism, for, at least under ordinary
circumstances, the cause of my perceptive act is the object. It is the lemon that causes
me to see it and the fire which makes me feel its heat. Hence, if perception is not a matter
14. However, it has been misunderstood, and in Chapter 4 and in the first section of Chapter 5, I aim
to rectify these misunderstandings.
7of the affection of the senses by the agency of the object, then, well, how can Durand
possibly defend the thesis that the content of a perceptive state is fixed by its cause?
This is the problem that the opening chapters of the present dissertation address. As
a first approximation of the argument I will pursue, Durand, as I interpret him, does,
indeed, reject affectionism. However, he does not reject the doctrine that the object is
the cause of a perceptive state. Durand establishes and defends a distinction between
efficient causes and what he calls sine qua non causes. To say that X is an efficient
cause of Y is to say something more than that X is a sine qua non cause of Y. Very
roughly, the relation of sine qua non causality, as Durand explains it, is what we would
nowadays consider a counterfactual dependency relation.15 To say that X is the sine qua
non cause of Y means that were X to occur, Y would occur, and were X not to occur,
Y would not occur. By contrast, the relation of efficient causality is counterfactual
dependency plus something more. More precisely, an efficient cause induces or impresses
a ‘form’. The stove efficiently causes the water in the kettle to boil, and this means
that it induces or impresses the ‘form’ of heat upon the water in the kettle. The heat
in the water doesn’t simply counterfactually depend upon the heat in the element on
my stove.16 Now, Durand doesn’t reject the notion of efficient causality; he would, for
instance, accept this analysis of the heating of the kettle. He, however, holds that it is
inappropriate to characterize the objects of our perceptive states as efficient causes of
those states; rather such objects are mere sine qua non causes. Our perceptive states
counterfactually depend upon the presence of their objects. Affectionists, by contrast,
hold that our perceptive states counterfactually depend upon the presence of their objects
15. See, e.g., Peter Menzies, (2009), http : / / plato . stanford . edu / entries / causation -
counterfactual/.
16. For some discussion on the distinction between counterfactual dependence theories of causation
and medieval theories of causation, see Graham White, “Medieval Theories of Causation,” Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2009), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/causation-medieval/,
Richard Cross, Duns Scotus on God (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), 17–8, Marilyn McCord Adams, “Was
Ockham a Humean about Efficient Causality?” Franciscan Studies 39 (1979): 5–48, and Andre´ Goddu,
“William of Ockham’s Distinction between ‘Real’ Efficient Causes and Strictly ‘Sine Qua Non’ Causes,”
The Monist 79, no. 3 (1996): 357–367.
8and something more, namely, that when object is present to the senses, it also affects
the senses and so induces or impresses somehow its ‘form’ upon the senses. It is this
doctrine, then, that Durand rejects and not the doctrine that objects are the causes of
our perceptive states.
In Chapter 1, I will sketch, briefly, what motivates Durand to reject affectionism.
In Chapter 2, I will take up the affectionist doctrine as defended by Durand’s older
contemporary at Paris, Godfrey of Fontaines. Godfrey maintains an extreme form of
affectionism: the object of all our mental states is the efficient cause of those states,
or, in other words, any form of cognition (not just perception) is the affection of the
relevant mental faculties by the agency of the object.17 As it turns out, Godfrey develops
a celebrated argument against the thesis that the object is not the efficient cause but a
mere sine qua non cause. Hence, his position offers a challenge to Durand’s position, a
challenge, I argue in Chapter 3, Durand meets. Along the way, in the second section of
Chapter 2, I address an alternative form of affectionism: self-affectionism. On this view,
as defended in one form by John Duns Scotus, the object is a sine qua non cause and the
mind the efficient cause, impressing upon itself the ‘form’. John Duns Scotus limits this
analysis to a certain sort of mental act, namely acts of the will, but some people extended
this analysis further, to include all mental acts, even perceptions. Durand, by contrast,
rejects affectionism tout court. Mental acts just ain’t (or at least just ain’t gotta involve)
‘forms’ added to and so in the mind, at least not so far as their causation is concerned.
In the second part of the dissertation, I turn to the issue of the content of our mental
states. In Chapter 4, I take up Durand’s refutation of the conformality theory of content,
according to which the content of a mental state is to be fixed by appeal to a ‘form’ in the
17. In what follows, I will use the term ‘cognition’ to mean the most general form of one sort of mental
activity, e.g., thoughts, visions, auditions, in short: apprehensive acts. A cognition is to be contrasted
with another form of mental activity: appetitive acts, e.g., acts of sensory desire and intellective desire.
All cognitions are mental processes but not all mental processes are cognitions. For some discussion of
the term ‘cognition’, see Norman Kretzmann, “Philosophy of Mind,” in The Cambridge Companion to
Aquinas, ed. N. Kretzmann and E. Stump (Cambridge: CUP, 1993).
9mind, focusing primarily on his refutation of Thomas Aquinas’s version of the theory.
In Chapter 5, I take up Durand’s positive theory of content. I mentioned above that
the causal theory of content is itself a controversial theory. While the general form of
the causal theory of content has been a popular theory in the last fifty years, it has its
problems.18 For instance, if the content of all mental states are fixed by their causes,
then how is Durand to explain mental states that are about items that do not, indeed
cannot, be causes? I can think about St. Nicholas and a baby to be born on the 4th of
July, after all. These, and other such problems, plague Durand’s account as well, and I
put forward and defend the thesis that Durand’s causal theory of content is not as naive
as it might at first seem.
Method
I attempt to present Durand’s position in the context of the late 13th- and early 14th-
century scholasticism, a rich and vibrant period which hardly requires justification. I will
discuss inter alia Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Ghent, Godfrey of Fontaines, John Duns
Scotus, Hervaeus Natalis, Peter of Palude, Nicholas Medensis (a.k.a. Durandellus), Peter
Auriol, James of Viterbo, and William of Ockham. I will also, inasmuch as they discuss
Durand’s view, look at late medieval and early modern scholastic thinkers, such as John
Capreolus, Francisco Sua´rez, and Thomas de Vio (a.k.a. Cajetan). I will also on occasion
allude to contemporary discussions which parallel the medieval debate, usually with the
aim of illuminating the latter by means of the former, although sometimes the other
way around. It is my view that knowledge of the contemporary debate can inform our
knowledge of the medieval debate and vice versa, especially in the domain of philosophy
of mind, where the questions aren’t so much how does the brain work but how does the
mind and the mental fit into our picture of the natural world.
18. See, e.g., Dennis Stampe, “Toward a Causal Theory of Linguistic Representation,” in Midwest
Studies in Philosophy, ed. P. French, H. Wettstein, and T. Uehling, vol. 2 (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 1977), 42–63 and Fred Dretske, Knowledge and the Flow of Information (Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press, 1981).
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While Durand was viewed as a celebrated thinker well into the early modern period,
he, unfortunately, never received a revival in the 19th and early 20th centuries in the
way that, say, Bonaventure, Aquinas, and Duns Scotus did, or, more recently, William
of Ockham and Henry of Ghent.19 Hence, the texts I have worked with are, with a few
exceptions, not to be found in critical editions. Indeed, most of the first and second
redaction of his Sentences commentary remain in manuscripts; and his third redaction in
various early modern printed editions, rife with typographical errors and homeoteleutons.
As a result, I have tried to, in cases where meaning is at stake, consult the manuscript
witnesses, and I also provide the Latin in the footnotes when not otherwise available in
the form of a critical edition. I include in the bio-bibliography at the end of this present
dissertation a discussion of the status quaestionis on Durand’s texts, and what I hope
will be an useful summary of extant manuscripts and critical editions. Translations and
transcriptions are my own, unless otherwise indicated, and I have freely modified the
Latin orthography and punctuation.
I will tend to focus on Durand’s earliest views and not his later views. There is a
complicated and interesting story to be told about the development of Durand’s posi-
tion, a story which, no doubt, will be easier to tell once we have critical editions to all
three versions of his Sentences commentary. In brief, however, as a bachelor, Durand
lectured on the Sentences sometime in the first decade of the 14th century,20 and these
lectures, either in the form of students’ notes or more likely a copy of his own lecture
notes—Durand tells us they were “snatched away from me by certain curiosi before I
had completed my corrections”21—received an immediate and negative reaction from his
19. However, the Durandus Projekt aims to produce a critical edition which should appear as early as
this year. See Thomas Jeschke et al., “Durandus von St. Pourc¸ain und sein Sentenzenkommentar: Eine
kritische Edition der A- und B-Redaktion,” Bulletin de philosophie me´die´vale 51 (2009): 113–43.
20. For more precise dates, see the status quaestionis in the bio-bibliography at the end of the present
dissertation.
21. f. 432rb: “Scripta super quattuor Sententiarum libros iuuenis inchoaui, sed senex compleui, siq-
uidem quod in primis dictaueram et scripseram fuit a quibusdam curiosis mihi subreptum antequam
fuisset per me sufficienter correctum, propter quod hoc opus solum quod per omnes libros incipit [. . . ]
tamquam per me editum et correctum approbo.” On the term ‘curiosi’ see Josef Koch, Durandus de S.
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Dominican confreres, primarily Hervaeus Natalis. (It is this version of his work that is
censured twice.) In it, Durand makes some of his most interesting and, as a result, most
patently anti-Thomist claims on a whole host of issues, cognitive psychology included.
Since one’s lectures on the Sentences were, in many ways, the analogue of a dissertation,
Durand, thus, at some point produced a second version, which must have been finished
before 1312 when he received his degree and became regens actu magister at Paris. This
version often omits controversial claims and in general toes a more Thomist line. This
version also is much less interesting as a result. Once Durand had received his degree,
he continued to be harassed by clutch members of his order—notably, Hervaeus Natalis.
Two committees were established with the purpose of drawing up a list of Durand’s
theses which were either false, heretical, or at least against brother Thomas (1314 and
1316/17 respectively). Yet around 1313, the pope at the time invited Durand to take up
the position at Avignon of lector sacri palacii, a position which provided Durand with
something of a safe haven against the (so to speak) Thomist sycophantism exemplified
by Hervaeus Natalis and others in the Dominican order. (Thomas, it should be noted,
was canonized in 1323; and Hervaeus was a key player in this process.)22 Indeed, Durand
seems to have, if finding foe among his Dominican confreres, found friend among the
upper echelons of the ecclesiastical hierarchy, where he was shuﬄed from one bishopric
to another. It is during this period that Durand produced a third and final version of his
Sentences.23 This is the version which we can find in at least fifteen printings from 1508 to
Porciano O.P. Forschungen zum Streit um Thomas von Aquin zu Beginn des 14. Jahrhunderts. Erster
Teil: Literargeschichtliche Grundlegung, BGPTM 26 (Mu¨nster: Aschendorff, 1927), 68–9.
22. Hervaeus was too sick to attend the ceremony (July 18, 1323), yet lived to know about it—he
died in Narbonne on August 8 of that year. On this episode, see Agustin de Guimara˜es, “Herve´ Noe¨l
(†1323). E´tude biographique,” AFP 8 (1938): 75–6. Hervaeus, I should note, did not always adopt or
even endorse the positions of the Angelic Doctor: he rejects the real distinction between esse and essentia
to name one obvious case. For more points of difference, see Russell Friedman, “Dominican Quodlibetal
Literature, ca. 1260–1330,” in Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages. The Fourteenth Century, ed.
Chris Schabel, 2 vols., Brill’s Companion to the Christian Tradition 7 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 2007), 432–3.
23. As a twist to this story, Pope John XXII, who without doubt saved Durand from his own order,
asked Durand, towards the end of his life, to comment on a treatise the pope had written concerning
the beatific vision. Durand, it should come as little surprise, finding the treatise absurd, didn’t hesitate
to tell the pope as much, and so, at the very end of his career Durand found yet another of his works
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1594. In this version, Durand returns to quite a few of the positions he had omitted from
his second version; and while he still retains many of his distinctive theses in cognitive
psychology—he rejects species and the agent intellect, for instance—he remains silent on
what, I think, is his most interesting innovation, namely, his claim that the cause of our
mental acts is a mere sine qua non cause. Whether or not this is due to a change of mind,
or simply a change of dialectical context, is unclear, and further research, this present
dissertation included, as well as the publication of critical editions to all three redactions
of his Sentences, should allow us to eventually answer this question.
Status Quaestionis
In 1927, Josef Koch produced the first volume in a proposed two-volume study on Du-
rand of St.-Pourc¸ain. In it he covers a massive amount of terrain on the transmission and
authentication of the available manuscripts. The second volume, which never appeared,
was intended to be a study focusing on Durand’s philosophy,24 and in the intervening
four score and five years, there has been no attempt at a systematic investigation into
Durand’s philosophical doctrines. By contrast, Durand’s theology has received quite a bit
of scholarly attention,25 and, while various purely philosophical topics have been singled
put before a committee to be looked into for signs of heresy. Durand was nothing if not an independent
thinker, which no doubt justifies the apocryphal epitaph on his tombstone: “Durus Durandus jacet hic
sub marmore duro, An sit salvandus, ego nescio, nec quoque curo.” For more on Durand’s life, see the
references in the bio-bibliography provided at the end of the present dissertation.
24. Koch, Durandus de S. Porciano, 4: “Der zweite Teil, der die Lehre des Durandus in ihrer ur-
spru¨nglichen Fassung und weitern Entwicklung darstellt und wu¨rdigt, wird in einem zweiten Heft er-
scheinen.”
25. See, first of all, Iribarren, Durandus of St. Pourc¸ain: A Dominican Theologian in the Shadows
of Aquinas (which improves on Isabel Iribarren, The Trinitarian Controversy between Durandus of St
Pourc¸ain and the Dominican Order in the Early Fourteenth Century: The Limits of Theological Dissent
(Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Oxford, 2001)). See also: Isabel Iribarren, “La christologie de Durand
de Saint-Pourc¸ain dans le contexte de l’e´mergence du thomisme au XIV sie`cle,” RSPT 92 (2008): 241–
56, Thomas Jeschke, “Eine kleine eschatologische Skizze: Durandus von St. Pourc¸ain (†1334) und die
Identita¨t des Auferstehungsleibes,” Archiv fu¨r mittelalterliche Philosophie und Kultur 12 (2006): 122–39,
Isabel Iribarren, “Some Points of Contention in Medieval Trinitarian Theology: The Case of Durandus of
Saint-Pourc¸ain in the Early Fourteenth Century,” Traditio 57 (2002): 289–315, Gilles Emery, “Dieu, la foi
et la the´ologie chez Durand de Saint-Pourc¸ain,” RT 99 (1999): 659–99, Roman Cessario, “Saint Thomas,
Durand of Saint-Pourc¸ain et Capreolus: Le de´bat sur la foi,” in Jean Capreolus et son temps. 1380–1444:
Colloque de Rodez, ed. G. Bedouelle, R. Cessario, and K. White (Paris: Cerf, 1997), 159–164, and Lauge
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out in the secondary literature,26 including some very recent work on Durand’s cognitive
psychology or philosophy of mind,27 Durand’s views on a whole host of philosophical
topics, from metaphysics on up to epistemology, which, to be sure, are as coherent and
rich as the views of, e.g., William of Ockham, John Duns Scotus, and Thomas Aquinas,
still remain largely unevaluated.
Nielsen, “Signification, Likeness, and Causality. The Sacraments as Signs by Divine Imposition in John
Duns Scotus, Durand of St Pourc¸ain and Peter Auriol,” in Vestigia, Imagines, Verba. Semiotics and
Logic in Medieval Theological Texts (XIIth-XIVth Century), ed. C. Marmo (Turnhout: Brepols, 1997),
223–53.
26. Relations: Thomas Dewender, “Der ontologische Status der Relationen nach Durandus von St.-
Pourcain, Hervaeus Natalis und Petrus Aureoli,” in Brown, Kobusch, and Dewender, PDP, 287–307.
Epistemology: Kevin White, “Saint Thomas et Durand de Saint-Pourc¸ain: La question de la certitude
de la foi,” in Bedouelle, Cessario, and White, Jean Capreolus et son temps. 1380–1444: Colloque de Rodez,
165–75 and Henry Donneaud, “Durand et Durandellus sur les rapports de la foi et de la science,” RT 97
(1997): 157–72. Individuation: Mark Henninger, “Durand of Saint Pourc¸ain (B. CA 1270; D. 1334),” in
Individuation in Scholasticism: The Later Middle Ages and the Counter-Reformation, 1150–1650, ed. J.
Gracia (New York: SUNY Press, 1994), 319–32. Truth: Mischa von Perger, “Der Wahrheitsbegriff nach
Durandus von Saint-Pourc¸ain mit der Qua¨stion ‘Utrum veritas sit in rebus vel in anima’ aus In Sent.
I, Fassung A, und darauf bezogenen Texten,” AFP 74 (2004): 127–224. Future Contingents: Chris
Schabel, Russell Friedman, and Irene Balcoyiannopoulou, “Peter of Palude and the Parisian Reaction
to Durand of St Pourc¸ain on Future Contingents,” AFP 71 (2001): 183–300. The Infinite: Jean-Luc
Sole`re, “Thomistes et antithomistes face a` la question de l’infini cre´e´: Durand de Saint-Pourc¸ain, Herve´
de Ne´dellec et Jacques de Metz,” RT 97, no. 1 (1997): 219–244 and Jean-Luc Sole`re, “La puissance et
l’infini: Durand de Saint-Pourc¸ain,” in La puissance et son ombre. De Pierre Lombard a` Luther, ed. O.
Boulnois (Paris: Aubier bibliothe´que philosophique, 1994), 287–320.
27. On Durand’s rejection of the agent intellect: Bonino, “Quelques re´actions thomistes a` la critique
de l’intellect agent par Durand de Saint-Pourc¸ain” and Thomas Jeschke, “Die Ablehnung des ta¨tigen
Intellekts bei Durandus. Panorama einer Debatte,” in Per perscrutationem philosophicam. Neue Perspek-
tiven der mittelalterlichen Forschung. Loris Sturlese zum 60. Geburtstag gewidmet, ed. A. Beccarrisi, R.
Imbach, and P. Porro, CPTMA 4 (Hamburg: Meiner, 2008), 273–91. On his doctrine that it is impossible
to engage in multiple mental acts of the same kind at once: Friedman, “On the Trail of a Philosophical
Debate: Durand of St. Pourc¸ain vs. Thomas Wylton on Simultaneous Acts in the Intellect” and Jeschke,
Deus ut tentus uel uisus (which he tells me improves upon Thomas Jeschke, Deus ut tentus uel uisus.
Die Debatte um die Seligkeit im reflexiven Akt (ca. 1293-1320). Textedition und Untersuchung (Ph.D.
Dissertation, University of Cologne, 2008)). On his thesis that every direct mental act is also a reflexive
mental act: Jeschke, Deus ut tentus uel uisus. On his refutation of the doctrine of species: Jean-Luc
Sole`re, “The Activity of the Cognitive Subject according to Durand of Saint-Pourc¸ain” (Forthcoming).
On his reduction of mental concepts to mental acts: Russell Friedman, “Peter Auriol versus Durand of
St. Pourc¸ain on Intellectual Cognition,” in Intentionality, Cognition and Mental Representation in Me-
dieval Philosophy, ed. Gyula Klima (Fordham University: Fordham University Press, Forthcoming). I’d
like to thank Thomas Jeschke, Russell Friedman, and Jean-Luc Sole`re for providing me with advanced
copies of their works.
Part I
Causation and Cognition
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1 Affectionism and its discontents
Let us stipulate that the object alone
moves the intellect—which never
entered my head nor will enter it, so
I believe—such that the intellect is
only passive. Ponamus quod obiectum
solum moueat intellectum, quod
nunquam intrauit caput meum, nec
intrabit ut credo, ita quod intellectus
solum sit passiuus.
Durand of St.-Pourc¸ain, QLA 1 459
It just seems ever so obvious that we are affected by the world: when I place my
hand next to the fire, it becomes hot and when I plunge it into the ice water, it becomes
cold. What goes for physical changes also goes for at least some mental changes: when
I place my hand next to fire, I feel its heat. It seems ever so obvious, in other words,
that perception is a matter of being affected by the perceptible object. It might, of
course, be up to me to open my eyes or place my hand next to the fire, and, of course,
in quite a few cases present perceptible objects don’t cause perceptive acts, e.g., while
asleep, distracted, and so on,1 but once a perceptive act does occur, under ordinary
1. This qualification and henceforth assumed is important and in making it I am attempting to bracket
out a number of phenomena. For instance, there is a Daniel Simons’s by now famous gorilla and the
basketball court case, meant to support the notion of inattentional and change blindness (2010). In the
present context, such a case might make it absurd to claim that when the perceptible object is present
I can’t help but perceive it. Such qualifications are meant to bracket such cases: when a perceptive
act does occur of the obvious sort, e.g., when I do perceive the Gorilla, then it would be absurd to
deny that the Gorilla somehow affected me such that I perceived it. For an interesting discussion of
Thomas Aquinas and the phenomena of blindsight and agnosia, see Eleonore Stump, Aquinas (New
York: Routledge, 2003), ch. 8. For an interesting discussion of Francisco Sua´rez and selective attention,
see Cees Leijenhorst, “Cajetan and Suarez on Agent Sense: Metaphysics and Epistemology in Late
Aristotelian Thought,” in Forming the Mind: Essays on the Internal Senses and the Mind/Body Problem
from Avicenna to the Medical Enlightenment, ed. Henrik Lagerlund, Studies in the History of Philosophy
of Mind (Dordrecht: Springer, 2007), 237–63.
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circumstances, its ultimate cause does seem to have to have been the perceptible object.2
Of course, perception does involve certain neurological events in the brain and some forms
of perception will involve the firings of rods and cones in the eye and other physiological
changes in the body, but the ultimate cause of the perceptive act, at least in ordinary
situations, is, indeed, has to be, the perceptible object. As we go about the world, we
acquire information about the world from the world, and this is a matter of the affection
of our senses by the items in the world. Who would ever wish to deny such an ever so
evident doctrine?3
Yet, Durand does, or at least he seems to. Sir William Hamilton writes, as a result,
and with some praise, that “Durandus, I may notice, seems to deny, like Reid, [. . . ]
absolutely and without reserve, the affection of sense by the agency of the object” (The
Works of Thomas Reid, 958b). Jean-Luc Sole`re writes that, for Durand, “the object of
the senses or of the intellect cannot be the cause of the senses’ feelings or the intellect’s
understandings” (“The Activity of the Cognitive Subject”) and Russell Friedman notes
that, for Durand, “material objects cannot affect the soul, neither through the senses
nor through the intellect” (“Peter Auriol versus Durand of St. Pourc¸ain on Intellectual
Cognition”). Indeed, Durand declares that “sensing and thinking are not in us from the
objects as efficient causes” (Sent. II-A 3.5 17) and he holds it as absurd to suppose that
sensible qualities, through which sense objects purportedly affect our senses, might be
able to do just that.4 Such statements make it certainly look as if Durand rejects the
ever so evident doctrine that, at least under ordinary circumstances, perceptible objects
are the causes of our perceptive acts .
2. The qualification ‘under ordinary circumstances’ is meant to bracket unordinary circumstances, e.g.,
divine and demonic intervention, illusions and so forth. I’ll deal with these issues in passing throughout.
3. Obviously, some philosophers have denied that perception is a matter of being affected by objects,
usually with broader aims in mind. On this position, known as Projectivism or Projection, see Benj
Hellie, “An Externalist’s Guide to Inner Experience,” in Perceiving the World, ed. Bence Nanay (Oxford:
OUP, 2010), 97–146. For an interesting discussion of medieval theories of Projection, see Robert Pasnau,
“Scholastic Qualities: Primary and Secondary,” in Primary and Secondary Qualities: The Historical and
Ongoing Debate, ed. L. Nolan (Oxford: OUP, 2011), 41–61.
4. See, e.g., Sent. II-A 3.5 13 quoted below fn. 44.
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One of the primary theses which this dissertation aims to establish is that Durand
does not reject this thesis, but rather he rejects a nearby thesis—call it Affectionism—
that perception is a matter of being affected by perceptible objects , where this is taken to
mean that perception is a kind of change wherein the percipient acquires or receives the
‘form’ of the object. According to most philosophers in the High Middle ages, perception
is a change more or less like other sorts of physical changes, and all physical changes
involve, in one way or another, the production and reception of ‘form’. When the stove
makes the kettle hot, it produces in it the ‘form’ of heat which the kettle receives. So
too when the stove makes me feel its heat: it somehow produces in me the ‘form’ of
heat. Of course, there are disanalogies: when I see the red wall, I don’t become red, but
I do, all the same, come to acquire the ‘form’ of red. Indeed, all intentional mental acts,
according to most philosophers in the High Middle Ages, are a matter of reception of
the ‘form’ of the object of those acts owing either in whole or in part to the agency of
the object.5 Now, Durand does not deny the thesis that when the stove makes the kettle
hot it gives to it the ‘form’ of heat. Nor does he deny the thesis that when I place my
hand on the stove it becomes hot, that is, it receives the ‘form’ of heat from the stove.
What he denies is that the same sort of analysis applies to perception. On Durand’s
view, a perceptible object is a sine qua non cause and not an efficient cause,6 and what
5. See, e.g., John Duns Scotus, Quodl. 13 n. 28: “[S]icut esse album est habere albedinem tamquam
formam, sic sentire, uel esse sentientem, est habere sensationem sicut formam. [. . . ] Est igitur recipere,
uel habere, sensationem, et sic intelligere recipere intellectionem.” Thomas Aquinas, ST I.75.5: “An
object is cognized insofar as its form is in the cognizer.” QDV X.4: “All acts of cognition involve some
form which is the source of cognition in the cognizant subject.” See also SCG I.44, 47. Hervaeus Natalis,
Quodl. III.8 43: “[O]mnis actio realis terminatur ad aliquam formam absolutam superadditam passo.
Sed actio realis intellectus agentis et phantasmatis terminatur ad intelligere.” Godfrey of Fontaines,
Quodl. IX.19 270: “[I]ntelligere nostrum solum consistit in receptione speciei[. . . ].” ibid., 271: “[Q]uod
ab intelligibili fiat ipsum intelligere in intellectu uel saltem aliqua forma et species[. . . ].” Bonaventure,
Sent. II 17.1.2 415: “[A]nima non cognoscit rem, nisi speciem eius et formam sibi imprimat.” Albert the
Great, De anima II.3.4 101b: “Dicimus igitur quod omne apprehendere est accipere formam apprehensi.”
6. Sent. II-A 3.5 21: “[. . . ] sentire et intelligere [. . . ] sint ab obiecto sicut a causa sine qua non[. . . ].”
Sent. I-A 3.5 (S ) f. 77rb: “[. . . ] nullum obiectum mouet effectiue potentiam quamcumque sensitiuam
uel intellectiuam ad cognitionem sui, sed solum est causa sine qua non. Vnde sicut coelum agit in haec
inferiora et ab eis non patitur [. . . ], sic anima immaterialis unita corpori mouet corpus et a corpore non
mouetur nec aliquid recipit a corpore.” (This text is quoted in full below in footnote 61.)
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this means, at least, is that the object causes a perceptive act even though it does not
affect the senses. More precisely, I will argue, what this means is that perception does
not involve, as an essential component, the reception of a ‘form’ of the object owing to
the object as cause. The distinction between a sine qua non cause and an efficient cause
is a subtle one, of course, but it is more than a mere fuss about the names. In the present
chapter, I will look at Durand’s refutation of two positions which defend, in one form
or another, affectionism. In §1, I will look at how he understands such positions, and
in §2 I will look at the sorts of worries he raises against them. This should allow us
to understand what it is, precisely, that Durand rejects when he rejects the doctrine of
affectionism.
1.1 Varieties of affectionism
Durand addresses the question “How is it that, in us, acts of thinking, seeing hearing,
and so forth come about?” in the first article of his treatise on cognition, contained in
the first redaction of book two of his commentary on Peter Lombard’s Sentences (Sent.
II-A 3.5).7 As typical, before presenting his own answer to this question, he attacks
certain contemporary opinions. More precisely, he attacks two affectionist theories. The
first theory maintains that extramental objects are the efficient causes not of perceptive
acts themselves but of certain ‘forms’ or ‘species’ in the senses in virtue of the reception
of which perceptive acts, then, come about. The second theory maintains that these
objects are the efficient causes of the perceptive acts themselves, conceived of as ‘forms’
or ‘species’. Both theories subscribe to the affectionist dogma, the thesis that perception
is a matter of the affection of the senses by the agency of the object. Indeed, the starting
point of both theories is Aristotle’s dictum that perception is a kind of being affected
7. I would like to thank Russell Friedman for providing me with the incredibly hard to find second
edition of Joseph Koch’s critical edition to Sent. II-A 3.5.
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(quodammodo pati),8 and this means, at least, that such mental acts involve the reception
of a ‘form’ or ‘species ’ caused at least in part and at least ultimately by the object itself.
1.1.1 The first opinion: the species theory
We can call the first opinion the species-theory of cognition, although in the present
context we might want to call it the species-theory of the causation of cognitive acts,
for it is a theory which, like the second opinion and Durand’s own ultimate opinion,
attempts to explain how it is that an episode of cognition comes to be. (I will, however,
continue to call it the species-theory of cognition and sometimes even STC for this takes
up less space, and, in any case, this is what it is called in the literature.)
It is important to distinguish between a theory about the causation of cognition from
a theory about the content of cognition. Indeed, part of the reason Durand separates his
treatise on cognition into two articles is because he wishes to separate these two issues.
In the first article he enquires into what the cause of a mental act is and what sort of
cause it is, and in the second article he enquires into what fixes the content of a mental
act and whether or not a species, conceived of as a representation of some sort of the
object, is necessary.9 This is both an obvious and an important distinction to draw. It
is important, for it avoids an immediate confusion which usually surrounds the species .10
A species , at least according to people like Thomas Aquinas, is characterized as that by
which (id quo) the mind thinks, sees, hears, and so on whatever it is it thinks, hears,
8. DA II.5 416b33–4, 417a3–4 and DA III.4 429a13–4, 429b26.
9. See, e.g., Sent. II-A 3.5 23: “Per quid autem praesentetur sensibile sensui et intelligibile intellectui,
utrum per speciem uel per aliquid aliud, non dicetur modo, quia alias per intentionem agetur de hoc.
Sed hoc tantum ex dictis habeatur, quod species non requiritur ut eliciens actum per se, sed solum,
ut repraesentans obiectum, si tamen umquam requiritur.” Sent. II-A 3.5 24: “Species autem nullo
modo requiritur ad actum intelligendi, nisi solum ut repraesentans obiectum[. . . ]. Ergo solum in hoc
sensu tractabitur, utrum essentia angeli sit ei ratio repraesentans omnia quae intelligit uel aliqua ei
repraesententur per species.” In his third redaction—Durand omits the question entirely in his second
redaction—he only discusses this latter question and so omits the text that we find in Sent. II-A 3.5 up
to page 24. I discuss Durand’s refutation of species as representations in Chapter 4 and the first section
of Chapter 5.
10. In what follows, I italicize ‘species’ to distinguish this technical term from logical species, i.e.,
species as opposed to genus. This, of course, isn’t the usual confusion.
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sees, and so on.11 This way of putting things is ambiguous about the role of the species :
a species might be taken to be that in virtue of which the mental act is about whatever
it is about (i.e., it is that in virtue of which the content of the mental act is fixed) or a
species might be taken to be that in virtue of which (at least in part) a mental act comes
about.12 The distinction is obvious because the question “What makes me think?” is
not the same as the question “What makes me think about whatever it is that I think
about?” The elements which go into our answer to the first question need not be the
same as those that go into our answer to the second question.13
According to Durand, the species-theory of cognition holds that
thinking (intelligere) is an action of the intellect informed with the species of
the intelligible thing really distinct from both. The species-informed intellect
is related to the [action of] thinking just as hot water is to the action of
making a hand or foot hot. Indeed, just as water, which in itself isn’t hot,
11. See, e.g., Thomas Aquinas, ST I.85.2: “[. . . ] the intelligible species is related to the intellect as
that by which the intellect thinks.” For some discussion, see Robert Pasnau, “Id Quo Cognoscimus,” in
Theories of Perception from Antiquity to Early Modern Philosophy, ed. S. Knuuttila and P. Ka¨rkka¨inen,
Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind 6 (Dordrecht: Springer, 2008), 131–50. See also Chapter 4
and the references therein.
12. Indeed, as we will see in Chapter 5, many authors exploited this ambiguity in their defense of
the conformality theory of content, for the species is both a ‘form’ ultimately produced somehow by
the object and also a likeness (similitudo) of that object. Aquinas, I should note, clearly recognizes
these two functions of the species. See, e.g., QDV X.4: “Omnis cognitio est secundum aliquam formam
quae est in cognoscente principium cognitionis. Forma autem huiusmodi dupliciter potest considerari:
uno modo secundum esse quod habet in cognoscente, alio modo secundum respectum quem habet ad
rem cuius est similitudo. Secundum quidem primum respectum facit cognoscentem actu cognoscere,
sed secundum respectum secundum determinat cognitionem ad aliquod cognoscibile determinatum.”
This text is quoted in Pasnau, Theories of Cognition, 105–6, who remarks, ibid., 113: “[. . . ] Aquinas
distinguishes between two functions of intentional species: their role in bringing about a cognition in the
agent, and their role in making that cognition have a certain content.” See also Sent. IV 49.2.1 obj. 8,
ST I.55.1, 56.1, 75.5, 85.2.
13. Indeed, as Leen Spruit, Species Intelligibilis I: From Perceptions to Knowledge. Classical Roots and
Medieval Discussions, Brill’s Studies in Intellectual History 48 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1994), 283 demon-
strates, Durand’s criticism of species seems to have been an important impetus behind the later dis-
tinction between the effective/causative/virtual representation and the formal representation. See, e.g.,
Peter Crockaert, In DA (discussed by ibid., ch. 5.2.7) III.1.5. Rodrigo Arriaga, Cursus philosophicus
(qtd. in Spruit, Species Intelligibilis II, 330) f. 712b: “[. . . ] species, quae non est formalis et expressa
obiecti imago et repraesentatio, sed tantum uirtualis, non potest per seipsam formaliter determinare,
sed concurrendo efficienter ad cognitionem.” Raphaele Aversa, Philosophia metaphysicam physicamque
(discussed in ibid., 324) f. 820a. Francisco Sua´rez, Commentaria in De anima (discussed in ibid., 298–9)
ff. 304–6.
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can’t actually make a hand or foot hot unless it first receives into itself heat,
so too our possible intellect can’t think unless it first is actualized through
the species of the intelligible thing. And just as heat received in water is for
it the reason it actively makes something else hot (ratio calefaciendi alterum
actiue), so too the species of the intelligible thing is for our intellect the
reason it actively elicits the act of thinking (ratio eliciendi actum intelligendi
actiue). Nor is there any difference between the two cases except this: the
act of making something else hot is an act that passes into outside matter
and the act of thinking is not. (Sent. II-A 3.5 8–9)
Durand seems to have either Thomas Aquinas or Hervaeus Natalis (or both) in mind as
the primary proponent(s) of this position, although it was a common enough view.14 I
should note that I won’t fuss too much on the issue of whether or not Durand gets their
views right .15 In any case, on this view, as Durand presents it, Aristotle’s dictum that
14. See Hervaeus Natalis, Sent. II 3.4, TDV , and DIS . At 23.32–24.3 Durand makes a clear allusion
to Sent. II 3.4.1 f. 212b (quoted below in fn. 18). At 25.1–21 Durand paraphrases a passage from
Aquinas’s ST I.55.1. According to the committee established to censure Durand’s views (Hervaeus
Natalis, John of Naples, James of Lausanne, et al.) he has ST I.85.2 in view. See Articuli in quibus
magister Durandus deuiat . . . n. 58: “Eadem d. a. 5 reprobat modum quo Thomas p. 1 q. 85 a. 2
ostendit speciem intelligibilem esse principium quo intellectionis.” Aquinas, ST I.85.2: “‘Dicendum est
quod species intelligibilis se habet ad intellectum ut quo intelligit intellectus. Quod sic patet. Cum enim
sit duplex actio, sicut dicitur IX Metaphysicae, una quae manet in agente, ut uidere et intelligere, et
altera quae transit in rem exteriorem, ut calefacere et secare, utraque fit secundum aliquam formam. Et
sicut forma, secundum quam prouenit actio tendens in rem exteriorem, est similitudo obiecti actionis,
ut calor calefaciens est similitudo calefacti, similiter forma, secundum quam prouenit actio manens in
agente, est similitudo obiecti. Vnde similitudo rei uisibilis est secundum quam uisus uidet, et similitudo
rei intellectae, quae est species intelligibilis, est forma secundum quam intellectus intelligit.”
15. Aquinas lays out his doctrine of species in ST I.84–85. Aquinas’s theory of species has been, of
course, extensively studied. However, most of the secondary literature has focused on his view that
the species is somehow a representation (similitudo) of the object, with little interest in the thesis that
the species is somehow an item that goes into the causation of a cognitive act. On this aspect of the
species doctrine, see Spruit, Species Intelligibilis I, ch. 2.3, Eleonore Stump, “Aquinas’s Account of the
Mechanisms of Intellective Cognition,” Revue internationale de philosophie 52 (1998): 287–307, Stump,
Aquinas, ch. 8, John O’Callaghan, Thomist Realism and the Linguistic Turn (Notre Dame, Indiana:
University of Notre Dame Press, 2003), 175–82 and Pasnau, Theories of Cognition, chs. 3.4 and 4.
Hervaeus’s theory of species has, by contrast, received hardly any attention at all, which is a shame least
of all because he seems to have changed his mind on certain aspects of the doctrine between Quodl. II
and Quodl. III. See here Francis Kelley, “Some Observations on the ‘Fictum’ Theory in Ockham and
Its Relation to Hervaeus Natalis,” Franciscan Studies 38 (1978): 260–282, Prospero Stella, “La prima
critica di Hervaeus Natalis O.P. alla noetica di Enrico di Gand: Il De intellectu et specie del cosiddetto
De quatuor materiis,” Salesianum 21 (1959): 125–70, and Spruit, Species Intelligibilis I, ch. 4.1.3.
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thinking is a kind of being affected (intelligere est pati) shouldn’t be taken to mean that
thinking is entirely an affection but rather that, ‘concomitant’ with an affection, namely,
the reception of the species , there is also an action.
They tell us that the Philosopher’s dictum from De anima II—that thinking
is being affected—is true but not essentially (essentialiter) but concomitantly
(concomitatiue), since we don’t think unless beforehand we come to receive
the species of the intelligible thing. (ibid., 9: “Dictum autem Philosophi
2 De anima, quod intelligere est pati, exponunt quod hoc uerum est non
essentialiter, sed concomitatiue, quia non intelligeremus, nisi prius recepta
specie rei intelligibilis.”)16
What ‘concomitant’ seems to mean here isn’t what it looks to mean, for on this view the
reception of the species is in some sense prior to the act. However, I take it the point is
that at the same time and always when one receives the species one elicits the act, even
though the reception is conceptually prior to the elicitation.
What goes for the intellect also goes for the senses, a point Durand makes a little
further on in the text, inferring that “if the species in the intellect is the principle by
which the intellect elicits in an active way its operation of thinking, then, by the same
token, the species in the sense is the principle by which the sense elicits in an active way
its operation of sensing” (ibid., 11). Now, one could accuse Durand of misinterpretation
here, for he moves a little too fast from the intellect to the senses. As Robert Pasnau,
among others, has pointed out, for Aquinas at least, whereas the intellect is only partially
passive, the senses are entirely passive.17 One might be right in making this charge, but,
16. The passage continues: “quae receptio est passio large dicta.” See also ibid., 13 (which is Durand’s
presentation of the second opinion): “Igitur in intellectu non fit species praeter ipsum intelligere, quod
est ab obiecto effectiue, et est quoddam pati, non solum concomitatiue, ut primi dicunt, sed essen-
tialiter[. . . ].” On the continuation: The reception of a species is broadly speaking a reception of form for
a couple of reasons. First of all, when the mind receives the ‘form’ of heat it doesn’t become hot, unlike
the kettle. Second: usually when X receives a form, it loses some form which it already had—when the
kettle receives heat it loses the form of cold which it had. But when the senses or intellect receive the
form of cat, there is no form lost. See below.
17. Pasnau, Theories of Cognition, 128–129. See, e.g., Quodl. VIII.2 a. 1. Pasnau, Theories of Cognition,
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as we’ll see, it won’t matter one wit as to Durand’s general objections, for were one to
hold that the senses are entirely passive, then, at least in regards to this aspect of the
theory, one would be committed to the view which the second opinion puts forward. In
either case, what is clear is this much: at least part of what cognition involves is the
affection of the cognitive faculty by the agency of the object, and what this seems to
mean is that, at least, the object, either in whole or in part, gives to that faculty a
‘form’, called a ‘species’.
But let’s suppose Durand is right about his inference from intellect to sense. Suppose,
then, that all forms of cognitive change involve two elements: the reception of a species
and the elicitation of the act. What is the precise causal role of the species? Species are
said to be both really distinct from mental acts and also that by which mental faculties
(e.g., intellect and senses) elicit their mental acts, and so this would seem to place a
kind of constraint on how we interpret their causal role. While there are quite a number
of interpretations afoot as to what an individual author might have taken their causal
role to be, I think, in the present context, we should understand species to be a causal
precondition for mental acts, and even more precisely, as kinds of (acquired) dispositions
which allow our mental faculties to elicit their mental acts. In scholastic terms, a species
is, as Durand understands it, the active principle by which (principium actiuum quo) a
given cognitive faculty elicits in an active way its mental act much as heat is the active
principle by which the stove elicits its act of making some other item hot.18 In any
129: “Cognition at this stage [i.e., intellectual cognition] does have an active component. But here, as
at every other level of human cognition, the process’s distinctively cognitive feature is the reception
of forms from without. [. . . ] This is not of course the whole story. It is only the initial reception of
information that is entirely passive at the level of sensation and partly passive at the level of intellect.”
See also the references in footnote 54 below.
18. A lively debate has sprung up around Aquinas on this issue. R. Pasnau (Pasnau, Theories of
Cognition, 127, 190) declares that, for Aquinas at least, the species is the agent cause of the perceptive
act. But this can’t be right since a species is that by which the agent elicits the cognitive act. Another
interpretation, pursued by, e.g., O’Callaghan, Thomist Realism and the Linguistic Turn, 175–182, is that
the species is the formal cause of the cognitive act, and he does so in part because he wishes to downplay
the real distinction between species and acts. Indeed, he writes (176): “[. . . ] I hold that the species is the
form of the act of understanding and thus cannot be some thing in addition to it.” But this too can’t
be right since a species is supposed to be really distinct from the cognitive act. On this last point—that
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case, what is important in the present context is this: perception, according to such a
view, necessarily involves an affection—the reception of form—owing to the agency of
the object as the ultimate (efficient) cause.
species are really distinct from acts—see Panaccio, Ockham on Concepts, 28–9, Pasnau, Theories of
Cognition, 204, fn. 18 and, in Aquinas, e.g., QDP VIII.1: “Differt autem [sc. conceptio -PJH] a specie
intelligibili, nam species intelligibilis, qua fit intellectus in actu, consideratur ut principium actionis
intellectus[. . . ].” See also SCG I.53 and Quodl. V.2. For a recent balanced assessment, see Stump,
Aquinas, ch. 8. My own interpretation is inspired by Hervaeus Natalis. See, e.g., Sent. II 3.4.1 (H )
ff. 212b–3a (emph. mine): “Primum est uidere quam habitudinem (habitudinem] beatitudinem ! H )
importat haec praepositio ‘per’ quando quaeritur utrum angelus intelligat per speciem. [. . . ] Quantum
ad primum, ergo, sciendum, quod ‘per’ dicit habitudinem alicuius causae communiter, siue aliquid aliud
dicat, siue non. Quattuor sunt causae per quas, siue propter quas potest aliquid esse tale uel tale,
sicut: <1> Aqua est calida, sicut per causam subiectiuam et materialem, per potentiam receptiuam
caloris; <2> sicut per causam efficientem, <aqua> est calida, per ignem calefacientem; <3> sicut per
formam, per calorem ipsum; <4> sicut per finem, siue propter finem, propter coctionem uel lotionem
uel aliquid tale. Et sic etiam quando quaeritur per quid intelligit angelus, potest quaeri <1> per
quid sicut per principium passiuum et susceptiuum in quo recipiatur talis actus intelligendi, et sic non
est dubium quin sit illud per quod angelus intelligit, quia est sua potentia intellectiua, in qua sicut
in subiecto recipitur suus actus intelligendi. Similiter si fiat quaestio <4> de causa finali, non est
dubium [. . . ]. Si autem quaeritur per quid intelligit, <3> quid sc. illud quod facit ipsum formaliter et
denominat intelligentem, etiam facile est uidere, quia hoc est actus intelligendi et nihil aliud, sicut etiam
sola albedo facit album formaliter, ita solus actus intelligendi facit intelligentem formaliter. Si autem
quaeratur per quid, <4> sicut per principium actiuum quo agens agit, angelus intelligat, sic intelligit
quaestio, quando quaeritur, utrum angelus intelligat per speciem, sicut per principium actiuum per quod
angelus faciat se intelligentem in actu. Quod autem aliquando dicitur, quod species est principium
formale quo intelligens intelligit, si bene intelligatur, non est contra praemissa. Ad cuius euidentiam
sciendum est, quod efficere respicit duo, unum ut agens, et aliud ut formam quae est principium agendi.
Quando, ergo, dicitur quod species est principium formale intelligendi, sensus est, quod species non est
principium effectiuum, quod est supppositum agens, sed quod est principium effectiuum, quod est forma
agentis. Non autem est sensus, quod species formaliter denominet intelligentem esse intelligentem, uel
faciat formaliter intelligentem, sicut albedo formaliter facit esse album. Sensus, ergo, quaestionis est,
utrum angelus intelligat per speciem, sicut per principium effectiuum intelligendi.” See also DIS 143–4.
“Quantum uero ad causalitatem, sciendum quod species illa non est causa formalis actus intelligendi;
nec est illud quo formaliter intelligens est intelligens; licet sit forma aliqua ipsius intelligentis; immo
solo actu intelligendi intelligens est formaliter intelligens; sed per speciem intelligit intelligens sicut per
principium effectiuum sicut etiam graue descendens est formaliter graue sola grauitate et formaliter
descendens solo descensu.” This interpretation, I think, is also the one that Richard Cross, “The Mental
Word in Duns Scotus and Some of His Contemporaries,” in The Word in Medieval Logic, Theology
and Psychology: Acts of the 13th International Colloquium of the Socie´te´ Internationale pour l’E´tude
de la Philosophie Me´die´vale, Kyoto, 27 September – 1 October 2005, ed. T. Shimizu and C. Burnett,
Rencontres de philosophie me´die´vale 14 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2009), 300 is putting forward: “[T]he species
is a causal disposition (a habit or principle), not an object of cognition. Talk about the intellect being
‘made actual’ is just a way of claiming that the intellect with a species has thereby a dispositional belief
or cognition that enables it to have an occurrent belief or cognition about something: the occurrent
cognition can be thought of as the disposition actualized.”
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1.1.2 The second opinion: Godfrey of Fontaines’ theory
The second opinion which Durand considers is precisely Godfrey of Fontaines’ position
as found in Quodl. IX.19.19 On Godfrey’s view, as Durand correctly interprets him, the
object is the efficient cause of the mental act itself (be it a perceptive act of the senses
or a thought).20 Cognition—even intellectual cognition—is not also an action elicited
by the species-informed cognitive faculty but simply the affection of that faculty by the
agency of the object.21 Hence, Godfrey too—and perhaps more obviously—subscribes
to affectionism, for on his view cognition is a matter of being affected by the agency of
the object, where this means that it involves the reception of the ‘form’ or ‘species’ of
the object. It is important to stress here that although Godfrey rejects the idea that,
19. For a careful analysis of Godfrey’s Quodl. IX.19, held either in 1292 or 1293, see John Wippel,
“Godfrey of Fontaines on Intelligible Species,” in IIMP, ed. M. Pacheco and J. Meirinhos, 3 vols., Recon-
tres de philosophie me´die´vale 11 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2006), 1131–41. On the date, see John Wippel, The
Metaphysical Thought of Godfrey of Fontaines: A Study in Late Thirteenth-Century Philosophy (CUA:
CUAP, 1981), xxiv–viii and P. Glorieux, La littere´rature quodlibe´tique de 1260 a` 1320, vol. 1 (Paris:
[s.n.], 1925), 44–5. Sent. II-A 3.5 12–13 is a very close paraphrase of Quodl. IX.19 2733–5. Compare, for
instance:
Durand, Sent. II-A 3.5 12: “quae tamen species non
est essentialiter ipsa sensatio alioquin sensatio esset
in medio et in organo uirtute sensitiua corrupta.”
Godfrey, Quodl. IX.19 274: “quae etiam non est
essentialiter sensatio alioquin etiam esset sensatio
in medio et etiam in organo uirtute sensitiua cor-
rupta.”
As well, Durand’s own positive position (pages 17–23) bears a close resemblance to the first opinion
which Godfrey considers on pages 270–1, as has been pointed out in the literature. See, e.g., Sole`re,
“The Activity of the Cognitive Subject.” I discuss this resemblance in Chapter 3, §3.1.5. Godfrey’s
academic career ends roughly the same time Durand’s begins. For Godfrey’s biographical details, see
Maurice de Wulf, Un the´ologien-philosophe du XIIIe sie`cle. E´tude sur la vie, les oeuvres et l’influence
de Godefroid de Fontaines (Brussels: M. Hayez, 1904), Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought of Godfrey of
Fontaines, and John Wippel, “Godfrey of Fontaines at the University of Paris in the Last Quarter of the
Thirteenth Century,” in 1277, ed. Jan Aertsen, A. Speer, and K. Emery, Jr, Miscellanea Mediaevalia 28
(Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2000), 359–89.
20. Sent. II-A 3.5 12: “Alii dicunt aliter quod intelligere et sentire per hoc solum fiunt in nobis: quod
obiectum mouet potentiam non causando in ea aliquam speciem quae sit obiecti repraesentatiua uel
actus elicitiua, sed immediate causando ipsum sentire uel intelligere.”
21. ibid., 13: “Igitur in intellectu non fit species praeter ipsum intelligere, quod est ab obiecto effectiue,
et est quoddam pati, non solum concomitatiue, ut primi dicunt, sed essentialiter[. . . ].” See also ibid., 14:
“[. . . ] intelligere est pati secundum rem.” In Godfrey, see, e.g., Quodl. IX.19 276: “[. . . ] obiectum est
quod habet rationem efficientis et mouentis[. . . ].” Quodl. XIII.3 193: “[. . . ] actus potentiarum animae
[. . . ] non sunt effectiue a potentia animae in qua sunt sed potius ab obiecto.” Quodl. IX.19 276: “[. . . ]
et intellectus possibilis simpliciter habet rationem passiui et receptiui.” ibid., 280: “[. . . ] illud quod hoc
uerbo [sc. intelligere -PJH] significatur est uere passio intellectus possibilis et sic uere in ipso subiectiue.”
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during cognition, the object (efficiently) causes a species distinct from the act in virtue
of the reception of which the mind then elicits its mental act he still maintains that the
act itself should be viewed as a kind of ‘form’ and can even be called a species.22
It will also be important to observe, this early on, that Durand and Godfrey don’t
reject at least one form of the doctrine of species, for both Durand and Godfrey admit
that there exist, both in the ambient medium and also in our bodies, various species
owing to the agency of the object. The air is affected and so comes to receive the ‘form’
of the object (called a species in medio) because, for one thing, action at a distance is
impossible.23 As to our bodies, no one would deny the obvious fact that my hand becomes
hot when I place it next to the fire. Hence, fire acts upon the hand and makes it hot just
as it does the water. Such a form Durand and Godfrey call a species in organo.24 While
22. Godfrey, Quodl. IX.19 275: “Et quia huismodi condiciones conueniunt formae et speciei, ipsum
intelligere etiam potest dici species siue forma. Etsi intelligere non consistit in receptione alterius speciei
a se ipso realiter differentis, consistit tamen in receptione speciei pro tanto quod ipsum intelligere est
quaedam formalis perfectio et sic quaedam species intellectum perficiens et informans et rei intellectae
assimilans.” See also ibid., 280–1. See also X.12 361: “[. . . ] sed bene dicit [sc. Aristoteles -PJH]
ipsum actum intelligendi quamdam speciem in quantum est quaedam similitudo rei per quam etiam
intellectus dicitur rei assimilari et quodam modo secundum hoc fieri res ipsa; prout intellectus dicitur
fieri intelligiblia in quantum efficitur actu intelligens illa. Et secundum hoc dicit Philosophus quod lapis
non est in anima sed species lapidis. Id autem quod de lapide est in anima constat quod est ipse actus
intelligendi. Et quia actus intelligendi non est ipse lapis secundum esse reale quod habet extra, ideo
respectu talis esse dicitur esse species eius.” See also XII.3 193–4 and II.5 87.
23. Godfrey also appeals to the Aristotelian thesis (a dubious inference from the case of sight) that
all forms of sensory perception require a medium between the object and the senses. See, e.g., Godfrey,
Quodl. IX.19 274: “[. . . ] quod medium etiam requiritur in immutatione sensitiua eo quod sensibile supra
sensum positum nullum facit sensum, quod immutatur quidem immutatione intentionali, quae tamen
non est sensatio[. . . ].” For Durand’s discussion on the necessity of a medium, see Sent. II-C 13.2. On
the notion of an ‘intentional change’ (intentionalis immutatio) in both the organ and the medium, see
Chapter 4, §4.2.2. In Aristotle, see: DA II.7 419a12–21, DA II.11 423b20–1, and DA III.3 424b24–425b3.
24. For slightly more complicated reasons, which I’ll get into in Chapter 4, both Godfrey and Durand
also subscribe to the distinction between an intentional form (or species) and a non-intentional form. In
brief: the eye receives the form of the red object even though it does not become red. Hence, it receives the
intentional form of this object. But the eye in a corpse also receives the intentional form of the red object.
The reason the eye receives the intentional form of the red object is because it shares the same matter
as the air—it is ‘diaphanous’—and diaphanous items take on forms without taking on the characteristic
of those forms, or, in other words, they take on intentional forms. Godfrey, Quodl. IX.19 274: “[. . . ]
consimili etiam mutatione potest et ipsum organum immutari, quae etiam non est essentialiter sensatio,
alioquin etiam esset sensatio in medio et etiam in organo, uirtute sensitiua corrupta. Constat autem
quod in uirtute sensitiua, secundum quod huiusmodi, est alia immutatio secundum essentiam differens,
quae est ipsa sensatio; et sic ipsa uirtus sensitiua secundum formam duplicem informatur, quia ratione
qua in organo communicat cum medio, quod primo intentionaliter immutatur, potest etiam uis sensitiua
huiusmodi immutatione dici immutari. Sed in quantum est uis animalis et sensitiua sola sensatione
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there are interesting features which go along with such a species , e.g., in the case of sight
at least the reception of the species of color does not color the eye, what is important to
stress here is that such species in organo are not to be taken, as they are in the STC, as
causal dispositions or abilities by which the senses elicit their sensitive acts. For Godfrey,
the reason we shouldn’t make this further claim is because, as we will see in the next
chapter, such a position violates the principle that nothing can be both active and passive
with respect to the same thing at the same time; but the senses are, at least according to
Godfrey, passive with respect to perceptive acts since they are their passive recipients;
hence, they can’t also be active with respect to those acts, for otherwise the principle
that nothing can be both active and passive with respect the same thing at the same
time would be violated.25 For Durand, the reason we shouldn’t make this further claim
is because, as we will see in a moment, such a claim treats the senses as insufficient with
respect to the sensitive act, and on Durand’s view the senses and indeed all our cognitive
immutatur; et sic illud, quod per se immutat sensibile in potentia sensitiua, ut sensitiua est, non est
nisi ipsa potentia, secundum quod talis, et illud, secundum quod sensibile ipsam potentiam sensitiuam
immutat, non est nisi sensatio; sed tamen hoc etiam aliter immutatur, modo praedicto.” Cf. Durand,
Sent. II-A 3.5 12: “Dico autem in sensu, quatenus sensus est, quia organum sensus, quatenus communicat
cum medio in aliqua qualitate, ut pupilla cum aere in diaphanitate, praeter sensationem, quam recipit
sensus inquantum huiusmodi, recipit etiam speciem intentionalem rei sensibilis ratione qualitatis, in qua
communicat cum medio, quae tamen species non est essentialiter ipsa sensatio; alioquin sensatio esset
in medio et in organo uirtute sensitiua corrupta.” Durand’s use of ‘dico’ here is rhetorical; he is in fact
presenting Godfrey’s position. Durand agrees, however, with Godfrey on the point that the organ receives
the species. See, e.g., Sent. II-C 3.6 n. 11: “Quamuis enim color imprimat in medio et in oculo suam
speciem, propter similem dispositionem diaphaneitatis, quae est in eis[. . . ].” He disagrees, however, that
we should further claim that the sense object also brings about a sensitive act. See, e.g., Sent. II-A 3.5
23: “[. . . ] sensibile non agit in potentiam sensitiuam, sed in organum ratione qualitatum disponentium
ipsum, quae actio, cum sit praesens sensui, non latet ipsum, et ideo sentitur, nec est aliud sentire nisi
sensibile praesens non latere sensum[. . . ].” For a discussion of these points more generally, see Tachau,
Vision and Certitude and Katherine Tachau, “The Problem of the species in medio in the Generation
after Ockham,” Medieval Studies 44 (1982): 394–443. In Aquinas, see Stump, Aquinas, 253–6. (Aquinas
also recognizes that in most cases perception involves, in addition to the reception of the sensible species
the reception of the natural form of the sense object.) For further discussion and references, see Chapter
4, footnote 19 and the surrounding discussion.
25. Quodl. IX.19 273: “[. . . ] ad euitandum ista, dicitur, in secunda positione, quod obiecto agente fit
similitudo eius in intellectu et intellectus, secundum illam, factus in actu, elicit actionem intelligendi—
non uidetur bene dictum: [. . . ] quia etiam si fieret in uirtute illius, intellectus non posset in se ipso efficere
actionem intelligendi, quia secundum quod in pluribus locis est probatum, intellectus factus aliquo modo
in actu, tamen per hoc non potest se ipsum reducere in actum ulteriorem ad quem remanet in potentia,
huiusmodi prima actualitate posita, quia unum et idem secundum rem non potest reducere se ipsum de
potentia ad actum.” See also ibid., 275, 280, Quodl. X.12 361, VI.7 154, 169, VIII.2 30.
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faculties are totally sufficient on their own for carrying out the tasks assigned to them.
1.1.3 Summary of the two opinions
Both opinions agree, then, that perception involves the affection of the senses by the
agency of the object: perception either is or at least necessarily involves a ‘form’ of
the object which that object as efficient cause somehow gives to the percipient. The
analogy with hot water is appropriate in many ways. On the second view (Godfrey’s),
perception is the affection of the senses by the agency of its object in much the same way
that becoming hot is the affection of the water owing to the agency of the stove—the
stove gives to it, so to speak, the form of heat; on the first view (the species theory),
‘concomitant’ with this affection, perception also involves a further action by the species-
informed senses much as making some other item hot is a further action which the
heat-informed water elicits. Both opinions, I think, are, thus, clearly committed to the
affectionist dogma.
1.1.4 Self-affectionism, in brief
What I will be arguing in the following chapters is that Durand doesn’t reject the thesis
that the object is a cause of the perceptive act; however, he does reject the thesis that
it is an efficient cause and that perception either is or necessarily involves the affection
of the senses by the agency of the object, where this means that perception either is
or necessarily involves the reception of a ‘form’ owing to the object as efficient cause.
In the next section, I want to look at what motivates Durand to reject this affectionist
doctrine. However, before I do I want to first register the fact that the denial of these
sorts of affectionist theories (call such a view Object Affectionism) does not right
away entail the thesis that Durand eventually endorses. Basically, one can reject the
thesis that cognition is a matter of being affected by the agency of the object and still
be an affectionist, for one can hold that cognition is a matter of self-affection, the mind
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becoming affected by itself, in the mere presence of the object; the intellect, for instance,
might be held to impress upon itself the ‘form’ as efficient cause. This is the theory which
several medieval philosophers endorsed in at least some cases of psychological acts. I will
look at these theories in Chapter 2.26 Durand, however, doesn’t go in this direction.
Instead, he rejects the affectionist dogma tout court. In the next section, then, I will
limit myself to his concerns with object affectionism, the doctrine that perception is a
matter of the affection of the senses owing to the agency of the object . In the second
section of Chapter 2 I will take up John Duns Scotus’s defense of self-affectionism in the
case of certain sorts of mental acts, and in Chapter 3 we will see why it is that Durand
thinks that such self-affectionist doctrines are also wrong-headed.
1.2 Against object affectionism
So, why shouldn’t we be object affectionists? That is, why should we reject the thesis
that perception involves the affection of the senses by the agency of the object, either
as a necessary or a sufficient condition? While Durand raises a whole host of arguments
against affectionism in both of the forms which he considers in Sent. II-A 3.5, there are,
I think, two primary worries which motivate him to abandon the doctrine. These two
worries involve very different considerations. The first is a kind of metaphysical worry,
and it comes close to what we would nowadays call the interaction problem, a subset of
the mind-body problem: on Durand’s view, it is hard to see how something as ignoble as
the sense object (a rock, say, and its various sensible qualities) can affect something as
noble as the senses. The second worry appeals to the idea that we are cognitive agents,
26. See, for example, John Pecham, Quodl. I.4 10: “Cum tamen pars superior iudicet de eisdem,
ergo species immutat organum corporale et organum immutatum excitat animam ad immutationem sibi
consimilem suo modo quam anima facit in se ipsa de se ipsa. [. . . ] Vnde ita formatur anima a specie
quodam modo acsi cera per impossibile uiueret et propelleret se in similitudinem sigilli. Ita enim anima
habet aliquid actiuum et aliquid materiale quasi passiuum quod est in potentia omnia intellecta et fit
actu res intellecta dum excitatur ab extra et propellitur in eius similitudinem, et hoc naturali colligatione
animae cum corpore, ubi non exigitur praecognitio sed naturalis colligationis ductio.” ibid.: “[. . . ] species
illae nascuntur de se per occasionem excitatiuam, non per causam impressiuam.”
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and moreover the idea that we are sufficient cognitive agents, an intuition Durand holds
based, in part, on the way we ordinarily talk about cognition using active verbs in
active sentences. Now, neither of these worries should be taken to constitute knock-down
arguments against the affectionist dogma, but such considerations, I think, do motivate
us, and to be sure Durand, to reconsider the alternatives.
1.2.1 Agency and Language
Peter John Olivi, a generation before Durand, declares:
We clearly feel that our acts of seeing or thinking go out from us or are
produced by us on the inside and this in an intimate way. (Sent. II 72.24)27
Durand too holds that we are cognitive agents and moreover that we are sufficient cogni-
tive agents. What Durand takes this to mean is that our various cognitive faculties (the
senses and the intellect) are sufficient on their own, able to allow us to do whatever it is
that they allow us to do (see, smell, hear, think and so on).28 While the proponent of
the species-theory of cognition, as we saw above, would seem to agree with Durand on
the claim that we are cognitive agents, Durand rejects their view on the grounds that it
treats our cognitive faculties as insufficient : according to the STC our cognitive faculties
still require species or ‘forms’ added to them in order to allow us to elicit our cognitive
acts. But this is wrong; and the reason it is wrong seems to be that, granted the premise
27. See also Sent. II 58 463–4: “[. . . ] nos intime experimur in nobis actus istos procedere a nobis et
quod nos uere operamur illos.” See also (a little more proximate to Durand) Bartholomew of Bruges,
De sensu agente 51 (he is reporting the view of an anonymous opponent): “Sentire est operatio quae
est cognitio. Ergo oportet quod fiat ab agente [sc. as opposed to the object -PJH].” On the resemblance
between Durand’s views and Peter John Olivi’s views, see my discussion of the souces of Durand’s view
in Chapter 3, 3.1.5.
28. Peter John Olivi had been making noise about the same point. See, e.g., Sent. II 58.466: “[. . . ]
illud quod per se faciet ibi ipsa potentia, poterit facere absque specie, quia quantum ad illud habebit
sufficientem rationem principii actiui.” See ibid., 466–467: “Non enim potest dici quod sicut a duobus
impulsibus nauis factis a duobus impellentibus eam sequitur unus motus, ita quod ab uno illorum solo
non posset sequi, quod sic sit in proposito; quia actus intelligendi est prima actio alicuius uirtutis agentis
non facta per aliquem praecedentem impulsum.” I owe these references to Sole`re, “The Activity of the
Cognitive Subject.”
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that we are cognitive agents and the further premise that cognition is something we, as
cognitive agents, naturally do, then it is wrong to suppose that we are not sufficient, for
in every other case of a natural agent, that agent has already in it the natural where-
withal to do whatever it naturally does. Fire, for instance, has heat which allows it to
make other items hot and it doesn’t need, in order to do this, some new ‘form’ added to
it.29 Moreover, if we are to put much value into the chief analogy that the STC raises
here with hot water, then we would have to admit, it would seem, that, while the hot
water is an agent when it makes some other item hot, it is the heat that is doing all of the
work, for water on its own, by its nature, can’t make other items hot.30 But this, again,
flies in the face of the idea that we are sufficient cognitive agents having in ourselves the
relevant wherewithal to elicit cognitive acts provided the right conditions obtain.31 A
third argument Durand raises here presses the species theory on its commitments to a
broader doctrine of species . If the species which the senses receive from the sense objects
are, at least on some interpretations of their theory, the same sort of items which the
29. Sent. II-A 3.5 11–12: “[. . . ] nulla potentia naturalis ad eliciendi actum sibi connaturalem et propor-
tionatum indiget aliquo extraneo tamquam principio causatiuo actus[. . . ]. Sed intellectus se habet ad
intelligere tamquam ad actum sibi proportionatum et connaturalem.” Sent. II-A 3.5 9: “[. . . ] ridiculum
est dicere quod actus uitae inquantum huiusmodi sit principaliter uel totaliter ab eo, quod nihil est
uiuentis, sed aduenit ab extrinseco. Sed intelligere et totaliter cognoscere est actus uitae; species autem
nihil est ipsius uiuentis, sed aduenit ab extrinseco. Ergo inconueniens est, quod intelligere sit totaliter
uel principalius a specie quam ab intellectu.” Sent. I-A 3.5 (K ) f. 76va: “[. . . ] potentiam intellectiuam
quae de se nata est intelligere omnia, nec requiritur nisi quod ei praesententur obiecta[. . . ].” (This text
is quoted in full below in footnote 61.) On the notion of a vital act, see Bernard Lonergan et al., The
Triune God: Systematics, Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan 12 (Toronto: Toronto University Press,
2007), Appendix I, §8: ‘Actus Vitalis’, Sole`re, “The Activity of the Cognitive Subject,” and below. James
of Viterbo had made a similar argument in Quodl. I.12.
30. The background assumption here is that Water consists in the Cold and the Wet and, on its own,
by its nature, it makes things cold not hot. For some discussion on medieval theories about the elements
see Pasnau, “Scholastic Qualities: Primary and Secondary.”
31. Sent. II-A 3.5 9: “[. . . ] quandocumque aliquis actus principiatur a duobus, quorum unum est
materiale et reliquum formale, uerius principiatur a formali quam a materiali, ut patet in exemplo
de aqua calefacta. Sed secundum hanc opinionem intelligere nostrum principiatur ab intelle<c>tu
informato specie, ita tamen quod species est forma et actus intellectus, per quam factus in actu potest
elicere actum intelligendi. Ergo uerius causatur nostrum intelligere a specie quam ab intellectu, immo
plus, quia licet totum compositum ex intellectu et specie sit illud, quod agit uel elicit actum intelligendi,
sola tamen species est principium quo et nullo modo intellectus, sicut solus calor aquae est principiu,
quo aqua calida calefacit, licet totum compositum ex aqua et calore sit illud, quod calefacit.” Compare
with Hervaeus Natalis, Sent. I 3.4 (quoted in part above in fn. 15).
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ambient medium (e.g., the air) receives, then, granted the further thesis that species are
that by which their recipients elicit cognitive acts, then, so it would seem, the air too
would, having received the species, elicit cognitive acts.32
Now, it will be observed that Durand seems to be committed to a violation of the
principle alluded to above in our discussion of Godfrey’s position, namely, the principle
that nothing is both active and passive with respect to the same item at the same time.
I will return to this principle in Chapter 2, as it forms something of the cornerstone of
Godfrey’s position on the matter, but suffice it to say here Durand rejects the premise
that we are also patients (passive recipients) with respect to perceptive acts in the sense
that perceptive acts are ‘forms’ which we receive, no matter what we might point to as
their agent—even self-affectionists are wrong to insist on this point. Quite the contrary,
perceptive acts neither are nor necessarily involve the passive reception of forms, neither
from ourselves nor from objects.33 If the chief analogy for the species theory is water
and its passion of becoming hot and its action of making other items hot, and the chief
analogy for Godfrey’s view is the water and its passion of becoming hot, then the chief
analogy, I think, for Durand’s view is fire and its natural action of making some other
item hot, for fire, as opposed to water, already has in it the wherewithal (heat) and
32. Sent. II-A 3.5 11: Discussed in Ch. 5 there “[. . . ] omne, quod habet formam, quae est alicuius
actionis principium, potest per formam, quam habet, in illam actionem. Sed eamdem formam secundum
speciem quam habet sensus—puta uisus—habet medium; qualis enim species recipitur in oculo talis
recipitur in medio. Ergo si ipsa est principium eliciendi actiue operationem sentiendi, sicut per eam
sentit oculus, ita per eamdem sentiret medium; quod non est uerum.” Of course, the obvious response
here is to insist that the recipient must be a special kind of recipient. See Chapters 4 and 5 on the
prospects of this line of defense. Durand here raises and briefly rejects this objection. ibid., 11: “Sed
dicetur, quod non, quia actus non solum requirit principium a quo sit, sed etiam subiectum in quo sit.
Licet autem species sensibilis, quantum est de natura sua, sit elicitiua actus sentiendi, tamen medium
non est eius susceptiuum, sed organum solum. Et ideo medium non sentit, sed organum. Istud autem
excluditur per id quod prius dictum est, quod sentire est actus manens in agente per se et non per
accidens. Propter quod quidquid est preceptiuum formae, quae est principium actiuum talis actionis,
est similiter receptiuum actionis.”
33. I will return to this in Chapter 3, but see e.g., Sent. II-A 3.5 18: “[. . . ] operatio formae [sc. intelligere
et sentire -PJH] non est forma ei addita [sc. addita intellectui et sensui -PJH].” DQ 1 38: “[. . . ] intelligere
est relatio sola, et sic non facit realem compositionem cum intellectu, nec est res absoluta superaddita
intellectui.” DQ 1 33: “[. . . ] cum intellectus sit forma, si intelligere faceret cum eo compositionem,
reciperetur in eo per modum formae. Sed hoc est impossible.”
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doesn’t require the reception of the form of heat in order make other items hot.
He rejects Godfrey’s theory—that sense objects are the efficient causes of our per-
ceptive acts full stop—on the obvious grounds that it does not even treat cognition as
a kind of action at all but treats it as a passion. One of the arguments he makes here
appeals to language. This is a popular enough move in the history of philosophy. For
instance, Thomas Reid, whose theory of perception, incidentally, his 19th-century editor,
Sir William Hamilton, reckons Durand to have anticipated,34 writes:
In all ages, and in all languages, ancient and modern, the various modes of
thinking have been expressed by words of active signification, such as seeing,
hearing, reasoning, willing, and the like. It seems therefore to be the natural
judgment of mankind, that the mind is active in its various ways of thinking;
and for this reason they are called its operations, and are expressed by active
verbs. (Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, 21; see also ibid., 26 and
57)
A little more proximate to Durand, Peter of Trabes declares that “thinking is an act
since, according to the grammarians, it is an active verb” (Sent. II 24 281), and one
argument which, slightly after Durand, John Buridan considers in this context is that
sensing (sentire) is a [kind of] acting (agere) and so the sensitive [power] is
an active power. [. . . ] The antecedent is proved: this word ‘sensing (sentire)’
is active in form, and such grammatical modes of signifying ought to be taken
from a property of things and to be consonant with them, for otherwise they
would be made up and false, which is unfitting; and it would not be consonant
in the case at hand if sensing were a [kind of] being affected (pati) and not a
[kind of] acting (agere). (Quaestiones longae obj. 3 241–2)35
34. See Hamilton, The Works of Thomas Reid, Note M quoted in the introduction.
35. See also John Buridan, Quaestiones breves obj. 2 261: “[. . . ] probo antecedens primo per gram-
maticam quia hoc uerbum ‘sentire’ est uerbum actiuum quod dissonat ueritati si sentire non esset agere,
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Of course, such arguments are slightly dubious.36 Was Reid that much of a polyglot?
Only a philosopher in the grip of a theory would claim that we can reliably read off
from the surface structure of natural language to the way things are in reality. (Cheese
smells, after all, and I’ll bet the house—tho’ my competence in foreign languages be
limited—that most natural languages have similar sorts of mix-ups present.)37 In any
case, Godfrey dedicates a large portion of Quodl. IX.19 to this gap between reality and
the Latin language (267–280)38 and Durand, of course, recognizes his efforts.39
Durand doesn’t adduce this sort of naive language argument, but he does raise a
slightly more interesting variation on it to establish his worry. Suppose that Godfrey is
right that verbs of cognition are active in form but passive in meaning. Durand reasons,
et tamen nulla scientia dissonat uero.” Dominic of Clavasio(?), Quaestio, “Vtrum sensus sit uirtus pas-
siua” obj. 3 279: “[. . . ] sentire est agere; ergo sensus est uirtus actiua et non passiua. [. . . ] Antecedens
patet, quia sentire significatur per uerbum actiuum.” See also Peter John Olivi, e.g., Sent. II 72 24:
“[. . . ] uidens dicitur actiue uidere potius quam passiue uideri.”
36. A point which Buridan, Richard of Middleton and Thomas of Sutton (to name three) all make.
Buridan, QDA II.12 268: “Sed si sentire est pati, quare ergo significatur per uerbum actiuum? Potest
responderi quod nomina significant ad placitum et fuit talis communis impositio propter aestimationem
uulgarem, quae saepe apparet uulgaribus quod sentire sit agere, eo quod ipsi non percipiunt motum
per quem sensus moueatur a sensibilo remoto.” Thomas of Sutton, Quaest. Ord. 2 59: “Et ideo multa
uerba actiua attribuuntur intellectui respectu actus intelligendi, sc. quod intellectus eliciat actum, id est
extrahat, et quod iudicet, et quod formet uerbum et gignat et exprimat, quamuis secundum ueritatem
istae operationes non sint ab intellectu actiue sed solum secundum apparentiam ut dictum est.” Richard
of Middleton, Sent. II 24.3 f. 308a–b: “Vnde est de illis uerbis de quibus dicit Priscianus in minori
uolumine, quod sub uoce actiui, et constructione actiui, significant passionem.” (I owe thanks to Jean-
Luc Sole´re for the reference to Middleton. See Sole`re, “The Activity of the Cognitive Subject.”) See also
Dominic of Clavasio(?), Quaestio “Vtrum sensus sit uirtus passiua” ad. 3 284: “[. . . ] tamen significatur
per uerbum actiuum et non passiuum, quia uulgus non percipiens mutationem et passionem sensus ab
obiecto credit solum sensum actiue concurrere ad sensationem et nullo modo obiectum, propter quod
sentire significatur per uerbum actiuum et non passiuum quamuis tamen sentire aliquo modo sit pati.”
Durand himself is willing, on a number of occasions, to admit that the common use of a term is not a
terribly reliable guide to reality. See, e.g., Sent. IV-AB 49.5 605: “Ad tertium, cum dicitur quod amor
concupiscentiae est solum de futuro, dicendum quod falsum est. Licet enim nomen ‘concupiscentiae’
secundum usum communius accipiatur pro desiderio non habiti, tamen secundum rei ueritatem conuenit
etiam complacentiae seu delectationi quae habetur de bono habito, et hoc etiam omnes concedunt.” I
would like to thank Thomas Jeschke for giving me an early version of his Deus ut tentus uel uisus which
contains a critical edition of Sent. IV-AB 49.5.
37. In response to Durand, Nicholas Medensis points out that, in Latin, deponent verbs are passive in
form but active in meaning. See Evid. II.9 384.
38. See, e.g., Quodl. IX.19 280: “[. . . ] illa passio [sc. intelligere -PJH] significatur per modum actiuum
uerbalem et per modum actionis respectu obiecti quo se habet in ratione ueri termini[. . . ].”
39. Presenting Godfrey’s position, Durand writes (Sent. II-A 3.5 12): “[. . . ] intelligere [. . . ] est quoddam
pati [. . . ] quamuis secundum nomen sit actio, eo quod per uerbum actiuum significatur.”
Chapter 1. Affectionism and its discontents 35
if verbs of cognition, e.g., to see, to hear, and so on, are active in form but passive in
meaning, then the passive forms of those verbs, e.g., to be seen, to be heard, and so on,
should be taken to be passive in form but active in meaning.40 After all, when a sentence
is changed so that the mood of its verb is switched up, any number of prescriptivist rules
about things being said in the passive voice will be violated, but nothing much about
what was said will have been changed.41 “Socrates is being hit by Plato” says more or less
the same thing as “Plato is hitting Socrates”. Hence, on Durand’s view, Godfrey must
be committed to the further thesis that the passive form of verbs of cognition are passive
in form but active in meaning. Just as ‘to see’ picks out a passion on the side of the one
seeing, so too ‘to be seen’ picks out an action—indeed, the corresponding action—on the
side of the item being seen, i.e., the object. But, even if we allow language its quirks, and
so allow that the active forms of certain verbs are active in form but passive in meaning,
it is a stretch to suppose that the passive form of verbs of cognition are passive in form
but active in meaning as well. For one thing, Durand points out, if the passive form of a
verb of cognition were active in meaning, then it would pick out the action on the side of
the object which corresponds to the passion on the side of the subject which the active
form of that verb picks out. But then we would seem to be committed to the thesis that
I see the object because the object is being seen; but our intuitions on the matter seem
to run in the other direction: the object is seen because I see it and not the other way
around.42 Secondly, if the object’s being seen were an action on the side of the object and
40. Sent. II-A 3.5 14: “[. . . ] si intelligere est pati secundum rem, intelligi erit actio secundum rem, licet
e contrario sit utrobique secundum nomen. Semper enim actio et passio proportionaliter designantur
uerbo actiuo et passiuo.”
41. As the last sentence demonstrates, prescriptivists about the English language are probably right to
insist on this point. See, e.g., Arthur Quiller-Couche: “Generally, use transitive verbs, that strike their
object; and use them in the active voice, eschewing the stationary passive, with its little auxiliary its’s
and was’s, and its participles getting into the light of your adjectives, which should be few. For, as a
rough law, by his use of the straight verb and by his economy of adjectives you can tell a man’s style, if
it be masculine or neuter, writing or ‘composition’” (On the Art of Writing, 1916, ch. 7 [available online
at: http://www.bartleby.com/190/7.html]).
42. Sent. II-A 3.5 14: “Tertio arguitur, quia non propter hoc agit agens, quia passum patitur, sed e
contrario. Sed obiectum propter hoc intelligitur, quia intellectus intelligit. Ergo, intelligi non est agere,
nec intelligere pati.” Cf. Giles of Rome, Q. de cognitione angelorum, q. 1 f. 77ra: “Nam non quia patiens
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if my seeing the object were the corresponding passion on the side of me, then, seeing
as actions are more noble than their corresponding passions, we would be committed to
the claim that the sense object’s action is more noble than our perceptions. But this, as
we will see in a moment, does not sit well with Durand, for it violates the more basic
principle that the animate is more noble than the inanimate.43
1.2.2 Nobility and the Animate-Inanimate Gap
Durand holds that affectionists are committed to a violation of two very basic causal
principles: (1) what is less noble cannot affect what is more noble,44 and (2) what is
less noble can’t bring about a more noble form.45 But, at least on Durand’s view, the
patitur ideo agens agit sed econuerso: quia agens agit ideo patiens patitur.”
43. Sent. II-A 3.5 14: “[. . . ] Sed omnis actio perfectior et nobilior est passione sibi correspondente.
Ergo perfectius et nobilius est intelligi quam intelligere. Quod est absurdum[. . . ].” In his early work (if
authentic) Duns Scotus makes a similar argument, QDA q. 12 n. 25: “Item, si sentire sit pati, sentiri
est agere; sed agere est nobilius quam pati; si obiectum igitur intelligi est nobilius quam intelligere, per
illud inanimata, quae non intelligunt sed intelliguntur, sunt perfectiora quam homo qui intelligit.”
44. More precisely, the active principle by which an agent affects a patient must be more noble than the
passive principle by which the patient is affected by that agent. Sent. II-A 3.5 13: “[. . . ] quamuis agens
non semper sit praestantius patiente quantum ad id quod est secundum suppositum—puta ignis non est
praestantior homine in quem agit—tamen oportet uniuersaliter agens quantum ad principium quo agit
esse praestantius et nobilius patiente quantum ad id quo patiens patitur, sicut nobilior est caliditas ignis
per quam agit quam sit siccitas uel humiditas hominis per quam ab igne patitur.”
45. Sent. II-A 3.5 16: “[. . . ] omne causa [. . . ] habet formam per quam agit quae eiusdem est rationis
cum illa quam inducit si sit agens uniuocum uel est perfectior ea si sit agens aequiuocum.” Cf. Godfrey,
Quodl. VI.7 151: “[. . . ] omne agens principale est nobilius, si sit non-uniuocum, effectu uel aeque nobile,
si sit uniuocum[. . . ].” According to a common medieval distinction, there are two kinds of agents:
equivocal agents and univocal agents. A univocal agent has a form, F, which allows it to bring about
an effect, G, which is formally identical—i.e., the same in kind—with F. For instance, the soapstone
has a form (heat) which allows it to bring about an effect (heat) in what is placed upon it. Hence, the
form in the univocal agent and the form produced in the corresponding patient are of equal nobility. An
equivocal agent, by contrast, has a form, F, which allows it to bring about an effect, G, which is not
formally identical with F. For instance, by common consent, must medieval philosophers held that the
sun, even though not itself hot, was still able to bring about heat. Now, in such a case, the produced
form must be less noble than the form in the equivocal agent. As John Buridan puts it, Quaestiones
longae 254: “[. . . ] oportet generans principale esse nobilius genito uel saltem aeque nobile, quia agens
non potest, uirtute propria, dare plus quam habeat.” See also Gonsalvus of Spain, DQ 15 309: “[. . . ] non
solum enim causa aequiuoca est nobilior suo effectu sed et illud quod est ratio agendi in causa aequiuoca
est nobilius[. . . ].” Even Descartes can be found defending some version of this principle. See, e.g., CMS
II 116: “Whatever reality or perfection there is in a thing, is present either formally or eminently in its
first and adequate cause.” I discuss this causal principle in more detail in Chapter 2, in the context of
Henry of Ghent’s and John Duns Scotus’s arguments against Godfrey’s view about the causation of an
act of the will.
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senses and their sensory perceptions are more noble than sense objects. Why? This can’t
be because the former is material and the latter immaterial, because there is nothing
immaterial about Fido, his sensitive powers, and his sensory perceptions. Rather Du-
rand thinks that sensitive powers and sensory perceptions are more noble than sensible
qualities because he holds, as a general thesis, that what is not alive (the inanimate)
is less noble than what is alive (the animate). In another context—his discussion of the
nutritive power and its operations—Durand declares that “acts proper to the animate are
more perfect than acts common to both the animate and the inanimate” (Sent. I-A 3.3
f. 42va),46 and in Sent. II-A 3.5 he notes that it seems “very problematic” to hold that
sensory perceptions and thoughts have “non-living efficient causes” because other “less
noble vital acts, such as nutrition and growth” do not.47 In general, he tells us, “the acts
of living things and cognizant things are more noble than any property common to the
non-living and the living, the cognizant and the non-cognizant” (Sent. II-A 3.5 14).48
46. Sent. I-A 3.3 [Paris Bibl. Nat., lat. 14454 f. 42va] (transcription my own): “[. . . ] actus proprius
animatorum perfectior est actu qui est communis animatis et inanimatis.” Cf. Sent. I-C 3.2.2 n. 12.
47. Sent. II-A 3.5 16: “[. . . ] inconueniens ualde uidetur, quod actus uitalis, ut est sentire et intelligere,
sit in nobis effectiue a non-uiuente [. . . ] quia actus uitales minus nobiles, ut nutriri et augeri, sunt in
nobis a principio intrinseco et nullo modo ab extrinseco effectiue.” Notice that Durand calls even acts of
nutrition and growth vital acts. The adjective ‘uitalis’ gets flung around in these discussions and it isn’t
clear what an individual author might have meant by such a qualification. Peter John Olivi, Henry of
Ghent, James of Viterbo, and John Duns Scotus, for instance, tell us that acts of the intellect and the will
are vital acts. Duns Scotus, Lect. II 25 n. 20 and Lect. I 3.3.2–3 n. 316, 340–1, 399 (cf. Ord. I 3.3.3 n. 410,
451–2, 509); Henry of Ghent, Quodl. XI.5 f. 450vR, 452rF; Peter John Olivi, Sent. II 58 400–8, 412–4,
437–515; James of Viterbo, Quodl. I.12 165. Most authors also held that acts associated with both the
so-called vegetative powers and sensitive powers are vital. (Hence, ‘uitalis’ seems to mean what we would
nowadays call biological). See, e.g., Aquinas, ST I.18.1 ad 2: “Sed plantae et aliae res uiuentes mouentur
motu uitali[. . . ].” Peter John Olivi, Sent. II 58 479: “[. . . ] uidere et audire [. . . ] actus uitales sunt[. . . ].”
(Olivi, it is worth noting, holds that sensory perceptions are not extended with the extension of bodies.
See also Sent. II 61 577. For discussion, see Juhana Toivanen, Animal Consciousness. Peter Olivi on
Cognitive Functions of the Sensitive Soul (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Jyva¨skyla¨, 2009), ch. 7, §3.)
Henry of Ghent, Quodl. XI.5 450vR: “[. . . ] operationes uitales cognitiuas quales sunt uisio, auditio, et
uniuersaliter sensatio ex parte sensus et intellectio ex parte intellectus [. . . ].” See also Aquinas, Sent.
III 13.2.1 ad 5, ST I-II.17.9 ad 2; John Duns Scotus, Lect. II 18 nn. 37–8, Ord. II 8.1 n. 1, Ord. I 17 n. 13;
and Godfrey, Quodl. VI.14 249. Durand talks of ‘vital heat’ involved in digestion and growth in Sent.
II-C 1.4 and the nutritive and augmentative powers in Sent. I-A 3.3 and Sent. I-C 3.2.2. On the notion
of a vital act, see Lonergan et al., The Triune God: Systematics, Appendix I, §8: ‘Actus Vitalis’. See
also Sole`re, “The Activity of the Cognitive Subject” in connection with Durand’s use of the term in this
text.
48. Sent. II-A 3.5 14: “[. . . ] actus uiuentis et cognoscentis semper est nobilior omni proprietate com-
muni uiuentibus et non-uiuentibus, cognoscentibus et non-cognoscentibus.” But what about animate
Chapter 1. Affectionism and its discontents 38
While Durand does defend the thesis that the human soul is immaterial,49 Durand’s
focus here isn’t on the immateriality of the soul but rather on the fact that it is animate,
as opposed to sensible qualities which are inanimate.50 Likewise, his focus isn’t on a
purported divide between the mental and the physical, but on what he sees as a more
basic divide between the animate and the inanimate.
Now, most authors from the period accepted these two causal principles.51 However,
there seems to have been something of a disagreement among medieval philosophers as
to whether or not sense objects are less noble than the senses and sensory perceptions,52
and by insisting upon this, as it were, metaphysical intuition—that the inanimate is less
noble than the animate—Durand seems to be aligning himself with a kind of minority
powers, e.g., the sensitive powers or the so-called vegetative powers? Durand doesn’t really say, but
there’s an argument in the neighborhood. John Buridan, presenting an argument not unlike Durand’s,
Quaestiones longae 252–3: “Primo, supponebant quod non posset argui nobilitas potentiae uel subiecti
nisi ex nobilitate operationis uel modi operandi.” See also Quaestiones breves 264 and QDA II.13 270–1.
The same position (almost verbatim) is discussed in Radulphus Brito, QDA III.2. James of Viterbo
makes a similar argument in Quodl. I.12.
49. Durand holds that the immateriality of the human soul follows from the thesis that it is separable
from the body. See, e.g., Sent. I-C 8.2.3 n. 14: “[. . . ] anima autem propter sui separabilitatem a corpore
non est capax quantitatis[. . . ].” Durand, however, doesn’t think that a decent argument can be made
that establishes the soul’s capacity to exist as separated from the body. In Sent. II-A 18.3 he rejects the
standard argument (which makes an inference from the fact that the soul carries out an operation that
doesn’t depend upon the body to the claim that the soul itself doesn’t depend upon the body); and in QA
II.11 (221) he notes that this argument is merely ‘probable’. Durand was, indeed, censured on this point.
See Articuli in quibus magister Durandus deuiat . . . n. 82. For some discussion of Sent. II-A 18.3, see
Peter King, “Immateriality and Intentionality” (Forthcoming). For contrasting takes on the value of the
argument Durand rejects, see Robert Pasnau, “Aquinas and the Content Fallacy,” Modern Schoolman
75 (1998): 293–314 and John Haldane, “The Metaphysics of Intellect(ion),” PACPA 80 (2007): 39–55.
50. Indeed, Durand never once uses the term ‘immaterial’, ‘incorporeal’, or ‘spiritual’ in Sent. II-A 3.5.
The question of whether X is corporeal or incorporeal is orthogonal to the issue of whether it is animate
or inanimate: purely corporeal things, like plants and dogs, are animate.
51. Indeed, both Augustine and Aristotle were taken to agree on this issue. In Aristotle, see DA III.5
430a18: “Semper enim honorabilius est agens patiente.” In Augustine, see De Gen. ad lit. XII.16:
“Omni enim modo praestantior est qui facit, ea re de qua aliquid facit.” Even Godfrey agreed on
this premise. See, e.g., Godfrey, Quodl. V.10 35: “[. . . ] uniuersaliter agens sit praestantius patiente,
secundum Augustinum duodecimo super Genesim[. . . ].” Quodl. VIII.2 19: “[. . . ] agens est praestantior
et prior patiente, secundum Augustinum et secundum Philosophum.” Quodl. VI.7 151: “[. . . ] omne agens
principale est nobilius, si sit non-uniuocum, effectu uel aeque nobile, si sit uniuocum; et est nobilius et
actualior eo ex quo uel in quo producitur huiusmodi effectus.”
52. See, e.g., Bartholomew of Bruges (who is presenting an anonymous objection), De sensu agente 49:
“Oppositum, quia petit id quod est in principio, quia deberet probare quod sensibile ducat sensum de
potentia in actum; et ad hoc probandum sumit quod sensible est actu tale qualis sensus in potentia et
ista sunt idem et consequuntur se. Quare, etc.”
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position on the matter. While we can find, especially among the Franciscans, proponents
of a ‘gap’ between the sensible and the sensitive (so to speak)—John of Jandun in 1310
quips that the claim “that the sensible form [of the extramental object] is more noble
than the cognitive power seems to me absurd” (Sophisma de sensu agente 164)53—by far
and large the majority position, especially among his Dominican confreres, denied such
a ‘gap’. Hervaeus Natalis, for instance, declares that “the senses do not so obviously
surpass sensible qualities as the intellect [does] material quiddities” (Quodl. III.8 69),
and Thomas Aquinas, as Adriaan Pattin puts it, “ne pre´sente gue`re d’importance” on
53. See also ibid., 138: “Si uera sunt ostenditur quod nullus sensus per se patitur et recipit ab obiecto,
semper enim agens nobilius est patiente, ut acceptum est tertio De anima; inconueniens autem reputatur
quod uirtutes animae cognoscitiuae sint minus nobiles uirtutibus obiectorum. Ergo non solum ab eis
non suscipiunt sensationem, sed nec speciem sensibilem, ut uidetur.” Tractatus de sensu agente 167: “Si
enim species sensibilis ut habet uirtutem actiuam sensationis est nobilior uirtute sensitiua oportet quod
ista uirtus speciei sit nobilior quam uirtus animae cognoscitiua, quod est contra quartum suppositionem
quam declaramus in Sophismate de sensu agente.” Anonymous (presenting John of Jandun’s view),
Quaestio “Vtrum praeter potentiam. . . ” 383: “[. . . ] supponit quod efficiens sensationis non sit obiectum
nec species sensibilis quia ista sunt ignobiliora sensu; actiuum autem debet esse noblius passo.” John of
Jandun and Bartholomew of Bruges exchanged verbal blows (it is an apt metaphor) on this issue. John
of Jandun, Tractatus de sensu agente 174: “Et tunc [Bartholomew -PJH] dicit quod numquam dixit
eam et ideo minus est credendum mihi ut dicit; sed sine dubio eodem baculo possum ipsum percutere
quo ipse me percutit—numquam enim dixi!” This debate is edited in Adriaan Pattin, Pour l’histoire
du sens agent: La controverse entre Barthe´lemy de Bruges et Jean de Jandun, ses ante´ce´dents et son
e´volution, Ancient and Medieval Philosophy 1.6 (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1988). John Buridan,
a generation later, tells us that arguments like Durand’s nobility arguments are both probable and
persuasive (probabiles et persuasiuae) but not demonstrative, in part because the first premise is not so
obvious to all people as opposed to, say, the law of non-contradiction. But in psychology, he remarks,
perhaps we should not expect strict demonstration. Quaestiones longae 257: “Et cum istis rationibus
apponuntur aliae quae prius tactae et positae fuerunt tamquam probabiles et persuasiuae. Tales forte
rationes sufficiunt in hac materia; non enim in omnibus est demonstratio petenda.” In the forthcoming
critical edition, Peter Sobol reads ‘acerboria expetenda’ instead of ‘demonstratio petenda’. See also
ibid., 253: “Sed quamuis illa ratio sit bene ordinata et apparens, tamen aliqui cauillant contra eam
dicentes[. . . ].” The position that Buridan quotes in these texts and calls probable is almost verbatim
the first position found in Radulphus Brito, QDA III.2.
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the activity of the senses (Pour l’histoire du sens agent, 7).54 For such authors,55 there
is little wrong with the idea that sense objects can (and do) affect our senses, although
some authors, like Nicholas Medensis (a.k.a. Durandellus), did admit the debate about
the further thesis that such objects can bring about more noble forms.56
Some people have noted that on this issue there is a kind of loggerheads between
‘Augustinians’ (mostly Franciscans) on the one hand and ‘Aristotelians’ (mostly Domini-
cans) on the other.57 Indeed, Jean-Luc Sole`re (“The Activity of the Cognitive Subject”)
claims that Durand here is simply taking on an ‘Augustinian’ stance resisting the Aris-
totelianism of his Dominican confreres. I’m not sure if this a way of thinking about the
issue is that helpful. Setting aside the fact that Durand, when he opens his Sentences
commentary, disowns all human authority, and this would include Augustine as well as
54. See, e.g., ST I.79.3 ad 1: “[. . . ] dicendum quod sensibilia inueniuntur actu extra animam, et ideo
non oportuit ponere sensum agentem.” Sent. IV 50.1.4: “[. . . ] cognitio sensus perficitur in hoc ipso quod
sensus a sensibili mouetur.” SCG II.57 §8: “[. . . ] anima igitur sensitiua non se habet in sentiendo sicut
mouens et agens, sed sicut id quo patiens patitur.” SCG II.76 §15: “[. . . ] si uero operatio illa consistit in
passione, adest ei principium passiuum, sicut patet de principiis sensitiuis in animalibus.” In DA II.10
§350: “[. . . ] sentire consistit in moueri et pati.” In DA II.13 §303: “[. . . ] sentire consistit in quodam
alterari et pati.” ST I.17.2 ad 1: “[. . . ] sensum affici est ipsum eius sentire.” ST I.27.5: “[. . . ] sentire
perficitur per actionem sensibilis in sensum.” ST I.85.2 ad 3: “[. . . ] duplex operatio. Vna secundum
solam immutationem, et sic perficitur operatio sensus per hoc quod immutatur a sensibili[. . . ].” Quodl.
V.9 ad 2: “[. . . ] cognitio sensus exterioris perficitur per solam immutationem sensus a sensibili.”
55. See also, e.g., Walter Burley, QDA 7 n. 20: “The object is the active [cause] of this activity [e.g.,
sensory perception or thought] and I grant that what is inanimate is an active [cause] of an animate
action.” Laurent of Lindores, De sensu agente 325: “Probatur, quia species sensibilis producitur bene
ab inanimato.” Nicholas Medensis, Evid. II.9 381: “Ergo obiectum sensus et intellectus est praestantius
quantum ad principium quo agit ante suam actionem, quam sit sua potentia.” ibid., 385: “Ad primum
contra secundum patet ex dictis, qualiter obiectum est praestantius ipsa potentia; in quantum habet
in actu illud quod ipsa potentia habet in potentia.” See also, of course, Godfrey, Quodl. IV.8 258:
“Sicut enim dicitur quod quia sensibilia extra possunt ex se sufficienter mouere et immutare uirtutem
sensitiuam, et ideo non ponitur communiter sensus agens[. . . ].” Peter of Auvergne, Quaestio “Vtrum
ponere sensum agentem”, “[. . . ] sensibilia enim quae sunt actiua sensus sunt actu existentia in rerum
natura et ideo possunt agere in sensus [. . . ].” Radulphus Brito, Quaestiones “Vtrum sensus sit uirtus
passiua” “Vtrum praeter sensibilia. . . ”, and QDA III.2. Bartholomew of Bruges in De sensu agente
raises no less than 24 arguments against the agent sense! In his assessment of Bartholomew’s position,
Thomas Wylton(?) quips (De sensu agente 351): “[. . . ] et puto namque quod ad eamdem conclusionem
non possit fieri 24 demonstrationes[. . . ].”
56. Evid. II.9 382: “Sed hic est dubium, sc. qualiter aliquod agens possit formam imprimere in aliquod
passum perfectiori modo quam sit in se ipso? Sicut enim non imprimit nisi formam quam habet, ita
non uidetur posse imprimere nisi in eo modo quo habet. Ad hoc dubium esset facilis responsio ex parte
intellectus, in quem agit obiectum mediante uirtute intellectus agentis.”
57. See, e.g., Lonergan et al., The Triune God: Systematics, Appendix I, §8: ‘Actus Vitalis’.
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Aristotle,58 I think that there is more to Durand’s recalcitrance here. At least two things
more: parsimony and upwards causation.
1. Parsimony.
Even if we don’t think that sensible qualities and sense objects are less noble than
senses and sensory perceptions, almost everyone, Augustinian and Aristotelian alike,
would agree that material qualities and material objects are less noble than intellects
and intellective acts, for the latter are immaterial . Hence, almost everyone posited a
‘gap’ between the material and the immaterial, and almost everyone posited an ‘agent
intellect (intellectus agens)’ whose function at least is to explain how it is that the less
noble can affect the more noble or bring about a more noble form. (And, for those who
took seriously Durand’s intuition at the sensory level, we can find authors positing an
‘agent sense (sensus agens)’.)59
58. See Sent. C Prol. n. 12, translated in the introduction: “Modus autem loquendi ac scribendi in
caeteris, que fidem non tangunt, est ut magis innitamur rationi quam autoritati cuiuscumque doctoris,
quantumcumque celebris uel solemnis, et paruipendatur omnis humana autoritas, quando per rationem
elucescit contraria ueritas. [. . . ] [O]mnis homo dimittens rationem propter autoritatem humanam incidit
in insipientiam bestialem ut comparatus sit iumentis insipientibus et similis factus sit illis. Quis enim
nisi temerarius existens audeat dicere quod magis sit acquiescendum autoritati cuiuscumque doctoris
quam autoritati sanctorum doctorum Sacrae Scripturae, Augustini, Gregorii, Ambrosii, et Ieronimi,
quos celebritate condigna sancta Romana Ecclesia sublimauit? Et tamen Augustinus, inter doctores
celeberrimus, dicit de se ipso III De Trinitate circa principium: ‘Noli meis literis quasi scripturis canonicis
inseruire, set in illis et quod non credebas, cum inueneris, incunctanter crede, in istis autem quod certum
non habebas, nisi certum intellexeris, noli firmum retinere.’” There is, of course, not a little irony in the
fact that Durand goes on to cite Augustine to support his anti-authoritian attitude. But he did say little
weight, after all!
59. For some discussion on the mind-body gap and the immaterial-material gap in medieval philosophy,
see see Peter King, “Why the Mind-Body Problem Isn’t Medieval,” in Lagerlund, Forming the Mind:
Essays on the Internal Senses and the Mind/Body Problem from Avicenna to the Medical Enlightenment,
188–206, Robert Pasnau, “The Mind-Soul Problem,” in Mind, Cognition, and Representation, ed. Paul
Bakker and J. Thijssen (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), 3–19, and King, “Immateriality and Intentionality.”
For secondary literature on the role of the agent intellect in 13th- and 14th-century authors see Z.
Kuksewicz, “The Potential and the Agent Intellect,” in CHLMP, ed. Norman Kretzmann, A. Kenny,
and J. Pinborg (Cambridge: CUP, 1982), 595–601, B. Carlos Baza´n, “Conceptions on the Agent Intellect
and the Limits of Metaphysics,” in Aertsen, Speer, and Emery, Jr, 1277, 178–210, Leonard J. Bowman,
“The Development of the Doctrine of the Agent Intellect in the Franciscan School in the Thirteenth
Century,” Modern Schoolman 50 (1973): 251–279, Jean-Baptiste Brenet, Transferts du sujet: la noe´tique
d’Averroe`s selon Jean de Jandun (Paris: J. Vrin, 2003), Peter King, “Scholasticism and Philosophy
of Mind: The Failure of Aristotelian Psychology,” in Scientific Failures, ed. T. Horowitz and A. Janis
(Lanham, MD: Rowman / Littlefield, 1994), 109–38. On the role of the agent intellect in Durand, see
Bonino, “Quelques re´actions thomistes a` la critique de l’intellect agent par Durand de Saint-Pourc¸ain”
and Jeschke, “Die Ablehnung des ta¨tigen Intellekts bei Durandus.” On the role of the agent sense, see
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Durand, however, finds it hard to understand how it is that simply positing an agent
intellect, say, allows the less noble to affect what is more noble.60 He examines a number of
different theories in this context and decides that none of them really explains what needs
to be explained. If we want to be object affectionists—rather than, say, antiaffectionists
or self-affectionists—and yet also want to cling to the immaterial-material gap, then we
will have to come up with a convincing account of how it is that the object, which is
material, can be an efficient cause, even if a partial efficient cause, with respect the
intellect, which is immaterial. In Durand’s lights, the sorts of accounts he finds among
his contemporaries—he directly addresses Hervaeus Natalis’s solution to the problem and
alludes to Thomas Aquinas’s position—are, as a lot, wanting.
Of course, most of his opponents thought they did have a convincing enough ac-
count. However—and here’s the crucial point about parsimony—Durand thinks that
such a complication—the postulation of a theoretical entity called the agent intellect—is
unnecessary, for if we simply stop thinking of cognition as a kind of being affected by
Pattin, Pour l’histoire du sens agent and Leijenhorst, “Cajetan and Suarez on Agent Sense: Metaphysics
and Epistemology in Late Aristotelian Thought.”
60. Durand is rather (in)famous for his refutation of an agent intellect. In the 17th-century, John of St.-
Thomas remarks that “Durand alone (who had denied that impressed species were required for cognition)
also had denied that an agent intellect is needed in order to produce them” (Cursus III:296). On the
legacy of Durand’s take on the agent intellect, see Bonino, “Quelques re´actions thomistes a` la critique de
l’intellect agent par Durand de Saint-Pourc¸ain.” Durand’s view on the agent intellect also found censure
among the Dominicans: Articuli nonaginta tres . . . n. 2 and Articuli in quibus magister Durandus deuiat
. . . n. 8: “D. 3 a. 4 dicit quod non est certum quod intellectus agens inter caeteras partes animae teneat
supremum locum nec aliquem locum; nec Augustinus umquam de eo fecit mentionem, nec forte oportet
aliquam intellectum agentem ponere, ut infra patebit. Contra communem doctrinam et Philosophi III
De anima et Thomae ubique, praecipue p. 1 q. 79 a. 3.” On Aquinas’s view on the agent intellect, see
Robert Pasnau, Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature. A Philosophical Study of Summa theologiae 1a,
75–89 (Cambridge-New York: CUP, 2002), 267–295 and Stump, Aquinas, 244–276. For an interesting
analysis of Aquinas’s view, which also engages with Durand, see Thomas de Vio’s commentary on ST
I.79.3. In Aquinas, see QDV 10.6 ad 7 and ST I.84.6 a. 6 where he tells us that the agent intellect’s action
is a real action, and that it is the primary cause of the reception of species in the possible intellect, with
the phantasm an instrumental cause of this reception. In what follows, I use the so-called additiones to
Durand’s first redaction (which I will call Sent. I-A 3.5) and his discussion of the agent intellect in his
third redaction (Sent. I-C 3.2.5). On the additiones, see the bio-bibliography; the transcriptions of the
text (found in Erfurt Allgemeinbibl. der Stadt, Ampl. F 369 ff. 76ra–77rb) I use are from:
K = Koch, Durandus de S. Porciano, 44–9
J = Jeschke, “Die Ablehnung des ta¨tigen Intellekts bei Durandus”
S = Prospero Stella, Nicolai Medensis (Durandelli) Evidentiae contra Durandum (Tu¨bingen: A. Francke
Verlag, 2003), I.4
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the agency of the object, then we will no longer need to posit such an entity in the first
place. In an addition to the third distinction of his commentary on the first book of
Peter Lombard’s Sentences , Durand writes:
Concerning the intention of Aristotle, who posited an agent intellect: there
isn’t any doubt that this was his intention, and perhaps he was motivated
to do so because he believed that the intellect changes and that singular
material items or phantasms don’t have in themselves the ability to change
the intellect, since no material item in itself can [change] an immaterial item.
Hence, he posited an agent intellect in virtue of which this action comes
about. But this motivation is not a sufficient one, for, as will be shown in
book two, distinction three [i.e., Sent. II-A 3.5], no object changes a power,
be it a sensitive or intellective power, as the efficient cause of the cognitive
act. Rather, the object is a mere sine qua non cause. Hence, just as the
heaven acts upon those items that are below it but is not affected by them—
since it does not have the same matter—and yet it is still in contact (tangit)
with them, in terms of a metaphysical contact (tactu metaphysico), so too
the immaterial soul united to the body changes the body but is not changed
by the body nor does it receive something from a body. (Sent. I-A 3.5 (S ) f.
77rb)61
61. Sent. I-A 3.5 (S ) f. 77rb: “De intentione Aristotelis ponentis intellectum agentem, non est dubium
hanc fuisse intentionem eius. Et forte motus fuit quia credebat quod ipsum moueret et quia singulare
materiale uel phantasma non habent de se uirtutem mouendi intellectum, quia nullum materiale de se
potest in immateriale, ideo posuit intellectum agentem, in cuius uirtute haec actio fierit. Hoc autem
motiuum non est sufficiens, quia ut patebit 2 libro, dist. 3, nullum obiectum mouet effectiue potentiam
quamcumque sensitiuam uel intellectiuam ad cognitionem sui, sed solum est causa sine qua non. Vnde
sicut coelum agit in haec inferiora et ab eis non patitur, quia non communicat cum eis in materia, tangit
tamen ea tactu metaphysico, sic anima immaterialis unita corpori mouet corpus et a corpore non mouetur
nec aliquid recipit a corpore.” See also Sent. I-A 3.5 (K ) f. 76va: “Iste modus saluaretur conuenientius
ponendo unam solam potentiam intellectiuam quae de se nata est intelligere omnia, nec requiritur nisi
quod ei praesententur obiecta, qui modus explicabitur 2 libro, dist. 3.” This last comment is prompted by
the thesis that the agent intellect might act upon and so impress the form of the thing upon the possible
intellect even though the thing does nothing at all but behaves as a mere object or terminus. Sent. I-A 3.5
(S ) f. 76va = Sent. I-C 3.2.5 (C ) n. 17: “Primum non potest dici, scilicet quod solus intellectus agens
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Hervaeus Natalis, commenting on Durand’s position, emphasizes this connection between
the sine qua non thesis and Durand’s rejection of the agent intellect.
However, according to his fairy tale (falsa imaginatio)—he who posits that
thinking (intelligere) is not some [absolute form] superadded to the possible
intellect but rather a mere relation to a newly produced or presented object—
it isn’t necessary to postulate an agent intellect since nothing is wrong with
the idea that something more noble can have a new relation to something less
noble produced by something less noble. (De articulis a. 2 443)
Clearly, an upshot of Durand’s position touches upon parsimony: we can abandon the
agent intellect and—if we felt inclined to endorse the more low-level animate-inanimate
gap—an agent sense as well, and so we can have a more parsimonious theory about the
causation of our mental acts at the end of the day.
It is clear too that what Durand objects to is the thesis that an absolute item—a
form—is impressed upon or given to the intellect from the agency of the object. The
worry isn’t so much that the less noble might be a cause of a more noble effect—for
Durand holds that material objects are in some sense the cause of intellective acts; it is
rather the worry that the object might be able to, as efficient cause, bring about a more
noble form and so in this way somehow affect something more noble than itself.
2. Upwards Causation.
Nowadays, philosophers of mind are interested in what is sometimes called the issue of
downwards causation: How can a mental event cause a physical event? Rarely, however,
are they interested in the issue of upwards causation.62 Durand’s concern touches on
agat in possibilem et phantasmata nihil omnino agant, sed solum se habeant obiectiue uel terminatiue,
quia si ad cognitionem non requiritur quod obiectum (obiectum] obiectiuum C ) uel repraesentans ipsum
aliquid agat in potentia, sed solum quod ei praesentetur (praesentetur] repraesentetur C ), cum sensus
sufficiat ad apprehendendum obiectum sibi propositum sine alio mouente, non uidetur (uidetur] uideo
C ) quare intellectus non sufficiat ad idem (idem] illud idem C ) absque hoc quod praeter obiectum sibi
propositum ponatur intellectus agens mouens ipsum.”
62. Indeed, what is interesting about David Chalmers’s introduction to the issue (Philosophy of Mind.
Classical and Contemporary Readings, 1) is that he outlines only two positions: Interactionism—physical
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upwards causation. He, of course, holds that perceptible objects can cause perceptive
acts, and so he holds that physical events can cause mental events. But he thinks that the
way that his contemporaries go about analyzing upwards causation doesn’t take enough
into account the very different nature of the mental. Indeed, I see his animate-inanimate
gap as being not so much a gap between the mental and the physical but a kind of gap
between the biological and the physical. And this, I think, is interesting.
Recast the animate-inanimate gap in contemporary terms as a gap between the phys-
ical and the biological. Can physical events cause biological events? Well, clearly they
do, but in what sense of the term ‘cause’? If physicalism is true—the thesis that all
that exists are physical items—then, it is sometimes argued, dualism—the thesis that
both the physical and the mental exist—must be false.63 But, as some have argued, if
physicalism is true such that dualism is false, then, well, it would seem that not just
mental events are to be eliminated but biological events as well.64 One problem that
contemporary philosophers of mind are now worried about, in fact, is precisely how bi-
ological and psychological events, on the one hand, and physical events, on the other,
causally interact, and while Durand’s nobility arguments will strike modern readers as
very foreign, I would suggest that their basic motivations are analogous. One upshot here
is this: on Durand’s view, what matters is whether or not a property, event, or thing is
biological, which is only as spooky, so to speak, as the entities postulated in the biological
sciences: it is, at the very least, less spooky than immateriality or spirituality—which
I take it drives the ‘Augustinian’ position.65 Durand is not appealing to a mind-body
events can cause mental events and mental events can cause physical events—and Epiphenomenalism—
physical events can cause mental events but mental events can’t cause physical events. But, logically
at least, there is a third option: mental events might be able to cause physical events even if physical
events can’t cause mental events.
63. See, e.g., Jerry Fodor, “Making Minds Matter More,” Philosophical Topics 17 (1989): 59–79 and
Donald Davidson, “Mental Events,” in Actions and Events (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980) and the
subsequent debate.
64. See, e.g., Fodor, “Making Minds Matter More.”
65. See, esp. Peter John Olivi who argues that even sensory perceptions are not material. Durand,
by contrast, although he holds that the intellect is immaterial, does so on faith, and in fact rejects
the going argument for its immateriality. Indeed, Durand even argues that something purely material
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gap nor is he appealing to an immaterial-material gap, but a more general gap between
biology and physics.
1.3 Conclusion
Durand has other arguments too. For instance, he worries that, on Godfrey’s view,
mental acts would be diversified in kind in accord with the specific diversity of their
objects, a thesis he thinks violates the idea that all human intellective acts, at least, are
the same in kind across all human intellects.66 He worries as well, interestingly enough,
that both the species theory and Godfrey’s view would entail certain skeptical worries.
Granted that God is able to bring about any absolute item independent of everything
else, provided that this absolute item can exist in the first place,67 then the species theory
would entail, Durand reasons, that we can’t infer from a mental act to a mind.68 As to
Godfrey’s theory, both this69 and another obvious skeptical consequence follow: we can’t
infer from mental acts to extramental objects.70
could engage in universal cognition, one of the primary motivations for the immateriality of the human
intellect. Durand, of course, was censured on these sorts of claims. See fn. 49 above. For the claim that
an material item can engage in universal cognition, see Ch. 5. In Olivi, see Sent. II 58.
66. Sent. II-A 3.5 16: “[. . . ] diuersorum agentium secundum speciem sunt diuersae actiones et effectus
secundum speciem. Sed intelligibilia differunt specie, ut homo et asinus. Ergo intelligere causata ab
hiis differunt specie. Quod est inconueniens, quia proprius actus speciei non potest plurificari secundum
speciem; sed intelligere ex phantasmatibus uel ratiocinari est actus specificus hominis. Ergo omne
intelligere hominis est unum secundum speciem; non enim potest homini assignari alia propria operatio
praeter suum intelligere.”
67. Sent. II-A 3.5 19: “Quaecumque differunt per essentiam absolutam, possunt diuina uirtute separari
secundum existentiam, nisi alicui eorum repugnet ratio actualis existentiae, ut est materia prima, de qua
dicunt aliqui, quod, cum sit pura potentia, non potest existere sine forma. Omne autem accidens
absolutum, cum sit actus quidam, potest existere diuina uirtute sine subiecto.”
68. Sent. II-A 3.5 10: “[. . . ] si intelligere uerius causatur a specie quam ab intellectu, cum uirtute
diuina possit fieri, quod intelligamus sine specie, ut in uisione beata, multo magis posset fieri, quod
intelligeremus sine intellectu, quod est absurdum.”
69. See the continuation of Sent. II-A 3.5 19 (quoted above fn. 67): “Sentire autem non potest existere
sine sensu, nec intelligere sine intellectu. Ergo non dicunt aliquid reale absolutum supra sensum et
intellectum.” I discuss this argument in more detail in Chapter 3, fn. 25.
70. Sent. II-A 3.5 17: “[. . . ] Deus potest facere effectum cuiuslibet causae secundae efficientis sine ipsa.
Sed Deus non potest facere, quod intelligere sit sine obiecto, quia tunc homo posset intelligere, dato, quod
nihil intelligeretur.” Godfrey responds to this sort of objection in Quodl. XII.1 (which asks: “Vtrum
Deus possit potentias animae passiuas reducere in actus suos absque suis obiectis faciendo uisionem sine
uisibili et sic de aliis”). For some discussion on this question, see Giorgio Pini, “Can God Create My
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So, what is Durand rejecting when he rejects the doctrine of affectionism? It is this.
He rejects the thesis that perception is a matter of the affection of the senses by the
agency of the object, where this is taken to mean that the senses come to receive or take
on the ‘form’ of that object owing to the object as efficient cause.
In general, Durand finds that his own theory can account for the causation of our
mental acts without leading to such worries as those discussed above. However, at least
with respect to some of these worries, Durand’s peculiar solution to the problem, already
alluded to by Hervaeus Natalis above, which attempts to analyze such mental acts as
relations, isn’t the only option on the table. At least with respect to the metaphysical
and agency arguments, self-affectionism is still a live option, according to which the mind
is the efficient cause of the mental act and affects itself in the mere presence of the object,
impressing upon and receiving into itself the ‘form’ of the object.
Hence, before I turn to Durand’s positive solution in more detail in Chapter 3, I want
to first look at a lively debate between Henry of Ghent and Godfrey of Fontaines and
John Duns Scotus on precisely this topic, although limited to a certain subset of mental
acts, namely, acts of the will. Godfrey as we have seen defends what we might call object
affectionism—the thesis that cognition is a matter of being affected by the agency of the
object as efficient cause—and he does so across the board: all mental acts, including acts
of the will, are owing to the agency of their objects; Henry of Ghent had argued, against
Godfrey, for self-affectionism in the case of the will, and Duns Scotus, at the turn of the
new century, sides with Henry on the issue. This issue was a kind of ‘hot topic’ issue
in Paris when Durand was lecturing on his Sentences and so an analysis of this debate
will prove useful. More precisely, I think it will be useful for at least two reasons. First,
it will show us where Durand is not a self-affectionist, a potential confusion among his
Thoughts? Scotus’s Case Against the Causal Account of Intentionality,” JHP 49, no. 1 (2011): 39–63
and Antoine Coˆte´, “L’objet et la cause de la connaissance selon Godefroid de Fontaines,” Freiburger
Zeitschrift fu¨r Philosophie und Theologie (2007): 409–29. For medieval skepticism more generally, see
Kretzmann, “Philosophy of Mind” and a recent collection of essays in Henrik Lagerlund, ed., Rethinking
the History of Scepticism: The Missing Medieval Background, STGM 103 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 2010).
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interpreters.71 The antiaffectionist theory which Durand pursues is not self-affectionism,
and Chapters 2 and 3 will make this very clear. Second, Godfrey can be seen as offering
us a rather good argument in defense of at least object affectionism, and, as Duns Scotus
recognizes, any future proponent of an alternative thesis, be it antiaffectionism or self-
affectionism, must face up to his arguments here.
71. Sole`re, “The Activity of the Cognitive Subject,” for instance, places Durand amongst the
Augustinian-Franciscans, e.g., Peter John Olivi, Roger Marston, John Pecham, John Duns Scotus, and
Henry of Ghent, who, by and large, endorsed a kind of self-affectionist doctrine. As we will see, this
isn’t where Durand should be placed. Durand is rather, as Leibniz put it, although in another context
(Essais de The´odice´e I.27) a party unto himself (qui faisoit assez souvent bande a` part). I’ll return to
this issue when I take up the sources of Durand’s view, in Chapter 3, §3.1.5.
2 Affectionism and self-affectionism
Godfrey of Fontaines defends the thesis that the object is the efficient cause of a mental
act, a thesis that Durand rejects.1 On Durand’s view, the object is the cause of a mental
act, but it is not to be characterized as an efficient cause, but rather as a so-called ‘sine
qua non’ cause.2 In this chapter, I want to look at Godfrey’s position in some detail.
My aim in doing so is to put us in a better position to appreciate Durand’s own positive
answer to the question: What causes a cognitive act? As we will see, Godfrey not only
defends the thesis that the object is the total cause of the cognitive act but he develops a
kind of master argument against what seems to be the only alternative—that the subject
is the total cause of the act and the object a mere sine qua non cause. In the first two
sections, I will look at both Godfrey’s defense of his own view and this master argument.
In the third section, I will look at John Duns Scotus’s limited defense of the notion of
a sine qua non cause in the case of a certain subset of mental acts, namely, volitions or
acts of the will.
2.1 Godfrey’s defense of affectionism
Godfrey, whose scholarly career in Paris ends about the same time Durand’s begins,3
defends the thesis that cognition is passive and its object an efficient cause due primarily
to his metaphysical commitments. He is perhaps most well-known to scholars of medieval
philosophy as a tireless advocate of the so-called act-potency axiom, according to which
1. See, e.g., Quodl. XIII.3 193: “[. . . ] actus potentiarum animae [. . . ] non sunt effectiue a potentia
animae in qua sunt sed potius ab obiecto.”
2. See, e.g., Sent. II-A 3.5 17: “Ex his patet, quod sentire et intelligere non sunt in nobis effectiue ab
obiecto.” ibid., 20: “[. . . ] intelligere et sentire sunt in nobis [. . . ] ab obiecto sicut a causa sine qua non.”
3. Godfrey’s first Quodlibet was held in Paris in 1285; his final and fifteenth Quodlibet in 1303/4.
Durand is known to have been in Paris on June 21, 1303, since he signed an appeal of the convocation
against Boniface VIII. For Godfrey’s dates and biography, see Chapter 1, fn. 19. Durand engages with
Godfrey’s view on a host of other topics, more often than not taking up and defending his position.
For some discussion of Durand’s intellectual relationship with Godfrey, see Iribarren, Durandus of St.
Pourc¸ain: A Dominican Theologian in the Shadows of Aquinas, ch. 5.
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nothing one and the same can be in both act and potency with respect to the same
thing at the same time, the most general form of Aristotle’s dictum that what is moved
is moved by another (omne quod mouetur ab alio mouetur).4 Godfrey decides that this
act-potency axiom ought to be considered so certain and fundamental as to be inviolable
and universal in scope.
It is fitting that certain principles are the most certain, for otherwise nothing
could be investigated through them. Therefore, those principles of meta-
physics, which somehow is every science, ought to be assumed in each special
science; and therefore, since it is from metaphysics that we ought to know
this—that one and the same item can’t be both in act and potency and
that what is in potency to something can’t reduce itself to act with respect
to it, and this pertains to metaphysics since it is common to every being—
therefore we ought to assume this concerning angels and the soul and, with
this assumed, investigate other matters which pertain in particular to the
soul; nor, on account of ignorance or doubt about posterior things ought we
to deny the most certain and first things. (Quodl. VI.7 170)5
4. Phys. VII.1 241b24. On Godfrey’s act-potency axiom, see John Wippel, “Godfrey of Fontaines
and the Act-Potency Axiom,” JHP 11 (1973): 299–317 and the many references therein. Most medieval
philosophers recognized some version of this principle, especially in the case of physics. See, e.g., Peter of
Auvergne, Quaestio “Vtrum sit ponere sensum agentem” 10: “Declaratum est enim prius quod impossi-
bile est aliquid a seipso moueri [. . . ] nec ad hoc declarandum laborare oportet, quolibet enim proferente
contraria opinionibus sollicitum esse stultum est.” For a general discussion, see James Weisheipl, “The
Principle Omne quod movetur ab alio movetur in Medieval Physics,” Isis 56, no. 1 (1965): 26–45. For
discussion of the principle in individual authors, see Rolf Scho¨nberger, “Philosophical Theology in John
Buridan,” in The Metaphysics and Natural Theology of John Buridan, ed. J. Thijseen and J. Zupko
(Leuven: E.J. Brill, 2001), 265–81, Johann Stufler, “Der hl. Thomas und das axiom: Omne, quod move-
tur ab alio movetur,” Zeitschrift fu¨r katholische Theologie 47 (1923): 369–90, Roy Eﬄer, John Duns
Scotus and the Principle ‘Omne quod movetur ab alio movetur’ (St. Bonaventure, NY: The Franciscan
Institute, 1962), Peter King, “Duns Scotus on the Reality of Self-Change,” in Self-Motion From Aristotle
to Newton, ed. M. Gill and J. Lennox (Princeton: PUP, 1994), 227–90, and Roland Teske, “Henry of
Ghent’s Rejection of the Principle Omne quod mouetur ab alio mouetur,” in Henry of Ghent: Proceedings
of the International Colloquium on the Occasion of the 700th Anniversary of his Death (1293), ed. W.
Vanhaml, Ancient and Medieval Philosophy 15 (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1996), 279–308.
5. See also Quodl. XIII.3 193: “Et qui dicit contrarium hoc non probat et manifeste dicit contradictoria
et contradicit primis principiis generalissimis fundatis super terminos generalissimos, scilicet super ens
et non-ens, et super actum et potentiam.”
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Godfrey appeals to this principle to resolve such diverse philosophical, physical (in a broad
sense), and theological issues as the proof of God’s existence, the natural downwards
motion of rocks, and his refutation of the (notorious) distinction between essence and
existence.6 Accordingly, it isn’t surprising to discover that he appeals to this axiom in
his discussion of issues that pertain to the subject-matter of psychology.7
Godfrey’s reasoning can be put as follows. It is evident that a cognizant subject, or
more precisely, a given cognitive power in a cognizant subject, is not always engaged in
cognitive activity, or, in other words, it is sometimes in potency and sometimes in act.8
For instance, Socrates, a cognizant subject, has a power for sight and a power for thought,
each of which is sometimes engaged in its associated cognitive activity and sometimes
not. Granted this, then, one might well wonder what actualizes a given cognitive power,
that is, what reduces a cognitive power from potency to act. What reduces, for instance,
Socrates’ power for sight from potency to act? (In what follows I will often talk of an
6. On God, see Quodl. V.10, IX.20, and XI.1. For discussion, see Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought
of Godfrey of Fontaines, ch. 3. On the esse/essentia distinction, see Quodl. II.2, III.1, IV.2, and VIII.3.
For discussion, see Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought of Godfrey of Fontaines, ch. 2 and John Wippel,
“The Relationship between Essence and Existence in Late-Thirteenth-Century Thought: Giles of Rome,
Henry of Ghent, Godfrey of Fontaines, and James of Viterbo,” in Philosophies of Existence Ancient
and Modern, ed. P. Morewedge (Fordham University: Fordham University Press, 1982), 131–64. On the
downwards motion of rocks, see Quodl. VI.7 155–158 and Quodl. XV.20.
7. Godfrey discusses psychological issues in a variety of texts and in a variety of contexts, among
the most important of which are Quodl. VI.7, VIII.2, IX.19, and XIII.3. His cognitive psychology
has been largely neglected in the secondary literature on medieval theories of cognition. For some
discussion see Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought of Godfrey of Fontaines, 194–200, John Wippel, “The
Role of Phantasms in Godfrey of Fontaines’ Theory of Intellection,” in HUMA, ed. C. Wenin, 2 vols.,
Philosophes me´die´vaux 26-27 (Leuven: Peeters, 1986), 573–82, Martin Pickave´ and Wouter Goris, “Von
der Erkenntnis der Engel. Der Streit um die species intelligibilis und eine quaestio aus dem anonymen
Sentenzenkommentar in ms. Bru¨gge, Stadsbibliotheek 491,” in Aertsen, Speer, and Emery, Jr, 1277,
125–77, Wippel, “Godfrey of Fontaines on Intelligible Species,” and Coˆte´, “L’objet et la cause de la
connaissance selon Godefroid de Fontaines.”
8. Godfrey also maintains the further thesis that all of our cognitive powers or potencies are really
distinct both from each other and the essence of the soul (DQ 12 and Quodl. II.4). Durand also main-
tains this thesis (Sent. I-C 3.2.2–4, Sent. I-A 3.3–4, Sent. II-C 3.5). Durand, in fact, borrows Godfrey’s
argument from DQ 12 and Quodl. II.4 in Sent. I-C 3.2.2 n. 37 (omitted in Sent. I-A 3.3). On Godfrey on
the real distinction between powers and the soul, see Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought of Godfrey of
Fontaines, 202–7, 314–47. For the distinction in general in scholastic debate, see Peter King, “The In-
ner Cathedral: Mental Architecture in High Scholasticism,” in Transformations of the Soul: Aristotelean
Psychology 1250–1650, ed. Dominik Perler (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 2009), 31–52 and Pasnau, “The Mind-Soul
Problem.”
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item ‘being reduced’ from potency to act or of something ‘reducing’ it to act; this is
a very special and technical use of ‘reduce’, a literal translation of the scholastic Latin
‘reducere’.)9 Since whatever it is that reduces a passive power from potency to act is to
be considered an efficient cause, the question “What reduces Socrates’ faculty for seeing
from potency to act?” is the same as “What is the efficient cause of Socrates’ vision?”
Hence, since a given cognitive power is sometimes in potency and sometimes in act, what,
as efficient cause, reduces it from potency to act? What, as an efficient cause, causes a
cognitive act to occur?
On the surface, there are three options: (1) it reduces itself; (2) an item outside it
reduces it; (3) both it and this item reduce it (as two necessary causes, jointly sufficient).
In fact, Godfrey considers a fourth option (4): the composite of it and a certain ‘dispo-
sition’ added to it (presumably, from the object) reduces it.10 A cognitive power can’t
reduce itself, neither (1) on its own, nor (2) together with the object, nor (4) together
with an acquired disposition, because then, Godfrey reasons, the act-potency axiom will
be violated. It will be violated because, as I’ll spell out in some more detail below, a
cognitive power is (at least) passive with respect to the cognitive act since it receives
it, and this much, Godfrey reasons, everyone would admit. But nothing can be both
passive and active with respect to the same thing at the same time, for then it would be
in potency and act at the same time with respect to the same thing. It follows that if the
cognitive power were to reduce itself from potency to act (on its own, with a disposition,
or with the object), then it would be both passive and active at the same time, and so
both in potency and act at the same time.
Hence, it has to be the case that (2) something outside of it reduces it. The most
plausible candidate here is, of course, the object and so Godfrey maintains that the object
(and it alone) is the efficient cause of the cognitive act, reducing the cognitive power from
9. Godfrey and other authors also sometimes speak of a power being actuated (actuare), educed
(educere), drawn out (extrahere), or, more simply, transitioning (exire) from potency to act.
10. This is the species-theory of cognition discussed in Chapter 1.
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potency into act.11 Hence, we are, Godfrey will go on to insist at length, in fact totally
passive with respect to cognition and not at all active.12 Godfrey defends this thesis in
the case of each form of mental activity: in the case of any psychological act (including
an act of the will) the object is the total active cause; and so vision, thought, and volition
are all passive and their objects are to be taken to be their efficient cause.13 As he puts
it:
It ought to be said that neither the will nor the intellect moves itself or educes
itself from potency to act but it is rather per se changed by the object. (Quodl.
X.14 379)
Godfrey’s position can be seen as a kind of minority position on two counts. First,
in the case of cognition, although many would agree that the object and the object
alone is the efficient cause of our sensory perceptions, few would allow that it is the
sole efficient cause of our intellectual cognitions. However, disagreement here usually
concerned Godfrey’s account of the role of the agent intellect, although some authors,
notably John Buridan and John Duns Scotus, also argued that, even setting aside the
issue of how the intelligible object comes to be present and so able to move the possible
intellect, it is impossible that it alone move the possible intellect without the possible
11. See, e.g., Quodl. IX.19 276: “Obiectum ergo intelligibile habet rationem mouentis et agentis re-
spectu intellectus possibilis educens ipsum de potentia secundum actum intelligendi ad actum secundum
illud[. . . ]. [O]biectum est quod habet rationem efficientis et mouentis[. . . ].” Quodl. XIII.3 193: “Quia
actus potentiarum animae qui dicuntur quaedam operationes non sunt effectiue a potentia animae in
qua sunt sed potius ab obiecto.”
12. See, e.g., Quodl. IX.19 276 “[. . . ] et intellectus possibilis simpliciter habet rationem passiui et
receptiui.”
13. On Godfrey’s view, the object of the will is the extramental thing itself, the same thing which
is the object of the intellect. See, esp. Quodl. VI.7 168: “[. . . ] quia dicitur quod illud idem quod est
obiectum intellectus est obiectum uoluntatis.” ibid., 170: “Vnde pro tanto intellectus mouet uoluntatem
in quantum uoluntas non fit in actu a suo obiecto nisi natura saltem prius intellectus factus sit in actu ab
eodem obiecto. Vnde unum et idem obiectum secundum rem efficit duplicem actionem ordine naturae,
tamen prius unam quam alteram, sed simul tempore in eodem subiecto, id est in anima ratione dictarum
eius potentiarum, scilicet intellectus et uoluntatis.” Godfrey discusses volition in Quodl. VI.7 and VIII.2.
Godfrey’s view of volition, in contrast to his view of cognition, has received significant attention in the
secondary literature. See (inter alia) Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought of Godfrey of Fontaines, 194–
202 and Stephen Dumont, “Did Duns Scotus Change his Mind on the Will?” In Aertsen, Speer, and
Emery, Jr, 1277, 719–94.
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intellect also concurring as a partial efficient cause.14 Second, in the case of volition,
quite a few authors argued that a view like Godfrey’s does not account for freedom.
One way to appreciate Godfrey’s position is to look at how he defends it against
attack. We are fortunate here for many people attacked it.15 One of the most famous
was Henry of Ghent, Godfrey’s older contemporary at Paris. Henry and Godfrey, in
fact, sparred with each other on this topic (with a special focus on the will) in a series
of public debates that spanned a baker’s dozen years or so. What is more, we have a
more or less complete record of these debates.16 While this debate has been discussed in
the contemporary literature, I want to focus on it again in order to illuminate Godfrey’s
position, for in its dialectical context it really shines. An examination of this debate
should also, I think, help us better refine what Durand has in mind when he tells us
that the object is a sine qua non and not an efficient cause, for Henry of Ghent had also
characterized the object (at least in the case of the will) as a sine qua non cause and not
an efficient cause. As I will argue in the next chapter, Durand’s theory of sine qua non
causality, in the end, looks very different from Henry of Ghent’s theory of sine qua non
causality.
On Henry’s view, the object—something presented to the will by the intellect—does
not actualize the will’s potency in the manner of an efficient cause but rather it is to be
thought of as a so-called sine qua non cause, a mere necessary condition without which
there would not be volition. It is not the object but the will itself that actualizes its own
14. On Godfrey’s view, the agent intellect does not act upon the possible intellect, neither on its own,
nor together with the object, but it rather removes an impediment on the side of the object so that the
object can then act as an efficient cause upon the possible intellect. On the role of the agent intellect in
Godfrey, see Quodl. V.10, VI.15, VIII.2, IX.19, and X.12. For some discussion see Wippel, “The Role of
Phantasms in Godfrey of Fontaines’ Theory of Intellection” and Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought of
Godfrey of Fontaines, 195–6.
15. In addition to Duns Scotus and Henry of Ghent, see, e.g., Hervaeus Natalis, Sent. II 17.2, John
Baconthorpe, Sent. Prol. 2.4, and Gonsalvus of Spain, DQ 3 and 8.
16. For a complete list of references where Henry develops his position, see the critical apparatus
to Henry’s Quodl. XIII.10 (page 82). On the debate between Henry and Godfrey, see Wippel, The
Metaphysical Thought of Godfrey of Fontaines, 148–202, Bonnie Kent, Virtues of the Will: The Trans-
formation of Ethics in the Late Thirteenth Century (CUA: CUAP, 1995), 140–146, and Dumont, “Did
Duns Scotus Change his Mind on the Will?” 749–758.
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potency. If acts of the will were caused by something other than the will, then these acts
would not be free.17 Hence, at least in the case of volition, the act-potency axiom does
not apply. Volition is a kind of self-change, a process wherein the will affects itself in the
mere presence of an object. Even if in other cases (sensory perception and thought) the
object is an efficient cause, in the case of free willings, the object can’t be an efficient
cause. However, an episode of volition as a psychological act does demand an object and
so the object of the will is a necessary or sine qua non condition without which there
would not be a volition. But it is not an efficient cause.18
2.2 Godfrey’s ‘achilles’ argument
As mentioned, this debate spanned quite a few years and took place in the form of
quodlibetal disputations held at the University of Paris. During the course of these
debates, Godfrey developed and refined a kind of master argument both in defense of
his own position and against a position like Henry’s. John Duns Scotus, in his own
recapitulation of the debate at the turn of the new century, labels this argument (or at
least important bits of it) Godfrey’s ‘achilles ’ argument against sine qua non causality,
meaning that it drives at the core theoretical problem with sine qua non causality and
any future proponent of the theory must face up to this argument if they wish to defend
the notion.19 The Achilles Argument, as I will be calling it, is complex, having a
number of components or steps. I think it is best to view it as having the following four
steps even though strictly speaking what Duns Scotus takes to be the achilles are steps
17. See, e.g., Quodl. X.9 235: “[. . . ] uoluntas mouet se scilicet quia aliter periret liberum arbi-
trium[. . . ].”
18. On Henry’s response to Godfrey, see Dumont, “Did Duns Scotus Change his Mind on the Will?”
For Henry’s theory of cognition, see Martin Pickave´, “Causality and Cognition: An Interpretation of
Henry of Ghent’s Quodlibet V, q. 14,” in Klima, Intentionality, Cognition and Mental Representation in
Medieval Philosophy, Pasnau, Theories of Cognition, Jerome Brown, “Sensation in Henry of Ghent: A
Late Mediaeval Aristotelian–Augustinian Synthesis,” Archiv fu¨r Geschichte der Philosophie 53 (1971):
238–266, and Jerome Brown, “Intellect and Knowing in Henry of Ghent,” Tijdschrift voor Filosofie 37
(1975): 490–512 and 692–710.
19. Ord. I 3.3.2 n. 521, 524, 525, 527.
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three and four in the analysis below. This analysis will abstract away from some of the
smaller details in order to provide a better picture of the whole; I will allude to some
possible responses to each of the steps and in the section that follows this I will explore
some of these responses in a little more detail.
2.2.1 The necessity principle
Let’s begin with the alternative: a psychological power (in this case, the will) is an
active not a passive power. But this seems impossible. An active power is by definition a
power or ability to bring about a change in something else (potentia actiua est principium
transmutandi aliud inquantum aliud). For instance, when the hot stove, having an active
power to make something else hot, acts, something else, outside the stove, becomes hot.
But when Socrates wills or sees something, nothing else, outside of Socrates, changes.
We might call this the Necessity Principle: if A acts, then it is necessary that there
be a P (somehow distinct from A) which is affected by A. The opposite is also true: if
P is affected, then it is necessary that there be an A (somehow distinct from P) which
is acting upon P.20 In short, when an agent is acting, some patient is being affected; and
when a patient is being affected, some agent is acting. Unless Bob is a thespian, it just
seems odd to say that Bob acts even though he is not acting upon something.21
The necessity principle is not simply true by definition. Godfrey recognizes two kinds
20. See, e.g., Godfrey, Quodl. VIII.2 18–9; VI.7 152–4, 161–2; XIII.3 193, 198. In Aristotle, see, e.g.,
Meta. IX.1 1046a12–6. See also Auct. Ar. 1 n. 219: “Potentia actiua est principium transmutandi aliud
in quantum aliud.” ibid., n. 220: “Potentia passiua est principium transmutandi ab altero in quantum
ab altero.” This principle was widely accepted. See, e.g., Thomas of Sutton, Quaest. Ord. 2 45: “Tertia
conditio potentiae actiuae est quod ipsa est distincta a patiente; et conditio huic correspondens ex parte
potentiae passiuae est quod ipsa est distincta ab agente.” See also inter alia: Duns Scotus, Quaest.
Meta. IX.14 n. 1, Rep. II 25 n. 1, Lect. II 25 nn. 5 and 30, Henry of Ghent, Quodl. X.9 232, Hervaeus
Natalis, Quodl. III.8 71, Guy Terrena, Quodl. II.13 602, Bartholomew of Bruges, De sensu agente 56,
John of Jandun, Sophisma de sensu agente 161, Durand, Sent. I-C 24.2 n. 15, QLA 2 479 and Quaestio
de aula 458.
21. In what follows I will be using the term ‘agent’ and its correlate ‘patient’ in their technical scholastic
sense. Agency, in this sense, has nothing to do with acting upon reasons and so even ovens are agents:
an agent (agens) is something that does something or performs an action (agere; actio) and a patient
(patiens) is something that has something done to it or undergoes a passion or affection (pati; passio).
For some discussion of this point, see Panaccio, Ockham on Concepts, 21, fn. 1.
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of agents: univocal agents and equivocal agents. In the former case, Godfrey argues, in
order for an agent to make a patient F, it must itself be F. For instance, in order for the
stove to make water hot, the stove must itself be hot, or, to use an example Godfrey uses,
“the liver can only make the stomach hot if it is itself already made hot” (Quodl. VI.7
165). This principle, too, can be found in Aristotle, and we might call it the Actualism
Principle.22 Hence, if an item is a univocal cause and were it able to reduce itself from
potency to act—from being able to be hot to being hot—then it would have to be already
in act—already hot—in the first place, and so it will be in potency and act with respect
to the same thing at the same time, a patent violation of the act-potency axiom.
However, in the case of an equivocal agent, the agent does not need to be F in order
to make the patient F. For instance, by common consent, most medieval philosophers
held that the sun is an equivocal agent: it is able to make things hot even though it is
not itself hot.23 Hence, the actualism assumption seems to apply to univocal agents but
not equivocal agents. It might seem that, were an equivocal agent to act upon itself,
the act-potency axiom would not be violated, since an equivocal agent need not be F in
order to make something F.
In fact, both Henry of Ghent and John Duns Scotus attempt to exploit the notion of
equivocal agency in order to explain, as it were, the self-motion of the will. For instance,
Duns Scotus writes (of Godfrey’s view):
As to the first argument of the second opinion (which fully renders the soul
vile) when it is argued that “nothing moves itself” [NB: ‘moves’ is to be taken
in its broadest sense as a change], it ought to be said that an item can be
moved by some other item in two ways: either as by a univocal cause or as by
22. See, e.g., Quodl. V.11 41: “[. . . ] ad hoc quod aliquid agat uel producat aliquid sufficiat quod sit
ens [. . . ] in actu tale quale est aliud in potentia [. . . ].” Quodl. VIII.2 19 and VI.7 152–4. In Aristotle,
see, e.g., Phys. III.2 202a9–12.
23. Better examples? Indeed, the fact that it is hard to come up with better examples suggests
something about the dubious nature of the distinction itself. For a list of examples, see footnote 25
below.
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an equivocal cause. Now, it is impossible that an item be moved by itself as
univocal cause. In fact, this totally entails a contradiction. Why? A univocal
cause that moves an item already has the form towards which the moveable
item is moved. If, then, an item were to move itself as univocal cause, then,
before it moves itself, it would have the form towards which it moves. But
a moveable item lacks the form towards which it is moved. Therefore it will
both lack and have the same form at the same time and so it will both have
it and not have it at the same time, or, in other words, it will be in potency
and act with respect to the same form at the same time—which entails a
contradiction. [. . . ] However, if we are talking about an item moved by an
equivocal cause, then this does not follow, since an equivocal cause has some
other form than the form towards which the moveable item is moved. (Lect.
I 3.3.2–3 n. 403)24
Godfrey, of course, recognizes this option and rejects it as well.25 First, Godfrey
points out, the example they appeal to (the case of the sun) is not a case of, as it were,
24. See also Ord. I 3.3.2 n. 513: “Cum probatur quod possibilis [sc. intellectus -PJH] non potest habere
causalitatem aliquam, quia nihil idem agit in se—respondeo quod illa propositio non est uera nisi de
agente uniuoco, nec illa probatio eius quod tunc idem esset in actu et in potentia concludit nisi quando
agens agit uniuoce, hoc est inducit in passum formam eiusdem rationis cum illa per quam agit; si
enim sic aliquid ageret in se, ergo haberet simul formam eiusdem rationis ad quam mouetur, et dum
mouetur ad illam, careret illa; ergo simul haberet illam et non haberet—saltem hoc sequitur de duabus
formis eiusdem speciei, uel de eadem. In agentibus autem aequiuoce, id est in illis agentibus quae non
agunt per formas eiusdem rationis cum illa ad quam agunt, propositio illa quod nihil mouet se non
habet necessitatem, nec probatio eius quod aliquid sit in potentia et in actu respectu eiusdem aliquid
concludit: non enim ibi agens est tale formaliter in actu quale passum est formaliter in potentia, sed
agens est uirtualiter tale in actu quale formaliter est passum in potentia; et quod idem sit uirtualiter
tale in actu et formaliter tale in potentia, nulla est contradictio.” Rep. II 25 n. 12 (quoted below). See
also Henry of Ghent, Quodl. XIII.11 131 and Quodl. X.9 221, 230.
25. Quodl. VI.7 150: “[. . . ] Et ad declarandum quomodo uoluntas mouet seipsam, dicunt quod
[. . . u]erum est etiam quod agens siue mouens semper est tale in actu quale est mobile in potentia.
Sed esse tale contingit dupliciter, sc. uirtualiter et formaliter. In quibusdam enim est agens tale uirtute
quale passiuum est in potentia, sicut in sole, qui est calidus uirtute, et inducit caliditatem formalem in
aliquo corpore mixto; sicut etiam graue habet formam secundum quam habet similitudinem uirtualem
ad locum deorsum et ideo mouet se ad illum, amoto impedimento; ita etiam appetitus humanus habet
a creante formam liberi arbitrii qua uult secundum actum, aut potest uelle, amoto impedimento, quod
est absentia obiecti, quo facto praesente in intellectu per cognitionem, libere uult illud, si sit finis, uel
potest uelle liberum arbitrium, si sit ad finem. Sed ista positio non uidetur rationabilis[. . . ].”
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self-motion, for the sun, even though it is an equivocal agent, acts upon something else
distinct from it in subject. Hence, the solution seems a bit too ready-made and ad hoc
since there doesn’t seem to be a case of equivocal self-agency (other than, of course, the
will).26 Second, while it is true that an equivocal agent doesn’t have to be formally F in
order to make some patient F—the sun doesn’t have to have the form of heat in itself in
order to make the water hot—still an equivocal agent must be virtually F in order to make
some patient formally F. This distinction—between formal act and virtual act—was a
common one.27 As Godfrey understands this distinction, this means that the equivocal
agent must be in a virtual act and so have some form which is more noble than the form
which its patient has being in formal act. The form that the sun has (whatever that
might be) in virtue of which it makes water hot is more noble than heat. But, Godfrey
goes on, if an equivocal agent were to act upon itself and give to itself the form which it
produces in something else, then it would reduce itself from a more noble or more perfect
state. It wouldn’t just add heat alongside whatever form it already has because it is,
by hypothesis, a simple item, and so it can have but one form at one time. Hence, it
would reduce itself from a more noble state to a less noble state. This, Godfrey thinks,
is unfitting.28
Admittedly, it is less clear that such a situation is a clear contradiction, in the way
that a univocal agent acting upon itself is a clear contradiction. Even so, Godfrey goes
26. Quodl. VI.7 151.
27. See, e.g., Henry of Ghent Quodl. II.6, X.9 231, Thomas of Sutton, Quaest. Ord. 7 and Quodl. I.11
81, John Duns Scotus, Quodl. 15 n. 3, Lect. II 25 n. 44, Durand, Sent. II-C 12.1 and Sent. II-C 14.1.
28. Quodl. VI.7 151: Praeterea, sicut impossibile est quod illud actiuum quod est formaliter quale debet
facere passiuum sit illud passiuum et se ipsum faciat formaliter tale, ita impossibile est quod illud quod
est uirtualiter tale quale debet facere passiuum sit illud passiuum et faciat se ipsum formaliter tale. Sicut
enim contra rationem eius quod formaliter est tale quale debet facere passiuum est quod ex quo iam est
tale faciat se tale, quia iam esset in actu et in potentia secundum idem et respectu eiusdem, item essent in
eodem numero et subiecto plura accidentia nuumero differentia et plura alia inconuenientia sequerentur;
ita etiam contra rationem eius quod uirtualiter est tale quale debet facere passiuum, formalier est quod
ex quo iam est tale eminentiori et perfectiori modo, quia est principale agens quod faciat se tale minus
perfecto modo. Inconueniens etiam est quod qualitas secundum quam agens aliquid tale dicitur uirtute
et qualitas secundum quam aliquid tale dicitur formaliter illi correspondens, cum haec dicantur esse talia
non-uniuoce sed aequiuoce, quod sint perfectiua unius et eiusdem subiecti, etc.”
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on, in the particular case of the will such a situation faces a special problem. If a will,
before it wills, being in virtual act, is in a more noble state than a will, while acting,
having the formal act, then it would seem that the will, when it wills, is less noble than
the will when it it doesn’t will. But, of course, the nature of the beatific vision and other
considerations make this a rather implausible position: a will that is willing, all things
considered, is better than a will that is not willing, and in particular, a will that is willing
God is more noble than one that is not.29
Now, both John Duns Scotus and Henry of Ghent have their answers to this sort of
objection, but I want to leave these details to one side.30 What we can take away from
the above discussion of the necessity principle is this. Nothing can act upon itself and
reduce itself from potency to act. A univocal agent can’t act upon itself and reduce itself
from potency to act, for then it would be in both potency and act at the same time with
respect to the same thing. An equivocal agent also can’t act upon itself and reduce itself
from potency to act, for then it would reduce itself from a more perfect state to a less
perfect state.
2.2.2 The sufficiency principle
However, if we want to reject the necessity principle and so allow that an item can
reduce itself from potency to act, we face another problem. Whenever a sufficient agent
is present to a sufficient patient, then the action will come about. When the pie is next
to the stove, the pie will become hot: the stove’s action will come about and a passion
29. Quodl. VI.7 151: “The primary agent is either more noble than the effect (if it isn’t a univocal
agent) or as noble as the effect (if it is). Further, [if it is not a univocal agent] it is more noble or more
actual than that out of which or in which the effect is produced. Further, if the agent is a composite, then
it is more noble or as noble as the composite it produces. If, then, nothing [other than the will] is the
agent with respect to the will proper—neither the intellect nor the object in virtue of the intellect—and
the will itself educes itself through itself from potency to act, and it does so as the primary (and not
the instrumental) agent such that it is virtually the sort of item that it makes itself [formally] be in act,
then the will without volition will be more noble than the whole [composite of the will and] volition.”
30. See, e.g., Duns Scotus, Quodl. 15 and Quaest. Meta. IX.14 n. 23 (discussed below). In Henry, see,
e.g., Quodl. X.9 223–5 (discussed below).
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on the side of the pie will come about.31 Call this the Sufficiency Principle. Hence,
since the will is the sufficient patient with respect to a volition—for it receives it—then,
were the will also the total efficient cause or agent, it would always be engaged in volition.
But we do not always will. (Nor see, hear, and so on.) As Godfrey puts it:
When the per se active item is present to the per se passive item then the
action will follow, under the assumption that all the impediments have been
removed, as is clear based upon the Philosopher, Metaphysics IX. Therefore,
if the will is claimed to be both the passive and the active item which are
always present to each other [. . . ], then the action will follow—and one can’t
propose an impediment to this, for what can impede the same item from
being present to itself? (Quodl. VI.7 151–2)
This problem, known in the literature as the problem of omniactivity,32 compels us
to admit that there is some other cause over and above the will that is necessary in order
for a volition to occur when it occurs. What might this something else be? The most
obvious candidate is, of course, the object.
Why can’t we claim that what is also necessary is an act of volition? Well, if our anal-
ysis is the causation of an act of volition, then this answer will be pretty uninformative:
we will when we will and don’t will when we don’t will! If, however, our analysis is the
causation of some psychological act other than an act of the will, then this answer starts
to look very implausible: I don’t see when I will, for if Fido is present and all obstacles
have been removed, it would seem that I see Fido regardless of whether or not I will.
31. Godfrey, Quodl. X.14 381: “[. . . ] praesentibus actiuo et passiuo consurgit action[. . . ].” See also
Quodl. VI.7 151: “[. . . ] quando actiuum per se est praesens passiuo per se sequitur actio et in hoc
exclusum omne impeditiuum, ut patet per Philosophum nono Metaphysicae.” In Aristotle, see Meta. IX.5
1048a5–7.
32. See, e.g., Dumont, “Did Duns Scotus Change his Mind on the Will?” 749–758, Wippel, The Meta-
physical Thought of Godfrey of Fontaines, 184–202, Kent, Virtues of the Will: The Transformation of
Ethics in the Late Thirteenth Century, 140–146, Teske, “Henry of Ghent’s Rejection of the Principle
Omne quod mouetur ab alio mouetur,” and Eﬄer, John Duns Scotus and the Principle ‘Omne quod
movetur ab alio movetur’.
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Hence, even if we claim that the will is both active and passive, we must take the
object to be a necessary cause. Of course, we need not take the object to be a necessary
efficient cause. This is, presumably, what Henry of Ghent and others who endorse the
notion of sine qua non causality mean when they claim that the object is a cause but
not an efficient cause: the efficient cause is the will which reduces itself from potency to
act and affects itself if and only if the object is present.
We now arrive at the core theoretical problem with the notion of a sine qua non cause.
In Godfrey’s lights, such a view is mysterious and ad hoc. It is mysterious because it is
committed to the claim that the object is a cause but not one of Aristotle’s recognized
four kinds of causes. It is ad hoc because it seems committed to the claim that sine
qua non causality applies only in the case of the will: in all other cases if an object is
present to a power, then, if that power is passive, the object is the agent or efficient cause
reducing it from potency to act, and if that power is active, the object is the patient or
material cause reduced from potency to act.
Let’s look at each of these objections in a little more detail.
2.2.3 The mystery objection
Aristotle recognizes but four kinds of causes: the material, the efficient, the formal, and
the final. Since the subject and not the object is the recipient of the thought or volition,
the subject and not the object is the material cause. Nor is it plausible to insist that
the object is the formal or final cause, and since the object is denied to be an efficient
cause, it would seem that it is not a cause at all. In other words, what kind of cause
is the object? If there is a fifth kind of cause over and above Aristotle’s gang of four, I
would like to hear a bit more about it. Hence, the notion of sine qua non causality is
mysterious. To put it differently, a sine qua non cause is not classified as a cause.33
33. Quodl. XV.4 24–5: “Si autem sit causa sine qua non aliquid faciens ad effectum, quaero in quo genere
causae se habet? Constat quod non in genere causae formalis, quia obiectum non est forma actus uolendi;
nec etiam est causa materialis, quia obiectum non est subiectum in quo recipiatur actus uolendi [. . . ] nec
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Of course, all that one will have to do in order to face up to this objection is provide
some explanation of what a sine qua non cause might be. After all, why should the
Stagirite have a stranglehold on the kinds of causes that are? I’ll look at Duns Scotus’s
attempt at providing us with just such an explanation in the next section. In the chapter
that follows this one, I will take it to be something of my goal to provide us with Durand’s
own explanation of sine qua non causality.
2.2.4 The ad hoc objection
The other core problem with the notion of sine qua non causality is that an appeal
to a sine qua non cause seems rather ad hoc, a ready-made solution to the problem.
We must have a reason to suppose that one instance of change is to be a case of self-
change, involving a sine qua non cause, and another instance of change a case of as
it were ordinary change, not involving a sine qua non cause. As Godfrey had already
noted, we shouldn’t deny certain metaphysical principles such as the act-potency axiom
on account of any particular matter. We ought not, in other words, make swiss cheese of
our metaphysics and limn it with provisos and exceptions to the rule.34
To put it somewhat dramatically, if we admit into the world so-called sine qua non
causes then we will have made causal explanation impossible. If we admit that there are
sine qua non causes, such that P, in the presence of A, becomes ϕ (whereas P not in the
etiam in genere causae finalis solum, quia finis non est quod dirigit sed in quod inclinatio dirigitur[. . . ].
Ergo relinquitur quod si obiectum est causa sine qua non aliquid faciens ad effectum, quod sit causa
effectiua in motione uoluntatis et quod effectiue mouet uoluntatem.” See also an objection (probably
from Godfrey) which Henry of Ghent answers in Quodl. X.9 229: “Dicit igitur quod ‘obiectum est causa
per se mouens uoluntatem’ quia non potest aliter probari <quod> aliquid est causa per se nisi quia ea
posita necessario effectus et ea remota nullo modo sequitur.” See also Duns Scotus, Lect. II 25 n. 58, 66
and Lect. I 3.3.2–3 n. 324 (quoted below, footnote 59).
34. Quodl. IX.19 273: “Vniuersaliter igitur tam in uoluntate quam in aliis dicendum quod nihil mouet
se ipsum [. . . ]; et hoc praecipue propter rationes actiui et passiui [. . . ], quia si de ratione potentiae
actiuae, secundum quod huiusmodi, est posse agere in aliud secundum quod aliud, passiuae autem
est transmutari ab alio secundum quod aliud, patet quod in quolibet genere entis oportet actiuum et
passiuum esse raliter distincta. Si autem dicatur quod in quibusdam de ratione potentiae actiuae est
transmutare aliud in quibusdam idem hoc sine ratione dicitur et in hoc etiam manifeste contradictoria
implicantur et qua ratione dicetur in uno et in alio. Vnde posito quod in uno solo idem agat in se ipsum
uel educat se de potentia ad actum aequali facilitate ponetur in omnibus.”
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presence of A does not) and that this is owing to (i) P’s self-affection and (ii) A as a
mere sine qua non cause, then we might as well claim that whenever it looks as if any
item whatsoever becomes ϕ owing to some other item as efficient cause, in fact what has
occurred is that the former item became ϕ owing to (i) its own self-affection and (ii) the
latter item as a mere sine qua non cause. Hence, branches will become burnt thanks to
their self-action together with fire as a mere sine qua non cause. Any prima facie passive
power can be said to be the active cause of its own act and the purported active power
or agent said to be a mere sine qua non cause. As Godfrey puts it:
If this can be said about the will, then with equal ease and with reason one
might deny that there is any active power distinct from the passive power
and so claim that each and every thing moves itself from potency to act. [. . . ]
Also, how will one prove that the branch or a body becomes hot thanks to
fire? Rather, one can say that it makes itself hot when the fire—as sine qua
non cause—is present. (Quodl. VI.7 158)
Or, to quote Bartholomew of Bruges (writing in Paris between 1307 and 1309):
[. . . ] matter would change to a form in the [mere] presence of some extrinsic
thing and a woman would impregnate herself when a man is present and the
wood would change itself into artificial forms (e.g., a stool or a bed) when the
artisan is present. (De sensu agente 57)
Hence, provided the alternative—self-change across the board—is off the table, then
one must provide a criterion which can be used to decide whether an instance of change
is a case of ‘ordinary’ change or a case of self-change. And Godfrey, for one, is little
convinced that his opponent has a decent criterion at hand.35 As he puts it:
35. Quodl. VI.7 158: “Non est enim dare quare in unum exeat potius quam in aliud si nulla facta sit in
ea mutatio quae prius non erat, aut si, quacumque mutatione facta secundum quemcumque influxum,
adhuc manet indifferens quantum est de se ad utrumque.”
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Nor does it seem that it could be postulated to be otherwise about whatever
specific thing, that one and the same item in reality and in subject might
move itself—except if one were to say as one pleases and for no reason: “This
is its nature”—since whatever reason is given for its being otherwise, this can
be found in whatever other item. Hence, I say, as a universal claim, that
nothing one and the same (I mean: in reality) is, thus, active upon itself
and reduces itself from potency to that act with respect to which it was in
potency. (Quodl. VIII.2 23)
On Godfrey’s view, there is no plausible criterion we can appeal to as to why one set of
things (wills, say) is capable of self-action whereas another set of things (everything else,
in fact) is not. A disjunctive attitude about the issue seems to be rather arbitrary: If a
change in X in the presence of Y is either a case wherein Y is a sine qua non cause or
a case wherein Y is an efficient cause, then, well, upon what ground do we decide upon
one of the disjuncts over the other? Hence, on his view, it is a kind of all-or-nothing
affair: either every purported instance of causation is in fact an instance of self-change or
every purported instance of causation is in fact an instance of ‘ordinary’ change involving
an extrinsic efficient cause. Godfrey, of course, thinks it is better to claim that when
X becomes ϕ this is not ever owing to the fact that X made itself ϕ in the presence
of something else which although it looks to be an agent in fact is not, but it is rather
always because there is some other item which is really an agent—which acts upon as
efficient cause whatever changes. If we admit sine qua non causality, in other words,
then it will be a slippery slope into a view about causality which makes no sense at all,
at least according to Godfrey.36
36. One might find this alternative—self-change across the board—attractive, for it comes close to the
analysis of causation which we find attractive nowadays, namely, counterfactual dependence. But notice
that the self-change or self-affection doctrine still clings to certain, as Hume would call them, mysterious
entities as part of its analysis of change: there is still an active power (the will, say) and a passive power
(again: the will) and the impression and reception of a ‘form’ (the volition). This is not how Durand
analyzes the notion of sine qua non causality. All that such a view does is take the standard scholastic-
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2.3 Duns Scotus’s defense of self-affectionism
To be sure, Godfrey’s achilles argument didn’t convince his opponents. Henry of Ghent,
for one, continued to insist that Godfrey’s arguments simply do not compel us to abandon
the view that the will (at least) is the sole efficient cause of its own volitions, the object
being a mere sine qua non cause or condition.
This debate was carried on by Godfrey’s student, John Lesage a.k.a. John Sapiens,
who became engaged in a similar back-and-forth with Gonsalvus of Spain (the regent
Franciscan master in Paris). Gonsalvus rejected Godfrey’s arguments and took up a
defense of Henry’s arguments and Lesage responded on Godfrey’s behalf, a debate that
continued for some years.37
John Duns Scotus (who worked under Gonsalvus while at Paris), interested as he was
in the absolute freedom of the will, took a special interest in this debate.38 Duns Scotus’s
views are interesting here for at least two reasons. First of all, the solution that Duns
Scotus arrives at is not (as I will aim to show in Chapter 3) the solution that Durand
arrives at. Second, Duns Scotus seems to have changed his mind while in Paris on the
issue.39 Now, I want to stress ‘seems’ here because (pace Dumont) it still seems to me
Aristotelian analysis of change and apply it to cases of self-change and sets those alongside the others.
Durand invents a new analysis of causation altogether and sets it alongside the others. But insofar as
Durand is a disjunctivist about change—change is either counterfactual dependence or affection—he will
still have to face up to Godfrey’s objections here, as we will see.
37. Gonsalvus disputed DQ 3 against Godfrey. Then Lesage replied in DQ 1. Then Gonsalvus replied
to Lesage in DQ 8. Then Lesage to Gonsalvus in Quodl. I.7. For some discussion, see Dumont, “Did
Duns Scotus Change his Mind on the Will?” 775–6, B Martel, La psychologie de Gonsalve d’Espagne
(Montreal-Paris, 1968), 121–5, 131–4, 147–152, 158–9 (and the references therein) and P. Leonis Amoro´s,
Fr. Gransalui Hispani O.F.M. Quaestiones disputatae et de Quodlibet, BPFSMA 9 (Florence: College of
St. Bonaventure, 1935). A similar debate, in connection with sensation, occurs between Bartholomew of
Bruges and John of Jandun towards the end of the first decade of the 14th century, with Bartholomew
defending a Godfridian position and John the alternative. See the texts edited in Pattin, Pour l’histoire
du sens agent.
38. On Duns Scotus’s relationship with Gonsalvus see Dumont, “Did Duns Scotus Change his Mind on
the Will?” 744–9, 773–9, Amoro´s, Fr. Gransalui Hispani O.F.M. Quaestiones disputatae et de Quodlibet,
18–22, and Eﬄer, John Duns Scotus and the Principle ‘Omne quod movetur ab alio movetur’, 93–96,
149–154.
39. For discussion on Duns Scotus’s (second) stay at Paris at the turn of the new century, see Antonie
Vos, “Duns Scotus at Paris,” in Boulnois et al., DSP, 3–20, Dumont, “Did Duns Scotus Change his
Mind on the Will?” and Timothy B. Noone, “John Duns Scotus’ ‘Quodlibet’,” in Schabel, Theological
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that it is an open question as to whether he changed his mind or merely softened his
tone in order to ameliorate his supervisor, Gonsalvus.40
What is clear, however, is this. In his early treatment of the issue at Oxford (Lect.
II 25), Duns Scotus presents Godfrey’s position as one extreme (according to which the
object is the total cause)41 and Henry of Ghent’s position as the other extreme (according
to which the will is the total cause),42 and opts for a middle way (uia media) according
to which both object and will are two partial causes, jointly sufficient, neither of which
is on its own sufficient.
I answer, therefore, to the quaestio that the efficient cause of an act of willing
is not just the object or the phantasm as the first opinion claims (because this
in no way safeguards freedom) nor is the efficient cause of an act of willing
just the will as the second opinion claims (because this does not safeguard
all the conditions which follow an act of willing). Therefore, I hold a middle
way: both the will and the object cooperate in causing an act of willing such
that the act of willing is from the will and from the object as from an efficient
Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages. The Fourteenth Century, 131–98. On the ‘second’, see the introduction
to the critical apparatus to QDA. Bruno Decker claims that Durand’s Sent. I-A 2.1 contains the first
Dominican criticism of Duns Scotus, who lectured on books I and IV of the Sentences in Paris during
the academic year 1302/3 and disputed his only Quodlibet in 1306/7. Durand is known to have been
in Paris in 1303 and 1307 (see the bio-bibliography). For discussion of a possible connection between
Duns Scotus and Durand, see Bruno Decker, Die Gotteslehre des Jakob von Metz. Untersuchungen zur
Dominikanertheologie zu Beginn des 14. Jahrhunderts, BGPTM 42 (Mu¨nster: Aschendorff, 1967), 45, 72,
86–88, Vos, “Duns Scotus at Paris,” and Schabel, Friedman, and Balcoyiannopoulou, “Peter of Palude,”
190, fn. 12. In my view, Sent. II-A 3.5 shows signs of Durand’s being aware of Quodl. 13 or, perhaps, it is
the other way around, depending on how we settle the matter of when and where Durand delivered his
first lectures on the Sentences (see the bio-bibliography) and when Duns Scotus delivered his Quodlibet
13.
40. Dumont thinks he did change his position. Dumont, “Did Duns Scotus Change his Mind on the
Will?” 749: “But what does all of this indicate about Scotus’s doctrine of the will in the Reportatio
question? Why has Scotus focused exclusively on Godfrey’s view and left aside all criticism of Henry’s
position? Why has he not explicitly explained volition in terms of partial causality, as he did in the
Lectura, but instead reached a conclusion similar to Henry’s position, which he had so emphatically
rejected at Oxford? The answer can only be that at Paris Scotus undertook a defense of Henry’s
position against Godfrey.” See also ibid., 773: “All evidence considered, it is clear that the Lectura and
the Reportatio contain two different positions on the causality of the will[. . . ].”
41. Lect. II 25 n. 22–5.
42. Lect. II 25 n. 54: “Alia opinio—Gandaui—extrema est quod sola uoluntas est causa effectiua re-
spectu actus uolendi et obiectum cognitum est tantum causa sine qua non[. . . ].”
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cause. (n. 69)
However, in his later treatment at Paris,43 Duns Scotus changes the presentation. He
presents and refutes the first extreme opinion (Godfrey’s) but then presents and offers
some defense of what was previously the second extreme opinion (Henry’s). He also drops
the five arguments he had raised against it.44 Finally, he omits his own positive ‘partial
cause’ thesis.45 However, despite the somewhat spirited defense of the second extreme
opinion (that the will is the total cause), his own responsio which comes towards the end
is presented as the following negative claim:
I say, then, to the quaestio that nothing created apart from the will is the
total cause of volition in the will.46
So did Duns Scotus change his mind on the will? Did he abandon the partial cause
thesis in favor of the sine qua non thesis? The problem is that this negative thesis is
compatible with both the partial cause thesis which he had defended earlier at Oxford
and the sine qua non thesis, for on both views it is true that the object (i.e., something
apart from the will) is not the total cause of the act of willing.47 Even though Duns Scotus
does provide some positive argumentation on behalf of Henry of Ghent’s position (more
on this below), and even though Duns Scotus doesn’t provide any positive argumentation
43. A potential confusion. In what follows I draw from three texts to reconstruct Duns Scotus’s position
at Paris: (1) the text contained in the Vive`s edition, volume 23, which I will call the Reportatio, (2)
the text contained in the Vive`s edition, volume 13, which I will call the *Reportatio, and (3) William of
Alnwick’s Additiones magnae II.25 (edited in Carolus Balic´, Les commentaires de Jean Duns Scot sur les
quatre livres des Sentences. E´tude historique et critique, Bibliotheque de la revue d’histoire eccle´siastique
(Leuven: Bureaux de la revue, 1927), 264–301.) For some discussion, see the Vatican edition, volume 7,
pages 4*–5* and volume 8, 89*–92*. See also the introduction in Franc¸ois Lauret, La cause du vouloir
suivi de l’objet de la jouissance. Traduction, pre´sentation et notes (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2009). In
brief: Reportatio is the most pure, although the differences between these texts is not that dramatic.
44. Lect. II 25 nn. 55–68.
45. ibid., nn. 69–80.
46. *Rep. II 25 n. 22: “Dico ergo ad quaestionem quod nihil aliud a uoluntate est causa totalis uolitionis
in uoluntate.” Rep. II 25 n. 20: “Dico igitur ad quaestionem quod nihil creatum aliud a uoluntate est
causa totalis actus uolendi in uoluntate[. . . ].” It is true that the Latin (indeed the English) could mean:
The will is the total cause and nothing else is the total cause. However, there’s other evidence that Duns
Scotus means to keep his options open. See below.
47. To be explicit: (A) Nothing apart from X is the total cause of ϕ is compatible with (B) X and Y
are two partial causes of ϕ and (C) X is the total cause of ϕ.
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in defense of the ‘partial cause’ thesis, he still seems to wish to leave his options open.
He seems to take, in other words, an ambivalent stance; he never determines which is
better: the partial cause thesis or the sine qua non thesis.
To pick one example, consider his answer to the first opening argument from authority,
which is the same in both the Oxford text and the two Paris texts. The argument is that
Aristotle in De Anima III tells us that the appetible moves an appetite as an unmoved
mover and he seems to mean by this that it is an efficient cause.48 This argument, of
course, is an argument based upon authority; even so it is a good authority and so one
should have an answer to it provided one wishes to to hold that the object is not at
least a partial efficient cause of the volition.49 Hence, in Lect. II 25, Duns Scotus finds
no reason to even give an answer to it since it supports his case.50 But in Rep. II 25 and
*Rep. II 25 he gives two answers. The first is the answer that someone who holds the
partial cause thesis might give. The second, however, is the answer that someone who
does not hold to either the total or partial cause thesis might give. Hence, he seems to
48. Lect. II 25 nn. 2–4: “[. . . ] Philosophus III De anima ponit ordinem mouentium et motorum in ani-
mali, et dicit quod appetitus mouetur ab appetibili mouente non moto; igitur appetibile causat motum in
appetitu (et generaliter loquitur ibi de appetitu [sc. de appetitu sensibili et rationali -PJH]); igitur obiec-
tum appetibile causabit actum in appetitu qui est uoluntas. Dicitur quod appetibile metaphorice mouet
appetitum, contra: Vltimum quod ibi [sc. in ordine mouentium et motorum -PJH] mouetur, mouetur
uere, et si primum [sc. appetibile -PJH] moueret secundum [sc. appetitum -PJH] tantum metaphorice,
hoc non est ponere ordinem mouentium et motorum in animali sed uariatur et aequiuocatur ordo.” Rep.
II 25 n. 1: “[. . . ] per Aristotelem III De anima, text. 54, ordo est mouentium et motorum ut appeti-
tus; quoddam est mouens motum ut appetitus; quoddam mouens immobile ut appetibile, etc. Et quod
Aristoteles ibi loquatur de mouente effectiue et non metaphorice ut finis patet aliter enim aequiuocaret
‘mouens’ quia aliud mouens de quo loquitur mouet effectiue.” *Rep. II 25 n. 1: “III De anima, ponit Aris-
toteles ordinem mouentium et motorum, sic, scilicet quod appetibile est mouens non motum; appetitus
mouens et motum ab ipso, scilicet obiecto appetibili; et tertio motum non mouens, quod scilicet mouetur
per actum et imperium uoluntatis uel appetitus, ut corpus animalis. Non potest dici, quod appetibile
mouet metaphorice, sicut finis mouet, quia tunc Philosophus statim aequiuocaret de ‘mouente’ in suo
processu, cum dicit quod primum, puta appetibile, mouet secundum, scilicet appetitum, et secundum,
scilicet appetitus, mouet tertium, quia secundum, scilicet appetitus, mouet proprie, et in essentialiter
ordinatis, uidetur quod eo genere motus, quo mouetur ultimum a medio, moueatur medium a primo.”
49. The argument itself is a common one. It is present in, e.g., James of Viterbo, Quodl. I.7 and Henry
of Ghent, Quodl. X.9 228, 238–9.
50. ibid., n. 81: “Ad auctoritatem primae partis patet responsio quod est pro hac uia, quod obiectum
mouet simul cum uoluntate respectu actus uolendi; unde ista opinio [sc. Scoti -PJH] habet pro se rationes
affirmatiuas et negatiuas.” The affirmative arguments are the arguments in defense of the thesis that
the object is at least a partial efficient cause (nn. 2–11); the negative arguments in defense of the thesis
that the will is at least a partial cause (nn. 12–20).
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wish to keep both answers on the table as live options.51
In general, Duns Scotus seems to take this ambivalent stance about the causation of
volition in Rep. II 25 and *Rep. II 25. He is clear, however, that the total cause of an act
of willing is not the object; but he is less clear whether or not he thinks we should opt for
the sine qua non thesis or the partial cause thesis at the end of the day, and whenever
he defends the sine qua non thesis he is careful to use qualifiers such as “by maintaining
the view that” or “one might say”.52
By contrast, consider his treatment of the issue of the causation of a cognitive act.
At Oxford, in his Lectura (Lect. I 3.3.2–3), he had also considered Godfrey’s thesis and
a sine qua non thesis and he rejects both, using some of the same arguments from II.25.
(He maintains, of course, the partial cause thesis.) In Ord. I 3.3.2 and Quodl. 15 (i.e., at
Paris)53 he considers, again, Godfrey’s thesis and a sine qua non thesis. In Ord. I 3.3.2 he
adds an interesting revision, a comment as to how one might be able to defend the notion
of a sine qua non cause in the case of volition.54 Yet, in Quodl. 15 and Ord. I 3.3.2, he
does not take an ambivalent stance about the issue of the object’s causal role: he clearly
opts for the partial cause thesis. He writes:
I should answer to the quaestio that an actual thought is something that isn’t
perpetually in us but it has existence after it had non-existence just as we
51. Rep. II 25 n. 21: “Ad primum principale, sustinendo quod obiectum mouet effectiue uoluntatem, non
tamen est causa totalis, tunc auctoritas Aristotelis est pro me. Vel sustinendo quod tantum appetibile
mouet metaphorice, tunc uult Aristoteles intelligere quod sicut appetibile mouet appetitum metaphorice
ita appetitus motus mouet effectiue animal ad exequendum, ut acquiratur illud appetibile.” *Rep. II 25
n. 24: “Ad primum principale, qui diceret quod obiectum mouet uoluntatem effectiue, non tamen ut
totalis causa sed ut aliquid ibi faciens, tunc non esset glossanda auctoritas quod mouet sc. metaphorice,
ut tunc auctoritas esset pro me. Vel sustinendo et dicendo quod appetibile mouet appetitum tantum
metaphorice, tunc debet intelligi, quod sicut appetibile mouet appetitum metaphorice, ita appetitus sic
motus mouet effectiue membra ad exequendum, ut acquiratur illud appetibile.”
52. *Rep. II 25 n. 18: “[. . . ] sustinendo quod quamquam uoluntas sit actiua, tamen intellectio uel
obiectum apprehensum est illud sine quo non sicut ponunt alii quod intellectio sine phantasmate non est
in actu, et hoc facit naturalis ordo potentiarum[. . . ].” Rep. II 25 n. 14: “[. . . ] sustinendo quod quamquam
uoluntas sit actiua, tamen intellectio est sine qua non uel obiectum quamquam nihil agat, sicut ponunt
alii quod intellectio non est sine phantasmate actu et illud facit ordo naturalis potentiarum[. . . ].”
53. He omits the question in his Paris Reportatio, book one, distinction three.
54. In fact, an additio: Ord. I 3.3.2 n. 417–421 (quoted in footnote 57 below).
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experience. It is fitting to posit some active cause of this actual thought which
is somehow in us for otherwise it would not be under our control to think when
we want (which is against the Philosopher in De Anima II). However, it seems
obvious here that it is fitting that the soul and the present object concur [. . . ].
I say, then, that the total active cause of this thought is not the object [. . . ]
nor is the total cause of the thought the intellective soul or something formally
belonging to it [. . . ]. If, therefore, neither the soul alone nor the object alone
is the total cause of the actual thought—and these alone are what seem to be
required for the thought—it follows that these two are one integrated cause
with respect to the generated cognition. (Ord. I 3.3.2 nn. 486–94)
Hence, object and intellect are two partial causes, both necessary, and jointly sufficient
in causing the thought—a thesis Duns Scotus doesn’t back down from throughout his
career.55
Whether or not Duns Scotus changed his mind on the will is an intriguing issue, of
course, but I think we can set it to one side at the moment, for what is important here is
how he goes about defending (even if it is a tentative defense) the sine qua non thesis—
both against Godfrey’s attack and, for that matter, against his own earlier one from the
Lectura. In what follows, then, I want to first go over his analysis of Godfrey’s position,
showing where he agrees and disagrees with Godfrey’s attack on sine qua non causality,
and then I will turn to his later defense of sine qua non causality.
2.3.1 Duns Scotus vs. Godfrey
Now, common to both the Oxford and Paris texts is a rejection of Godfrey’s thesis that the
object is the total efficient cause of the act of willing, a view which, of course, entails that
55. In a very early work (if authentic), QDA q. 12 (Vtrum potentiae animae, sc. intellectiua et sensitiua,
sint tantum passiuae), Duns Scotus discusses the same issue, but his presentation and his answer (if he
even gives one) are very different. He doesn’t, for instance, discusses Godfrey’s view nor the partial
cause thesis. The editors of the (recent) critical edition make the interesting case that this text is also
from Paris, albeit from an earlier stay, sometime in the early 1290s.
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the will is totally passive. This view, as Duns Scotus puts it, fails to safeguard freedom.56
However, such a view, Duns Scotus admits, does follow from the act-potency axiom. But
the act-potency axiom is not as certain as Godfrey thinks it is: there are, in fact, quite a
few prima facie exceptions to the act-potency axiom (other than the will) which at least
suggest that it might be neither the most universal metaphysical principle nor the most
certain. Indeed, Duns Scotus doesn’t hesitate to ridicule Godfrey’s recalcitrance on this
point. In Rep. II 25, for instance, Duns Scotus writes:
This [“that something can move itself”] is not opposed to a metaphysical
principle since metaphysical principles are most evident and this principle
[“that nothing moves itself”], when its terms are made evident, does not
occur to many people; in fact, it seems to them that it is false. (n. 10)
In Quaest. Meta. IX.14 he writes:
What he adds there concerning metaphysical principles is true: there are most
universal metaphysical principles and none of them allows for a particular
exception to the rule. [. . . ] But how is this [“that nothing moves itself”] said
to be a principle since so many absurda follow from it? I do not believe that
Aristotle had posited such a complex principle as the first much less the tenth
which entails so many obvious absurda in so many particular cases! (n. 23)
In the Ordinatio we find similar passages: “there are no metaphysical principles that en-
tail that so many singular instances are false” (Ord. I 3.3.2 n. 516). Hence, “the principle
that they rely upon is false, namely, that the mover and the moved must be distinct in
subject” (Lect. II 25 n. 46).
So, Duns Scotus rejects the act-potency axiom both at Oxford and at Paris. This,
of course, makes perfect sense since a rejection of Godfrey’s thesis that the object is
56. In the case of cognition, his main line of argument is to appeal to various cases of intellectual
cognition which suggest that the intellect is at least in part active. See Ord. I 3.3.2, Lect. I 3.3.2–3 and
Quodl. 15; cf. QDA q. 12.
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the total cause does not entail the sine qua non theory. As we saw above, on Duns
Scotus’s view, the necessity principle—the thesis that an action is always an action upon
something else somehow distinct from the agent (see page 56 above)—is true in the case
of an univocal agent, but quite false in the case of an equivocal agent.57 An equivocal
agent is able to act upon itself and reduce itself from potency to act as both the efficient
and material cause. Even more generally, Duns Scotus tells us, if the act-potency axiom
were without exception, then we would be unable to account for the contingency we find
in the world.58
2.3.2 Duns Scotus vs. Henry of Ghent
However, as mentioned, granted a rejection of the act-potency axiom, we are still free to
endorse either the sine qua non thesis or the partial cause thesis. In Lect. II 25, Duns
Scotus seems to have taken a liking to Godfrey’s mystery and ad hoc objections against
the sine qua non thesis (see page 62 above) and so opts for the partial cause thesis.
Indeed, Duns Scotus uses these two objections in his refutation of Henry’s position, and
he rejects the sine qua non thesis as both ad hoc and mysterious in the Lectura. For
instance, he writes:
In addition to the four kinds of causes it would be necessary to posit some
57. In addition to the passage quoted on page 57, see also Rep. II 25 n. 12: “Et cum dicitur passum
est tale in potentia quale agens in actu, dico quod hoc est uerum in actione uniuoca et impossibile est
quod idem sit in actu ens formaliter tale, et in potentia ante actum formaliter tale; tamen in actione
aequiuoca numquam oportet hoc esse uerum quia ibi agens oportet esse nobilius et uirtualiter tale.”
See also Ord. I 3.3.2 n. 516: “[. . . ] intelligendo autem quod nihil est in actu uirtuali et in potentia ad
actum formalem, et quod ista repugnantia accipiatur ex ratione actus et potentiae, multa sunt singularia
satis patenter falsa, ex quo satis sequitur quod istud non est principium metaphysicum. Sed quod nihil
est in actu formali et in potentia respectu eiusdem actus formalis, est uerum, scilicet quod sic nihil est
simul in actu et in potentia. Et si omnino contendas quod ‘etiam loquendo de actu uirtuali et potentia
ad formalem actum, sit principium metaphysicum’, quomodo alii erant ita caeci, et ille solus uidens,
ut rationem terminorum communium metaphysicorum non possent concipere, et ex eis apprehendere
ueritatem talis complexi quod ipse ponit principium metaphysicum? — quod non tantum ab aliis non
ponitur principium, immo in multis falsum, et nusquam necessarium ratione terminorum.”
58. Rep. II 25 n. 20: “[. . . ] aliquid euenit contingenter in rebus, hoc est, euitabiliter [. . . ]. Quaero igitur:
a qua causa contingenter euenit?” For further discussion of Duns Scotus’s rejection of the act-potency
axiom, see King, “Duns Scotus on the Reality of Self-Change” and Eﬄer, John Duns Scotus and the
Principle ‘Omne quod movetur ab alio movetur’.
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other cause or to reduce a sine qua non cause to one of them, since when all
the causes are posited, it is necessary to posit the effect.59
And likewise he applies the ad hoc or slippery slope objection:
Against this [i.e., Henry’s opinion] it is argued with the argument of the other
people who hold the opposite position [i.e., Godfrey]: [If it is true], then it
can be said that any item whatsoever changes itself (e.g., the branch burns
itself when fire is present). This is because, on this view, the following is a
non sequitur: “When fire is present the stick becomes hot and when fire is
absent the stick doesn’t become hot; therefore fire makes the stick hot.” On
this view, what follows is: “Therefore, the branch makes itself hot and fire
is a sine qua non.” Just as, according to you [i.e., Henry], the following is a
non sequitur: “When the object cognized by the intellect is posited a volition
is posited and when the object is removed the volition is removed; therefore,
the object is the cause of volition.” On this view, what follows is: “Therefore
the object is a sine qua non.”60
Hence, in the Lectura, Duns Scotus decides that at least these last two steps in
Godfrey’s achilles argument convince: they convince us to maintain that the object’s
causal role is efficient even if they do not convince us to maintain that the object is the
59. Lect. II 25 n. 58. Duns Scotus makes the same charge against the sine qua non thesis in the
case of cognition in Lect. I 3.3.2–3 n. 324: “Praeterea tantum sunt quattuor genera causarum, ex II
Physicorum et V Metaphysicae, quae simul accepta sufficienter ponunt effectum in esse si sint sufficienter
approximata passo et passum sit summe dispositum quia si causae quattuor existentes in tali dispositione
non producerent effectum in esse, tunc non sufficienter essent causae, sed esset ponenda quinta causa.
Praesentibus igitur causis—uel quattuor uel duabus uel tribus uel quotquot habet necessitas—illis positis
et sufficienter approximatis ad passum, effectus producitur ab eis uel necessario, si agant ex necessitate
naturae, uel possunt producere, si agant libere. Sed obiecto non existente praesente, non potest anima
habere actionem suam intelligendi, et tamen anima tunc est sufficienter disposita; sunt etiam quattuor
causae, secundum istam opinionem, nam sufficit quod duae causae praecedant, scilicet causa efficiens et
materialis, forma autem et finis secundum esse sequuntur. Sed si anima sola sit principium sufficiens
eliciendi actum, tunc istae duae causae praecedunt, quia anima est et efficiens et recipiens et sunt summe
disposita; ergo anima obiecto non praesente intelligeret, quod falsum est. Non igitur anima est sufficiens
principium eliciendi actum sed requiritur aliud in rationem principii eliciendi.”
60. Lect. II 25 n. 57.
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only efficient cause. In other words, he thinks that there is no problem in the view that
the subject acts upon itself as both agent and patient (and so violates the act-potency
axiom). However, the mystery and ad hoc arguments compel us to avoid the thesis that
the subject is the total cause of an act of volition and the object a mere sine qua non
cause. For what kind of cause is a sine qua non cause? And, were we to allow sine
qua non causality in the one case, then we would seem to be forced to allow it in every
case. Rather, the object is a partial efficient cause cooperating with the will as the other
partial efficient cause in much the same way that a mother and a father cooperate in the
production of a child or the husband and the wife in good housekeeping.61
While Duns Scotus gives four other arguments against the sine qua non thesis, I want
to highlight just one more of these before I turn to his very different treatment in Rep.
II 25 and *Rep. II 25. The third argument he raises against the sine qua non thesis is as
follows:
The act of willing is essentially related to the object as what is measured
to the measure and not the other way around (for from the fact that the
stone is willed, it does not follow that it depends upon the will). But what is
measured depends upon the measure either as a posterior effect upon a prior
effect or as an effect upon a cause. (I am not talking about the sort of priority
with respect to which the human nature depends upon the suppositum of the
Word and an accident upon its subject [. . . ].) But the act of will does not
depend upon the cognized object as upon a prior effect. Therefore, as upon
a cause.62
61. Lect. II 25 n. 73: “Tertio modo aliquando plura agentia concurrunt in causando ita quod alterius
ordinis sunt aut rationis, contra primum modum, quorum neutrum capit ab alio uirtutem actiuam sed
utrumque habet causalitatem propriam perfectam in suo genere—unum tamen est agens principale et
aliud minus principale, ut pater et mater ad productionem prolis et stilus et penna ad scribendum
et uir et mulier ad regimen domus. Sic in proposito: uoluntas habet rationem unius causae, scilicet
causae partialis respectu actus uolendi et natura actu cognoscens obiectum rationem alterius causae
partialis—et utraque simul est una causa totalis respectu actus uolendi.”
62. Lect. II 25 n. 66. For discussion of the issue related to the parenthetical aside, see Giorgio Pini,
“Substance, Accident, and Inherence. Scotus and the Paris Debate on the Metaphysics of the Eucharist,”
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Call this the Dependency Objection: a volition depends upon the object; yet this
dependence relation isn’t the kind of dependence relation that one effect has upon some
prior effect. Therefore, it is the dependence relation that an effect has upon its cause.
Notice that Duns Scotus never gives us a reason why the dependence relation can’t be
of one effect upon some prior effect, which is interesting since this is precisely how he
explains sine qua non causality in Rep. II 25 and *Rep. II 25.
2.3.3 Duns Scotus vs. Duns Scotus
So, how does the Duns Scotus at Paris answer to these objections from the Duns Scotus
at Oxford?63
The mystery objection, Duns Scotus’s reply
Duns Scotus decides that there can be a kind of ‘natural priority’ which is not the priority
that obtains between a cause and its effect. He points out that even Godfrey would have
to admit this much, because Godfrey holds that there can be no volition unless there
is first a cognition, and yet a cognition is neither material nor efficient cause of the
volition. Hence, it is a necessary or sine qua non precondition: “igitur tale sine qua non
necessario praeexigitur” (Rep. II 25 n. 16). In general, Duns Scotus declares, if one effect,
in Boulnois et al., DSP, 273–312. See Lect. III 1.1 and Ord. III 1.
63. He raises the ad hoc objection against himself in Rep. II 25 n. 4; *Rep. II 25 n. 4. Rep. II 25 n. 4:
“Si dicatur quod non sequitur [sc. semper esset actio -PJH], quia obiectum est causa sine qua non et
ideo non potest esse semper uolitio nisi obiecto praesente, contra: Sic posset sustineri quod quodlibet
semper agit in se quantum est ex parte sui quod tamen non semper agit in se, hoc est, quia aliquid
deficit sine qua non. Vnde lignum est combustiuum sui non tamen comburit se nisi igne praesente quia
ignis est sine qua non. Ita igitur probabiliter posset sustineri quodlibet agere in se sicut uoluntatem
agere in se.” *Rep. II 25 n. 4: “Dices quod obiectum apprehensum requiritur, sicut causa sine qua non
[. . . ], contra: quia sic posset sustinere, quod quodlibet agit in se, nam si lignum approximatum igni
comburatur, dicam eodem modo quod ignis non comburit sed lignum comburit se, et ignis est causa
sine qua non, et sic dicam de omnibus.” He raises the mystery objection against himself in Rep. II 25.n.
15; *Rep. II 25 n. 20. Rep. II 25.n. 15: “Dices effectus non dependet nisi a causis prioribus, ut materia,
efficiente, quantum ad fieri, igitur si obiectum non sit actiuum nec est materia actus uolendi, igitur non
dependet ab obiecto.” *Rep. II 25 n. 20: “Si etiam instes sic: Effectus non dependet a causis prioribus
quantum ad suum fieri, nisi a materia et efficiente; cum igitur obiectum respectu actus uolitionis non se
habeat nec ut materia nec ut efficiens, igitur uolitio non dependebit ab obiecto, et sic esse poterit sine
obiecto.”
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B, can’t come about unless some other effect, A, already exists, then, provided A is not
the efficient cause of B, A is a sine qua non cause of B. B depends upon A as a sine qua
non cause or necessary precondition (praeexactum).64 The example he goes on to give is
the following:
Example: The sun can’t illuminate the posterior part of the medium unless
it illuminates first (in nature)65 the part closer to it; and yet the part closer
to it having been illuminated is not a cause with respect to the illumination
of the posterior (more distant) part since it is immediately illuminated by the
sun as the immediate cause. Whence, so too sensory imaging (phantasiatio)
or the apprehended object is necessary for volition and as a sine qua non
cause.66
64. Rep. II 25 nn. 15–6: “Dices effectus non dependet nisi a causis prioribus, ut materia, efficiente,
quantum ad fieri, igitur si obiectum non sit actiuum nec est materia actus uolendi, igitur non dependet
ab obiecto; igitur semper erit in actu, sicut sensus semper sentiret si esset actiuus. Dico quod necessario
est aliqua prioritas naturae quae non est prioritas causae respectu effectus quia, secundum sic arguentes,
intellectio est necessario prius natura uolitione et tamen non in aliquo genere causae, igitur tale sine qua
non necessario praeexigitur, et non sufficiunt causae per se ad fieri, ut actiua et passiua. Istam prioritatem
oportet ponere propter ordinem potentiarum et tamen potentia inferior non est causa superioris. Vnde
phantasiatio non est causa totalis intellectionis et tamen necessario est prius in nobis ut plurimum et
maxime secundum istum doctorem [sc. Godfrey -PJH] qui ponit quod agens et patiens sunt distincta
subiecto, oportet ponere prius uolitione aliquid in parte intellectiua ut intellectionem quae tamen per
eum nullo modo est causa uoluntatis. Dico igitur quod quando unus effectus est posterior alio effectu
et neuter habet rationem causae respectu alterius, posterior effectus habet dependentiam ad causam
prioram et effectum priorem tamquam ad sine qua non.” *Rep. II 25 n. 19: “Dico igitur hic primo,
quod oportet in hac materia, etiam secundum eos, dare aliquid prius, quod tamen non sit causa efficiens,
sed sit causa sine qua non, et hoc probo per ipsum, qui hanc opinionem ponit. Nam secundum ipsum
intellectus non est causa intellectionis, nec uoluntas uolitionis, sed solum phantasma est causa utriusque,
et tamen, secundum eum, impossibile est phantasma prius causare uolitionem, nisi prius natura causet
intellectionem, et ita ponit intellectionem esse causam sine qua non ipsius uolitionis. Quod igitur uoce
negat, dictis suis affirmat, scilicet causam sine qua non. Intellectio enim, secundum eum, est prior
natura uolitione, tamen in nullo genere causae se habet respectu uolitionis; quando enim aliquis effectus
praecedit alium effectum ordine naturae, non potest causa exire in actum causandi effectum posteriorem,
non prius causato effectu priori illa prioritate.” n. 20: “Patet satis per praedicta huius obiectionis solutio,
licet enim effectus dependeat solum a causis prioribus, quantum ad suum fieri per se et suum esse per
se, materia scilicet et efficiente, potest tamen dependere ex alio tanquam ex illo, quod est praeexactum
necessario.”
65. The proviso ‘in nature’: because both effects might come about at the same precise time; but
conceptually the prior effect is prior to the posterior effect.
66. *Rep. II 25 n. 19. Rep. II 25 n. 16: “Vnde totus radius est immediate a sole, immediatione causae,
et tamen non potest fieri pars remotior a sole nisi prius natura fiat pars prior. Proprie loquendo de
dependentia effectus ad illud quod dat sibi esse effectus tantum dependet ex causis per se; loquendo
tamen de illo ad quod dependet tamquam necessario praeexactum dependet ad illud tamquam ad aliquid
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What Duns Scotus is driving at is a defense of the option he rejected in the dependency
argument. It would seem that X might depend upon Y for its very existence even though
(a) Z (not Y) is the efficient cause of X and (b) Y is neither the material, formal, or final
cause of X. A sine qua non cause is simply a necessary precondition.67
sine qua non.” It is interesting to note that Godfrey had also considered a similar case in Quodl. XV.20
(and so in Paris in 1303/4). See his example of the motion of the stick on page 73.
67. Duns Scotus makes the same point, at some greater lengths, in an additio to Ord. I 3.3.2 (nn.
417–21). This addition comes after his refutation of the sine qua non thesis of cognition, a refutation
which is the same as the one found in Lect. I 3.3.2–3. In brief, he outlines four cases where a sine qua
non cause has purchase: (1) volition/pleasure: one can’t take pleasure in something unless one already
is engaged in an act of volition; but the act of volition isn’t the efficient cause of the act of taking
pleasure; (2) thought/desire: one can’t have a desire unless one has a thought; (3) the intelligible species
or phantasm/thought: one can’t have a thought unless one has a phantasm or intelligible species; (4)
sunlight in the air/water: light isn’t in the water unless it is in the air. I quote this passage at length, even
though it is a kind of scattered note because I think it hasn’t been emphasized in the literature. Moreover,
it would seem that Duns Scotus might allow for a sine qua non analysis of at least intellectual cognition.
“Haec tamen ratio concluderet similo modo ut uidetur contra actionem uoluntatis. Vnde responderi
potest quod quando formae habent essentialem ordinem ut recipiuntur in eadem siue natura siue potentia,
et hoc siue ab eodem agente siue alio, dato etiam quod neutra sit ratio recipiendi alteram, numquam
secundum potest induci ab agente in suo receptiuo nisi prima prius inducta. Exemplum de uolitione et
delectatione: ponendo illa esse diuersa realiter, numquam secunda recipitur nisi prima prius recipiatur;
cum tamen secunda habeat causam actiuam naturalem [sc. obiectum -PJH] praesentem sibi antequam
sit uolitio, in huiusmodi ordinatis negatur maior. Simile de specie intelligibile ad intellectionem, ponendo
speciem intelligibilem non esse causam nec receptiuum intellectionis; simile de lumine in medio, si non
sit actiuum nec receptiuum speciei coloris. Nota: aliter dicitur quod quandocumque aliquam formam
recipi in suo potentiali de necessitate praeexigit aliam formam recipi in suo susceptiuo, falsa est illa
maior ‘agens perfectum approximatum passo et non impeditum potest agere’, intelligendo de potentia
propinqua—et hoc siue receptiuum formae prioris sit eadem potentia cum receptiuo formae posterioris
(exemplum: uolitio et delectatio in uoluntate), siue sit eadem natura (exemplum: in anima intellectio et
uolitio, ponendo uoluntatem totaliter actiuuam respectu uelle), siue in eodem supposito recipiantur non
in una natura nec potentia (exemplum: de phantasmate et intellectione, si negetur species intelligibilis et
actio tota detur intellectui), siue in alio et alio supposito recipiatur forma prior et posterior (exemplum:
lumen in aere et in aqua, a sole). Nec hic saluatur propositio quod ‘forma prior sit actiua respectu
posterioris uel ratio recipiendi’ sicut lumen in medio respectu speciei coloris, quia si in talibus instetur,
nihil ualet instantia, quia ibi actiuum proximum deficeret uel passiuum proximum: in quattuor instantiis
iam positis [sc. volition/delectation, intellection/volition, phantasm/intellection, lumen -PJH] neutro
conditio [sc. quod actiuum proximum deficit uel passiuum proximum -PJH] accidit, nam nec uolitio
est causa actiua delectationis, sed obiectum, nec receptiua, sed uoluntas; sic in aliis [instantiis -PJH]
secundum illas opiniones. Nec est dicendum quod maior illa est uera nisi ab eodem agente sint duo
effectus necessario secundum ordinem producibiles, quia etiam non est uera si necessario sit ordo inter
formas a diuersis agentibus inducibiles, sicut patet in instantiis positis. Vniuersaliter ergo, quaecumque
forma ad hoc ut recipiatur in suo passiuo requirit aliam prius recipi in quocumque et a quocumque,
numquam actiuum formae secundae est in potentia accidentali ad agendum in receptiuum illius nisi
forma priore iam inducta. Ergo forma posterior quoad fieri dependet essentialiter ab alio a suis per se
causis in fieri quae sunt agens et materia. Potest concedi haec conclusio, quia prius essentialiter non
tantum competit causae (patet in tractatu De primo principio cap. 1) tamen non probabiliter negatur
illa nisi ostendatur prioritas formae alterius—uel ut actiuae respectu secundae uel ut rationis recipiendi
uel ut effectus propinquioris causae communi uel cauase necessario prius causanti.”
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The ad hoc objection, Duns Scotus’s reply
As to the ad hoc objection, Duns Scotus gives a number of answers. One answer he gives
appeals to control (potestas):
I say, therefore, that it is fitting that a patient be affected by something else
(pati ab alio) and when it can’t be affected by something else, it follows that
it is affected by itself (pati a se). But the will is not affected (in connection
with its act) by some other created item apart from itself, since to will is
under the control of the will, whereas an extrinsic agent is not under the
control of the will. (Rep. II 25 n. 15 [om. *Rep. II 25])
This looks to be a direct answer to Godfrey’s charge: the rational criterion which Godfrey
worries about is simply the fact that the will has control over what it undergoes, whereas
other patients do not have such control. Hence, in cases where an effect in some subject
is under its control then we can claim that what looks to be the efficient cause of that
effect (i.e., the object in the case of a volition) is, in fact, a mere sine qua non cause.
This seems to provide a neat enough division between branches erupting into flame and
Socrates’ wanting something.
Still, an appeal to ‘control’ seems rather dubious; indeed, it looks close to Godfrey’s
complaint that one can simply declare that “this is its nature” and be done with it.
Moreover, it comes close to begging the question: Why is the will so special? Well, it’s
because it has control. What does it mean to have control? Well, to be the will, of
course.
Another answer he gives is more interesting. He writes:
One doesn’t have to claim that, therefore, all items are active with respect
to themselves and simply lack sine qua non causes since, as Aristotle in De
generatione [et corruptione] II [says]: “Nature always does what is better.”
Hence, just as one ought not to ever posit a plurality without necessity, so
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too one ought not to ever posit that a nature is ignoble without necessity.
However, an item receptive of a perfection is more perfect if it is able to be
active with respect to this perfection and so nature supplied the need as often
as it could. (Rep. II 25 n. 16 [om. *Rep. II 25])
I want to call this Scotus’s Razor: numquam est natura ignobilitanda sine necessitate.
One shouldn’t, in other words, suppose without good reason that something is so ignoble
that it is incapable of self-action.
What Duns Scotus seems to be doing with this answer is shifting the burden of proof.
Our default intuition, he seems to be saying, should be that X becomes Y owing to X
itself as efficient cause. This should be taken to be the standard case and so anytime
something changes from one state to another we should assume that it did it to itself
unless there is some manifest reason why not.68
2.3.4 Concluding remarks on Duns Scotus
I want to close this discussion of Duns Scotus’s theory of sine qua non causality with a
few concluding remarks.
1. First, I want to stress one aspect of Duns Scotus’s position here which will be
important when we come to Durand’s view. On Duns Scotus’s view, the will is affected.
The will receives or takes on its own volition. Of course, it is not affected by something
else (pati ab alio) but it is affected by itself (pati a se). Hence, I characterized Duns
68. Rep. II 25 nn. 16–17 (emphasis mine): “Cum igitur existens in actu primo perfecte et tantum
in potentia accidentali ad actum secundum non eget agente extrinseco ad hoc quod exeat de potentia
ad actum, ut patet octauo Physicorum et secundo De anima, illud est nobilitas naturalis. Ideo dico
uniuersaliter quod omne existens in actu primo perfecte sufficat ad hoc quod exeat in actum secundum
nisi possit manifeste probari quod aliud ad hoc requiratur. Sicut manifeste patet quod uisus non sufficit
existens in actu primo ad hoc quod exeat ex se in actum secundum quia ut patet in tenebris non
uidemus.” *Rep. II 25 n. 20: “Dico tertio, ad instantiam de ligno calefactiuo sui, cum dicitur, si ita esset
de uoluntate, ita posset dici de quocumque alio, scilicet quod lignum comburit seipsum praesente igne,
qui est causa sine qua non, concedo quod existens in actu primo mouendi se, seipso actiue et non alio,
exit in actum secundum, sicut habens scientiam in actu primo, non indiget aliquo effectiuo uel motiuo
ducente ipsum ad actum considerandi, nisi habens actum primum deficiat in aliquo, quod necessario
requiritur ad hoc, quod possit exire ad actum secundum; sicut quamuis oculus hominis, qui non potest
immutare medium, haberet actum primum uidendi, non tamen posset uidere rem in tenebris.”
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Scotus’s position as a kind of self-affectionism. The will is both active and passive: it
is passive, at least, because it is the passive recipient of the volition; it is active, as
well, because nothing else could be the corresponding agent, at least not in the created
world. Durand, by contrast, will want to insist that the will (and for that matter any
psychological powers) is not passive in this sense, for no psychological change should
be analyzed as a kind of being affected, even if we have available the resources to cash
out this notion in terms of self-affection, that is, even if we aren’t committed to the
further thesis that the object is the agent which acts upon the power. What is at issue
here, as we’ll see in Chapter 3, is the ontology of psychological acts. On Duns Scotus’s
view, a psychological act is an absolute form received into the subject. He makes this
explicit when he defends the thesis that our mental acts are, ontologically, absolute items
(qualities) as opposed to relative entities in Quodl. 13.69 Durand defends the opposite
thesis: a mental act is a relation and not an absolute form superadded to the mental
faculty. Hence, he holds that psychological change isn’t a kind of being affected (and
so doesn’t involve the reception of form) but it is rather a kind of being related: it
involves the acquisition of a new relational property and not the acquisition of a new
non-relational property.
2. Second, Duns Scotus seems to be, thus, committed to a disjunctive analysis of
change. On his view, a given case of change is either what we might call a so to speak
standard case of change involving an extrinsic agent or it is a special case of change
involving a sine qua non cause.70 Such a disjunctivist position is one which, I have
suggested above, Godfrey of Fontaines rails against. On Godfrey’s view, if there is a case
69. ibid., n. 4: “Cum igitur operatio non sit praecise relatio, ut probant rationes iam positae, sequitur
quod non sit praecise respectus, et per consequens est ibi aliqua entitas absoluta[. . . ].”
70. Obviously, there are non-standard cases of standard change: sometimes the effect has weak or
intentional existence, sometimes the effect requires the constant presence of the agent, sometimes an
effect requires one or more extrinsic agents, sometimes an effect is acquired together with the concomitant
lose of an existing property in the patient and sometimes it is not, and so on. What makes all of these
cases standard however is the fact that one (or more) extrinsic agent is required and that the change is
to be analyzed in terms of the giving and receiving of forms.
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of change, then this is a standard case of change, and he finds it implausible to posit
a special case of change, for then we will have to find some principled reason to decide
whether a given case of change is to be analyzed as a special or a standard change. This
theory works perfectly well in explaining other kinds of natural effects, so why not put
it to work in our explanation of psychological effects? The problem with disjunctivism
is that we must have some criterion that determines us towards one of the disjuncts. Of
course, we might have such a criterion, but I doubt Scotus’s razor will hold up under
analysis in the way Ockham’s razor has.
3 Durand’s theory about the ontological status
and causation of our cognitive acts
According to Godfrey of Fontaines, the present object is to be characterized as the
efficient cause of the cognitive act. Hence, on his view, the presence of the object to a
cognitive power is a necessary but not a sufficient condition under which cognition can
be said to come about, for what is also necessary is that the object act as efficient cause
upon a cognitive power in the cognizant subject, reducing it from potency to act. Such
a view takes cognition to be a passive enterprise, the reception of form owing to the
object as efficient cause.1 Durand, by contrast, holds that the presence of the object is a
sufficient condition under which cognition occurs.2 On Durand’s view, the object should
not be characterized as an efficient cause, which impresses a form upon the cognizant
subject when it is present and in this way reduces a cognitive power in her from potency
to act, but rather the object should be characterized as a so-called sine qua non cause.
In other words, whereas Godfrey holds that the object causes the act, Durand holds that
it occasions the act.
In the last chapter, we saw some of Godfrey’s argumentation in defense of his position.
When object is present to subject, then, were the object not to cause the act, the subject
1. In fact, Godfrey seems to hold that presence is not even a necessary condition, for God might be
able to cause a thought without the object’s being present. See Chapter 1, fn. 70. In what follows, I will
ignore this wrinkle. In other words, at least in the natural order of things, Godfrey holds, the presence
of the object is necessary, for if the object were not present, then it could not act upon the subject as
efficient cause.
2. Durand seems to think that his position doesn’t even force us to make the proviso: “at least in
the natural order of things”, for, while God can bring about in a direct manner an absolute entity, he
can’t bring about in a direct manner a relative entity. Hence, even God must present the object to the
mind in order to cause a thought. See below. It is interesting to note here that Thomas Wylton thinks
that even Durand must still make this proviso. Quaestio, “Quod in intellectu. . . ” 509: “Ideo non est
necesse quod omne obiectum communiter per se causet actum, uel per se cum aliis, uel etiam sine quo
non causatur actus. Nam Deus posset causare in uirtute phantastica mea speciem alicuius rei praesentis
uel futurae quam numquam uidi. Per ipsam speciem haberem actualem cognitionem de re illa, qualem
nunc habeo de absente. Ista tamen obiectiue cognita a me nec per se causauit actum cognitionis in me,
neque per se cum aliis, nec fuit causa sine qua non, quia dato quod esset, talem cognitionem habere
potero per phantasiam.”
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would have to be said to cause the act. But the subject can’t cause the act, since
nothing can be both passive and active with respect to the same thing at the same time,
a thesis that follows from the act-potency axiom. Since Godfrey holds that the act-
potency axiom is the most certain of all metaphysical principles, he thinks that we must,
therefore, maintain that the object is the efficient cause of the cognitive act—and this
despite whatever inchoate intuitions we might have about the relative nobility between
things and the purported active nature of cognition. Moreover, all the going attempts
at explaining the notion of a sine qua non cause, Godfrey argues, are either mysterious
or ad hoc. If the intellect (or the will) which looks to be the passive recipient of the act
owing to its object as cause were, in fact, the agent cause, then why not claim that in
any case where it looks as if X became Y owing to Z as efficient cause, what has actually
transpired is that X became Y owing to X itself (as efficient cause) and Z as mere sine
qua non cause? Furthermore, the cognitive act depends upon the object for its existence
as upon a cause; yet Aristotle offers us but four kinds of causes upon which some effect
might depend and so a sine qua non cause must reduce to one of these, for otherwise it
would be a rather mysterious sort of cause.
Durand, by contrast, holds that the object simply can’t be an efficient cause, for, as
we saw in Chapter 1, he takes serious both the intuition that we possess some sort of
cognitive agency along with the idea that the inanimate can’t be an efficient cause with
respect to the animate. Hence, he holds that Godfrey’s view, as attractive as it might
seem, just can’t stand. Rather, Durand tells us, one ought to characterize the object as
a mere sine qua non cause. But, as Godfrey had asked, what is a sine qua non cause?
Moreover, even provided a coherent and adequate answer to this question—which avoids
the further charge of being a ready-made solution—is it appropriate to characterize the
cause of a cognitive act as a mere sine qua non cause?
In the first section of this chapter, I want to examine Durand’s answer to the first
question. That is, I want to outline Durand’s basic defense of the notion of sine qua
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non causality. I will argue, in brief, that he does meet the challenge that faces him: he
provides a positive account of the notion of a sine qua non cause and in doing so he points
to other domains (besides cognition and volition) wherein the notion has purchase. In
the second section, I will take up the issue of whether it is appropriate to characterize
the cause of a cognitive act as a mere sine qua non cause.
3.1 Durand’s theory of sine qua non causality
In Sent. II-A 3.5, after his discussion and rejection of two theories about the causation of
our cognitive acts—the species-theory of cognition and Godfrey’s theory—Durand tells
us that the first thing to be done here is to investigate the question: Quid sit cognoscere?
He takes this question to be an ontological one and its scope includes both so-called
intellective acts (intelligere) and sensitive acts (sentire). Is a cognitive act, he asks,
something absolute superadded to the cognitive power?3 He goes on to argue that it is
not. Having established this much, he then provides his answer to the causation question:
A quo sit intelligere et cognoscere in nobis? Durand’s decision to address the ontological
question first is not incidental, for as we will see his distinctive thesis about the causation
of a cognitive act is tied up with his distinctive thesis about the ontological status of a
cognitive act. In fact, he thinks that his account of the causation follows in part from
his account of the ontology. He writes:
And so the first [sc. quid sit cognoscere] is clear: thinking (intelligere) doesn’t
make reference to something [absolute] superadded to the intellect. As to the
second [sc. a quo sit cognoscere], it should be said that thinking and sensing
(sentire) are in us (i) from what per se gives us an intellect and our senses
(i.e., the creator or the generator) and also (ii) from the object as sine qua
3. This is the same question which Duns Scotus raises in Quodl. 13; indeed, Durand comes to the
opposite conclusion which Duns Scotus comes to: Durand argues that such acts are relative items and
not non-relative items; Duns Scotus argues that they are non-relative items not relative items.
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non cause. The first member of the conjunction is clear based upon what has
already been said, for if thinking and sensing are not something [absolute]
superadded to the senses and the intellect, then it follows that they are from
the same thing. (Sent. II-A 3.5 20)
Now, it will be important in what follows to distinguish three elements in Durand’s
positive account about the causation of a cognitive act. First, there is the Ontological
Claim. On Durand’s view, a cognitive act—an occurrent episode of cognition in a
cognizant subject—is not something absolute added to the cognitive power—the non-
occurrent capacity for cognition in a cognizant subject. In fact, it is not something
absolute added to the cognizant subject at all but it is rather a kind of relation that
the subject enters into once the object is present. In contemporary terms, we might say
that, on Durand’s view, a thought (or a sensory perception) is not a monadic property
but rather a polyadic property.4
Second, there is what I will call the Generans Claim: a cognitive act comes about
in us (somehow) from what furnished us with our capacity to engage in such cognitive
acts in the first place. Just as what made fire and gave to it its capacity to make other
things hot is the cause (in some sense) of its episodic acts of making things hot, so too
what made Socrates and gave to him his mental capacities is the cause (in some sense)
of his episodic mental acts.
Finally, there is what I will call the Sine Qua Non Claim: the object is involved
in the cognitive process not as an efficient cause but rather as a mere sine qua non cause
(whatever that might mean).
These three claims Durand evidently feels are connected with each other. Indeed, he
tells us that the generans claim follows from the ontological claim. But at first sight the
4. See, e.g., Jeffrey Brower, “Relations without Polyadic Properties: Albert the Great on the Nature
and Ontological Status of Relations,” Archiv fu¨r Geschichte der Philosophie 83 (2001): 225–257 and
Mark Henninger, “Peter Aureoli and William of Ockham on Relations,” Franciscan Studies 45 (1985):
231–44.
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connection between the three claims isn’t at all obvious; in fact, at first sight the claims
themselves aren’t at all obvious. Hence, in what follows, I hope to unpack this passage
so that by the end of this section we should be in a better position to see how these three
claims might be connected to each other and, ultimately, whether or not Durand does
provide an adequate account of sine qua non causality in light of the sorts of objections
to it that we saw in the last chapter. My ultimate goal, of course, will be to show what
Durand’s account of cognition amounts to and what the prospects are for its success.
Hence, in the second section I will address some further issues which his account seems
to face.
3.1.1 The ontological claim
Why would Durand even want to defend such a prima facie absurd claim? After all, I
sometimes think and sometimes do not, which would seem to suggest in a pretty obvious
way that thoughts are something superadded to if not my intellect at least me, for a
thought is something which I have which before I did not. This sort of objection rests
upon precisely the false assumption Durand wishes to undermine. It is true enough that
I sometimes think and I sometimes do not think, but this does not entail that a thought
is, therefore, something absolute superadded to me or my intellect. Quite the contrary,
a thought is not something absolute superadded to me or my intellect.5 Thinking should
be thought of in relational terms: a thought is not (pace almost all of his contemporaries)
an absolute entity like a qualitative form which inheres in or informs whatever it is added
to but it is rather a relative entity like a relation—or, in other words, it is not something I
have but it is a way in which I am related to something else. When I think, nothing non-
5. See, e.g., ibid., 20: “Cum igitur intellectus sit quandoque sine intelligere, uidetur, quod intelligere
faciat compositionem cum intellectu [. . . ]. Et ideo aliter dicendum, quod intellectus non est perfectior,
cum actu intelligit quam ante intelligere per se, sed solum per accidens eo modo, quo graue perfectius
est, cum est deorsum quam impeditum. Quae tamen perfectio non est per compositionem; sicut enim
graue simul cum grauitate acquirit locum, nisi prohibeatur, sic habens intellectum statim per ipsum
intelligit, nisi sit defectus obiecti intelligibilis, ut magis patebit infra.”
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relational is added to me or my intellect which wasn’t there before; rather the intellect
enters into a new relation which it hadn’t been in before. On Durand’s view, just as
relations aren’t in or added to the related subject, so too thoughts aren’t in or added
to the thinking subject. Or, to put it the other way around: Just as relations are in or
added to the related subject, so too thoughts are in or added to the thinking subject;
but the manner in which a relation is in or added to its foundation is quite different
from the manner in which an absolute accident is in or added to its subject. According
to Durand’s ‘modalist’ theory of relations, absolute accidents inhere in or inform their
subjects whereas relative accidents do not.6
His ontological claim seems to have prompted a fairly immediate response from his
academic supervisor, Hervaeus Natalis.7 In Quodl. II.8, while answering the question
6. For some discussion on Durand’s ‘modalist’ theory of relations, see Dewender, “Der ontologische
Status der Relationen nach Durandus von St.-Pourcain, Hervaeus Natalis und Petrus Aureoli,” Iribarren,
“La christologie de Durand de Saint-Pourc¸ain dans le contexte de l’e´mergence du thomisme au XIV
sie`cle,” 250–2, Mark Henninger, Relations: Medieval Theories, 1250–1325 (Oxford: OUP, 1989), 177–
8, Iribarren, “Some Points of Contention in Medieval Trinitarian Theology: The Case of Durandus of
Saint-Pourc¸ain in the Early Fourteenth Century,” 293–4, Mu¨ller, Die Lehre vom verbum mentis, 97–
8, Iribarren, Durandus of St. Pourc¸ain: A Dominican Theologian in the Shadows of Aquinas, 109–21,
Decker, Die Gotteslehre, 427–38, Maria Fumagalli, Durando di S. Porziano. Elementi filosofici della terza
redazione del Commento alle Sentenze (Florence: La Nuova Italia, 1969), 93–113, Rolf Scho¨nberger,
Relation als Vergleich. Die Relationstheorie des Johannes Buridan im Kontext seines Denkens und der
Scholastik (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1994), 125–31. In Durand, see Sent. I-AC 33.1, Sent. I-AC 30.2, QA I.1,
Sent. IV-C 12.1. Durand’s ‘modalist’ theory of relations is in part derived from Henry of Ghent. In
Henry, see SQO 32.5 and 55.6, Quodl. VII.1–2, IX.3, III.4, V.2. For discussion, see J. Paulus, Henri de
Gand: Essai sur les tendances de sa me´taphysique, E´tudes de philosophie me´die´vale 25 (Paris: J. Vrin,
1938), Henninger, Relations, ch. 3, Jos Decorte, “Relatio as Modus Essendi : The Origins of Henry of
Ghent’s Definition of Relation,” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 10, no. 3 (2002): 309–336
and Isabel Iribarren, “Henry of Ghent’s Teaching on Modes and Its Influence in the Fourteenth Century,”
Medieval Studies (2002): 111–29.
7. Josef Koch used Hervaeus Natalis’s second Quodlibet (Christmas 1308 or Easter 1309) as a termi-
nus ad quem for Durand’s first redaction, since in it Hervaeus quotes Durand while attacking several of
his positions whereas in Hervaeus’s first Quodlibet (Christmas 1307 or Easter 1308) there is no mention
whatsoever of Durand’s views. For a status quaestionis on the dating of Hervaeus’s Quodlibeta, see
Friedman, “Dominican Quodlibetal Literature.” However, the terminus a quo for Durand’s first redac-
tion is still very much an open question, although 1303 is the usual answer. For a status quaestionis
on the dating of Durand’s Sentences see Russell Friedman, “The Sentences Commentary, 1250–1320.
General Trends, the Impact of the Religious Orders, and the Test Case of Predestination,” in Medieval
Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard. Current Research, ed. G. Evans, vol. 1 (Leiden: E.J.
Brill, 2002), 41–128 and the bio-bibliography at the end of the present dissertation. In sum, we can’t
conclude that Durand, therefore, delivered his lectures which culminate in his first redaction between
1307/8 (when Hervaeus delivered his first Quodlibet) and 1308/9 (the date of his second), although very
recently William J. Courtenay, “The Role of University Masters and Bachelors at Paris in the Templar
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whether thinking and saying (dicere) are the same in God, Hervaeus makes one of the
earliest explicit references to Durand’s ontological claim.
But here what remains is but one doubt, namely, what sort of thing is an act
of thinking? Concerning this some say that all cognitive dispositional states
(habitus) and [episodic] operations, both of the intellect and of the sense and
of their respective appetites, are pure relations (pure relationes); however, I
hold that they are certain absolute qualities and the foundation of certain
respects that follow upon them as will be proved in Quodlibet III. (Quodl. II.8
f. 48vb)8
As advertised, in Quodl. III.8 (Christmas 1309), Hervaeus returns to Durand’s ontologi-
cal claim and he attacks, point-by-point, Durand’s Sent. II-A 3.5. Not only did Durand’s
thesis initiate an immediate reaction from his supervisor, it also stuck. Even after Du-
rand’s second redaction (before 1312), which omits these claims and the discussion entire,
we can find authors citing (and refuting) Durand’s ontological claim as found in Sent.
II-A 3.5.9
Arguments from the disputatio
We owe a great deal of debt to Josef Koch, who first brought Durand’s Sent. II-A 3.5 to
the attention of historians and philosophers interested in medieval philosophy of mind.
Affair, 1307–1308,” in 1308, ed. Andreas Speer and D. Wirmer, Miscellanea Mediaevalia 35 (Berlin-New
York: De Gruyter, 2010), 176–7 argues for this idea based upon the fact that Durand is not yet listed
as a bachelor in 1307.
8. Durand defends the further thesis that habits and dispositions are mere relations and not super-
added absolute items. See, e.g., Peter of Palude’s and Nicholas Medensis’s presentation of his (lost)
Sent. III-A 23 in Sent. III 23.1–2 and Evid. III.30 respectively.
9. Peter of Palude, Sent. II 3.3–5, Peter Auriol, Sent. I 35.1 f. 751ra–b, Gregory of Rimini, Sent.
II 7.2–3 85–6 (in the margin: “Hanc opinionem, si bene meminit, tenuit Durandus in secundo opere
libro 2. Sic recitat Aureolus”), John Capreolus, Defensiones I 35.1 355b (his source is Peter Auriol)
and Defensiones II 3.2 258b–9b (his source is Gregory of Rimini), Nicholas Medensis, Evid. II.10, and
Peter Schwarz, Clipeus II 46 (his source is Hervaeus). Durand himself, although he returns to most of
the theses he omitted in his second redaction, never in fact bothers to return to the issue of a thought’s
ontological status. Cf. Sent. II-C 3.5–8. In fact, Durand subscribes to the alternative thesis “for the
moment” in QLA 1–3 and his second redaction (see, e.g., Sent. II-B 38.2).
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Josef Koch had also discovered a disputation with the same title as Hervaeus’s Quodl.
III.8 wherein Durand features as an opponens.10 In line with the format of a disputation,
the opponens (Durand) first gives an opening argument quod non—in this case, that
thought is not something absolute superadded to the intellect (33.6–9)—followed by an
argument from a respondens (to date: anonymous) quod sic (33.10–34.17). Next, the
respondens replies to the opponens’s original argument quod non (34.18–24). The debate,
then, takes off: Durand first argues against the argument quod sic (34.28–38.11) and
then the argument against his quod non argument (38.12–21), followed by six further
arguments quod sic (arg. 2: 38.22–41.5; arg. 3: 41.6–24; arg. 4: 41.25–42.6; arg. 5: 42.7–
11; arg. 6: 42.12–15; arg. 7: 42.16–42.21).11
In what follows, I want to provide a brief summary of these various arguments, with
analysis to follow.
1. Durand’s opening salvo (33.6–9) appeals to the idea that while hylomor-
phism makes sense, morphomorphism does not: forms are added to either
matter or the matter-form composite (and so “make a real composition”);
but forms are not added to other forms. Hence, granted that a cognitive
power is a form (and not the composite or matter), then the cognitive act
can’t be itself a form added to it, since then a form would inhere in or inform
another form, which doesn’t seem quite right.12
10. He suggests that Quodl. III.8 might have been its determinatio. On the format of Quodlibeta,
see John Wippel, “Godfrey of Fontaines’ Quodlibet XIV on Justice as a General Virtue: Is It Really a
Quodlibet?” In Schabel, Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages. The Fourteenth Century, 287–344.
11. I take the opening argument quod non to be arg. 1.
12. DQ 1 33: “Videtur quod non, quia, cum intellectus sit forma, si intelligere faceret cum eo com-
positionem, reciperetur in eo per modum formae. Sed hoc est impossibile, quia formae non est forma.”
See also Durand’s argument against the opponent’s argument against this argument a few pages later
(38): “Vlterius arguebatur [sc. Durando -PJH] contra responsionem rationis. Dixerat [sc. respondens
-PJH] enim ipsum actum intelligendi esse formam et ideo formae esse formam concesserat. Contra hoc:
Quia quando aliqua duo ad inuicem distinguuntur, illud quod est ratio distinctionis non potest utrique
esse commune. Quod patet. Sed actus primus distinguitur a secundo actu, quia actus primus est forma,
actus secundus est operatio. Igitur operationi non potest conuenire, quod sit forma. Ergo nec intelligere
dicitur forma esse.” This line of reasoning is captured in the first argument from Sent. II-A 3.5 discussed
below (fn. 26). Note that Hervaeus Natalis in Quodl. III.8 uses this as the second argument quod non
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2. The absolute items which are the relata of a given relationship can be
understood on their own—one can understand Socrates’ color on its own
without also taking into account Plato’s color or the relationship which ob-
tains between them. Hence, were a thought an absolute item upon which a
relationship to the object were founded—as Hervaeus and Duns Scotus hold—
13then the thought could be understood on its own, without its relationship
to the object and indeed without its object. Hence, as Durand puts it, “I
can think about a thought even though I don’t think about its object” (ibid.,
38: “Ergo possum intelligere ipsum intelligere absque hoc quod cognoscam
obiectum[. . . ].”). Durand declares that this is false.14 Hence, thought is it-
self a mere relation (relatio sola) and so, seeing as it is a mere relation, it
doesn’t make a real composition with the intellect nor is it an absolute item
superadded to the intellect.15
3. If something is in accidental potentiality then it doesn’t need, in order that
it be reduced into actuality, some form added to it; yet at least the intellect
after a habitus has been acquired is said to be in accidental potentiality.
Hence, at least in this case its reduction to act does not need something that
changes it and gives to it a new form.16
(43): “Secundo: quia omnis forma absoluta est primus actus. Sed intelligere non est primus actus. Ergo
est forma relata.”
13. See, e.g., Hervaeus Natalis, Quodl. II.8 (quoted above). See also Hervaeus Natalis, Quodl. III.8
(quoted below) and John Duns Scotus, Quodl. 13. In the margin to Quodl. III.8: “Vide pulchre etiam
in consimili materia Scotum in Quol. q. 13.”
14. Duns Scotus, in Quodlibet 13, argues that it is quite possible, and that the belief that it is not is
owing to sloppy linguistic practice.
15. DQ 1 38–9: “Vlterius arguitur ad principale sic: Omnis forma absoluta quae est fundamentum
relationis potest intelligi sine relatione. Sed intelligere est huiusmodi, quia est fundamentum relatio-
nis referentis ad obiectum, ut ponebat Respondens. Ergo poterit intelligi sine relatione ad obiectum.
Ergo possum intelligere ipsum intelligere absque hoc quod cognoscam obiectum, quod falsum est. Ergo
intelligere est relatio sola, et sic non facit realem compostionem cum intellectu, nec est res absoluta
superaddita intellectui. Maior patet, quia possum creaturam intelligere sine relatione ad Deum.” This
argument shows up in a variant form as the fourth argument in Peter of Palude’s text (see below fn. 27).
16. DQ 1 41: “Vlterius ad principale: Illud quod est in potentia accidentali tantum, non est in potentia
ad aliquam formam facientem compositionem realem. Sed intellectus post habitum est in potentia
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4. In the case of an action that passes outside, like the stove’s operation
of making something else hot, the elicitive principle of the operation and the
operation are the same thing, as viewed from the perspective of the agent. For
instance, when the stove makes the kettle hot (whereas before it was not doing
this) there is no non-relational item superadded to the stove which wasn’t
there before. Hence, in an immanent operation like thought, the elicitive
principle and the operation are the same thing, as viewed from the perspective
of the thinking subject.17
5. In Physics VII, Aristotle makes the claim that “circa intellectum non est
alteratio”. Hence, were thought a thing making a real composition, then the
intellect would be altered.18
accidentali tantum respectu actus intelligendi. Ergo, etc. Maior patet, quia illud quod est in potentia
accidentali, ad hoc quod fiat actu, non indiget transmutatione. Sed quod est in potentia ad formam,
indiget transmutatione, quia forma non potest induci in subiecto nec educi de subiecto nisi per actionem
agentis transmutantis. Vnde 3 De anima dicitur, quod aliter est in potentia intellectus ante habitum
scientiae et post habitum, quia primo <modo> est in potentia essentiali quae respicit formam, in quo
indiget transmutatione [et] a sensibus ad intellectum; secundo modo est in potentia accidentali tantum,
in quo non indiget transmutante, sed seipso cum uoluerit potest exire in actum, remoto prohibente, sicut
patet de motu grauis deorsum.” In Sent. II-A 3.5 (see below) Durand will drop the qualification that
the intellect “post habitum” is in accidental potentiality; on his view, the intellect both before and after
the habitus can be said to be in accidental potentiality. For the reference to DA III.4 see below.
17. DQ 1 41–2: “Item ar<gui>tur: Principium elicitiuum actus in operatione immanente non minus
conuenit cum actione quam principium elicitiuum operationis transeuntis cum actione. Sed in operatione
transeunte idem est principium elicitiuum et operatio, ut est in agente, sicut in igne idem est calor et
calefacere, ut respicit ignem calefacientem; ex hoc enim quod ignis nouiter calefacit aquam uel lignum,
nulla realis et noua additio uel compositio facta est in igne. Ergo idem de intellectu cum scientia, et sic
intelligere non superaddit compositionem nouam.” On the qualification “de intellectu cum scientia” see
the last footnote.
18. DQ 1 42: “Praeterea 7 Physicorum dicitur quod circa intellectum non est alteratio; sed si intelligere
esset res faciens realem compositionem, tunc intellectus alteraretur, cum factus sit de non intelligente actu
intelligens. Ergo, etc.” See Aristotle, Phys. VII.3 247b1. See also Durand, TDH 4.8 46: “Sed scientia
acquiritur in nobis non ut per se et immediatus terminus alicuius actionis, sed solum ut secundarius
terminus alterationis factae secundum partem sensitiuam. [. . . ] Minor patet ex 7 Physicorum, ubi
probat Aristoteles ex intentione, quod ad scientiam non est per se et primo neque alteratio neque aliqua
actio, sed fit in nobis facta alteratione secundum corpus et uires sensitiuas.” See also TDH 4.8 55: “Vbi
autem Aristotelis loquitur ut naturalis philosophus, sc. 7 Physicorum, plane dicit, quod nobis non motis
secundum ullam potentiam intellectiuam fit scientia in nobis; quod non posset esse, si scientia esset in
intellectu subiectiue, maxime si esset aliquid absolutum. Et expresse dicit ibidem, exemplificando, quod
non solum scientiae usus, sed prima acceptio eius fit in nobis per solam realem alterationem corporalem.”
Cf. Duns Scotus, Quodl. 13 n. 19: “[. . . ] quod accipitur ex 7 Physicorum, si diceretur, quod Aristoteles
omnia illa dicit non secundum opinionem propriam, sed secundum opinionem Platonis, uidetur posse
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6. God can separate two absolute accidents from each other, e.g., he can
make the white sweet milk simply sweet. (In general, Durand holds, God
can destroy any given absolute item and create any given absolute item—
provided the absolute item doesn’t have a ‘repugnance’ towards existence.
He can annihilate Plato, just his color, and so on.) Hence, granted that the
intellect is an absolute form, then, were the thought an absolute accidental
form, it would seem to follow that God could separate the thought from the
intellect, which, on Durand’s view, is absurd, since then there would be a
thought even though there is not someone thinking it.19
7. At least in the case of self-knowledge, i.e., when the intellect thinks about
itself, the thought is not something absolute superadded to the intellect.20
Arguments from Sent. II-A 3.5
Some of these arguments show up in Sent. II-A 3.5. Now, I have found evidence to suggest
that there were at least three versions of Sent. II-A 3.5 in circulation; the first—call it
A1—is what we find in Magdeburg Domgymnasium 91 and Vaticanus Chigi., lat. B
VIII 135, the former of which was used by J. Koch in the second edition of his critical
edition of Sent. II-A 3.5.21 The second—call it A2—is the text that Peter of Palude used
in Sent. II 3.3–5.22 Finally, the third—call it A3—is the one that Hervaeus Natalis used in
haberi ex Commentatore, ubi in fine commenti: ‘Aristoteles,’ inquit, ‘intelligit in hoc loco, non quod
haec sit opinio eius, sed intendit declarare uim opinionis huius.’ Haec ille.” See also ibid., n. 7 and n.
20. I will return to this (and other) passages from Durand’s TDH in Chapter 5.
19. DQ 1 42: “Praeterea Deus potest duo accidentia re absoluta differentia separare ab inuicem. Sed
intelligere non potest separari ab ipso intellectu, ita quod sit intelligere et non sit aliquis intelligens.
Ergo, etc.” This (in expanded form) is the third argument from Sent. II-A 3.5 (see fn. 25 below).
20. DQ 1 42: “Praeterea magis conuenit extremum cum medio quam extrema ad inuicem. Sed inter
intelligentem et obiectum est actus intelligendi medius. Cum igitur idem sit intellectus et res intellecta,
cum anima se intelligit, ergo ad minus tunc intelligere est idem cum intellectu et non faciens realem
compositionem.”
21. Nicholas Medensis seems to have used A1 in his Evidentiae.
22. J. Koch, in the first edition of his critical edition of Sent. II-A 3.5, had used this text, being unaware
of Magdeburg Domgymnasium 91 at the time. The text which J. Koch uses for Peter’s Sent. II 3.3–5
can be found in Basel Universita¨tsbibl. B II 22 and Vaticanus lat. 1073.
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Quodl. III.8.23 The difference isn’t great. In A1, there are three arguments in defense of
the ontological claim whereas in A2 (Peter) and A3 (Hervaeus) there are four. However,
this fourth argument is different in A2 (Peter) and A3 (Hervaeus). In any case, the first
three arguments are the same in all three versions.24
Now, of these three arguments, the third argument is (an expanded form of) the sixth
argument from the disputatio (re God’s absolute power);25 and the first argument here
seems to be a variation of the opening argument quod non from the disputatio.26 As
well, the fourth argument in A2 (Peter) is a variation on the second argument from the
disputatio (re second-order thoughts about thoughts).27
Hence, we can add to this list the following two further arguments in defense of the
ontological claim:
23. Peter Auriol, Gregory of Rimini, and John Capreolus all use A3 (or someone who used A3). Judging
by the fact that Peter Auriol adduces the same arguments against Durand that Hervaeus does, I’d suggest
that Auriol used Hervaeus.
24. More precisely, the arguments in A2 (Peter) and A1 are verbatim the same whereas in A3 (Hervaeus)
the arguments are paraphrases. This seems to suggest to me that Hervaeus was dealing with an early
reportatio whereas Palude had before him an ordinatio, or the beginnings of one.
25. Sent. II-A 3.5 19: “Tertio patet idem ex inseparabilitate ipsius intelligere et sentire a sensu et
intellectu sic: Quaecumque differunt per essentiam absolutam, possunt diuina uirtute separari secundum
existentiam, nisi alicui eorum repugnet ratio actualis existentiae, ut est materia prima, de qua dicunt
aliqui, quod, cum sit pura potentia, non potest existere sine forma. Omne autem accidens absolutum,
cum sit actus quidam, potest existere diuina uirtute sine subiecto. Sentire autem non potest existere
sine sensu, nec intelligere sine intellectu. Ergo non dicunt aliquid reale absolutum supra sensum et
intellectum.”
26. Sent. II-A 3.5 18: “Primo ex natura operationis secundum se et absolute sic: Actus primus est
forma, sicut intellectus in homine et calor in igne; sed actus secundus est operatio formae, ut intelligere
et calere uel calefacere, et sic de similibus. Operatio autem formae non potest esse forma distincta ab ea,
quae est actus primus, quia tunc operatio non esset actus secundus, sed primus. Forma enim quaecumque
substantalis uel accidentalis dicit actum primum. Et iterum, si operatio secundum se esset aliqua forma,
eius esset aliqua operatio, et procederetur in infinitum, quod formae esset forma, et operationis operatio.
Quare melius est sistendum in primo, sc. quod operatio formae non est forma ei addita.”
27. Peter of Palude, Sent. II 3.3–5 20–21: “Quarta ratio sumitur ex habitudinem istorum actuum ad sua
obiecta, quia si intelligere sit aliquid absolutum faciens compositinem cum intellectu, tunc intelligere et
intelligibile erunt relatiua secundum dici tantum et nullo modo secundum esse, quia relatiuum secundum
esse est illud, cuius esse est referri et essentia est relatio, quod non conuenit alicui absoluto. Ex hoc
sic arguitur: Relatiua secundum dici non claudunt se mutuo in intellectu suo, sicut si Sortes sit filius
Platonis, in intellectu quidem patris clauditur filius et e contrario; sed in intellectu Sortis non includitur
Plato nec e contrario, quia pater et filius sunt correlatiua secundum esse, eo quod paternitas et filiatio
sunt essentialiter relationes, Sortes uero et Plato sunt relatiua solum secundum dici. Intelligere autem
et sentire necessario includunt intelligibile et sensibile. Ergo intelligere et sentire non sunt relatiua
secundum dici, nec per consequens sunt aliquid absolutum additum super sensum et intellectum, faciens
cum eis compositionem.” I will return to this argument in Chapter 5.
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8. An operation that does not pass outside the operator, e.g., whitening or
shining, is not some absolute item added to the form already in the operator
in virtue of which it operates, e.g., whiteness or light. But a thought is an
operation that doesn’t pass outside. Hence, it isn’t a form added to the
intellect.28
9. Under the assumption that efficient causes which differ in kind bring about
effects which differ in kind, then, were cognitive acts the effects of objects as
efficient causes, it would follow that objects that differ in kind would produce
acts that differ in kind (and so too contrary objects would produce contrary
acts). But one can see at once a black item and a white item and a green
item. Hence, were cognitive acts absolute forms, then in such a case the
subject would be informed with several contrary absolute forms at the same
time.29
Analysis
One thing that this motley crew of arguments suggests is that Durand seems to be
interested in a very broad and uniform account of what cognition is (and by extension:
what causes a cognitive act). Hence, his appeal in arg. 7 to the case of self-cognition and
28. Sent. II-A 3.5 18: “Secundo patet idem ex natura operationis intramentis sic: Vbicumque actus
secundus non transit in materiam exteriorem, actus primus et secundus, sc. forma et operatio, non
differunt realiter sic, quod faciunt ad inuicem compositionem, sed differunt solum dictione uerbali et
nominali, ut lux et lucere, calor et calere, albedo et albescere, et sic de aliis; sed sentire et intelligere sunt
actus intramanentes; ergo sunt idem realiter quod sensus et intellectus, nisi quod designantur uerbaliter
et illa nominaliter.” This is the second argument in A1, A2 (Peter) and A3 (Hervaeus).
29. Hervaeus, Quodl. III.8 46: “Quarto sic: quia si intelligere diceret aliquam formam absolutam,
ergo et sentire. Consequentia patet. Consequens est falsum. Ergo et antecedens. Probo falsitatem
consequentis, quia simul et semel aliquis uidet album et nigrum, uiride et talia. Aut ergo eodem actu
aut pluribus. Si pluribus, tunc plures actus sentiendi in uno sensu particulari—puta uisu—sunt simul,
quod est inconueniens. Si uno, et iste unus actus est absolutus, sequitur, quod uno et eodem actu sentitur
album et nigrum et uiride, quod est inconueniens, quia diuersitas obiectorum facit diuersitatem actuum.
Ergo ponere actum sentiendi esse aliquid absolutum additum potentiae est falsum et inconueniens.”
This is the fourth argument in A3 (Hervaeus). It is also in Sent. II-A 38.3. Durand himself refutes this
argument in QLA 3 and Sent. II-B 38.3. For some discussion of this argument in Durand and Thomas
Wylton, see Friedman, “On the Trail of a Philosophical Debate: Durand of St. Pourc¸ain vs. Thomas
Wylton on Simultaneous Acts in the Intellect.” I will return to this argument in Chapter 5.
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his appeal in arg. 3 to the case of scientific cognition (i.e., cognition which occurs “after
the habitus”). We can add to this the observation that in Sent. II-A 3.5, Durand aims
to establish both the ontological claim and his account of the causation of a cognitive
act in the case of both sensory perception and intellectual cognition.30 Hence, on his
view, cognition about an external object (no matter what sort of cognition it is, be it a
direct perception or an act of remembering) is not something absolute superadded to its
associated cognitive power, or, as we might put it, it is not a monadic property (like a
quality). It is rather best to view it as a relation to a present object, or, as we might put
it, it is a polyadic property. This is true in the case of sensory perception, pre-scientific
intellectual cognition, scientific intellectual cognition, and self-cognition.
There is still some considerable qualification that must be made to this thesis. Is
thought a conceptual relation or a real relation? Is it a mutual or a non-mutual relation?
Is it a relation in the category of Relation, or is it in one of the other categories? Under
what conditions can we claim that the object is present to a cognitive power? Is the
object present to, say, the intellect in the same sense of ‘presence’ as it is to, say, the
visive faculty? What stands in for the present object when the object is not, in fact,
present, e.g., when I think about some past event? I will return to these (and other such
questions) below. This much, however, we can be sure of. On Durand’s view, a cognitive
act (no matter what kind of cognitive act it might be) is not an absolute accident or form
superadded to the cognitive power in the cognizant subject; it is rather best to view it
as a relative item or relational property which obtains between a cognizant subject, with
a cognitive power, and a present object of the right sort: a vision, for instance, is the
relation which obtains between a thing with a visive power and a present visible quality,
audition the relation of presence between a thing with an auditory faculty and a sound,
and so forth.
30. As well, arg. 9 (fn. 29 above) begins with the modus tollens: “[. . . ] si intelligere diceret aliquam
formam absolutam, ergo et sentire. Consequentia patet. Consequens est falsum. Ergo et antecedens.”
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Having established, then, that the cognitive act is not an absolute entity superadded
to the cognizant subject or its associated cognitive power, Durand addresses the issue of
its causation. What item or items cause a cognitive act? What sort of cause is it? The
cause of a cognitive act is not, of course, the object as efficient cause (as Godfrey had
held); nor is it the composite of intellect with species as the first opinion had maintained.
Rather, Durand declares, it is from whatever caused the cognitive power to be in us (the
‘generans ’) as the ‘per se cause’, on the one hand, and the present object as the ‘sine
qua non cause’, on the other hand.
3.1.2 The generans claim
Durand claims that what generated or created the intellect is the ‘per se cause’ of its
natural operation, thought, and, likewise, what generated or created a given sensitive
power is the ‘per se cause’ of its associated sensitive act.
Now, the claim that the generans or creans is the per se cause of the natural operation
is open to quite a number of interpretations. Usually, in these discussions, a per se cause
is to be taken in contrast with a per accidens cause. Even more usually, a per se cause
is one of the four Aristotelian causes. Hence, to call the generans the per se cause of
the cognitive act makes it look as if Durand is claiming that the generans is the efficient
cause of the cognitive act. The generans or creans seems to do, on Durand’s model, what
the object does on Godfrey’s, and in the present context, it might look as if Durand is
committed to a kind of Occasionalism, the doctrine that God is the proximate efficient
cause of each and every natural action, or, at least, each and every mental act. However,
it can’t mean this. Durand is quite famous, in fact, as one of the only proponents of the
thesis that God is a mere conservative cause and so he does not at all intervene in the
natural world in the way that an Occasionalist would have him intervene.31
31. Part of the reason Leibniz declares that Durand is ‘le celebre Durand’ and a ‘bande a` part’ (Essais
de The´odice´e I.27, II.330; see also III.361, 381) is because of Durand’s commitment to the view that
God is a mere conservative cause and not, as others took him to be, even a partial proximate cause of
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Rather, what I take it that Durand means is something a little less controversial. It
is the trivial idea that whatever gives a causal disposition—a capacity or ability to do
something—to some item is in some sense the cause of that item’s doing whatever it is
that that causal disposition allows it to do. Consider a jack-in-the-box with a rock that
rests upon its lid. Whoever wound up the jack-in-the-box or made it is in some sense
the cause of Jack’s springing forth. So too with other capacities or abilities: whatever
item (call this the generans) gave a capacity to some other item to do something is in
some sense the cause of its doing it. Durand’s point is simply that natural operations
follow naturally from natures. If we want to find an efficient cause of such operations,
we should look rather at what made the nature in the first place, that is, whatever gave
to the item its natural abilities and capacities with respect to which such operations and
motions are associated. Indeed, as Durand puts it, “the generans giving a form gives as
well the operation or motion associated with that form” (ibid., 21: “[. . . ] generans dans
formam dat etiam operationem et motum conuenientem formae[. . . ].”). For instance,
what gives the form of heat to fire gives to it its combustive activity and what gives the
form of lightness to fire gives to it its upwards motion (ibid, 21: “[. . . ] sicut dans calorem
igni dat ei ut calefaciat combustibile praesens et dans ei leuitatem dat ei per se motum
sursum.”). We need not take this generator (generans), giver (dans), or creator (creans)
to be also the proximate efficient cause of each and every combustive act which the fire
elicits or each and every downwards motion that the rock undergoes. Furthermore, I
events which occur in the natural world (Sent. II-C 1.5). See Alfred Freddoso, “Medieval Aristotelianism
and the Case against Secondary Causation in Nature,” in Divine and Human Action: Essays in the
Metaphysics of Theism, ed. Thomas Morris (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988), 74–118 (who
calls Durand ‘William Durandus’), Alfred Freddoso, “God’s General Concurrence with Secondary Causes:
Why Conservation is Not Enough,” Philosophical Perspectives 5 (1991): 553–85 (again, gives him the
wrong name), and Alfred Freddoso, “God’s General Concurrence with Secondary Causes: Pitfalls and
Prospects,” ACPQ 67 (1994): 131–56 (which contains a detailed study of Sent. I-C 1.5 and (finally!)
gets Durand’s name right). For someone who holds that the generator is the efficient cause of the
rock’s downward motion (a surprisingly common view), see, e.g., Giles of Rome, In Phys. f. 193r: “Nam
huiusmodi motus effectiue est a generante, formaliter autem est a forma grauis.” For discussion, see
Edith Dudley Sylla, “Aristotelian Commentaries and Scientific Change: The Parisian Nominalists on the
Cause of the Natural Motion of Inanimate Bodies,” Vivarium 31, no. 1 (1993): 37–83.
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would submit, we needn’t even pin things back onto God. Durand, of course, thinks we
should, but this doesn’t have to follow. It seems to me that it is compatible with what
Durand says to modernize his position a bit: whatever natural processes, presumably
evolution-driven, went into generating a well-defined species with well-defined natural
proclivities, abilities and routines can be taken to be the generans .
In any case, Durand here is using language which one can find in Aristotle, and,
indeed, he goes on to clarify his idea by appeal to Aristotle’s Physics VIII.4 and the
technical apparatus of essential and accidental potentiality. Durand writes that it is
Aristotle’s view that whatever made the form is in some sense the cause of the natural
operation of that form.
Something that has a form is in mere accidental potentiality with respect to
the activity or motion associated with that form. Hence, in order for it to
be reduced to actuality, it doesn’t need some agent which gives to it a new
form, since then it would not have been in accidental potentiality but rather
it would have been in essential potentiality. Therefore, it is from the same
item from which it has a form that it also has whatever second actuality is
associated with that form. (ibid., 21)32
The distinction between essential and accidental potentiality is an important one, for
it, among other things, can, Durand tells us, allow us to establish both the generans
claim and the ontological claim. He writes:
And an argument that establishes both articles [i.e., the ontological claim
and the generans claim] can be formulated based upon this. That which is
32. ibid., 21: “Auctoritas etiam Aristotelis 8o Physicorum est ad hoc; dicit enim ibi expresse, quod
generans dans formam dat etiam operationem et motum conuenientem formae, sicut dans calorem igni
dat ei, ut calefaciat combustibile praesens et dans ei leuitatem dat ei per se motum sursum; habens
enim formam solum est in potentia accidentali ad operationem et motum conuenientem formae; et ideo
ad hoc, ut reducatur in actum, non indiget agente dante nouam formam quia iam non esset in potentia
accidentali solum sed essentiali. Ab eodem ergo a quo habet formam habet etiam quantum est de se
quod sit sub actu secundo.” Durand’s language here is taken from Averroes. See Comm. Phys. VIII.32
and Comm. De Coelo III.28.
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in mere accidental potentiality is not in potentiality to a new form nor does
it need, in order to be reduced into actuality, an agent giving a new form.
But something having first actuality alone is in accidental potentiality with
respect to second actuality, that is, the operation. Therefore, etc. The major
and the minor are clear based upon Physics VIII. Therefore, the first article
is clear, namely, that sensing and thinking are per se from what gives the
form of sense and intellect. (ibid., 21)33
On Durand’s view, there are two kinds of potentiality (essential and accidental) and so
too two kinds of reductions (essential and accidental) which in turn demand two kinds of
analyses. If A is in essential potentiality with respect to B, (1) B is something absolute
superadded to A (“a new form”) and (2) A’s reduction requires an agent or efficient cause,
C (“an agent giving a new form”). By contrast, if A is in accidental potentiality with
respect to B, then (1) B is not something absolute superadded to A and (2) A’s reduction
does not require an efficient cause. In other words, whereas essential reductions can be
explained with the ‘standard’ causal model (involving an agent with an active principle,
a patient with a passive principle, and the impression and reception of form—i.e., an
action and a passion)34 an accidental reduction demands a very different causal model.
Whereas our analysis of an essential reduction will make reference to an efficient cause
(indeed, an efficient cause distinct from the item so reduced), an accidental reduction
will not; instead it will make reference to, on the one hand, the fact that the item has
some form already (and so by extension the generans) and, on the other hand, something
else, which, whatever causal role it can be said to perform, is not an efficient cause, for,
33. ibid., 21: “Illud, quod est solum in potentia accidentali, non est in potentia ad nouam formam nec
indiget ad hoc, ut reducatur in actum, agente dante nouam formam. Sed habens actum primum solum
est in potentia accidentali ad actum secundum, qui est operatio.” See also DQ 1 41 (arg. 2 in fn. 15
above): “Illud quod est in potentia accidentali tantum, non est in potentia ad aliquam formam facientem
compositionem realem. [. . . ] Maior patet, quia illud quod est in potentia accidentali, ad hoc quod fiat
actu, non indiget transmutatione. Sed quod est in potentia ad formam, indiget transmutatione, quia
forma non potest induci in subiecto nec educi de subiecto nisi per actionem agentis transmutantis.”
34. See Chapter 2, §2.3.4.
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as Durand put it above, if this were an efficient cause then “it would not have been in
accidental potentiality but rather it would have been in essential potentiality.”
This is all still very abstract, and so before I turn to Durand’s sine qua non claim,
I want to first look at this distinction between essential and accidental potentiality in a
little more detail.
Accidental and essential potentiality
The text that Durand appeals to here is Aristotle’s Physics VIII.4. There, Aristotle
writes:
In the same way, too, what is potentially of a certain quality or of a certain
quantity or in a certain place is naturally movable [NB: ‘moveable’ in its
broadest sense of changeable] when it contains the corresponding principle
in itself and not accidentally (for the same thing may be both of a certain
quality and of a certain quantity, but the one is an accidental, not an essential
property of the other.) So when fire or earth is moved by something the
motion is violent when it is unnatural, and natural when it brings to actuality
the proper activities that they potentially possess. But the fact that the term
‘potentiality’ is used in more than one way is the reason why it is evident
whence such motions as the upward motion of fire and the downward motion
of earth are derived. [. . . ] Thus what is cold is potentially hot: then a change
takes place and it is fire, and it burns, unless something prevents and hinders
it. So, too, with heavy and light: light is generated from heavy, e.g. air from
water (for water is first such potentially), and air is actually light, and will
at once realize its proper activity unless something prevents it. The activity
of lightness consists in the thing being in a certain place, namely high up:
when it is in the contrary place, it is being prevented. [. . . ] As we have said,
a thing may be potentially light or heavy in more ways than one. Thus not
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only when a thing is water is it in a sense potentially light, but when it has
become air it may be still potentially light; for it may be that through some
hindrance it does not occupy an upper position, whereas, if what hinders it
is removed, it realizes its activity and continues to rise higher. (255a25–b23;
tr. R. Hardie and R. Gaye)
This passage, to be sure, offers a variety of interpretations. However, it seems clear
enough that Aristotle is drawing our attention to a distinction between two kinds of
potentiality (known nowadays as the distinction between ‘first’ and ‘second’ potential-
ity).35 Medieval authors tended to characterize this distinction as a distinction between
potentia essentialis and potentia accidentalis.36 These technical terms seem to have been
first introduced into the debate by (the Latin translation of) Aristotle’s great Arabic
commentator, Averroes. Hervaeus Natalis, when he attacks Durand’s position in Quodl.
III.8, writes, pedantically:
As to what is said about being in accidental potentiality, it ought to be
known that these words—“being in accidental or essential potentiality”— are
not the direct words of Aristotle in Physics VIII but rather they are of his
Commentator, who seems to have derived this distinction from Aristotle’s
35. For some discussion here, see U. Coope, “Aristotle on Action,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian
Society Supplementary Volume 81 (2007): 109–37, Robert Heinaman, “Actuality, Potentiality and De
Anima II.5,” Phronesis 52 (2007): 139–87, U. Coope, “Aristotle’s Account of Agency in Physics III 3,”
Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy 20 (2004): 201–21, Michael Wedin,
“Aristotle on the Mind’s Self-Motion,” in Gill and Lennox, Self-Motion From Aristotle to Newton, 81–
116, Myles Burnyeat, “De Anima II 5,” Phronesis 47 (2002): 29–90. DA II.5 contains a (more famous)
discussion of the distinction.
36. On the distinction between essential and accidental potentiality in medieval philosophy, see An-
neliese Maier, An der Grenze von Scholastik und Naturwissenschaft, 2nd edition (Rome: Edizioni di
Storia e Letteratura, 1952), and Sylla, “Aristotelian Commentaries and Scientific Change: The Parisian
Nominalists on the Cause of the Natural Motion of Inanimate Bodies.” For actual examples, see Roger
Bacon, Summulae Dialectices 2.1.6 n. 387–8; John Duns Scotus, Lect. II 25 n. 46–50; Quodl. 15 n. 3;
Henry of Ghent, Quodl. X.9 222–3, XI.6 f. 453v; Peter of Palude, Sent. II 3.3–6 8–9; Guy Terrena, Quodl.
II.13 600, 608 and III.3 625; John of Jandun, In Phys. VIII, q. 11, f. 117v; Thomas of Sutton, Quodl. I.9
67, I.15 103 and Quaest. Ord. 7 215–6; “Master Thomas Anglicus”, Quaestio magistrorum 521; Thomas
Wylton(?), De sensu agente, 352; Walter Burley, In Phys. VIII f. 239rb; Thaddeus of Parma, Quaestio
“Vtrum sit possibile . . . ” 399; John Buridan, Expos. in Ar. De Coelo IV.1.3, 209–10 and Expos. in Phys.
tr. 2, ch. 2 363–4; and John Baconthorpe, Sent, Prologus, q. 2, a. 4 ff. 22bB–23aA.
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words there where Aristotle says that “an item that is light in potentiality
and up in potentiality is in potentiality with respect to being up in a way
that is different from an item that is light in actuality and up in potentiality.”
The first of these the Commentator labels as “being in essential potentiality”;
and the second he labels as “being in accidental potentiality”. (73–74; see
Averroes, Comm. Phys. VIII.32; Comm. De Coelo III.28)
In any case, in the passage from Physics VIII.4 Aristotle does, indeed, appear to be
drawing a distinction between two kinds of potentiality; moreover, he seems to apply it
precisely to, on the one hand, the natural capacities and abilities of the elements and,
on the other hand, their natural activities and motions. The heavy, for instance, has a
natural capacity towards downwards motion and the hot a natural ability to make things
hot. If the heavy or the hot is prevented owing to some impediment from executing
its natural action or motion, then it can be said to be in accidental potentiality with
respect to that action or motion. Accidental potentiality is quite different from essential
potentiality, the sort of potentiality the cold is in with respect to being hot or the heavy
with respect to being light; in these cases, a mere removal of an impediment won’t be
sufficient, for what will also be necessary is an efficient cause which reduces the patient
from potency into act giving to it a new form (usually at the cost of the existing form).37
Medieval authors also associated this distinction between two kinds of potentiality
with a distinction between two kinds of actuality, namely, actus primus and actus secun-
dus .38 An essential reduction—the reduction of an item existing in essential potentiality
37. See, e.g., Peter of Palude, Sent. II 3.3–5 9 (emph. mine): “Sed potentia essentialis non reducitur in
actum sine causa per se, formam imprimente, nisi forte per uiolentiam, sicut graue sursum non fertur nisi
ui aut leuitate sibi impressa et grauitate expulsa.” Most medieval philosophers recognized a distinction
between corruptive and non-corruptive changes. A corruptive change is the addition of form with the
concomitant loss of an existing form, e.g., when a thing acquires the form of heat it loses the form of
cold. Non-corruptive change is simply the acquisition of form, e.g., when the moon acquires the form of
light, or, more to the point, when the senses and the intellect acquire forms.
38. Auct. Ar. 6 n. 39: “Duplex est actus, sc. primus et secundus: primus ut scientia, secundus ut
speculari secundum scientiam.” See, e.g., Nicholas Medensis, Evid. II.15 434: “[. . . ] duplex est actus:
primus et secundus. Et huius ratio est quia duplex est potentia, sc. potentia ad esse et potentia ad
operari.”
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from potency to act—results in actus primus (at least) and provided it is able to execute
a second act and nothing is preventing it actus secundus as well. But sometimes an item,
having been reduced from essential potentiality, is impeded so that it can then be said
to be in first act but not second act; or, in other words, it can then be said to be in
accidental potentiality. For instance, when the cold becomes the hot (and so reduced
from essential potentiality to act owing to some agent) it might be impeded from making
something else hot (owing to the absence of a heatable item); hence it will be in first act
with respect to heating but not second act, or, alternatively, in accidental potentiality.
So too the heavy which rests upon a plank and anything which has a nature upon which
certain operations and motions naturally follow which is in the wrong circumstances so
that its operation is impeded. Remove these impediments, and an accidental reduction
occurs and so the item transitions from its first act into its second act even though it
received no new form from an extrinsic efficient cause.
On Durand’s interpretation of Physics VIII, Aristotle is offering us a very general
discussion of two kinds of potentiality which in turn demand two sorts of analyses. As
mentioned, an essential reduction can be analyzed with the ‘standard’ causal (affectionist)
model: it involves a patient that undergoes something owing to an agent that does
something to it, to wit, impresses a form upon it. But an accidental reduction doesn’t
seem to require the same explanation. Does an accidental reduction require an efficient
cause which reduces the item in accidental potentiality from potency to act? Durand’s
answer is that it does not: all that an accidental reduction requires is, on the one hand,
a thing with a form (and so by extension an appeal to the generator which gave to that
thing its form) and, on the other hand, the removal of any impediments to the realization
of that form’s natural activities or motions.
Hence, Durand takes Aristotle to be committed to the following two claims:
1. All essential reductions require an extrinsic efficient cause.
2. No accidental reduction requires an (extrinsic) efficient cause.
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We can drop the qualification ‘extrinsic’ as well, for it seems quite clear that Durand
would also hold, although he never says this, that we shouldn’t think of an accidental
reduction as requiring an intrinsic efficient cause either, for, as Durand put it above, if
a reduction requires an agent which gives to the item so reduced a new form (be this
agent identical with the patient or distinct) then its reduction will have been an essential
reduction and not an accidental reduction. (Sent. II-A 3.5 21: “Illud, quod est solum
in potentia accidentali, non est in potentia ad nouam formam nec indiget ad hoc, ut
reducatur in actum, agente dante nouam formam. Sed habens actum primum solum
est in potentia accidentali ad actum secundum, qui est operatio.” See fn. 33 above.)
This marks an important difference between the way that we saw Duns Scotus analyze
volitional change (as a “pati a se” and not a “pati ab alio”) and the way that Durand
thinks of psychological change (see, e.g., Chapter 2, §2.3.3).
This also makes clear, I think, that Durand’s appeal to the generator is not, as with
some of his contemporaries, an appeal to a proximate efficient cause of the reduction,
for, once more, if a reduction requires an agent—even God—which gives to the item so
reduced a form, then that reduction will have been essential and not accidental. (Sent.
II-A 3.5 21: “[. . . ] et ideo ad hoc, ut reducatur in actum, non indiget agente dante nouam
formam quia iam non esset in potentia accidentali solum sed essentiali.” See fn. 32 above.)
Hence, even God does not reduce fire (say) from accidental potency to act.
3.1.3 The sine qua non claim
To sum up, Durand holds that (a) mental acts (e.g., thoughts and sensory perceptions)
are not absolute forms superadded to mental faculties (e.g., the intellect or the senses),
(b) that cognitive change does not require an efficient cause or agent, and (c) that the
object is a mere sine qua non cause. Having established the ontological claim and the
generans claim, Durand goes on to establish the sine qua non claim; in doing so, he
tells us, he will also answer the nearby questions: How is it that thought and sensory
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perception come about in us and why do we not always think and sense granted that we
always do have intellects and senses?39
First a large quote and then some analysis.
(A) Sometimes first and second act per- (A) [. . . ] actus primus et secundus quan-
fect a thing without reference to something doque perficiunt rem secundum se et abso-
else and, thus, are signified as, e.g., heat lute et sic significantur, ut calor et calere,
and heating or whiteness and whitening. albedo et albescere. Et in talibus simul et
5 In these cases, a thing is made to be un- inseparabiliter res ab eodem efficitur sub 5R
der first and second act all at once from primo actu et secundo; simul enim et ab eo-
the same item [i.e., the generans ]. For in- dem aliquid est calidum et calet, album et
stance, at once and from the same item albescit. Quandoque autem actus primus
something is hot and heats or is white and et secundus perficiunt rem non-absolute,
10 whitens. However, sometimes first and sec- sed in habitudine ad alterum et sic sig- 10R
ond act perfect a thing not without refer- nificantur, ut calefactiuum et disgregatiu-
ence to something else but in relation to um, calefacere et disgregare; et respectum
something else and, thus, are signified as, talem importat actus primus secundum po-
e.g., able-to-make-hot or able-to-break40 and tentiam, actus autem secundus secundum
15 makes-hot or breaks: and the first act im- actum, et in talibus non semper simul est 15R
plies the relationship as potential whereas aliquid sub actu primo et secundo, sed con-
the second act as actual. In these cases, tingit quandoque habere actum primum sine
something is not always at once under the secundo.
39. Sent. II-A 3.5 21: “[. . . ] qualiter intelligere et sentire fiant in nobis, et quare non semper intelligimus
aut sentimus, cum semper habeamus sensum et intellectum.” This is, in fact, the question Aristotle raises
in DA III.4 430a5–6.
40. According to the standard scholastic view, things with heat which are hot make other things hot
(of course) and things which are white ‘disgregate’ other things, namely, sight. Cf. Moliere’s Monsieur
de Pourceaugnac, Act I, Scene 8: “SECOND ME´DECIN: [. . . ] Je les approuve tous, manibus et pedibus
descendo in tuam sententiam. [. . . ] le sel est symbole de la sagesse; de faire blanchir les murailles de
sa chambre, pour dissiper les te´ne`bres de ses esprits: album est disgregativum visus[. . . ].”The ultimate
allusion seems to be to Plato’s Timeaus 67d–e, where the idea seems to be the whiteness dilates and
blackness contracts.In any case, Durand’s choice of the example is not important.
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first act and the second, but it might hap-
20 pen sometimes that it has the first act with-
out the second.
(B) The reason behind this: First act (B) Cuius ratio est, quia actus primus
requires the presence of that with respect requirit praesentiam eius, ad quod dicitur, 20R
to which it is said only in potency whereas solum secundum potentiam; sed operatio
25 activity or second act requires its presence uel actus secundus requirit praesentiam eius
in act. For instance, in order for something secundum actum. Ad hoc enim, quod aliq-
to be able-to-make-hot it is sufficient that uid sit calefactiuum, sufficit, quod possit
it be able to have a heatable item; but in habere calefactibile, sed ad calefacere re- 25R
order for it to make-hot it requires an ac- quiritur actualiter praesens calefactibile; et
30 tually present heatable item. And since it quia contingit aliquid esse praesens secun-
might happen that something is present in dum potentiam, quod tamen non est ac-
potency which is not present in act, there- tu praesens, ideo contingit aliquid esse sub
fore, it might happen that something is un- actu primo absque actu secundo. 30R
der first act without second act.
35 (C) However, numbered among such acts (C) De numero autem talium actuum
are the intellect (or the intellective prin- sunt intellectus uel principium intellectiu-
ciple) and thinking, for both of these are um et intelligere; dicitur enim utrumque
spoken of not without any reference what- non-omnino-absolute, sed in habitudine ad
soever to something else but in relation to intelligibile, quam habitudinem importat 35R
40 an intelligible item; the intellect implies intellectus secundum potentiam, intelligere
this relationship as potential whereas the autem secundum actum. Propter quod hab-
act of thinking implies it as actual. Hence, ens intellectum non semper intelligit quia
an item having an intellect does not al- non semper habet intelligibile actu prae-
ways think since it does not always have sens. [. . . ] [O]biectum autem praesenta- 40R
45 an intelligible item actually present. [. . . ] tum uel praesentans obiectum est causa
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However, the object’s being presented or sine qua non pro eo, quod intelligere non
the presenting of the object is the cause est perfectio mere absoluta, sed in compa-
sine qua non since an act of thinking is ratione ad alterum. [. . . ] Et idem est de
not a perfection that makes no reference actu sentiendi[. . . ]. 45R
50 to something else but a perfection in com-
parison to something else. [. . . ] And the
same is the case with an act of sensing.
Durand is doing a number of things in this passage, and it will be helpful to go over
the details. His primary aim, of course, is to establish the conclusion that the object
is the sine qua non cause of a cognitive act. He does so, however, by first (A) drawing
our attention to a distinction between two kinds of first/second acts, (B) analyzing the
second kind, and (C) applying this analysis to the case at hand.
(A) Two kinds of first/second acts
In the first part of the passage, Durand draws our attention to two ways in which first and
second act “perfect” a thing; in some cases, first and second act perfect a thing with no
reference to anything else at all whereas in other cases first and second act perfect a thing
with some reference to something else. Hence, I will call the former sort of first/second
act Nonrelational and the latter Relational.41
Now, the examples he puts forward here as examples of the first case aren’t too
illuminating at first sight; in fact this bit of the passage is almost impossible to translate
41. Cf. Hervaeus Natalis’s presentation of Durand’s position in Quodl. III.8 44: “[. . . ] actus primus
et secundus quandoque nullam habitudinem important ad aliquid aliud, sicut lux et lucere; et talia
semper sunt simul actu; quandoque uero important aliquam habitudinem ad extra, sicut calefactiuum
et calefactibile et calefaciens ad calefactum.” Cf. also Nicholas Medensis’s presentation of Durand’s
position in Evid. II.11 394: “[. . . ] actus primus et secundus aliquando perficiunt rem absolute et tunc
inseparabiliter aliquid efficitur sub actu primo et secundo, sicut simul aliquid efficitur sub calore et calere.
Aliquando perficiunt rem non-absolute sed in ordine ad aliquid ut calefactum et calefacere et in talibus
aliquid potest esse sub actu primo et tamen non erit sub secundo.” Since Durand’s position here has
not been analyzed in the secondary literature, I provide not only the Latin (as above) but also in this
footnote and some footnotes below, the Latin from Nicholas Medensis and Hervaeus Natalis who both
provide a close paraphrase of Durand’s entire position.
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into English. In an earlier passage (the second argument from Sent. II-A 3.5 in defense
of the ontological claim), Durand adds a third example to this list:
If second act does not pass into outside matter, then first act and second
act, that is, the form and the activity (operatio), are not really distinct such
that the latter enters into composition with the former, but rather they are
distinct in the way that a word said as a verb and a noun is, e.g., sunshine
(lux) and shining (lucere), heat (calor) and heating (calere), whiteness (albedo)
and whitening (albescere), and so on. (18; the Latin is quoted above, fn. 28)
What is Durand on about here? One thing is clear: in the first case second acts
are expressed by way of intransitive verbs (calere; lucere; albescere; cf. in English ‘to
twinkle’, ‘to glow’, ‘to live’) whereas in the second case second acts are expressed by
way of transitive verbs (calefacere; disgregare; cf. in English ‘to burn’, ‘to break’). This
grammatical distinction points at a more fundamental metaphysical distinction: just as
the transitive verb takes an object so too the (so to speak) transitive second act takes an
object; and just as the intransitive verb doesn’t take an object so too the (so to speak)
intransitive second act doesn’t take an object. In other words, some second acts are
object-oriented whereas other second acts are not. (Or, alternatively, some operations
associated with a form are object-oriented and others are not.)42 For instance, the second
acts of twinkling, shining, living, glowing, and so on, do not take objects whereas the
second acts of burning, breaking, freezing, drying, and so on, do. A cognitive act, of
course, is a second act which takes an object. Hence, the first difference between the two
cases rests on whether there is a reference to something else, taken to be the object.
A second difference between these two cases is that whereas object-oriented second
acts are episodic, intransitive second acts are not: Socrates always lives as long as he
has life (i.e., he is in second act as long as he is in first act) whereas the stove does not
42. Of course, downwards motion or upwards motion aren’t object-oriented but place-oriented.
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always bake as long as it has heat (i.e., it is not in second act as long as it is in first
act).43 Hence, sometimes a thing is said to be perfected so that the first and second act
always occur at the same time and so that the one can’t occur without the other and
sometimes a thing is said to be perfected so that the first act might occur even if the
second act does not.
(B) Relational first/second acts
Durand suggests in (B) that we should view both dispositions (e.g., calefactivity or
the ability to make something hot) and operations (e.g., calefaction or the action of
making something hot) as non-absolute (that is, non-monadic) properties. In the case
of a disposition like calefactivity this property is a relation to heatable items; in the
case of an operation like calefaction this property is a relation to present heatable items.
So too intellectivity—the ability to think—and the action of thought or sensitivity—the
ability to sense—and the action of sensory perception. This isn’t to say that a cognitive
power is itself a relation; Durand rejects this view in Sent. I-A 3.3. A cognitive power is
an absolute item superadded to the essence of the soul just as heat is an absolute item
added to the stove.44 What Durand maintains, however, is that a cognitive power can
43. Of course, Durand’s choice of an example here is poor and assumes a medieval view about the
elements, Fire being one of them. The idea is that it is possible to find an instance of Fire (which has
the Hot and the Dry) which isn’t at the moment making something else hot just as one can find an
instance of Water (which has the Cold and the Wet) which isn’t making something else cold, and so on
(Earth: Cold and Dry; Air: Hot and Wet). See Pasnau, “Scholastic Qualities: Primary and Secondary”
for further discussion. More generally, the idea is that something with the capacity or ability to do
something isn’t always doing it, e.g., a stove that ain’t cookin’ a pie.
44. Sent. I-A 3.3 f. 42vb = Sent. I-C 3.2.2 nn. 38–9: “Ergo potentia est aliquid additum super essentia
[sc. animae -PJH]. Et si dicatur, quod illud additum est solus respectus et non aliquid absolutum,
contra[. . . ].” The entire argument (Sent. I-A 3.3 (A) f. 42vb [Paris Bibl. Nat., lat. 14454] [transcription
is my own]): “Primo, ex diuersitate actuum sic: Illud, quod de se non dicit ordinem ad aliquem actum (ad
aliquem actum] add. i.m. A) sed est indifferens ad diuersos actus, oportet quod per aliquid determinetur
ad quemlibet eorum, si aliquem producere debet (producere debet] inv. C ). Sed essentia animae non
dicit aliquem ordinem ad actum hunc uel illum de se (de se] om. C ) sed est indifferens ad quemlibet
illorum, alioquin cum essentia animae sit una et (et] om. A) actus sint plures et realiter diuersi, unum
et idem et secundum idem esset simul determinatum ad plura realiter diuersa, quod est inconueniens.
Ergo oportet quod essentia (quod essentia] text. corr. A) animae determinetur ad hunc et illum per
aliquid (ad hunc. . . aliquid] per aliquid ad hunc et illum C ). Illud autem quo essentia determinatur
ad actum uocamus potentiam. Ergo potentia est aliquid additum super essentia. Et si dicatur, quod
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be said to be a disposition only in the right circumstances; so too it can be said to be an
operation only in the right circumstances. Consider the soapstone which has heat. Now,
heat is a monadic property that the soapstone has (much as the intellect is a monadic
property that Socrates has). In a world in which there is no heatable item at all, the
hot soapstone won’t be said to have the disposition associated with calefactivity—the
ability to make items hot—whereas in a world with at least one heatable item it will
be said to have this disposition. If we transport the soapstone back and forth between
these two worlds, it will acquire and lose this disposition even though none of its monadic
properties varied. Likewise, in the case of an operation. None of the monadic properties
change when the circumstances change such that a heatable item which before existed
now comes to be present to the soapstone. So too in the case of thought and sensory
perception.45
illud additum est solus respectus et non aliquid absolutum, contra: Respectus et habitudo numquam
est causa determinationis sed potius determinatus respectus sequitur et (sequitur et] om. A) causatur
a principio determinationis. Verbi gratia: ignis non est determinatus ad calefaciendum per hoc, quod
habet talem habitudinem uel respectum, sed calor determinat ignem ad calefaciendum, et per calorem
habet determinatum respectum. Et hoc rationabiliter, sicut enim respectus supponit fundamentum ex
quo oritur, sic determinatus respectus determinatum fundamentum. Ergo determinatio animae ad hunc
actum uel illum non est per solum (solum] om. A) respectum sed fit necessario per aliquid absolutum,
quod est immediatum principium actus, et illud dicimus potentiam.” (C = Sent. I-C 3.2.2 nn. 38–39.)
See also Sent. I-A 3.3 (A) f. 42vb: “Ergo inter potentias animae non esset distinguere quod quaedam
(quaedam] quidam A) sunt organicae et quaedam (quaedam] aliud A) non, quod est contra Philosophum
et commune dictum. Maior patet de se. Minor declaratur: essentia enim animae per (per] secundum C )
se aequaliter perfecit totum corpus (corpus] text. corr. A) et quamlibet partem corporis; respectus autem
non perficit nisi ratione sui fundamenti. Si ergo potentiae non dicant nisi animam (animam] essentiam
animae C ) cum respectum, sequitur quod omnes aequaliter perficiant corpus.” (C = Sent. I-C 3.2.2 n.
40.) On Durand’s arguments for the real distinction here, see Chapter 2, fn. 8.
45. Cf. Hervaeus Natalis (presenting Durand’s position), Quodl. III.8 45: “Modo dicunt quod in istis
semper sunt simul forma a qua aliquid dicitur esse calefactiuum et esse calefactibile quia calefactiuum
importat calefacere secundum esse possibile. Nunc autem licet calefactibile non semper sit praesens
calefactiuo, tamen semper est praesens aptitudine et possibilitate. Sed in calefaciente et calefacto forma
per quam conuenit alicui calefacere calefaciens et calefacere non semper sunt simul. Vnde non semper
est simul calor et calefacere.” Cf. also Nicholas Medensis (presenting Durand’s position), Evid. II.11 395:
“Cuius ratio est quia actus primus, puta calefactiuum, requirit id aliud quod dicitur secundum potentiam
tantum. Actus autem secundus, puta calefacere, requirit id ad quod dicitur secundum actum. Et quia
aliquid potest esse praesens alicui secundum potentiam, quod non secundum actum, ideo aliquid potest
esse sub actu primo quod non est sub secundo.” Cf. also Peter Auriol (presenting Durand’s position),
Sent. I 35.1 (P ) f. 751bC: “[. . . ] sicut lux et lucere se habent, sicut actus primus et actus secundus, sic
intellectus et intelligere, nisi quod lux semper est in lucere, quia non exigitur ad obiectum uel aliquod
extrinsecum praesens, intellectus autem indiget praesentia obiecti ad intelligere, sicut et calefaciens ad
calefacere indiget praesentia (praesentia] potentia P) calefactibili. Et hinc est, quod intellectus non
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(C) Thought and sensory perception as relative second acts
Thought and sensory perception will, of course, turn out to be analyzable along the
same lines, for thought and sensory perception are also relative object-directed second
acts, the natural activities of items that have senses and intellects. Hence, since thought
is an activity characteristic of the form (in this case, intellect) and vision an activity
characteristic of the form (in this case, the visive power), once a thing has an intellect
or visive power, and provided something intelligible or visible exists in the world, it is
in relative first act (i.e., it has a disposition) and so in one of two states: it is either in
accidental potency if it is prevented or it is in second act if it is not. What prevents it,
of course, is the absence of the intelligible or visible object and so when the object is
present to it it will then be said to see or think. Hence, the object is the cause sine qua
non of a cognitive act.46
Durand’s theory of sine qua non causality, I would submit, looks a lot like the theories
of causality that we can find nowadays, for Durand seems to analyze the causal relation
here as nothing short of and nothing more than counterfactual dependence: if X were
present, then Y would occur, and if X were not present, then Y would not occur.
It is important to highlight one aspect of Durand’s analysis here. On Durand’s view,
cognitive acts, although not productive, are structure-wise the same as productive second
acts, e.g., soapstone’s second act of producing heat in something else. Both are object-
oriented or object-directed. Recall the fourth argument from the disputatio (fn. 17 above):
The elicitive principle of the act in the case of an immanent operation goes
semper dicitur intelligere, non quia ad intellectum addat intelligere aliquod absolutum, sed quia non est
semper praesens obiectum.”
46. Cf. Hervaeus Natalis (presenting Durand’s position), Quodl. III.8 45: “Et dicunt quod sicut in-
tellectiuum nihil addit super potentiam intellectiuam nisi solum respectum ad obiectum possibile esse
praesens, ita intelligens super potentiam nihil addit nisi habitudinem ipsius potentiae ad obiectum prae-
sens licet semper intellectus sit intellectiuus non tamen semper intelligit.” Cf. also Nicholas Medensis
(presenting Durand’s position), Evid. II.11 395: “Huiusmodi autem actus sunt intelligere et intellectus.
Vnde quia intelligere non perficit rem nisi in ordine ad aliud, ideo illud requirit non tamquam causam
per se, sed tamquam causam sine qua non, quia, ut dictum est, per se est a generante.”
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with an action no less than the elicitive principle in the case of an operation
that passes outside. But in the case of such an operation, as it is in the agent,
the elicitive principle is the same as the operation. For instance, in fire, the
[the principle] heat and the [operation] makes-hot are the same as viewed from
the perspective of the hot-making fire. Indeed, because fire newly makes the
water or the branch hot, there is no real and new addition or composition
made in the fire. (41–42; the Latin is quoted above, footnote 17)
I take it that what Durand means here is that it is incidental to our analysis of the
causation of an operation whether or not that operation is a production (as with cale-
faction) or non-productive (as with thought or sense perception). What matters, rather,
is that there be something able to ϕ (see, burn) present to something able to be ϕed
(seen, burnt), or, in other words, what matters is that what is ϕive be present to what
is ϕable. Hence, Durand, can declare that cognition is an action (and so active and not
passive) even though cognition is not, obviously, productive, neither of something outside
the cognizant subject (of course) nor even of something inside the cognizant subject.47
I should note an important upshot that touches upon the purported activity and
passivity of thought and sensory perception. Jean-Luc Sole`re underscores Durand’s com-
mitment to the activity of the cognitive agent, and, indeed, some of the arguments which
Durand makes against Godfrey’s position make it seem as if he is interested in a radically
active picture of the mind (see Chapter 1), akin to the picture of the will that Henry of
Ghent defends. Yet the problem with viewing the mind as radically active is that, while
delivering on the intuition that the mind is spontaneous, it fails to deliver on the intuition
that the mind must meet up with a certain amount of resistance with the world.48 If the
47. Durand is, indeed, emphatic that Aristotle’s claim that thought and vision are immanent actions
from Metaphysics IX should entail that such actions are not productions, neither of something outside
the agent nor of something inside the agent. See Sent. I-A 27.2 and Sent. I-C 27.2–3, e.g., Sent. I-C 27.3
n. 6: “[. . . ] intelligere enim non est producere intellectionem tamquam rem distinctam, sed est habere
intellectionem[. . . ].”
48. This tension is what we find in, e.g., John McDowell, Mind and World (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
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mind is active, then it seems hard to understand what sort of traction thought might
have with the world. Indeed, Duns Scotus, in his comment on the ‘Augustinian’ picture
of cognition is baﬄed by the thesis that the mind is the total cause and the object merely
inclines or excites it to elicit its mental acts. The will, of course, can be taken to be the
total cause but such a view makes little sense in the case of, say, sensory perception.49
On Durand’s view, however, thought and sensory perception, seeing as these are
relations which obtain between the mind and a present object occur regardless of whether
I want them to or not. It is, of course, under my control to open my eyes but, once eyes
are open, it isn’t up to me to see what is there to be seen.50 I can be said to be an
agent or active with respect to my mental acts insofar as such acts are attributed to me
much as the campfire is said to be an agent or active (setting aside the fact that it is also
productive) with respect to its combustive acts insofar as such acts are attributed to it.
We attribute such acts to them as agents because they have forms in them upon which
such acts naturally follow.51 This, to be sure, is a thin sense of agency, for not just minds
are agents but also rocks, campfires and, indeed, anything which has a nature upon which
certain natural operations or motions naturally follow when the circumstances are right.
Of course, such items are not patients or passive in the strict technical sense of the term:
such items do transition from potentiality to (second) actuality but this transition is not
owing to an efficient cause which impresses upon the item so reduced a form. Yet there
is a perfectly clear sense in which such transitions are passive—it is not up to the rock to
University Press, 1994). For what I think is a nice medieval statement of the tension, see Peter John Olivi,
Sent. II 72.38: “Vlterius sciendum quod quia ad actum cognitiuum concurrit duplex causa praedicta:
idcirco experimentaliter sentimus in ipso duas rationes quasi oppositas. Nam pro quanto exit ab interno
principio cognitiuo, sentimus quod est actio nostra et quoddam agere nostrum a nobis exiens et quasi in
obiectum tendens et in illud intendens. Pro quanto uero fit ab obiecto tanquam a terminante, uidetur
nobis esse quasi quaedam passio ab obiecto et cum ipso obiecto intra nos illapsa, acsi ipsum obiectum
esset in intimo nostrae potentiae impressum et illapsum. Et propter hanc secundam experientiam moti
sunt fere omnes illi qui dixerunt actus cognitiuos et etiam affectiuos influi et imprimi a suis obiectis
immediatis, non attendentes primam experientiam[. . . ].”
49. Ord. I 3.3.3, Lect. I 3.3.2–3.
50. Durand also holds that the mind can issue commands to the imaging faculty, which also can be
trained, and so to speak open and close the eyes of the intellect. See Chapter 5 and fn. 52 below.
51. On the notion of attribution at work here, see, esp., Sent. II-C 15.2.
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fall down when one removes the plank and it is not up to me to see the rock when it is
presented to me. The sense in which we are agents is thin (and so too the sense in which
we are patients): it has nothing to do with productivity and it has nothing to do with
spontaneity, in the sense of freedom of choice.52
Let’s sum up. Durand makes three closely connected claims when he develops his
positive account concerning the causation of cognitive acts. As Durand puts it at the
close of his discussion in a passage that mirrors the passage that opened his discussion
(quoted above, pg. 85):
Through what, then, is [the intellect] reduced from potency with respect to
52. See Sent. II-A 3.5 26: “[. . . ] licet in potestate agentis liberi, hominis uel angeli, sit approximare
actiua passiuis uel ea quae quocumque modo sunt ad operationem necessaria, tamen eis approximatis
non est in potestate uoluntatis eorum, quin sequatur actio, sicut in potestate angeli uel hominis non est
quod ignis approximatus stuppae comburat uel non comburat, licet sit in eorum potestate approximare
unum alteri. Sed ad intelligere solum requiritur intellectus et praesentia obiecti, ut declaratum est.”
See also ibid., 26: “Sed intellectus noster non potest non intelligere rem, cuius speciem habet praesente
phantasmate speciei et rei correspondente.” See also TDH 4.3 17: “Quid si quis dicat quod immo
operantur ex imperio rationis, quia ex imperio rationis possunt aperiri palpebrae uel claudi, et sic potest
oculus uidere uel non uidere, dicendum est quod istud non ualet, quia istud non est ex hoc, quod potentia
uisiua oboediat imperio rationis, sed quia organa corporis oboediunt uoluntati ad nutum, puta palpebrae
uel manus, per quae ratio potest ponere actui uidendi impedimentum; sicut non est dicendum, quod
Sortes oboediat mihi quoad motum, quia possum eum ponere in uinculis ut non moueatur.” See also
ibid., 15–6: “[. . . ] non est in potestate hominis, quod non uideat colorem propositum, aut quod non
audiat sonum catantis uel quod non immutetur a calore, et sic de caeteris.” See also Sent. II-A 3.8 f.
173va–b: “Non enim potest fieri, quia agente et passo approximatis necessario fiat actio. Nec similiter
fieri potest quin praesente obiecto potentiae cognoscitiuae, necessario fiat cognitio. Vnde in potestate
uoluntatis non est quod intellectus noster non intelligat praesentato sibi obiecto in phantasmate. Sed quia
uoluntas potest facere quod phantasia non phantasietur de aliquo, potest etiam facere per consequens
quod intellectus nihil consideraret de illo.” (The text is from Stella, Evidentiae.) Cf. Augustine, De lib.
arb. III: “Non est in potestate nostra quibus uisis tangamur.” Durand’s position about the causation of
psychological acts, in general, was censured, and in one of these censures we discover the charge that
such a view is dangerous to freedom of choice! Articuli nonaginta tres . . . n. 19: “Ibidem etiam dicit
quod huiusmodi actus immanentes sunt a generante per se et ab obiecto solum sicut a causa sine qua
non. Nec iste articulus est in suo nouo, sed in antiquo tantum. Periculosum propter libertatum arbitrii
reputamus.” As Sole`re understands this censure, it is because “Durand’s epistemological position opens
the door to a blantantly anti-Thomist theory of free-choice” (“The Activity of the Cognitive Subject”).
I’m not so sure about the inference here. Durand, it seems to me, will have to develop—and in fact
does—an alternative way of safeguarding freedom. But his view on sine qua non causality, it seems to
me, won’t land him with an anti-Thomist (read: Franciscan) theory of free-choice! Durand’s sine qua
non causality makes it as hard for him to safeguard the freedom of the will as it is for Godfrey! Durand,
in fact, defends the thesis that a purely passive power can be still said to be free with freedom of choice.
See QLA 1–3, Sent. II-C 24.1–4, Quaestio vesperiarum, Quaestio in aula, Quaestio in aula resumpta. In
contrast with Henry of Ghent, Duns Scotus, and Peter John Olivi, the sine qua non thesis is orthogonal
to the issue of the will’s purported freedom.
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the act of thinking? It ought to be said, as was discussed, that it is through
that which per se gives the intellect—since what gives the form also gives the
thought quantum est de se because to have an intellect is to think about a
present object; however the presented object or the presenting of the object
is the cause sine qua non because to think is not at all an absolute perfection
but a perfection in comparison to something else. (Sent. II-A 3.5 22–3)
He adds that it doesn’t matter, at the moment, what account we give as to how it is or
through what it is that the object is said to be present to the power.
Through what, however, is the sense object presented to sense and the intel-
ligible object presented to the intellect? Is this through a species or through
something else? An answer won’t be given here, since I intend to discuss this
elsewhere. But this alone should be held from what has been said: the species
is not required as what per se elicits the act but only, if it is ever required, as
what represents the object. (ibid., 23)
Durand’s account of the causation of mental acts can be reduced to the following
three claims. First, he makes the ontological claim that mental acts are mere relations.
Second, he claims that the per se cause of a mental act is the generans in the sense
that any natural activity or motion is in some sense from whatever gave to a thing the
form with respect to which that activity or motion is associated. Finally, he claims
that the object is a sine qua non cause, that is, the absence of the object is a kind
of impediment with respect to the realization of a cognitive power’s natural operation
(thought or sensory perception) which is removed owing to its presence.
On Durand’s view, when a thing able to cognize and a thing able to be cognized are
present to each other, cognition ensues; there is no need to suppose that the object act
upon as efficient cause the power, nor is there any reason to suppose that, at least as far
as the causation is concerned, cognition requires the reception of form. On this view, the
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presence of the object is sufficient whereas, on Godfrey’s view, its presence was taken to
be a mere necessary condition, for, on Godfrey’s view, the object must also act upon, as
efficient cause, upon the cognitive power.
3.1.4 Replies to Godfrey’s ‘achilles’ argument
I think the foregoing discussion should now put us in a position to examine how Durand
would respond to Godfrey’s ‘achilles ’ argument discussed in Chapter 2. On Godfrey’s
view, Henry of Ghent’s characterization of the object of the will as mere sine qua non
cause is both ad hoc and mysterious. It is mysterious, because Henry claims it is a cause,
yet it doesn’t classify as any of the four kinds of causes Aristotle lays out. It is ad hoc
because it looks as if in every other case, the present object is an efficient cause, or, to
put it the other way around, if we allow that in one case where it looks as if X becomes
Y owing to Z as an efficient cause what actually has transpired is that X has become
Y owing to X itself as efficient cause and Z as a mere sine qua non cause, then what
prevents us from claiming that in any cause where it looks as if X becomes Y owing to
Z as an efficient cause what actually has transpired is that X has become Y owing to X
itself as efficient cause and Z as a mere sine qua non cause?
Durand (in contrast with Duns Scotus) doesn’t pose these problems to his account and
so he doesn’t provide us with an explicit answer. However, he certainly had the debate in
mind, and, I think, based upon what he does say, we might provide the following answers
on his behalf.
The mystery objection, Durand’s reply
Now, in order to answer the mystery objection—the charge that the a sine qua non cause
is a mysterious fifth kind of cause—all one must do, of course, is provide an adequate
positive account of the notion. Scotus, as we saw, attempts to articulate the notion of a
causal precondition. Durand explains sine qua non causality in terms of the Aristotelian
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distinction between essential and accidental potentiality. On Durand’s view, the cause
of an accidental reduction can’t reduce to one of the four kinds of causes, for, were it an
efficient cause, then it would have caused an essential reduction and not an accidental
reduction. Whenever a natural operation or motion is impeded, then whatever removes
that impediment should be treated as a sine qua non cause of the natural operation or
motion. Who could ask for a better explanation than that?
The ad hoc objection, Durand’s reply
Nor is an appeal to a sine qua non cause ad hoc, for on Durand’s view a sine qua non
cause is not involved in a few exceptional cases, such as volition or mental acts, but it is
involved in any accidental reduction: the fire’s transition from inactivity to activity and
a rock’s downwards motion are both owing to the removal of an impediment as a sine
qua non cause. When fire acts upon water and heats it up, for instance, water is a sine
qua non cause.53 When a rock falls down, the removal of the plank is a sine qua non
cause.
Provided we are committed to the idea that there are natural forms which have
associated with them natural activities and motions, then, I would submit, Durand’s
position avoids the slippery slope. Provided, in other words, a distinction between, on
the one hand, an event that occurs with respect to X which is natural to X and, on the
other hand, an event that occurs with respect to X which is not natural to X, then we
can claim that, in the one case, that event occurred owing to an extrinsic efficient cause
whereas in the other case it occurred owing to a sine qua non cause. It is natural to
fire and not water to make things hot; it is natural to rocks to fall down. Hence, fire as
efficient cause makes the branch burn; but the presence of the branch as sine qua non
cause ‘makes’ the fire burn the branch or Socrates perceive it.
53. The water also happens to be consequently a material cause, but antecedently it was first a sine qua
non cause.
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Durand’s position is, like Duns Scotus’s, a disjunctivist one: either a case of change
has as its motive cause an efficient cause or it has a sine qua non cause. However,
Durand’s position, unlike Duns Scotus’s, (1) doesn’t force us to violate the act-potency
axiom even a little and (2) has, I think, a much more principled reason for choosing one
of the disjuncts.
3.1.5 The sources of Durand’s view
Durand’s view, to be sure, is peculiar, but is it unique? There have been various attempts
in the secondary literature at tracing back Durand’s position, at finding its source. Jean-
Luc Sole`re decides that Durand’s position here resembles none other than Peter John
Olivi.54 I would submit that Durand’s view resembles that of James of Viterbo, a con-
temporary of Godfrey and whose view it is that is most likely the one that Godfrey
paraphrases in Quodl. IX.19 as the first opinion.55 Durand, as mentioned, without doubt
54. Sole`re, “The Activity of the Cognitive Subject.” It is interesting to note that whereas Olivi appeals
more often than not to what we would nowadays call phenomenological considerations, Durand more
often than not does not. Durand is interested in metaphysical and ontological, even linguistic, consider-
ations. Durand also doesn’t ever talk about the attention or intention of the soul (unlike Sua`rez, Henry
of Ghent, and Olivi), at least not in this discussion. The adverb ‘attentius’ appears once in the text, as
part of a quotation from Augustine meant to bolster his defense of the claim that the sense object doesn’t
act on the soul but on the organ and so then can be said to be present or not-hidden from the soul (Sent.
II-A 3.5 23). The text is De Musica VI.5. On Peter John Olivi’s theory of cognition, see Robert Pasnau,
“Petrus Iohannis Olivi Tractatus de Verbo,” Franciscan Studies 53 (1993): 134–48, Pasnau, Theories of
Cognition, 271–6, Robert Pasnau, “Olivi on the Metaphysics of Soul,” Medieval Philosophy and Theology
6 (1997): 109–32, Dominik Perler, Theorien der Intentionalita¨t im Mittelalter (Frankfurt: Klostermann,
2002), ch. 2, and Toivanen, Animal Consciousness. Peter Olivi on Cognitive Functions of the Sensitive
Soul. Sole`re also compares Durand’s views with those of John Pecham, Roger Marston, Henry of Ghent,
and John Duns Scotus. Pattin, Pour l’histoire du sens agent attempts to trace back the source of the
‘Augustinian’ position against which John Duns Scotus argues in book one of his commentary on the
Sentences. This position is mostly a mash-up of Peter John Olivi and Henry of Ghent. On the term
‘sine qua non’ in Olivi (he prefers the term ‘terminative’), see F. Simoncioli, Il problema della liberta`
umana in Peitro di Giovanni Olivi e Pietro de Trabibus (Milan, 1956), 87–91, E. Bettoni, Le dottrine
filosofiche di Pier di Giovanni Olivi (Milan: Societa editrice ‘Vita e pensiero’, 1959), 429–446, and Kent,
Virtues of the Will: The Transformation of Ethics in the Late Thirteenth Century, 129–37. Note that
Bettoni, Le dottrine filosofiche di Pier di Giovanni Olivi, 439, n. 143 argues that Olivi’s view is not to
be confused with the sine qua non thesis.
55. See Coˆte´, “L’objet et la cause de la connaissance selon Godefroid de Fontaines” who makes a
convincing argument for this case. In addition to the textual evidence, he presents the following bit of
external evidence. According to a “disciple admiratif de Godefroid”: “Item, quaestione undeuicesima,
contra unam opinionem quae ponit actum intelligendi fieri in intellectu non uirtute obiecti nec uirtute
speciei, sed seipso si adsit obiectum. Et ibi dicitur contra speciem quod non sit ponenda alia praeter
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had Godfrey’s Quodl. IX.19 in front of him when he composed Sent. II-A 3.5 and he
seems to have simply launched a defense of this first opinion.56 However, it seems to me
actum et quantum ad modum speciei communem et quantum ad modum quod ponit eam Iacobus. Et
ibi generaliter quod nihil ducit se de potentia ad actum. Et ibi improbat unam positionem de duplici
immutatione in sensu: una ratione organi, quae non est sensatio; et alia potentiae quae est ipsa sensatio.
Et est positio Iacobi primo quodlibet suo.” The text is originally from J. Hoffmans, “La Table des
divergences et innovations de Godefroid de Fontaines,” Revue ne´oscolastique de philosophie 36, no. 41
(1934): 435 quoted in Coˆte´, “L’objet et la cause de la connaissance selon Godefroid de Fontaines,” 414, fn.
20. On Godfrey’s relationship with James, see John Wippel, “The Dating of James of Viterbo’s Quodlibet
I and Godfrey of Fontaines’ Quodlibet VIII,” Augustiniana 24 (1974): 372–86, Wippel, “The Relationship
between Essence and Existence in Late-Thirteenth-Century Thought: Giles of Rome, Henry of Ghent,
Godfrey of Fontaines, and James of Viterbo.” On Durand’s relation with James, see Thomas Jeschke,
“U¨ber natu¨rliche und u¨bernatu¨rliche Gottesliebe. Durandus und einige Dominikaner gegen Jakob von
Viterbo. (Mit einer Textedition von In III Sententiarum, D. 29, Q. 2 des Petrus de Palude),” RTPM 76
(2009): 111–98. Probably later than James of Viterbo, Radulphus Brito also presents a position like this
one, which looks strikingly similar—it is this view, incidentally, which Buridan in Quaestiones longae
declares is both ‘probable and persuasive’ but not demonstrative. Radulphus Brito, QDA III.2 n. 5:
“Vnumquodque ens per suam propriam formam habet propriam actionem consequentem illam formam,
ut patet ex praedicta auctoritate. Sed anima intellectiua est forma substantialis hominis. Ergo ratione
animae intellectiuae hominis est aliqua propria operatio. Et non est alia nisi intelligere. Ergo intelligere
est agere. Et si intelligere est agere, intellectus est actiuus.” (The text is from the FV column on pages
113–4 in the critical edition.) Unfortunately, the editors of the critical edition do not attribute this view
to anyone, and as far as I know, no one has.
56. The position in full (Quodl. IX.19 270–1): “Dicendum quod uidetur aliquibus quod uirtute obiecti
nec species nec actus intelligendi fiunt in intellectu, sed ipse intellectus habet esse in actu intelligendi se
ipso, si adsit obiectum huiusmodi sui actus. Omni formae enim debetur aliqua actio; intellectus autem
quaedam forma est; ergo aliqua actio ei debetur. Hoc autem non uidetur nisi intelligere. Quare, etc. Et
hoc declaratur per simile. Cum enim alia entia imperfectiora habeant formas secundum quas se ipsis
sunt in actu primo, sc. semper, et secundo etiam si adsit obiectum uel materia talis actionis, puta: ignis
semper est calidus actu primo, quo sc. secundum se calet; et ex hoc etiam semper est in actu secundo,
sc. calefaciendi si adsit materia; quae quidem materia uel obiectum talis actionis ad hoc quod ignis sic
in huiusmodi actu nihil penitus facit in ipsum ignem, sed ignis per primum suum actum hac materia
praesente exit in hunc secundum actum. Ita etiam uidetur in proposito, quod intellectus secundum se
sit aliqua res et natura secundum formam et actum, secundum quem semper est in suo actu primo,
et etiam ex se ipso ex huiusmodi actu primo nata est exire in actum secundum, qui est intelligere in
actu, praesente obiecto non quidem ut agente aliquid in ipsum intellectum, sed ut id in quod terminatur
actio intellectus. Et secundum hunc modum ponendi posset dici quod, licet obiectum sic per se nihil
faciat in intellectu, est tamen ut causa sine qua non fit ipse actus intelligendi; nec respectu alicuius
in intellectu habet rationem causae ut sine qua non nisi respectu ipsius actus et non alicuius alterius
speciei quae ad actum ipsum requiratur, quia ad hoc sufficit ista actualitas intellectus secundum quam
est secundum se in actu suo primo. Et secundum istos intelligere non est species aliqua proprie dicta
ad modum alicuius qualitatis per modum inhaerentis et informantis se habens, nec etiam ad ipsum
intelligere requiritur aliqua alia species uel forma ultra actualitatem naturalem ipsius intellectus, sed est
intelligere actio excercita.” Durand clearly rallies to the defense of this view; indeed, at one point he
even calls a thought an exercise of an action. Sent. II-A 3.5 18–19: “Vnde satis irrationabiliter uidentur
aliqui dicere ponentes, quod intelligere non est exercere aliquam actionem, sed solum habere formam
aliquam, sicut calere non est exercere aliquam actionem, sed solum habere formam caloris; et tamen
dicunt, quod intelligere non est solum habere intellectum, sed est intellectum habere quandam aliam
formam, quae est ipsum intelligere; quod est simile, ac si diceretur, quod calere non est habere calorem,
sed est calorem habere quandam aliam formam, quae sit ipsum calere, quod est ridiculum.” Note as well,
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that Durand can’t have read James of Viterbo, but rather, most likely, he latched onto
the position presented in Godfrey and ran with it. For one thing, Durand doesn’t use the
same language that James does. James rarely if ever calls the object a sine qua non cause
but rather he constantly—at least 30 times in Quodl. I.12 alone—characterizes it as an
‘exciting’ or ‘inclining’ cause. James also, as we will see below, has other peculiar lan-
guage which Godfrey omits: James uses terms like ‘incomplete actualities’, ‘aptitudes’,
and so forth, none of which can be found in Durand.
Even so James’s position has most the hallmarks of Durand’s.57 He seems to hold
that an episodic act is not a new form added to the intellect. He holds to a kind of
antiaffectionism, arguing that neither our senses nor our intellects can be affected by
the agency of the object. He makes some of the same arguments which Durand makes
(discussed in Chapter 1), and even appeals to some of the same authoritative passages
to support his case. Indeed, he insists on an important disanalogy between physical
change and so to speak mental change.58 He argues that cognitive change isn’t a matter
of being affected by the object as efficient cause but a kind of formal change with a
formal cause.59 And he even seems to want to treat cognition as more or less a matter of
at the end of his refutation of the actio excercita view, Godfrey writes (272): “Vnde sic hoc commune
dictum aliquorum de causa sine qua non possit habere locum, hoc non potest esse in entibus absolutis et
secundum se perfectis, sed aliquo modo in relatiuis. Nam Sorte existente albo et Platone existente nigro,
si Plato fiat albus, Sortes fit realiter de non-simili simils, et tamen nihil factum est per se in Sorte ex
hoc quod Plato est realiter transmutatus. Sed in his quorum entitas non est in uno praecise, scilicet in
relatiuis, est ratio specialis, ut alibi tractatur.” Durand, it would seem, latched onto this, to Godfrey’s
view, reductio and ran with it. Well, what if we thought of thoughts as relative entities?
57. The primary texts are Quodl. I.7 and Quodl. I.12.
58. ibid., 165: “Sicut et huiusmodi motus, qui sunt proprii uiuentibus, sunt alterius rationis et modi,
quam illi qui sunt communes etiam non-uiuentibus.”
59. 166: “ “Est enim quaedam actualitas incompleta, pertinens ad secundum speciem qualitatis, quae
est potentia naturalis, considerata secundum exordium et praeparationem quamdam respectu actus
ulterioris. Vnde dicitur aptitudo et idoneitas naturalis ad completum actum. Illud autem, quod sic est
in potentia secundum actum quemdam incompletum, mouetur ex se ad completum actum, non quidem
efficienter, sed formaliter. Et ita secundum idem est passiuum et actiuum, licet non eodem modo, nec
actione et passione transeunte.” See also ibid., 167: “Eodem modo et uniformiter ponendum est aliquid
actiuum in omnibus huiusmoid potentiis, quia ipsa potentia cum suis aptitudinibus, secundu quod nata
est perfici per ulteriores actus, dicitur possibilis, secundum uero quod ad illos actus mouet se, non quidem
efficienter, sed formaliter, dicitur agens. Et sic est intelligendum quod itnellectus possibilis et agens est
una et eadem potentia, diuersimodo sumpta.” See also Quodl. I.7 110–1.
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relational change.60 And, of course, he extends his analysis all the way down, from will
to the senses.61
However, James’s view is different from Durand’s on a very important point, and part
of the reason I bring all of this up is because James is an innativist and Durand is not.
In the next section, I will look at this issue in more detail.
By way of conclusion, as I hope has been established, Durand’s account of sine qua
non causality is very different from the account which Henry and Duns Scotus defend.
The most striking difference pertains to the ontology of psychological acts or states. On
Duns Scotus’s and Henry of Ghent’s view, a psychological act (be it an act of the will or
a cognitive act) is, ontologically, a monadic property: an absolute form superadded to its
associated power.62 Durand, by contrast, rejects this view. On his view a psychological
act should not be thought of as an absolute item superadded to the psychological power
or the subject in the manner in which an absolute accident is added to a subject: psy-
chological acts are mere or pure relations between things capable of thought and things
capable of being thought (or desired, or seen and so on).
Durand is, if not unique, at least peculiar in combining these two theses—the sine
qua non thesis and the ontological thesis—and defending with such zeal antiaffectionism.
Most authors were either affectionists or self-affectionists, that is, most philosophers in
the High Middle Ages thought that mental processes involve the reception of ‘form’
60. Quodl. I.12 178 where he draws an analogy with the relational change involved in color-similarities.
Durand, in DQ 1 draws the same analogy.
61. Quodl. I.12 171–5 is an extended discussion of sensory perception.
62. Henry of Ghent, Quodl. IV.7 f. 93vV: “[. . . ] et ipse actus [sc. intelligendi elicitus in intelligente
-PJH] informat intellectum tamquam operatio intrinseca ei inhaerens[. . . ].” ibid., f. 93vV–4rX: “Et per
hunc modum determinans intellectum ad intelligibile et informans ipsum tamquam similitudo intellecti
et species eius potius ponit debet eius actus qui consistit in notitia de re intellecta quam aliqua alia
species ab ipso impressa. Vnde actus uidendi quo oculus percipit extra rem uisam obiectiue perfectius
assimilat oculum rei uisae quam species rei impressa ei, quia species ista non informat neque assimilat
oculum nisi sub ratione speculi; actus uero ille informat et assimilat oculum sub ratione cognoscentis,
et sic specie illa principalius informatur et assimilatur rei uisae organum quam uis uisiua, in act autem
uidendi contingit econuerso.” Duns Scotus defends this thesis in Quodl. 13. See also Quodl. 15 n.
2: “Intellectio aliqua in nobis est noua, ut experitur quilibet, et est forma absoluta, ut dictum est in
quaestione de hoc habita.”
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owing either to the agency of the object or to the agency of the mind or to both. But
not Durand.
3.2 Is Durand’s theory adequate?
Recall that I started this chapter with two questions.
1. What is a sine qua non cause?
2. Is it appropriate to characterize the cause of a cognitive act as a sine qua non
cause?
I hope the above will have provided us with an answer to the first question: a sine qua
non cause reduces an item in accidental potentiality to act whereas an efficient cause
reduces an item in essential potentiality to act. Or, in other words, a sine qua non cause
reduces an item in potency to act without giving to it a new form or ‘affecting’ it.
But even provided that the above account of the notion of sine qua non causality meets
up to the ad hoc and mystery objections—which I think it does—and so is available for
use in an analysis of the causation of a cognitive act, there is still the further question
of whether or not it is appropriate to characterize the object as a mere sine qua non
cause of a cognitive act. More precisely, is it appropriate to maintain that the intellect,
without anything else added to it, is in accidental potentiality (as opposed to essential
potentiality) with respect to thought?
In this final section I want to look at one objection to Durand’s account which I will
call the ‘innatism’ objection. In Chapter 5, I will address a second objection which I will
call the ‘intentionality’ objection. In brief, these objections are:
1. The ‘innatism’ objection: Innatism is false, and one thing this means is that in order
for the intellect to think about the world it must acquire or receive information from
the world.
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2. The ‘intentionality’ objection: If the object does not add its species to the intellect
(be this species identified with the act as with Godfrey or held to be separate and
really distinct from the act, as the species theorist maintains), then there would be
no more reason to claim that a thought is about this object rather than that object.
3.2.1 The ‘innatism’ objection
On Durand’s view, the intellect is in accidental potentiality without anything being
added to it; it is an actual form much as heat is an actual form and thought is a natural
operation that follows upon this natural form much as calefaction is a natural operation
that follows upon heat as a natural form. Hence, a thing with an intellect doesn’t need
an efficient cause that reduces it to its act of thinking about something when it is in the
presence of an intelligible object any more than fire needs an efficient cause that reduces
it to its act of heating something when it is in the presence of a heatable object. So
too with the other cognitive powers: sight vis a` vis a visible object, hearing vis a` vis an
audible object, etc.
The ‘innatism’ objection, in short, is that this view seems to attribute a bit too
much wherewithal to our intellects. In other words, the intellect comes into the world in
essential potentiality and not accidental potentiality and it must first acquire a new form
from the object (somehow) before it can be said to be in accidental potentiality. If the
intellect were already in accidental potentiality, then we would be forced to admit that
the intellect already had such forms in it. As Hervaeus Natalis puts it:
Some people say that the possible intellect is not moved by the phantasms
[i.e., the objects]. And these people can be divided into two groups. The
first group maintains the opinion of Plato which is that the intellect has
concreated species of all things and it doesn’t require the phantasm except
as what excites it and so reduces it into an actual consideration of those
things which it already had knowledge of. [. . . ] The others are those who
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maintain the same conclusion—that is, that the intellect is not moved by the
phantasms—and they say that the intellect formulates in itself all those items
that are in it and that the phantasms are required so that the intellect can
act directed at (circa) it as at its object. (Sent. II 17.2.3 f. 255aA–B)
The second option here looks to be a kind of self-affectionist position, but the first
option here looks to be subscribed to the sort of antiaffectionism that Durand subscribes
to.63 Durand, of course, doesn’t wish to be labeled a Platonist on this issue. He in fact
tells us that the intellect is a blank slate.64 Indeed, Durand, in contrast to his contem-
poraries, offers a picture of the mind that takes this metaphor to its logical extreme. On
Durand’s view the intellect is not just a blank slate before it acquires knowledge from
the world, but it is also a blank slate even after it has acquired knowledge and, indeed,
even when it is engaged in an occurrent episode of thought, for Durand rejects not just
the idea that a thought is a received form and species as forms received in the mind, but
he also rejects the hypothesis that habitus are themselves added to or in the intellect.
63. The first view—a kind of antiaffectionist doctrine—seems to James of Viterbo’s, or one very much
like it. See Quodl. I.7 and Quodl. I.12 and below. The second view—a kind of affectionist doctrine—looks
to be one like the one John Pecham defends. See Quodl. I.4 quoted in Chapter 1, fn. 26.
64. TDH 4.8 51: “[. . . ] intellectus, qui secundum se natus est determinari per obiectum nec de se habet
aliquam indispositionem ad quemcumque actum, cum sit sicut tabula rasa.” He discusses Augustine’s
discussion of Plato’s famous slaveboy in ibid., 43: “Si enim proponantur intellectui principia per se nota
et sub eis gradatim accipiantur ea, quae sunt eis per se connexa, determinatur intellectus ad cogni-
tionem ueri et scientifice. Si uero proponantur principia non per se nota, sed dubia, ut per syllogismum
dialecticum, uel apparentia et non-existentia, ut fit per syllogismum sophisticum, determinatur intellec-
tus ad opinandum uel ad erronee sentiendum [. . . ]. De primo istorum dicit beatus Augustinus 12o De
Trinitate c. 15 recitans sententiam Platonis, qui ‘retulit puerum quemdam de geometria interrogatum
sic respondisse, tamquam esset illius peritissimus disciplinae. Gradatim quippe atque artificiose inter-
rogatus uidebat, quod uidendum erat.’ Et subdit beatus Augustinus ex sua sententia, non ex sententia
Platonis, quod ‘de rebus intelligibilibus illud fieri potest, ut bene interrogatus quisque respondeat, quod
ad quamque pertinet disciplinam, etiamsi eius ignarus est’, nec assignat istius aliam causam, nisi quia
mentis intellectualis ita condita est natura. Videtur ergo, quod ad determinationem seu facilitatem
intellectus, sufficiat determinatio et facilitas uirium, quae requiruntur ad repraesentationem obiecti.”
Durand does have, it is true, a different view of what Plato thought. Sent. II-C 3.6 n. 24: “Ad tertium
dicendum quod numquam fuit intentio authoris De causis, quod in angelo uel in intelligentia sint species,
de quibus alii loquuntur, sed cum ipse fuerit Platonicus posuit tales formas esse in intelligentiis quales
ideas posuit Plato, quas etiam quandoque uocauit formas. Plato autem secundum ueritatem uocauit
ideas cognitiones rerum uel res ut cognitas et non aliquas formas intellectui inhaerentes uel per se sub-
sistentes, sicut fabulose imposuit ei Aristoteles, et tales formas, hoc est, rerum cognitiones, dicit author
De causis esse in intelligentiis.”
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Quite the contrary, habitus exist somewhere in the body, explaining how it is that we
elicit our thoughts with more or less ease, and how it is that we engage in disciplined
trains of thought.65 The model of mind which emerges from all of this is spartan: the
human intellect was, is, and will remain totally empty, void of any absolute entities or
forms (e.g., impressa uel expressa species, acts as traditionally conceived, and habitus).
Indeed, Jerry Fodor’s characterization of the ‘Wicked Behaviorist’ seems apt here:
Each day, he would climb to his attic and throw things out, for it was his
ambition eventually to have almost nothing in his attic at all. (Some peo-
ple whispered this was his only ambition, that the Wicked Behaviorist was
actually just a closet Ontological purist. For all I know, they were right to
whisper this.) (“Precis of Modularity of Mind,” 195)66
In any case, Durand still must answer the objection. The ‘innatism’ objection is based
upon the premise that in order to think it is not enough to have an intellect; something
more must be involved, namely, some sort of form added to the intellect. Call this the
Insufficiency Assumption: the intellect on its own is not sufficient in order to think.
Durand, as we saw in Chapter 1, rejects this assumption. We are cognitive agents and
we are sufficient cognitive agents.
The insufficiency assumption itself can, I think, be analyzed as the conjunction of two
doctrines. First, there is the doctrine which, at the moment, I will call Conceptualism:
in order to think about X an intellect must have or possess a concept, A, of X and in order
to think about Y it must have some other concept, B, of Y. We can cash out the notion
65. Durand also rejects, it goes without saying, the idea that the mental word is something distinct
from the cognitive act in Sent. I-A 27.2 (cf. Sent. I-C 27.2). His rejection of habits in the intellect is in
Tractatus de habitibus (cf. the text found in Peter of Palude, Sent. III 23.1–2). See Chapter 5.
66. Or Thomas Reid (Thomas Reid, Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense
(University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997) VII 207: “[Aristotle] thought, That there
can be no sensation, no imagination, nor intellection, without forms, phantasms, or species in the mind;
and that things sensible are perceived by sensible species and things intelligible by intelligible species.”
See also Thomas Reid, Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man (University Park: Pennsylvania State
University Press, 2002) I.1 30.
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of a concept in a number of different ways (e.g., as a mental representation, as a causal
disposition, and so forth).67 Second, the insufficiency assumption is based upon a denial
of Innatism, in this context, the doctrine that the intellect comes into the world already
in possession of all the concepts it’ll ever need to make use of. Hence, anti-innativists
maintain that the intellect is a kind of blank slate upon which nothing has already been
written, that is, it does not yet have concepts and it must acquire such concepts as it
moves about in the world.
The doctrine of conceptualism and the doctrine of anti-innatism, I think, combine
together to make up the insufficiency assumption: in order for the intellect to think
about X, it must first acquire or receive the concept associated with X. In the context of
the distinction between first and second act and accidental and essential potentiality, this
seems to suggest that the intellect is in essential potentiality and must be reduced from
essential potentiality to first act owing to some agent as efficient cause before it can be in a
state where it is able to think about something in particular. By contrast, conceptualism
combined with innatism yields the claim that the intellect is not in essential potency but
in accidental potentiality, or, in other words, it is already in first act and so able to think
about something without an efficient cause or the reception of a new form. And this
looks to be precisely Durand’s position.68
Is, Durand, then, an innativist or is he, perhaps, an anti-conceptualist? Does he in
other words, hold that the mind already has all the concepts in it that it will ever need
or does he hold that minds simply do not need to have concepts in order to think? I will
argue that there is a perfectly good sense in which we can take Durand to be both an
67. I choose ‘conceptualism’ because of its association with the contemporary debate about nonconcep-
tual content between conceptualists and non-conceptualists. See, e.g., Gareth Evans, The Varieties of
Reference (Oxford: OUP, 1982) and Susanna Siegel, The Contents of Visual Experience (Oxford: OUP,
2010).
68. See, e.g., Sent. II-A 3.8 f. 173va: “Quod enim dicitur, quod intellectus angeli numquam est in
potentia ad actum primum, uerum est non solum de angelo, sed etiam de nobis. Intellectus enim
comparatur ad intelligere sicut actus primus ad secundum, ut declaratum fuit prius. Et ideo dicere quod
habens intellectum sit in potentia ad actum primum est implicare contradictionem.” (Text from Stella,
Evidentiae.)
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anti-innativist and also a conceptualist. However, before I do, let’s look at the charge in a
little more detail. I will first look at how some of Durand’s contemporaries took Durand
to be committed to innatism. I will then look at what a real medieval innativist looks
like. I will then argue that Durand is not an innativist, according to these standards.
The charge that Durand’s position entails innatism
In Sent. I 35.1, Peter Auriol argues against a view which is clearly Durand’s.69 He argues
that it entails innatism and that, since innatism is false, it is false.
If the intellect and the thought (intelligere) were the same item in reality,
then the intellect wouldn’t be a tabula rasa and also it wouldn’t be all things
in potency but rather it would be all things in act. (f. 753rb)
More precisely, he goes on to argue that a view like Durand’s entails that the intellect
would have an infinite number of ‘perfections’. But it is impossible that a human intellect
(seeing as it is finite) have or possess an infinite number of items.
It is impossible that a created substance contain in itself in a unitive mode an
infinite number of perfections. But if the substance of the created intellect—
be it angelic or human—were that in which the undetermined concept of
thought coincided, then it would follow that this substance would contain in
itself in a unitive mode an infinite number of perfections. For that in virtue
of which a stone appears is a stone and that in virtue of a flower appears is a
flower, and so on. In general, that in virtue of which a creature appears is a
creature. Hence, if the substance of the intellect is the same as the thought,
and if a thought is that in virtue of which a thing thought appears, then it
follows that the substance of a created intellect is that in virtue of which any
69. See Friedman, “Peter Auriol versus Durand of St. Pourc¸ain on Intellectual Cognition” for a discus-
sion of this argument. Auriol uses A3, that is, the same text as found in Hervaeus Natalis and Gregory
of Rimini. See footnote 9 above.
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given thing appears. Hence, the perfections of all created things will be in
it in a unitive mode—which is not possible. Therefore, one can’t maintain
that the thought is really the same as the intellect, at least not with thoughts
about thinkable things whatever might be the case in the case of thoughts
about itself. (ibid., f. 753rb)70
The charge is mixed in with some of Peter Auriol’s distinctive views about cognition.71
The idea seems to be that in order to think about X, the intellect must first have X
present to it owing to a mental representation of X. Hence, if the intellect did not acquire
these mental representations from the world but rather came into the world already in
possession of such representations, then the intellect would have an infinite number of
representations.
We can also make the same charge without appeal to the thesis that in order to
think about X the intellect must be in possession of a mental representation of X. John
Duns Scotus, for instance, argues that if the intellect were the total cause of its acts,
then this would entail that it would be infinitely active, since in order to elicit a thought
about X, the intellect must have a ‘perfection’ associated with X which allows it to elicit
that thought. In this case, a perfection is a kind of causal disposition and not a mental
representation.
70. Sent. I 35.1 f. 753rb: “Quod autem illud absolutum non sit nuda potentia intellectus, sic patet: Im-
possibile est enim quod aliqua creata substantia contineat unitiue infinitas perfectiones. Sed si substantia
intellectus creati, angelici uel humani, esset id in quod coincidit indeterminatus conceptus intellectionis,
sequeretur quod substantia ista (ista] illa F ) creata contineret unitiue perfectiones infinitas. Omne enim
quod facit lapidem apparere quodammodo est lapis; quod uero florere, quodammodo est flos; et ita
quod facit omnes creaturas apparere, est quodammodo omnes creaturae. Et per consequens substantia
intellectus, si est id ipsum quod intelligere et intelligere est id quo res intellecta praesens est per modum
apparentis, sequitur quod substantia intellectus creati est id quo res omnes creatae praesentes sunt in
esse apparenti, et sic erit perfectiones creaturarum omnium unitiue, quod impossibile est. Ergo (Ergo]
igitur F ) poni non potest quod intelligere sit realiter idem quod intellectus, saltem respectu omnis in-
telligibilis quidquid sit respectu sui ipsius.” The base text is the 1596 edition; F = Friedman, “Peter
Auriol versus Durand of St. Pourc¸ain on Intellectual Cognition.”
71. On Auriol’s views about cognition, see Russell Friedman, “Peter Aureol,” Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy (2009), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/auriol/, Friedman, “Peter Auriol versus
Durand of St. Pourc¸ain on Intellectual Cognition,” and Tachau, Vision and Certitude, ch. 4.
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[If the intellect were the total cause], then the soul would have an infinite
causal activity since in order to think this it requires a perfection and in
order to think that it requires some other perfection. Therefore, if nothing
else apart from the soul cooperates in eliciting a thought and since it can think
about an infinite number of things, it will be claimed that the soul has an
infinite causal activity. This is false. If its being able to achieve this thought
is attributed to a perfection, therefore its being [able to achieve] an infinite
number [of thoughts] will be attributed to an infinite number of perfections.
Therefore, the thought is not from the soul alone as the only efficient cause.
(Lect. I 3.3.2–3 n. 363)72
Whereas Auriol’s worry concerned the representational aspect of cognition, Duns Scotus’s
concerns the causal aspect: a perfection is not simply that in virtue of which X appears,
but it is that in virtue of which a thought occurs. A ‘perfection’, for Duns Scotus, seems
to be a kind of disposition or capacity which cooperates with the intellect in causing the
thought whereas a ‘perfection’ for Auriol seems to be a kind of mental representation.
However, the worry is the same: in order to think about X, I must have A, and in
order to think about Y, I must have B, and so on. The precise role of the perfection is
incidental. Since the intellect is finite yet its capacity for thought infinite, it would seem
to follow that either we endorse the view that we acquire such perfections or we endorse
the view that we have an infinite number of such perfections. Better to do the former
than the latter, of course.
Finally, consider Peter of Palude’s objection to Durand’s account.
72. See also Ord. I 3.3.2 n. 492: “Videtur etiam <quarto> quod tunc esset infinita actiuitas in intel-
lectu, in quantum intellectus est actiuus respectu omnium intellectionum, quia ad unam intellectionem
requiritur aliqua perfectio in causa illius intellectionis, et ad aliam intellectionem alterius rationis re-
quiritur tanta perfectio, uel maior, <quia continens uirtualiter duas perfectiones causarum propriarum,
hic et ibi;> ergo habens hanc et illam, erit perfectius quam habens illam tantum, et ita habens infinitas
tales ut totalis causa, est infinitum perfectione.” The pointed-brackets indicate additiones identified by
the editors.
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[T]he possible intellect before it has acquired knowledge (scientia) is in essen-
tial potentiality since it lacks the first act of knowledge. Hence, the Philoso-
pher tells us that it is none of those items before it knows since the soul is
like a tabula rasa upon which nothing is written; and the Commentator tells
us that the possible intellect is, in the class of intelligible stuff, what prime
matter is in the class of sensible stuff. Therefore, since it can’t be coerced,
before it transitions to an act of thinking it needs a form impressed upon it.
(Sent. II 3.3–5 8–9)
According to Peter, in order for the possible intellect—Socrates’ actual intellect, say—to
be in such a state that it is or is able to think about some item—cats, say—then it must
first acquire knowledge (scientia). Now, judging from the context of the passage—it is a
defense of the necessary role of intelligible species—what this would seem to mean is that
in order for Socrates’ intellect to think or be able to think about cats (say), it must first
acquire the intelligible species associated with cats, presumably from cats themselves as
efficient cause.73
The foregoing discussion makes clear, I think, two things. First, it makes clear what
conceptualism in this context amounts to. A conceptualist holds that in order to think
about X, I must possess A and in order to think about Y, I must possess B, where A and
B can be cashed out in a number of different ways. It doesn’t matter if A, B, C, and so
on are cashed out in terms of causal dispositions or mental representations or species or
perfections. Second, it makes clear what an innativist is in this context: an innativist is
someone who thinks that A, B, and so on are not acquired but innate.
73. See also Godfrey, Quodl. IX.19 271: “Sed uidetur inconueniens quod intelligere sit actio sic proce-
dens ab intellectu et in intellectu per se nihil agente obiecto respectu intellectus. Cum enim intellectus
possibilis de se sit in potentia ad actum intelligendi, nullo modo uidetur quod possit se ipsum reducere
in actum intelligendi hoc intelligibile uel illud, nisi aliquid fiat in actu uirtute cuius possit prosilire in
talem actum intelligendi. Oportet ergo quod ab intelligibili fiat ipsum intelligere in intellectu uel saltem
aliqua forma et species mediante qua intellectus factus in actu secundum illam possit in se ipso producere
actum intelligendi.”
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Durand, however, is both an anti-innativist and a conceptualist. In the next section
I will make this case. First, I will look at what a real innativist looks like. We should
then be in a better position to judge whether or not Durand is an innativist.
James of Viterbo: a real innativist
It is, of course, an open question what ‘innatism’ might mean, both in a medieval con-
text and nowadays.74 However, innatism in this context, I have been arguing, is to be
understood as a commitment to the view that the intellect does not acquire concepts but
is born with them. Most medieval authors were not innativists in this sense, associating
this view with Plato, as an absurdum to which one reduces a view. But in the High
Middle Ages there were a few proponents of innatism; one of these was James of Viterbo.
James of Viterbo is a good source here: he is proximate enough to both Durand and
Godfrey to be considered a possible source.75 In his first Quodlibet, probably disputed in
1293 or 1294, James defends a kind of innatism. James, like Durand, is concerned with
safeguarding some semblance of cognitive agency and, more importantly, the relative
nobility of the ‘vital’ over the inanimate (see Chapter 1). However, unlike Durand (as
I will argue) he is committed to the same kind of concept of conceptualism that others
were committed to. Hence, he recognizes that the truth of conceptualism demands that
we either embrace innatism or abandon some of our intuitions about nobility and agency.
James does the former.
On James’s view the mind is not purely passive but it has a certain incomplete actu-
ality (quaedam actualitas incompleta). James cashes out this notion in terms of innate
propensities (idoneitates) or aptitudes (aptitudines). He draws a distinction between
74. For some discussion on innatism in medieval thought, see Spruit, Species Intelligibilis I, ch. 2
(with caution), Gerd van Riel and Caroline Mace´, Platonic Ideas and Concept Formation in Ancient
and Medieval Thought (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2004), and (recently) Martin Pickave´, “Innate
Cognition” (Forthcoming).
75. On James of Viterbo’s theory of cognition, see Coˆte´, “L’objet et la cause de la connaissance selon
Godefroid de Fontaines,” Antoine Coˆte´, “Simplicius and James of Viterbo on Propensities,” Vivarium
47 (2009): 24–53, and Spruit, Species Intelligibilis I, 238–240.
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general aptitudes—our various psychological powers—and special aptitudes, that is, ap-
titudes added to a given cognitive power.76 The special aptitudes are founded upon the
intellect and perform the role that acquired intelligible species perform on the alternative
paradigm: such aptitudes are distinct innate likenesses or forms of thinkable things.
James, then, is an innativist.77 He tells us that Plato’s error consists in his endorse-
ment of innatism and the thesis that our souls exist before their union with our bodies;
innatism itself, however, is not a problem in James’s lights.78
James also does not reject Aristotle’s metaphor of the blank slate or tabula rasa;
however, he reinterprets it. On his view, to characterize the intellect as a blank slate
is to claim that the intellect has no actual or occurrent thoughts already in it; but
it is compatible with the claim that the intellect is a blank slate that it might have
already written upon it certain propensities or incomplete thoughts.79 The intellect is in
accidental potentiality and this is what it means to be a blank slate: it has no occurrent
thoughts but is able to have them. However, James, unlike Durand, is committed to the
idea that the intellect in accidental potentiality has added aptitudes—which ontologically
are forms. It is blank with respect to its complete thoughts but it is quite stock full of
incomplete thoughts or aptitudes.80
How does James answer to the objections raised above? Isn’t he, thus, committed to
the idea that the (finite) human intellect has an infinite number of incomplete actualities,
propensities, or dispositions? As far as I can tell, this isn’t a worry for James; it isn’t,
to be sure, one of the five worries he raises against his account.81
76. Quodl. I.7 92–3; see also Quodl. I.12 166.
77. Coˆte´, “L’objet et la cause de la connaissance selon Godefroid de Fontaines,” 411–2: “En effet, pour
Jacques de Viterbe—et c’est la` une de ses doctrines les plus caracte´ristiques—l’intellect agent n’a pas a`
abstraire les formes des phantasmes car celles-ci se trouvent de´ja` dans l’intellect possibile sous forme de
ce qu’il appelle des idoneitates, c’est-a`-dire des actualite´s incomple`tes ou des ‘inchoations’ relatiuement
a` la perfection ulte´rieure de l’intellect.”
78. Quodl. I.12 171.
79. Quodl. I.12 170.
80. Quodl. I.12 170.
81. Quodl. I.12 168–169.
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Durand is not an innativist and he is not an anti-conceptualist
Both innativists and anti-innativists would seem to agree, then, that conceptualism is
true: in order to think about X, one must possess the concept associated with X. On both
views, concept-possession is to be analyzed in terms of form-possession of some sort. We
can claim, for instance, that one possesses the concept, C, associated with X when one
has an intelligible species—be it identified with the act (Godfrey) or held to be separate
(the species theorist); or we can claim that one possesses C when one has an incomplete
act (James); or when one has “that in virtue of which X appears” (Auriol). However it is
that we cash out the notion, concept-possession involves the possession of some monadic
property added to the cognizant subject.
Is Durand an innativist or an anti-conceptualist? The foregoing discussion makes it
look as if this is an either/or situation: either Durand denies the conceptualist thesis
that in order to think X one must already have the concept X or Durand denies anti-
innatism—that in order to have the concept X one must acquire the concept X from the
world.
It is true enough that Durand would reject one version of conceptualism. He denies
that in order to think about X, we must have the concept associated with X where “have
the concept” means something like have the form as an item that inheres in or informs
the mind. Let’s distinguish, however, between two versions of conceptualism. According
to type A conceptualism, what it means to have a concept is to be in the possession of
a monadic property, or, to put it in scholastic terms, to be informed with a non-relative
accident, e.g., a species. Hence, this view is committed to internalism about concept-
possession: to have a concept is to have some intrinsic property. Type B conceptualism
is committed to externalism about concept-possession. A has a concept, C, under certain
external conditions; the intrinsic properties of A tell us nothing about whether or not A
possesses the concept C; rather it is the relational properties which matter. To put it in
scholastic terms, A has a concept when A has founded upon it a relative accident.
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I submit that Durand is a type B conceptualist. Here’s how. In general, Durand is an
externalist about ability-possession: X has an ability (or disposition) to do ϕ provided
certain external conditions are met. For instance, soapstone has an ability to make things
hot not in virtue of its having heat (strictly speaking) but in virtue of the relational fact
that it is related to something able to be made hot. The possession of heat is a necessary
but not sufficient condition.
Recall my discussion of dispositions when I discussed Durand’s sine qua non claim
above (§3.1.3). On Durand’s view, a relative object-oriented second act is related to
a present and existent object whereas a relative object-oriented first act is related to
an existent but non-present object. On this view, soapstone, having heat (a monadic
property), can be in one of three states: it can either be in second act (if a heatable item
is actually present to it) or it can be in first act/accidental potency (if a heatable item
is not actually present to it but rather is potentially present to it). However, it can also
be in a third state: suppose the soapstone, having heat, exists in a world wherein there
is no heatable item at all, i.e., no heatable item that is even potentially present to it.
In such a world, soapstone, having heat, will have all the same monadic properties that
soapstone, having heat, does in the alternative world (where there is something heatable,
be it actually or potentially present to it). The relevant difference between the two will
be in terms of their relational properties: in the one world, the soapstone, having heat,
will have no relation at all to something else heatable whereas in the other world it will
have a relation to something else heatable. This relation will either be a relation of
potential presence or a relation of actual presence. Hence, soapstone’s calefactivity, that
is, its ability to make something hot, is attributed to the soapstone along externalist
lines: if the soapstone exists in a world wherein there is some item able to be heated,
then the soapstone is able to make something hot; if not, it is not, even though all the
intrinsic properties of the soapstone are by hypothesis the same in both worlds. Hence,
on Durand’s view, I would submit, an ability or disposition to ϕ ϕable items (ϕativity)
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obtains if (a) there exists some subject, S, with some monadic property, M, and (b) there
exists some ϕable item. An oven is not able to cook if there is not something able to be
cooked that exists. An oven is able to cook (but not cooking) if a cookable item exists
but is not present. And an oven is able to cook and also cooking if that cookable item
both exists and is present.
Applied to the intellect, the story should look something like this. Socrates has an
intellect (a monadic property). Provided there is at least one item in the world able to
be thought, then we can claim that Socrates’ intellect bears a relationship to that item—
Socrates has a disposition to think about that item. Provided that item is, then, made
to be present to Socrates’ intellect, Socrates’ intellect will then be said to think it. Now,
it might be true that Durand is committed to an infinite number of relations—although
Durand does, in fact, deny that an actual infinity is possible.82 But, even if he did think
an actual infinite number of items were possible, it still wouldn’t be a problem, or at
least not the problem Peter Auriol and Duns Scotus seem to be worried about, for a
finite item can have an infinite number of relations, even if it can’t be informed with an
infinite number of forms or perfections or have an infinite activity.83 Just as the actual
thought is not a non-relative item added to the power, so too a possible thought is not
a non-relative item added to a power. The intellect is truly a blank slate, both before,
after, and when it thinks.
This, I think, is Durand’s position. Hence, on Durand’s view of conceptualism, in or-
der to think about X, I must have the concept associated with X. But concept-possession
is not to be analyzed in terms of the possession of a monadic property but in terms of a
polyadic property. On the alternative view, I have the concept associated with X when
I have some monadic property (a perfection). Hence, the threat of innatism is that I
82. See, e.g., Sent. I-C 44.2, Sent. I-C 43.1, Sent. I-C 43.2, Sent. I-C 39.2, Sent. I-C 17.2.7–10, Sent.
I-C 3.1, Sent. II-C 1.3–4. See Sole`re, “La puissance et l’infini: Durand de Saint-Pourc¸ain” and Sole`re,
“Thomistes et antithomistes face a` la question de l’infini cre´e´: Durand de Saint-Pourc¸ain, Herve´ de
Ne´dellec et Jacques de Metz.”
83. See especially Sent. II-C 1.4.
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will have an infinite number of monadic properties, which is absurd. On Durand’s view,
I have the concept associated with X when I have some polyadic property (a relation).
The threat of innatism does not arise. Of course, I have a relation to everything that
exists (and is intelligible, which, as it turns out, is everything that exists), but this is
not infinite. In any case, even if an infinite number of items existed, the threat is not a
threat, because a finite item can be related to an infinite number of items.
Part II
Content and Cognition
138
4 Durand of St-Pourc¸ain and Thomas Aquinas on
mental representations
In his Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, Thomas Reid writes:
All philosophers, from Plato to Mr. Hume, agree in this, that we do not
perceive external objects immediately, and that the immediate object of per-
ception must be some image present to the mind. (II.7)
Most philosophers in the High Middle Ages agreed that what we immediately perceive
are external objects and that the immediate object of perception must not be some image
present to the mind. Yet, most philosophers in the High Middle Ages also held, following
Aristotle, that perception is a process wherein the perceiver takes on the form or likeness
of the external object. This form or likeness—called a species—is a representation by
means of which we immediately perceive the external object. But how can perception be
both mediated by such representations and also immediate? How can an item represent
an external object to someone without itself being perceived?
Thomas Aquinas is one of these philosophers. For Aquinas, all our cognitive activi-
ties, from vision on up to our most abstract thoughts about the world, require species or
similitudines which function somehow as representations of the thing.1 Durand rejects
this thesis on two fronts.2 First of all, he argues, in order to explain how it is that a
1. See, e.g., Sent. I 36.2.3: “Omnis cognitio est per speciem aliquam cogniti in cognoscente.” QDV
II.5: “[. . . ] aliquid cognoscitur secundum quod est in cognoscente repraesentatum, et non secundum
quod est in cognoscente existens.” SCG II.77: “Omnis enim cognitio fit secundum similitudinem cogniti
in cognoscente.” In DA I.4: “[. . . ] cognitio fit per similitudinem rei cognitae in cognoscente, oportet
enim quod res cognita aliquo modo sit in cognoscente.” ST I.88.1: “[. . . ] requiritur ad cognoscendum ut
sit similitudo rei cognitae in cognoscente quasi quaedam forma ipsius.” Aquinas allows for two notable
exceptions: the beatific vision (Sent. IV 49.2.1) and self-knowledge (QDV X.9). Henceforth, I take this
proviso as assumed.
2. The best analysis of Durand’s criticism of species remains Fumagalli, Durando di S. Porziano, 65–
76. See also (with some caution) Spruit, Species Intelligibilis I, 281–3. Both authors limit themselves to
Durand’s printed third redaction (‘C’). More recently, Sole`re, “The Activity of the Cognitive Subject”
and Friedman, “Peter Auriol versus Durand of St. Pourc¸ain on Intellectual Cognition” discuss aspects
of Durand’s criticism of species from his first redaction (‘A’).
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perception—the mental act—comes about, one does not need to postulate that a form
somehow comes to be received in the percipient. In order to perceive, all that is needed
is an item able to perceive and an item able to be perceived and their mutual approxi-
mation.3 One does not need to posit that the object acts upon the percipient, nor does
one need to suppose that the percipient comes to acquire or take on a form or species of
the object. Second of all, one does not need to posit a species or form in the percipient
in order to explain what the perceptive act is about.
In his discussion of the species-theory of cognition, Durand clearly distinguishes be-
tween two roles associated with the species : as a necessary postulate in an account of the
causation of a cognitive act and as a necessary postulate in an account of the aboutness of
a cognitive act. We have already seen some of the basic assumptions which motivate him
to reject the first role associated with a species . In this chapter, I will be concerned with
Durand’s arguments against the second role associated with a species or form received
or possessed by the mind, that is, its role as a representation.
One of the arguments which Durand makes in this connection is the following. The
postulation of a species , conceived of as a representation, runs against the tribunal of
experience, for were direct forms of cognition to involve species as representations, then
we would experience them, since whatever represents something is perceived.4 Durand’s
3. See, e.g., Sent. II-C 3.6 n. 21: “Sicut ergo sensibilia, secundum se praesentia sensui, cognoscuntur
per sensum, puta omnia colorata et omnia lucentia, quae secundum se praesentialiter obiiciuntur uisui,
statim uidentur, quia unum est uisiuum et aliud uisibile, propter quod eis approximatis statim sequitur
uisio a quocumque sit effectiue, et similiter est de aliis sensibus [. . . ].” Durand, Sent. II-A 3.5 31: “[. . . ]
ad hoc quod intellectus intelligat sufficit quod res intelligibilis sit praesens obiectiue intellectui secundum
se uel secundum aliquid eam repraesentans.” Sent. II-C 8.4 n. 3: “[. . . ] ad actum sentiendi non requiritur
nisi praesentia sensibilis. [. . . ] Sensibile, dico, uel de nouo formatum, modo quo supra dictum est, uel
aliunde oblatum.” See also Sent. II-A 3.5 24, Sent. I-C 39.1 n. 8, Sent. II-C 4.1 n. 4, Sent. II-C 3.6 n. 23,
Sent. II-C 3.7 n. 16, Sent. I-C 3.8 n. 7, and Sent. IV-C 49.2 n. 24.
4. Sent. II-C 3.6 n. 102: “Et quod non sit ponere speciem in sensu, puta in uisu, ad repraesentandum
uisui colorem ut uideatur, patet sic. Omne illud per quod tamquam per repraesentatiuum potentia
cognitiua fertur in alterum est primo cognitum. Sed species coloris in oculo non est primo cognita,
seu uisa ab ipso—immo nullo modo est uisa ab eo. Ergo per ipsam tamquam per repraesentatiuum
uisus, non fertur in aliquid aliud.” Sent. II-C 3.6 n. 12: “Quod autem in intellectu nostro non sit ponere
speciem talem patet per eandem rationem, quia oporteret quod esset ab intellectu primo cognita, cuius
oppositum experimur.”
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refutation of species raised the immediate ire of his 14th-century contemporaries,5 and
even during the early modern period Durand’s arguments were regularly addressed by
proponents of the species-theory of cognition.6 One of the more common criticisms
of Durand’s refutation, reiterated by Robert Pasnau in Theories of Cognition, is that
Durand simply misrepresents the theory. A species is, it is true, a representation of the
external object, but it is not a representation in which the external object is perceived
but rather a representation by means of which it is immediately perceived. A species ,
in other words, represents an external object to a percipient even though it is not itself
perceived.7
In what follows, I want to re-evaluate the success of Durand’s criticism of repre-
sentational species . I will first (§4.1) present one of Durand’s arguments against the
species-theory of cognition, followed by this common objection to it. I then (§4.2) argue
that Durand’s criticism is better than all that, for it is part of a more general kind of
burden-of-proof argument which goes roughly like this. It is natural to suppose that a
representation is apprehended before whatever it represents is apprehended and it is also
evident that my perception of an external object does not involve my apprehension of
anything other than the external object. Hence, the burden of proof is not mine but
yours to show that there is such a thing as a representation which represents something
to someone without itself being apprehended and that such an entity necessarily mediates
perception. Such is the burden that is never met by the proponent of the species-theory
of cognition. I close (§4.3) by considering some options that such a proponent might take
5. See, e.g., Hervaeus Natalis, Quodl. III.8, Peter of Palude, Sent. II 3.3–5, Gregory of Rimini, Sent.
II 7.2–3, Peter Auriol, Sent. I 35.1, and Nicholas Medensis, Evid. II.8–12.
6. Spruit, Species Intelligibilis I, 281: “In the eyes of later generations of philosophers, especially the
authors of the Second Scholasticism, Durandus of Saint-Pourc¸ain is one of the main opponents of the
intelligible species.” L. Spruit discusses Peter Crockaert (ibid., ch. 5.2.7; In DA III.1.5 and Raphaele
Aversa (Spruit, Species Intelligibilis II, ch. 10.2.2.5; Philosophia . . . vol. 2, f. 820a). See also John
Capreolus, Defensiones II 3.2, Francisco Sua´rez, Comm. DA 5.1, and Thomas de Vio (Cajetan), ST
I.84–85. On Durand’s legacy, see Mu¨ller, Die Lehre vom verbum mentis and Bonino, “Quelques re´actions
thomistes a` la critique de l’intellect agent par Durand de Saint-Pourc¸ain.”
7. Pasnau, Theories of Cognition, 18.
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in response.
4.1 Against species
Durand rejects species as representations throughout his career, and offers a series of
arguments against the species-theory of cognition—the view that all cognitive activities
are mediated by representational species.8 One argument which Durand makes, which
seems to invite the criticism that he misrepresents the theory, is the following:
Such a species, if it were to direct [a cognitive power] into the cognition of some
other item, would do this as a likeness (similitudo)—indeed, it is commonly
called a likeness of the thing (similitudo rei)—and so it would have the nature
of an image. But an image directing [a cognitive power] into the cognition of
that of which it is an image is cognized first, which can’t be said about such
a species. (Sent. II-C 3.6 n. 11)
Durand’s argument is simple. An ordinary representation (e.g., an image) is apprehended,
by whatever cognitive route, before whatever it represents is apprehended. As he put it
earlier, in general, “that through which, as through a representative, a cognitive power is
directed to something else is cognized first” (ibid., n. 102: “Omne illud per quod tamquam
per repraesentatiuum potentia cognitiua fertur in alterum est primo cognitum”).9 The
image of Hercules in the courtyard, his reflection in the pond, and the utterance ‘Hercules’
represent Hercules; yet in each case, the representation is something which is apprehended
first: I hear the word or see the statue and then I think about Hercules. As Durand
explains:
8. His most extensive discussions are in Sent. II-A 3.5 and Sent. II-C 3.6. But see also Sent. I-C 3.2.5,
Sent. I-A 3.5 (= Additiones ad comment. I Sent.), Sent. II-C 3.7–8, QLA 3, and Sent. IV-C 49.2.
9. See also Sent. II-C 3.6 n. 11: “Et sine dubio de se uidetur absurdum quod potentia cognitiua ducatur
in cognitionem alicuius per tale repraesentatiuum, quod est sibi totaliter incognitum. Contrarium enim
uerissimum est, uidelicet quod per notum ducitur in cognitionem ignoti.” Spruit, Species Intelligibilis I,
283 remarks that “this methodological rule, which Durandus assumes to be self-evident, has a brilliant
future ahead of it.”
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Whatever holds itself as object (se habere obiectiue) to a cognitive power qua
cognitive is or can be cognized by it. But whatever represents something to a
cognitive power holds itself as an object, for it stands in for the thing which
it represents (supplet enim uicem rei quam repraesenta), which thing, were it
itself present, would hold itself as an object to the cognitive power. Therefore,
any such representation is or can be cognized by it, and when it directs it
into the cognition of some other item, it is cognized before that item (either
in time or in nature). (Sent. II-C 3.6 n. 102)
10
Yet a species is not apprehended before the external object, for when I perceive Her-
cules, I do not first perceive a representation of Hercules. Hence, a species can’t be a
representation, at least not an ordinary representation.11
4.1.1 An objection
An obvious objection to this line of attack against the species-theory is this. A species,
to be sure, is a representative or representation, but it isn’t an ordinary representa-
tion. Quite the contrary, it is a special representation, and special representations can,
as it turns out, represent external objects to percipients without themselves being per-
ceived first. For instance, John Capreolus, a 15th-century thinker known to early modern
philosophers as the prince of the Thomists (princeps thomistarum),12 in his Defensiones
theologiae Diui Thomae Aquinatis writes:
10. What Durand means by the proviso ‘either in time or in nature (tempore uel natura)’ is that one
might at the very temporal instant that one grasps the representation also grasp the representatum; but
even so, the grasp of the representation is conceptually prior to the grasp of the representatum.
11. It will be useful in what follows to make something explicit: The ordinary or folk conception of a
representation treats it as a triadic-relation: X represents Y to Z.
12. On Capreolus, see M. Grabmann, “J. Capreolus, O.P., der Princeps Thomistarum und seine Stel-
lung in der Geschichte der Thomistenschule,” DT 44 (1944): 145–70, the forward and introduction to
Kevin White and Romanus Cessario, On the Virtues: Defensiones Theologiae Divi Thomae Aquinatis,
Book 3, English (CUA: CUAP, 2001) and Kevin White, “John Capreolus,” in A Companion to Phi-
losophy in the Middle Ages, ed. J. Gracia and T. Noone (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2003), 349–50. For
some discussion of the relationship between Durand and Capreolus, see Cessario, “Saint Thomas, Du-
rand of Saint-Pourc¸ain et Capreolus: Le de´bat sur la foi” and White, “Saint Thomas et Durand de
Saint-Pourc¸ain: La question de la certitude de la foi.”
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[Durand] was deceived by an equivocation in the terms ‘image’, ‘likeness’
and ‘medium of cognition’, for each of these is said in many ways. There
is a medium of cognition in which (medium in quo), a medium of cognition
by means of which (medium quo), and also medium of cognition under which
(medium sub quo). In the case of vision, the medium of cognition under which
is light, the medium by means of which is the species impressed upon the
sense, and the medium in which is a mirror or some other object outside the
one who is seeing which, when looked upon, directs sense into the cognition
of something else. And just as I distinguish here between many media, so
also one can draw these distinctions in the case of [the term] ‘image’. For
an impressed species is an image by means of which (imago qua) the thing is
seen and a mirror or a statue is an image in which (imago in qua) that item
is seen. Hence, it is answered [to Durand’s argument] that an image in which
a thing is seen is seen before [the thing is seen], but an image by means of
which a thing is seen is not. (II.3.2 300)
More recently, Robert Pasnau, in his study on medieval philosophy of mind, has
reiterated this charge, telling us that Durand’s argument here is a good example of a bad
argument against Aquinas’s theory of species since Durand fails to recognize “that the
following situation is perfectly conceivable: X represents Y to A, and A thereby perceives
Y without A’s perceiving X” (18). Pasnau writes:
The issue, [Durand] says, is whether the species is a representative of the
external object. It quickly becomes clear that Durand’s argument against
species rests on a very narrow interpretation of what it could mean for one
thing to represent another. The example he immediately cites of one thing
representing another is of someone’s understanding a cause through the rep-
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resentation of the effect.13 That [. . . ] is hardly the sort of example Aquinas
would have used to illustrate the role of species. For an effect to represent
its cause, the effect must be explicitly apprehended, and an inference to the
cause must be made. This is precisely how Durand supposes species would
operate. (17)
For Capreolus and Aquinas (as Pasnau interprets him), a species is a representation,
but it isn’t an ordinary representation. There are two kinds of representations: ordinary
ones, like a statue or an effect, which, when apprehended, direct us to something else (a
medium in quo) and special ones, like species, which direct us to something else without
themselves being apprehended (a medium quo).
Now, the idea that a species is a special representation is, I will argue, one of the
problems with the species-theory of cognition. What does it mean to say that something
both represents an external object to someone and, at the same time, is not perceived?
Robert Pasnau goes on to suggest an analogy with vehicles (‘cognitional vehicles’) which
convey us to external objects.14 Dominik Perler suggests an analogy with microscopes.
By looking through the microscope one is able to see some microbiological
aspects that are inaccessible to the unaided senses. Likewise, by using an in-
telligible species the intellect is able to grasp the thing’s universal aspect that
is inaccessible to the senses and to the unaided sensory faculty. The crucial
point is that the intelligible species, like the microscope, is that by which some-
thing is seen under a certain aspect, not at all that which is seen. (“Things in
the Mind: Fourteenth-Century Controversies over Intelligible Species,” 242)15
13. Sent. II-C 3.6 n. 4: “Haec praepositio ‘per’ potest denotare uel principium intellectiuum [. . . ] uel
illud quod est subiecti repraesentatiuum, sicut dicimus quod homo intelligit causam per effectum[. . . ].”
14. Pasnau, Theories of Cognition, 18. See also ibid., ch. 6. On the notion of a cognitional vehicle in
contemporary philosophy, see, e.g., Sonia Sedivy, “Minds: Contents Without Vehicles,” Philosophical
Psychology 17, no. 2 (2004): 149–81.
15. In this passage, Perler has in mind John Duns Scotus, who also defends intelligible species. Perler
suggests that Duns Scotus required such species only in the case of intellectual cognition of a thing under
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In any case, Durand’s argument does seem to get the target theory wrong: a species is
a representation which is able to represent the external object even though it is not itself
perceived beforehand. It can be characterized as an image, but it is not, as Capreolus
puts it, an image in which but an image by means of which.16
4.2 Defensio Durandi
It would be an embarrassment indeed if Durand did glide over the common scholastic
distinction between a medium quo and a medium in quo. Fortunately, Capreolus is quite
mistaken when he tells us that Durand was unaware of the distinction. In his criticism of
the species theory in his first redaction, for instance, Durand begins his discussion with
that very distinction in mind. He writes:
If, in an angel, there were species representative of things, then either these
would operate as a cognized medium (medium cognitum) or as mere means of
cognition (ratio cognoscendi) [i.e., an uncognized medium]. Not as a cognized
medium. First of all, this isn’t how we ordinarily use the term ‘species’,
its universal aspect, relying on his celebrated notion of ‘intuitive cognition’ to explain sensory contact
with a thing. But Duns Scotus retains sensible species in his account of human cognition—indeed, one
of his main arguments for intelligible species is an inference from ‘how it is in the senses’ to ‘how it is in
the intellect’. See Ord. I C.3.31–3, Lect. I 3.3.1–3, Rep. I-A 3.3–5, Quodl. 13 and (with caution) QDA. For
further discussion, see King, “Duns Scotus on Mental Content.” To my mind, the microscope metaphor
breaks down in such a case. Do I use a normal-setting microscope to grasp the sensible aspects of a
thing? On this last point (in connection with Aquinas), see Stump, Aquinas, 245, fn. 2: “[I]t does not
seem sensible to say that wearers of contact leneses see what they see with mediated cognition; it does
seem right to suppose that use of an electron microscope produces mediated cognition; and it is hard to
be clear about the categorization of cognition resulting from the use of an ordinary light microscope.”
16. For further discussion on the medium quo/medium in quo distinction in Thomas Aquinas’s philos-
ophy of mind, see Claude Panaccio, “Aquinas on Intellectual Representation,” in Ancient and Medieval
Theories of Intentionality, ed. Dominik Perler, STGM 76 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 2001), 185–203, Stump,
Aquinas, Max Herrera, “Understanding Similitudes in Aquinas with the Help of Avicenna and Averroes,”
PSMLM 5 (2005) and Jeffrey Brower and Susan Brower-Toland, “Aquinas on Mental Representation:
Concepts and Intentionality,” The Philosophical Review 117, no. 2 (2008): 193–243. One of the first
scholastic authors to emphasize this distinction was John of la Rochelle. See, e.g., Summa de anima 285:
“Species uero, siue formae abstractae a materia, quaedam sunt abstractae per naturam propriam, ut spir-
itualia omnia, quaedam uero per actionem ipsius uirtutis intellectiuae, idest, consideratione, ut sspecies,
siue similitudines, quibus cognoscuntur corporalia.” For discussion, see Spruit, Species Intelligibilis I,
126–127.
Chapter 4. Mental Representations 147
for otherwise we would say that a cause is the species of the effect and vice
versa[. . . ]. Second of all, the role the species performs in an angel’s mind is
the same as the role the species performs in our senses and intellects [. . . ].
But the species (if there is one) in our senses and intellects isn’t a cognized
medium. (Sent. II-A 3.5 27, emph. mine; see also ibid., 7–8)17
And in another text, from his third redaction, Durand recognizes these three senses of
the term ‘medium’:
There are three media involved in vision, namely, a medium by means of
which (medium quo), for example, a species in the eye or, according to those
who postulate it, an intelligible species in the intellect, a medium under which
(medium sub quo), for example, corporeal light in the case of corporeal vision
or, according to Aristotle and his followers, the intellectual light of the agent
intellect [. . . ]. But there is a third medium: a medium in which (medium in
quo) the thing is said to be seen, for example, in the case of corporeal vision,
a mirror in which or by the mediation of which someone sees their own face or
in the case of intellectual vision, an effect through which its cause is cognized
or something like this. But this [latter kind of] medium is not a mere means
of cognizing something else (which is what the species is said to be) but it is
rather a cognized medium. (Sent. IV-C 49.2 n. 9, emph. mine)
Finally, in the very same text in which Durand made his (according to Capreolus and
Pasnau) dubious argument, Durand declares that the species is a “medium by means of
which the thing is cognized” (n. 19: “[. . . ] species quae est medium quo res cognoscitur
[. . . ]”).
17. On the distinction between a ratio cognoscendi and a medium cognitum, see Sent. II-A 3.5, Sent.
I-C 6.1, Sent. II-C 3.6, Sent. IV-C 49.2, Sent. II-C 13.2, Sent. 3 Prol. q. , Sent. IV-C 44.8, QA II.11, Sent.
I-C 36.3, and QA III.1.
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Hence, Durand recognizes the distinction between a medium in which and a medium
by means of which, and he recognizes that, on the species-theory of cognition, the species
is not to be understood as the former but rather should be taken as the latter: it is a
representation by means of which someone perceives something else even though it is
not itself perceived. As he puts it, in still another text, the species in the eye “does not
terminate the soul’s activity but rather it is that by means of which (illud quo) the soul
tends towards its object, for the species of the color [in the eye or the air] is not itself
seen but rather the color in the corporeal object is seen by means of the species , as some
people say” (Sent. II-C 13.2 n. 9).18
Hence, Durand is not confused by an equivocation in the term. Nor does he (pace
Pasnau) suppose that a species represents the external object in the way that an effect
represents its cause. As we saw above, Durand clearly places effects into the category of
cognized media as opposed to uncognized media, like species. But if Durand isn’t confused
by an equivocation, then, well, why does he make what appears to be an obviously bad
argument against the species-theory of cognition?
Now, one thing that is interesting about Durand’s refutation of species is that he,
unlike some of his contemporaries, such as William of Ockham, doesn’t eliminate species
entirely—and this, I think, is an important fact, for on Durand’s view there are species
with well-defined natures and well-defined roles; yet such entities are not representations.
Durand holds that there are certain species which exist in the air, in the eye, and even in
certain inner parts of the body.19 What Durand finds wrong with the species-theory of
18. Sent. II-C 13.2 n. 9: “Ratione enim imperfecti [sc. species -PJH] non terminant actum animae sed
sunt illud quo anima tendit in obiectum. Non enim species coloris uidetur sed color corporis obiecti
mediante specie, ut quidam dicunt.” See also Sent. II-C 3.6 n. 102: “Sed species coloris in oculo non
est primo cognita seu uisa ab ipso—immo nullo modo est uisa ab eo.” See also Sent. I-C 36.3 n. 12:
“[. . . ] nec idea est ratio intelligendi quae sic est ratio intelligendi quod non est intellecta sicut est species
secundum ponentes ipsa[. . . ].” See also Sent. IV-C 49.2 n. 9: “Tale autem medium [in quo] non est solum
ratio cognoscendi alterum, sicut de specie dicitur sed est medium cognitum.”
19. Sent. II-C 3.6 n. 11 [= Sent. IV-C 49.2 n. 13]: “Color does impress a species of itself upon the
medium and the eye[. . . ].” QLA 3 494: “An organ does receive the species of a color[. . . ].” Sent. II-A 3.5
31: “Res enim distans ut color parietis efficitur praesens uisui per id quod causat in organo quod cum
sit accidens est in eo ut in subiecto.” This distinguishes Durand’s rejection of species from William
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cognition is that, on their view, such entities operate as representations or representatives
during a direct act of perception. In his Questions on Freedom of Choice, Durand writes:
An organ does receive the species of a color because it has the right kind of
corporeal disposition needed for its reception. However, this species received
in the organ or in the medium does not contribute at all to the act of seeing.
Rather, sight, as what is able to see, is directly changed to an act of vision
from the whole visible object. On this view, such a species in the organ or
in the medium conveys (refert) nothing when one sees something white or
black regardless of whether there is one species or several since it contributes
nothing at all to the act of seeing, neither as a representation nor in some
other way. (QLA 3 494)20
And in Sent. II-C 3.6 he concludes:
And so it is clear that there is no species in the eye for the purpose of rep-
resenting to sight a color, that it may be seen. For even though color does
impress a species of itself upon the medium and the eye owing to the like
of Ockham, who eliminates species entirely. On Ockham’s rejection of species, see Eleonore Stump,
“The Mechanisms of Cognition: Ockham on Mediating Species,” in Spade, The Cambridge Companion
to Ockham, 168–203 and Panaccio, Ockham on Concepts, ch. 2. Durand’s position is much closer to
Godfrey of Fontaines’ or Peter John Olivi’s, both of whom retain species in medio and species in organo
but reject representational species in direct perception. On Godfrey’s views about species, see Chapter
1 and footnote 25. On Olivi, see Chapter 3, footnote 54.
20. Cf. Thomas Wylton (who comments on this passage), Quaestio, “Quod in intellectu. . . ” 514:
“Secundum istos nihil refert ad uisionem albi et nigri qualis sit species in medio.” On Wylton, see
Stephen Dumont, “New Questions by Thomas Wylton,” DSTFM 9 (1998): 341–81 and Friedman, “On
the Trail of a Philosophical Debate: Durand of St. Pourc¸ain vs. Thomas Wylton on Simultaneous Acts in
the Intellect.” Sole`re, “The Activity of the Cognitive Subject” suggests that Durand has Henry of Ghent
in mind as the source of this view. If so, it is a misreading of Henry’s position. For instance, in Quodl.
XI.5 451 (quoted in Tachau, Vision and Certitude, 3, fn. 30 and Brown, “Sensation in Henry of Ghent:
A Late Mediaeval Aristotelian–Augustinian Synthesis”), Henry writes: “Est enim quaedam alteratio
sensitiui principaliter in ipso organo sentiendi quae est per speciem sensibilem [following Tachau; Brown
reads ‘sensibilis’] receptam in illo per medium a sensibili extra [. . . ] quia sensibile in seipso non potest esse
praesens intra ut inclinando sensum ducat ipsum in actum.” Tachau, Vision and Certitude, 3 interprets
Henry here as maintaining that “the species [is] required as a means of presenting that object within
the mind”. For a recent discussion of Henry and species see Pickave´, “Causality and Cognition: An
Interpretation of Henry of Ghent’s Quodlibet V, q. 14.” More likely, Durand has Godfrey of Fontaines
in mind. For Godfrey’s view, see footnote 19 above. For Durand’s discussion of Godfrey’s view about
species, see Sent. II-A 3.5 12–13.
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diaphanous disposition that exists in them, nevertheless this species does not
at all contribute to the act of seeing, nor does it represent a color to sight so
that it may be seen. (n. 11 [= Sent. IV-C 49.2 n. 13])21
On Durand’s view, a species does exist both in the intervening medium (the air) and
also in the eye but neither of these contributes to—i.e., has a positive effect upon—the
act of vision and neither of these is a representation.
4.2.1 The burden of proof
On Durand’s view, the proponent of the species-theory of cognition motivates the thesis
that cognition is mediated by special representations—items that both represent and
are unperceived—through an appeal to such natural species. But the fact that there
exist such natural species, which are, it is true, unperceived media, does not warrant the
further claim that during a direct act of perception there exists a species in the percipient
itself which, as a representation, directs her to the external object. In a prolegomenon
to his discussion of species, Durand describes the situation as follows:
These species, however, seem to have been introduced originally on account
of the sense of sight and the sensibles of that sense. For color seems to effect
its species in the medium and the [sense] organ, just as it appears sensibly [to
21. Sua´rez, in his question commentary on De Anima, puts Durand’s view succinctly (disp. 5, q. 1):
“On this topic there is one opinion that asserts that the conjunction of the cognizable object with the
cognizing power is not necessary for cognition. This virtually everyone who denies intentional, sensible
or intellectual, species asserts. [. . . ] Durand ([II-C] 3.6 n. 11 and [II-C] 13.2) does not reject species.
However he tells us that they do (conducere) nothing for cognition. ‘Rather when an object’, he says, ‘is
put in front of sight, it is at once seen, not on account of the species but because the one is able to see and
the other able to be seen.’” Cf. Durand, Sent. II-C 3.6 n. 21: “Sicut ergo sensibilia secundum se praesentia
sensui cognoscuntur per sensum, puta omnia colorata et omnia lucentia quae secundum se praesentialiter
obiiciuntur uisui statim uidentur, quia unum est uisiuum et aliud uisibile propter quod eis approximatis
statim sequitur uisio a quocumque sit effectiue et similiter est de aliis sensibus [. . . ].” Cf. also Durand,
Sent. II-A 3.5 31: “Ad primum argumentum principale dicendum quod ad hoc quod intellectus intelligat
sufficit quod res intelligibilis sit praesens obiectiue intellectui secundum se uel secundum aliquid eam
repraesentans. Quod autem sit in intellectu subiectiue accidit sicut in anima nostra contingit maxime in
potentiis sensitiuis, quidquid sit de intellectu. Res enim distans ut color parietis efficitur praesens uisui
per id quod causat in organo quod cum sit accidens est in eo ut in subiecto. Quod enim sit praesens
uisui, necessarium est ad uisionem; quod autem sit in eo ut in subiecto, accidit uisioni.”
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do] when reflected in a mirror. And if it were not for this, perhaps mention
would never have been made of species required for cognition. But because
some believe that the species of color in the eye represents to sight the color
of which it is the species, they therefore posit, both in our and in angelic
intellects, certain species for the purpose of representing things, that they
may be known both by us and by angels. (Sent. II-C 3.6 n. 101 [= Sent.
IV-C 49.2 n. 13]; tr. Tachau, Vision and Certitude, 4, emph. mine)
On Durand’s view, proponents of the species-theory were motivated to postulate psycho-
logical species based upon considerations taken from the going optical theory. In optics,
there are species in the air which are invisible mediators between the a mirror placed
on one side of the room and a mirror placed on the other side of the room; hence, it
might well be the case that in psychology there are species in the mind which are un-
perceived mediators between the perceiver and the perceived object. However, Durand
goes on to argue, the species-theory of optics does not, at the end of the day, furnish
us with an entity that represents an item to or for someone even if it does furnish us
with entities (also called species) which are invisible means by means of which someone
sees something else. In other words, something’s being a species (that is, the theoretical
entity identified and talked about in the species-theory of optics) is not sufficient for its
being a representation, for the optical species does not represent. We must supplement
our theory with something more if we hope to make the further claim that a species is
a special representation. This, I would submit, is the burden that Durand thinks his
opponent has not quite met.
It will be useful to speak of two species theories, one psychological and the other
physical. What I will call the Species-Theory of Cognition (STC) is the psycho-
logical theory. It claims that a species (whatever this might be) performs a necessary
representational role in each and every cognitive act, from vision on up to our most ab-
stract thoughts. Call these psychological species. STC is the theory Durand rejects. The
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physical theory, which I will call the Species-Theory of Optics (STO), is a theory
meant to explain optical phenomena, such as the fact that a color travels across a great
distance from wall to mirror or eye without coloring the intervening medium. Call these
natural species. This is the theory that Durand retains. Durand goes on to reject not
just the extension of natural species into the domain of (human and angelic) intellectual
cognition22 but also the very idea that a natural species (the species in the eye) represents
a color to sight.23
One might respond to the above line of reasoning in one of two ways. On the one
hand, one might insist that the natural species (the entity identified and talked about
in the species-theory of optics) does in fact represent albeit in a special way. STO does
give us support for the claim that a psychological species is a special representation
since a natural species is a special representation. Durand has simply misunderstood the
species-theory of optics. On the other hand, one might insist that a psychological species
and a natural species, although having a thing or two in common, are fish and fowl. In
other words, one might simply deny Durand’s story about the origins of psychological
species. However, if one pursues this strategy, then one will have to tell some other story
about why an account of perception or psychological activity must involve species , that
is, special representations. Indeed, part of the reason that one might have wanted to
appeal to natural species in the first place is because such a move allows us to explain
what seems to be obscure—the nature of mental representation—in terms of what is, in
theory at least, less obscure—the entities postulated by our best science about optics.
This, it seems to me, is a laudable goal, to naturalize the mind, as it were.
22. Durand maintains that while there are species in the eye and air and perhaps other organs of our
body, there are no species in our intellect, a power that has no organ, and likewise angels (which don’t
have organs at all).
23. Sent. II-C 3.6 n. 102: “Hoc autem non reputo uerum esse, nec in sensu, nec in intellectu nostro, nec
in angelico. Et quod non sit ponere speciem in sensu, puta in uisu ad repraesentandum uisui colorem ut
uideatur, patet sic [. . . ].”
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Before I turn to the first option, I should note that, based on the texts, it isn’t
clear how we should take Thomas Aquinas on the issue. Does Aquinas think that the
only grounds for countenancing psychological species is taken from considerations about
natural species? Or does he think that the two are fish and fowl? Curiously, Aquinas
hardly ever gives us an explicit argument in defense of psychological species. Thomas de
Vio (Cajetan), Aquinas’s famous early modern commentator, in his running commentary
on Aquinas’s Summa, arrives at ST I.84.3 (which asks whether we know through innate
or acquired species) and quips:
This seems to be a bad way of going about things—a very difficult question
has been omitted, namely: “Does the soul know with species?” There are,
indeed, quite a few different opinions about this issue, and it ought to have
been tackled here. Indeed, before one asks whether [it knows] with innate,
influxed, or acquired species, one ought to have established first that it knows
with species. (f. 318a)
He decides, however, that the omission is warranted since it is a universal assumption:
“For no one would deny that in the cognizing soul there is a likeness of the item that is
cognized” (ibid.).24
24. An interesting note: Hamilton, The Works of Thomas Reid, Note M, 959a: “It has been an almost
universal assumption of philosophers, that the relation of knowledge infers similarity of nature between
the object known and the subject knowing.” Cajetan thinks that people like Ockham and Godfrey of
Fontaines, who reject species, reject the thesis that this likeness (similitudo) is an entity distinct from
the act itself, but they do not reject the thesis that all cognition is by way of the likenesses of things
existing in the soul. On this score, he is right: both Godfrey and Ockham maintain that the act itself
can be taken to be a likeness (Godfrey: Quodl. IX.19; Ockham: Quodl. IV.35; Quaest. Phys., q. 2).
For Ockham, see Panaccio, Ockham on Concepts, ch. 7 and Cyrille Michon, Nominalisme: La the´orie de
la signification d’Occam (Paris: J. Vrin, 1994), 147–148. For Godfrey, see Chapter 1, fn. 22. However,
Durand rejects the thesis that in the cognizing soul there is a likeness of the thing, be it the act or
a species distinct from the act. There are species in the body and in the air, but not, at least not
necessarily, in the soul. See, for example, Sent. II-A 3.5 31, quoted in footnote 21 above.
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4.2.2 The species-theory of optics: a neutral description
Is Durand correct, then, that in the original species-theory of optics a species does not
represent?25 Now, a theory of optics is not a theory of cognition, for each has their own
explananda. As suggested in the quote above, one thing that a theory of optics hopes to
explain is the phenomenon of optical reflection, when a color is reflected in or by a mirror.
The species-theory of optics is the solution of those who would prefer not to deny the
principle that action at a distance is impossible. Thomas Aquinas and most Thomists
defended this principle, and so did Durand.26 The color on the wall first transmits its
species to the air and the air then transmits it to the mirror in much the same way that
the element on my stove transmits heat to the kettle which in turn transmits it to the
water. As Aquinas puts it:
Color must actually move the translucent medium, for example, air or some-
thing else of that sort, and by that the sensory capacity—the organ of sight—
is moved, as by a body in contact with it. For bodies don’t alter one another
25. For a general discussion of STO during the period see Anneliese Maier, “Das Problem der species
sensibilis in medio und die neue Naturphilosophie des 14. Jahrhunderts,” in Ausgehendes Mittelalter,
vol. 2, 2 vols. (Rome: [s.n.], 1967), 419–51, Tachau, “The Problem of the species in medio in the Gen-
eration after Ockham,” Tachau, Vision and Certitude, and Spruit, Species Intelligibilis I. On individual
authors, see Stump, “Aquinas’s Account of the Mechanisms of Intellective Cognition,” Edward Mc-
Carthy, Medieval Light Theory and Optics and Duns Scotus’ Treatment of Light in D. 13 of Book II of
his Commentary on the Sentences (Ph.D. Dissertations, City University of New York, 1976), Stump,
“The Mechanisms of Cognition” (Ockham), and Katherine Tachau, “Walter Chatton on Sensible and
Intelligible Species,” Rivista critica di storia della filosofia 40 (1985): 711–48.
26. See, e.g., Durand, Sent. II-C 14.1 n. 9: “[. . . ] corpus non agit in distans nisi agendo in proprinquum.”
See also Sent. I-C 37.1. For Aquinas, see below. Duns Scotus and Ockham, however, maintained that
action at a distance is possible. Curiously, Duns Scotus still retains species while Ockham uses this
as a mark against the theory. On Duns Scotus and the action-at-a-distance principle, see Francis
Kovach, “Action at a Distance in Duns Scotus and Modern Science,” in Regnum Hominis et Regnum Dei.
Acta Quarti Congressus Scotistici Internationalis, ed. C. Be´rube´, vol. I, Studia Scholastico-Scotistica 6
(Rome: Societas Internationalis Scotistica, 1978), 477–90. For Ockham, see Dominik Perler, “Seeing and
Judging. Ockham and Wodeham on Sensory Cognition,” in Theories of Perception from Antiquity to
Early Modern Philosophy, ed. S. Knuuttila and P. Ka¨rkka¨inen, Studies in the History of Philosophy
of Mind 6 (Dordrecht: Springer, 2008), 151–169, Stump, “The Mechanisms of Cognition” and Arthur
McGrade, “Seeing Things: Ockham and Representationalism,” in Wenin, HUMA, 591–597. Like Ockham,
Durand thinks that a color, even though distal, can occasion a vision. However, unlike Ockham, Durand
maintains that the color is not the efficient cause of the vision. Rather the faculty of sight in the presence
of color elicits its own visual act. On Durand’s theory of the causation of our cognitive acts, see the first
half of his Sent. II-A 3.5.
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unless they are touching. (In DA II.15 §432; tr. Pasnau, Theories of Cogni-
tion, 43)27
Obviously, the air does not become colored in contrast to the kettle which becomes hot,
but it still must receive something since nothing can act at a distance. What does it
receive? Well, it receives the species of the color.
One peculiar feature a species does have, then, is that it is a form that is received but
one that is able to exist in a subject without that subject taking on the characteristics
of that form. A number of often-deceptive terms were trotted out to characterize this
peculiar mode of existence that a species has in the intervening medium, for example,
‘spiritual’, ‘intentional’, ‘weak’, ‘imperfect’, and even ‘immaterial’.28 Some of these terms
(e.g., ‘spiritual’ and ‘immaterial’) might suggest something rather mysterious. But they
don’t, at least according to Durand and Thomas Aquinas. Notice, for starters, that the
species in medio exists in the air even if nobody is around to perceive something by means
of it . To say that a color exists in the air in an immaterial way is to say that the color
exists in something which has some other matter than the matter that the wall (say) has.
As Aquinas puts it:
Sometimes a form is received in the thing affected in keeping with a manner
of existence different from the agent’s, because the affected thing’s material
27. See also In DA III.12 §773 and In DA II.14 §425, Sent. IV 10.1.4 and QDP V.8. Both Durand and
Aquinas are committed to the real existence of secondary qualities. See Pasnau, “Scholastic Qualities:
Primary and Secondary.”
28. For a recent survey, see Myles Burnyeat, “Aquinas on ‘Spiritual Change’ in Perception,” in Per-
ler, Ancient and Medieval Theories of Intentionality, 129–54. Stump, “The Mechanisms of Cognition”
(quoted below) prefers the term ‘spiritual’ and Pasnau, Theories of Cognition, 39, invents the acronym
‘ISI’ (intentional, spiritual, and immaterial). I will use the term ‘imperfect’ as this is Durand’s preferred
term, although he does use most of the above terms to pick out the phenomenon: Sent. II-C 13.2 n.
11: “Esse autem intentionale est esse imperfectum.” See esp. Sent. II-C 13.2 (quoted below) where he
tells us that something is intentional in the broad sense if it is weak in a certain sense and all of this
is in virtue of the fact that it is imperfect in a certain sense. In Sent. IV-C 44.4, 8, and 10 he uses the
term ‘spiritual’. I have not seen him use the term ‘immaterial’, but Aquinas, as Pasnau has convincingly
argued, does often use this as synonymous with what I will call imperfect. In Aquinas, see QDV XXVII.4
ad 4; In DA II.20–21; In Meta. I.16; ST I.67.3 and 82.3; and Sent. IV 44.2.1, II 13.1.3 and IV 44.3.1 For
a good list of the various terms which scholastic philosophers deployed in this context, see Roger Bacon,
De multiplicatione specierum I.1 and Gregory of Rimini, Sent. II 7.3.
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disposition for receiving is not like the agent’s material disposition. (In DA
II.24 §553; tr. Pasnau, Theories of Cognition, 40–41, emph. mine)29
Likewise, the term ‘intentional’30 might suggest something more. However, at least
according to Durand and Thomas Aquinas, to say that the species has intentional exis-
tence is to say nothing more than that it is a form which exists in something without
that thing taking on the characteristics of the form. To be sure, it doesn’t mean that
the species is somehow mind-dependent, for the species will still be said to have inten-
tional existence in the air in between two mirrors even if no minds exist at all. Durand
underscores this point—and I think very well—in his discussion of the nature of light as
it exists in the medium:
‘Intentional existence (esse intentionale)’ can be taken in two ways. In one
way, as opposed to real existence (esse reale) and in this way an item is said
to have intentional existence if it exists owing to intellectual activity, as is the
case with [logical] species, genera, and logical intentions (logicae intentiones).
This is the proper way to understand the terms ‘intention’ and ‘intentional
existence’. Taken in this way, light and the species of a color as they exist
in the medium do not have intentional existence since an item that exists
because of real principles with all intellectual activity having been set aside
will have real and not intentional existence. But light and the species of a
color as they exist in the medium are like this. [. . . ] In another way, an
item is said to have intentional existence in a broad sense inasmuch as it has
weak existence (esse debile). Now, ‘weak existence’ can itself be taken in
three ways. [. . . ] In a third way, an item is said to have weak existence [. . . ]
because it falls short of the perfection proper to its kind (perfectio propriae
29. See also In DSS 2–3 and In DA II.14–15.
30. Which we’ve already seen Godfrey use in Chapter 1. For an interesting discussion, see Katherine
Tachau, “Some Aspects of the Notion of Intentional Existence at Paris, 1250–1320,” in Medieval Analyses
in Language and Cognition, ed. S. Ebbesen and R. Friedman (Copenhagen, 1999), 331–53.
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speciei). It is in this way that light and the species of a color as they exist in
the medium have weak existence, which also can be said, in a certain way, to
be intentional existence. (Sent. II-C 13.2 nn. 6–8)31
Elsewhere, he makes much the same point:
The alteration that the sense object produces in the medium or in the sense
[organ] seems to be natural and real. ‘Natural’ since it is from natural prin-
ciples acting naturally. ‘Real’ since through it there comes about a true and
real form in the recipient and this form has its entire existence when every
activity of the soul is removed. (Sent. IV-C 48.8 n. 12)
I take it that what Durand is driving at here is that a species is a real mind-
independent entity with certain peculiar properties but none of these properties makes
it unreal or mental or conceptual. A species is as physical as the color on the wall is.32
So the claim that the species has intentional, spiritual, or immaterial existence isn’t
that mysterious. To claim that a color as it exists in the medium (i.e., a species) has
intentional, spiritual, or immaterial existence is to claim that it exists naturally and really
in the air even though—for whatever reason—the air does not become colored. I submit
that this is also the view that Thomas Aquinas endorsed about the nature of species.
Here, I am in good company, for Pasnau also interprets Aquinas along these lines:
31. Sent. II-C 13.2 nn. 6–8:“‘Esse intentionale’ potest dupliciter accipi. Vno modo prout distinguitur
contra esse reale, et sic dicuntur habere esse intentionale illa, quae sunt nisi per operationem intellectus,
sicut genus et species et logicae intentiones. Et iste est proprius modus accipiendi ‘intentionem’ et ‘esse
intentionale’. Et isto modo lumen in medio uel species coloris non habent esse intentionale, quia <illa>,
quae sunt a principiis realibus circumscripta operatione intellectus, habent esse reale et non intentionale.
Sed lumen et species coloris in medio sunt huiusmodi. Ergo, etc. Alio modo dicitur aliquid habere esse
intentionale large, quia habet esse debile. Sed ‘habere esse debile’ adhuc tripliciter. [. . . ] Tertio modo
dicitur aliquid habere esse debile non solum per comparationem ad causam proximam naturalem, sed
quia deficit a perfectione propriae speciei. Et sic lumen et species in medio habent esse debile, quod
etiam potest dici aliquo modo intentionale.” The other two kinds of weak existence are (i) the kind of
existence that processes or changes have, that is, things that can be said to exist only over a span of
time (non habent suum esse simul siue permanens sed in successione ut motus et tempus) and (ii) the
kind of existence that an item that depends for its entire existence upon its cause has (ad sui existentiam
requirunt praesentiam suae causae proximae naturalis). Durand makes much the same point in QLA 3
493–494.
32. See below.
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To put the point differently, a form of some character (e.g. a certain color) that
exists intentionally does not cause its subject to take on that character (e.g.,
take on a certain color). This, I believe, is all Aquinas means by intentional
existence. (Theories of Cognition, 37)33
There is, to be sure, still something odd in saying that a color is still a color when it
exists (invisibly) in the air. However, the claim is that the form which is called a color
when it exists in the wall is the same (in kind) as the form which is called a species
when it exists in the air. In fact, Durand suggests, we might clean up our language to
make this perspicuous. In Latin, the noun ‘lux’ picks out light as it perfectly exists in a
dense body, e.g., a star, whereas the noun ‘lumen’ picks out the same form (light) when
it imperfectly exists in the air. Lumen and lux are the same form. Lumen in the air
makes the air illuminated (illuminatum) whereas lux in the star makes it shine (lucens).
So too with colors and species. A color in the air (a species) makes it qualified-in-some-
way but it does not make it colored (coloratum). This ‘qualified-in-some-way’ is to the
species-informed air as ‘illuminated’ is to the lumen-informed air.
‘Whiteness’ or ‘blackness’ do not name the nature of the species without
qualification but rather the nature in its most powerful degree—which is only
found in a transparent item determined by opacity—just as ‘lux’ names the
form in a diaphaneous item which is in its most powerful degree—which is
33. See also Pasnau, Theories of Cognition, 41–42: “Notice that ISI existence [= imperfect existence] is
defined in negative terms. All we are told is what it is not: it is not natural alteration. What we would
further like to know is what ISI existence is, but here Aquinas falls silent. Yet even though he is unable
to explain ISI existence in any definite way, it is not hard to see why he feels the need to introduce
some such concept. On the one hand, he believes that the likenesses of objects are somehow transmitted
through the air into the eye. On the other hand, he also knows that the intervening air and the eye do
not in any ordinary sense take on the forms of these objects. So Aquinas is committed to there being
some nonordinary way in which species are present in the medium and the sense organs. I have been
arguing that such species could well be present physically and could bring about physical change, despite
the superficial appearance of his terminology. But Aquinas, quite reasonably, seems to leave open the
question of exactly how this spiritual alteration happens. He gives the theoretical outlines of an account
but leaves the specific details to be filled in. Understood in this way, lack of specificity can hardly be
seen as a weakness in the account.”
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only found in a dense diaphanous item. And since there is no color in the
medium in this degree, therefore the medium can’t be properly said to be
colored (coloratum) even though it belongs to the same specific nature with
the color from which it was caused [i.e., the color in the wall], just as the
medium is not properly said to be shining (lucens) since it does not have
lux in its perfect degree (which is what ‘lux’ names), even though it might
have lumen which belongs to the same species with light although in a weak
degree. However, it is said to be illuminated (illuminatum) since there was
a name imposed in this denomination which ‘lumen’ makes. However, in
the denomination which ‘speices’ makes (in the medium) there is no name
imposed.34
If we refine our language, then, we can speak of the species-informed air as not color-
qualified (coloratum) but species-qualified (specialis?) just as the lumen-informed air is
not lux-qualified (lucens) but lumen-qualified (illuminatum). Unsurprisingly, and thank-
fully, no one seems to have taken Durand up on his suggestions for improving the Latin
language.
In any case, the point to take home is that a color can be said to have intentional
existence (i.e., said to be a species) and all that this means is that it exists in a body such
that that body does not exhibit the characteristic features of color: it does not become
colored. All the same a species is a real and natural mind-independent feature of the
world. This is, in part, why I characterize STO as a physical theory: the entities that
34. Sent. IV-C 49.2 n. 17: “Ad secundum dicendum quod albedo et nigredo non nominant naturam
speciei absolute sed secundum potissimum eius gradum quae solum reperitur in perspicuo terminato
per opacum, sicut lux nominat formam diaphani secundum potissimum gradum quae solum reperitur in
diaphano denso. Et quia secundum illum gradum nullus color est in medio, ideo medium non proprie
potest dici coloratum, quia nec illa species proprie potest dici color, licet sit eiusdem naturae specificae
cum colore a quo causatur, sicut medium non proprie dicitur lucens, quia non habet lucem secundum
perfectum gradum, secundum quem nominatur lux, quamuis habeat lumen quod est eiusdem speciei
cum luce licet in gradu remisso, dicitur tamen illuminatum quia illi denominationi quam facit lumen est
nomen impositum. Sed denominationi quam faci species in medio non est nomen impositum.” See also
Sent. II-C 13.2 n. 13.
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STO countenances and the way it goes about talking about them refrains from talk of
psychological or cognitive entities and psychological or cognitive concepts. In this sense,
STO is what we might nowadays call naturalistic. The details of the theory might be
wrong, but the method is, more or less, right.
There is a surprisingly large amount of literature dealing with the question of whether
or not this is all that Aquinas meant with the notion of imperfect existence. As men-
tioned, he prefers the terminology of spiritual or immaterial existence, and this has led
some interpreters to suggest that he rather means something more. On one interpreta-
tion, Aquinas really does mean to say that the species has a kind of immaterial existence,
at least as it exists in a cognizant subject.35 I will return to this interpretation in the
third section (§3).
I take the above account to be one that both Thomist and Durandian alike would
accept. There are, to be sure, other important issues concerning STO that authors
disagreed upon.36 Notably, there was the further question of whether or not the species
as it exists in the air is really the same in kind as the color as it exists in the wall, that
is, whether or not both are bona fide instances of color.37 Durand maintains that it is,
35. John Haldane, “Aquinas on Sense Perception,” Philosophical Review 92, no. 1 (1983): 233–39
and Paul Hoffman, “St. Thomas Aquinas on the Halfway State of Sensible Being,” The Philosophical
Review 99 (1990): 73–92. Against this interpretation, see Pasnau, Theories of Cognition, ch. 1, Sheldon
Cohen, “St. Thomas Aquinas on the Immaterial Reception of Sensible Forms,” Philosophical Review
91, no. 2 (1982): 193–209, Martin Tweedale, “Origins of the Medieval Theory that Sensation is an
Immaterial Reception of a Form,” Philosophical Topics 20 (1992): 215–31, Stump, Aquinas, ch. 8, and
Burnyeat, “Aquinas on ‘Spiritual Change’ in Perception.” ibid. offers a recent appraisal of the lay of the
interpretative land. For a recent good discussion of the issue in Averroes, see Deborah Black, “Arabic
Theories of Intentionality and their Impact in the Latin West” (Forthcoming).
36. For instance, whether species are involved in sense-modalities other than vision, e.g., audition or
smelling. For a general discussion of these other sense-modalities see Richard Sorabji, “From Aristotle
to Brentano: The Development of the Concept of Intentionality,” Festschrift for A. C. Lloyd: On the
Aristotelian Tradition [= Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy Supplementary Volume] (1991): 227–
59. On sound, see Robert Pasnau, “Sensible Qualities: The Case of Sound,” Journal of the History of
Philosophy 38 (2000): 27–40. Further, there was a more peculiar issue of whether or not only sensible
qualities are transmitted as species or if other things, like the harmful character of the wolf or perhaps
even entire substances, might also be transmitted as species. On the harmful character of the wolf,
see, e.g., King, “Scholasticism and Philosophy of Mind: The Failure of Aristotelian Psychology.” On
substances see, e.g., Stump, “The Mechanisms of Cognition.”
37. See, for example, the debate between Ockham and Walter Chatton recorded in their commentaries
on the Sentences. Ockham: Rep. III 2; Chatton: Rep. II 4.1. Walter Chatton, abandoning scholastic
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but other authors, and many Thomists, maintained that it is not.38
As I understand Durand’s position, Durand wants to point out that the fact that
a species has this peculiar mode of existence does not mean that it is a representation.
Something more must be added to our story here, for so far we simply have a causal story
about the transmission of a distal color across the intervening medium and onto some
remote recipient, e.g., a mirror or an eye (embodied or not). The species-theory of optics
does, it is true, get us part of the way to the claim that the species is a representation
of the sort he views his opponent as wanting to endorse: (i) a species is a form of the
color that is taken on by some item without that item’s taking on the characteristics
of that form, (ii) it is also a medium by means of which we perceive distal colors, and
(iii) it is not itself perceived. But STO hasn’t gotten us the whole way to the claim that
his opponent wants, for a lot of items take on the imperceptible forms of color—air and
disembodied eyeballs—and yet there isn’t any representing going on in such items. To
claim that a species represents color because it exists in X with intentional, spiritual, or
immaterial existence is not enough. Something more must be added to our story.
norms, cites Durand by name in his discussion.
38. See e.g., Nicholas Medensis, Evid. II.12 410: “Ad exemplum dicendum est, primo, quod multum est
dubium quod color, in quantum color, in medio et oculo, sint eiusdem rationis.” See also, e.g.,, Capreolus,
Defensiones II 3.2 and Francisco Sua´rez, Comm. DA 5.2, Walter Chatton, Rep. II 4.1, Gregory of Rimini,
Sent. II 7.3. I cite most of these authors in Chapter 5, fn. 22. For more on this debate, see Maier, “Das
Problem der species sensibilis in medio und die neue Naturphilosophie des 14. Jahrhunderts,” Tachau,
“The Problem of the species in medio in the Generation after Ockham,” and Tachau, “Walter Chatton
on Sensible and Intelligible Species.” But cf. Kretzmann, “Philosophy of Mind,” 139: “The likenesses
that are identified as sensory species and phantasms may be literally ‘likenesses’: images—realizations
ofn the material forms (colors, sounds, textures, etc.) of external objects in different matter, the matter
of the external/internal sensory apparatus of the human body. And,, in keeping with the formal-identity
theory, the sensory species, at least, are likenesses that lose none of the detail present in the external
sensess themselves (which, of course, vary in sensitivity among individuals and from one time to another
in the same individual)[. . . ]” He cites In DA II.23 § 547 (his translation): “A sense organ is affected
by the sense-perceptible thing, because to sense is to undergo something. For that reason the sense-
perceptible thing, which the agent [in sensation], makes the organ be actually as the sense-perceptible
thing is, since the organ is in a state of potentiality to this [result].” But cf. ibid., 139, fn. 37: “Although
Aquinas expresses himself in ways that at least permit the interpretation of the seensory species as
literally images (visual, aural, etc.), an interpretation of them as encodings of some sort, involving no
iconic resemblance, is also possible and seems not only more plausible but also in some respects better
suited to his account generally.”
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4.3 Some responses
So, if the above is correct, then one can’t appeal to the species-theory of optics on its own
in order to justify one’s claim that, in cognition, there is a species which represents, and,
more precisely, an item that represents without itself being grasped beforehand. The
notion of a special representation, as opposed to a familiar representation, still requires
argument.
So, what more can we add to the story here? Imagine a well-lit room, then, with a
mirror on one wall. In this room, according to STO, there will be a species (probably
several) in the intervening air between the mirror and the wall opposite it. But there
will not be a representation. How does a representation enter the room? There are two
answers one might give, a bad one and an initially plausible but ultimately unsuccessful
one.
4.3.1 The bad answer
The bad answer is to insist that the reintroduction of the visual agent causes the species
to take on the role of a representation. A species in the air is not a representation but
a species in the eye or the intellect is. This is the bad answer because one will have to
provide us with a convincing argument as to why this might be the case, and, to my mind,
this argument will do nothing but beg the question, since it will presumably eventually
make the claim that all cognition is through representation. But is all cognition mediated
by representations?
A variant on the bad answer is to insist that the recipient does some real work here:
the air’s reception or the organ’s reception of a species is one thing whereas the soul’s
reception is another. The species as it exists in a power of the soul (the faculty of sight,
say) is a representation whereas the species as it exists in a mere organ of the body (the
eye) is not. But this is an even worse suggestion. First, what reason do we even have for
supposing that a species is received in the soul? STO tells us that a species is received in
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the body, of course, but it does not warrant the claim that it is also received in the soul.
It tells us that a species is received in a body because that body has a certain kind of
material disposition. STO is a physical theory and not a psychological theory.39 Further,
Aquinas himself tells us that a species involved in sensory perception is not received in
the soul but in the body.
[T]he [soul’s] sensory part does not receive species in itself, but in the organ,
whereas the intellective part doesn’t receive them in an organ but in itself.
(DUI I §24; tr. Pasnau, Theories of Cognition, 46)
Moreover, even if one can convince us that a species is received in the soul, one will
still have to explain how this makes it a representation. Some authors take Aquinas
to be committed to the idea that representationality is a function of immateriality: the
intellect is totally immaterial and the senses partially immaterial and so, if the recipient
is totally or in part immaterial, then the species will represent, and if not, it will not.40
But this—to my mind—is a bad position to be in, for it seems to explain the obscure
(special representationality) by way of the more obscure (immateriality).41
39. Durand makes this point in a different context when rejecting the need to postulate a second
species in the intellect, the so-called forma expressa or mental word in order to acquire a clear and
express cognition of a thing. Sent. I-C 27.2 n. 25: “Ergo propter hoc non oportet fingere quamdam
formam productam uel intellectam sicut isti dicunt de uerbo. Et mirum est de hac fictione, quia, cum
haec materia sit mere physica, nullus physicorum umquam posuit in intellectu nostro aliquam talem
formam ad habendam quamcumque cognitionem quantumcumque expressam.” Durand also resists the
idea that a material or nonliving item can bring about an effect in an immaterial or living item, like
the soul. For these arguments, see the first half of Sent. II-A 3.5 and his rejection of an ‘agent intellect’
whose job it is to somehow facilitate this transference in Sent. I-C 3.2.5 and Sent. I-A 3.5. On Durand’s
rejection of the agent intellect, see Bonino, “Quelques re´actions thomistes a` la critique de l’intellect agent
par Durand de Saint-Pourc¸ain” and Jeschke, “Die Ablehnung des ta¨tigen Intellekts bei Durandus.”
40. See footnote 35 above.
41. Brower and Brower-Toland, “Aquinas on Mental Representation” label this objection the “mystery
objection”. However, this does seem to be the view that many Thomists would endorse. See, for instance,
Cajetan’s comment on ST I.84.3. When confronted with the problem that the mere reception of a form
is not sufficient for cognition—since many things that are not cognizant receive forms—he considers the
following (uninformative) answer to the question “Why is the soul cognizant (cognoscitiua)?”: “There is
no reason other than that it is what it is” (f. 317a). Rather, Cajetan decides, a more informative answer
is this: “Being cognizant follows from being immaterial (esse cognoscitiuum sequitur esse immateriale)
[. . . ]. Even though the question ‘Why is a cognizant thing a cognizant thing?’ is empty, nevertheless
the question ‘Why is this substance cognizant and that one not?’ is a very subtle one. [. . . ] Hence, in
De Anima II the reason given as to why plants are not cognizant: because they are material” (ibid.).
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4.3.2 The plausible (but wrong) answer
The plausible answer, then, is the answer offered by some interpreters of Aquinas.42 On
this view, a species in the original theory (STO) might not have anyone to whom it
represents, but it nevertheless still “carries information about” its source, and, when we
reintroduce visual agents, it will carry information about its source to that visual agent.
Hence, it will be a representation in the sense that it carries information about something
else.
The idea that a species is the bearer of information is usually explained in the follow-
ing way.43 Consider what occurs during a television or radio broadcast, the conversion
of one’s music collection (from vinyl to 8-track to CD-ROM to MPEG-4), the architect’s
boardroom, and so forth. Representation as information is all around us and the imper-
fectly existing (or spiritually existing) species of the color in the air or eye is simply an
isomorphic copy of its source existing in air format (so to speak) rather than wall format.
Or whatever. Here’s Stump:
To say the sensible species are received in the medium with spiritual reception
is to say that the forms are imposed on a medium such as air but in such a way
that they do not make the air itself brown and round. The phrase ‘spiritual
reception’ and the notion of imposing a form on air in any way are alien to
us, but the phenomenon Aquinas was trying to capture is itself very familiar.
Consider, for example, blueprints. In a blueprint of a library, the configuration
of the library itself, that is, the very configuration that will be in the finished
library, is captured on paper but in such a way that it does not make the
paper itself into a library. Rather, the configuration is imposed on the paper
42. Notably: Pasnau, Theories of Cognition, Stump, “The Mechanisms of Cognition,” Stump, Aquinas,
Gyula Klima, “Tradition and Innovation in Medieval Theories of Mental Representation,” PSMLM 4
(2004), and King, “Rethinking Representation.”
43. This way of talking obviously owes much to Dretske, Knowledge and the Flow of Information. King,
“Rethinking Representation” cites Robert Cummins, Meaning and Mental Representation (Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press, 1989).
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in a different sort of way from the way it is imposed on the materials of the
library. What Aquinas thinks of as transferring and preserving a configuration
we tend to consider as a way of encoding information. Aquinas calls it “the
spiritual reception of a form,” or in the case of sensory cognition, “the spiritual
reception of sensible species.” For Aquinas, to say the sensible species of the
cup is imposed on the air with spiritual reception is to say the configuration
of the cup is preserved by some quality imposed on the air from the cup, but
in such a way that the air does not itself take on the features of the cup.
(“The Mechanisms of Cognition,” 170; see also Stump, Aquinas, ch. 8)
The medievals might not have had the luxury of 8-track, but they did have the relevant
notion of information encoding. After all, the species of a color is a form and it is said to
inform the air and so the air can be said to have or “carry information about” the color.
Of course, we must distinguish between two kinds of, so to speak, informings—those
wherein the informed subject takes on the characteristics of the form and those wherein
it does not—but common to these two kinds of informings is the fact that the informed
subject has or carries the form, that is, the information.
Durand, I think would concede this point. As mentioned, he thinks that—and he
thinks that Aquinas too thinks that—a species is a real likeness (similitudo) of a color.
In fact, on Durand’s view, it belongs to the same specific nature (ratio specifica) in virtue
of the fact that color as an active quality acts with so-called univocal causation on what
is next to it just as heat does when it heats first the kettle and then the water; and so
the air or the eye has the form of color even though it is not colored.44 We can call this
form in the air a real likeness of the color on the wall, since any two forms of the same
44. Sent. II-C 3.6 n. 19: “Actio omnium aliorum sensibilium in medio et organo est uniuoca. Calor enim
distans ad hoc ut sentiatur oportet quod calefaciat medium usque ad organum et ipsummet organum ut
experimur. Et idem est de sapore et de quocumque alio sensibili. Ergo a simili uidetur quod actio coloris
in medium et organum sit uniuoca, quod non esset nisi color et sua species essent unius rationis.” See
footnote 37 above and the surrounding discussion. Others disagree on precisely this point. See footnote
38 above.
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specific nature (e.g., two instances of redness) will really be like each other—i.e., formally
identical—even if the one is visible and the other invisible, that is, even if the one is had
and taken on whereas the other is merely had but not taken on.
One must admit this is an appealing solution to the problem, indeed plausible. The
problem is, however, this. What does it really mean to say that the species carries
information about X?45 Well, Thomas can give one of two answers. He can say that it
means that the species is really the same form as X or he can say that it is not really the
same form as X. If it is really the same form as X—not numerically identical with X but
formally identical, of course—then it is really the same form as X. But this means that the
species of whiteness, being really the same form as whiteness, can’t exist in the mind at
the same time as the species of blackness, for two contradictory forms can’t be possessed
at the same time by the same thing. This is, of course, a common enough argument, and
Durand doesn’t hesitate to make it.46 Moreover, and secondly, if it is really the same
form as X, then, since the species is an accidental form, indeed an accidental incorporeal
form, it seems that it will not be able to be really the same form as corporeal forms
and substantial forms. But, surely, I can think about a whole slew of things that aren’t
accidental incorporeal forms. At the very least, Thomas thinks I can. Again, this is a
common enough argument, and Durand makes it.47
45. I will return to this objection, indeed this issue, in Ch. 5 in more detail.
46. See, e.g., Sent. IV-C 49.2 n. 14: “[. . . ] formae contrariae non compatiuntur se simul in eodem
subiecto. Sed si species repraesentans et essentia repraesentata essent eiusdem rationis specificae, con-
traria essent in eodem subiecto.” See also Sent. II-C 3.8 n. 5 [= Sent. II-A 3.8]: “Haec opinio ponit quod
angelus intelligat per species, quod prius improbatum est. Et adhuc improbari potest communi ratione,
quae talis est: Sicut corpus non potest simul figurari diuersis figuris, sic, ut uidetur, nec intellectus noster
uel angelicus potest simul informari diuersis speciebus. Nec ualet si quis dicat quod non sunt ibi in actu
simpliciter, nec simpliciter in potentia, sed medio modo, sc. in habitu, quo modo nihil prohibet plures
species esse in eodem, quia quantum ad actum informandi omnes species sunt simpliciter in actu siue
intellectus consideret actu siue non.” This objection is the one raised by Brower and Brower-Toland,
“Aquinas on Mental Representation,” 223 and King, “Rethinking Representation,” 85. I wil return to
this argument in Chapter 5, fn. 37.
47. Sent. II-A 3.5 27: “Sed nihil existens in mente angeli potest esse eiusdem rationis specificae cum
quidditatibus rerum nec secundum genus, cum illae sint substantiae, haec autem quaedam accidentia.”
See also Sent. I-A 19.3 §3.1: “[. . . ] omne, quod est subiectiue in intellectu, est accidens; res autem
exterior est quandoque substantia materialis; inter haec autem non potest esse similitudo uel conformitas
in essendo, cum sint diuersorum generum.” See also Sent. I-C 19.2.5–6 §3.2: “[. . . ] omne, quod est
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So, to the alternative. Commentators have noticed that Aquinas is a bit mum on the
subject.48 If it is not really the same form as X, then, well, in virtue of what is it that a
species of X is a species of X and not Y?49 Durand raises this too as a problem. He notes
that most options should be dismissed out of hand either because such accounts would
violate the principle that we are unaware of the species—hence, it can’t be a matter of
its being a picture of X and not Y—or such accounts fail to deliver the goods: access to
the world. At the end of the day, this thesis, call it the quasi-formal identity thesis, looks
to be, as Durand notes, nothing more than the claim that the species represents Y and
not X because, well, X and not Y is repesented by the species . But that’s no solution at
all.50
subiectiue in intellectu, est accidens; res autem exterior est quandoque substantia materialis, uel, si
sit accidens, est accidens corporeum; inter haec autem non potest esse similitudo uel conformitas in
essendo, cum sit diuersorum generum.” See also Sent. II-C 3.6 n. 17: “Sed nulla species existens in
intellectu angeli, cum sit accidens, potest esse eiusdem rationis specificae cum substantiis rerum tam
spiritualium quam corporalium, quas angelus intelligit.” ibid., n. 20: “Et per eandem rationem non
intelligit accidentia rerum corporalium per speciem, quia in angelo, qui est substantia mere spiritualis,
non potest esse aliquod accidens eiusdem rationis cum accidentibus corporalibus.” Brower and Brower-
Toland, “Aquinas on Mental Representation” labels such arguments the “quiddity objection”. Again, I
return to this argument in Chapter 5, fn. 12.
48. To pick three examples. ibid., based on objections like the foregoing and the following, decides that
Aquinas isn’t a reductivist about intentionality but holds it as a brute fact, a nonrelational property
of the species. King, “Rethinking Representation,” 85 declares that Aquinas’s silence suggests mystery,
and so failure. Pasnau, Theories of Cognition, 112 tells us that his silence on the issue is warranted and
prudent.
49. Sent. II-A 3.5 28: “Si quis autem dicat, quod species repraesentans est eiusdem rationis cum re
repraesentata non in essendo sed in repraesentando, uane loquitur.” See also Sent. IV-C 49.2 (C ) n. 14:
“[. . . ] illud, quod dicitur quod ex quo species repraesentat naturam rei specificae ut sola ratio cognoscendi
(cognoscendi] cogendi C ), ideo uidetur esse eiusdem speciei cum ipsa re, non ualet[. . . ].” ibid., n. 18:
“Quod autem tertio additur—quod sufficit quod species repraesentans sit eiusdem naturae specificae
cum re repraesentata in repraesentando et non in essendo—friuolum est et sola fuga difficultatis quoad
hominem.” See also Sent. I-A 19.3 §3.1 and Sent. I-C 19.2.5–6 §3.2.
50. Sent. IV-C 49.2 (C ) n. 18 (emph. mine): “Si enim species repraesentans dicitur eiusdem speciei cum
re repraesentata in repraesentando, aut intelligitur, quod illa identitas attendatur quantum ad reprae-
sentationem, ita sc. quod sicut unum repraesentat aliquam rem, ita aliud repraesentat eamdem rem
secundum speciem (speciem] spaciem C ), et ista identitas non potest ponitur inter speciem repraesen-
tantem et rem repraesentatam per ipsam; aut intelligitur quod unum repraesentat et aliud repraesentatur;
sed dicere, propter hoc, esse identitatem secundum speciem inter repraesentans et repraesentatum, est
absurdum, quia causa repraesentat effectum et econuerso etiam in aequiuocis et in multis aliis, quan-
tumcumque genere uel specie differentibus, quae tamen, propter repraesentationem, non dicuntur unius
speciei cum eo quod repraesentant.” Again, I return to this argument in Chapter 5.
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4.3.3 Chalk and cheese: antinaturalism about representational species
I mentioned above that there are two sorts of responses that one might be tempted to
give to Durand’s argument. On the one hand, one might attempt to show that Durand
has gotten the species-theory of optics quite wrong: in point of fact, species in the
species-theory of optics do represent. I hope the foregoing has shown that this sort of
answer doesn’t look too promising. However, the other answer one might give is to deny
Durand’s story about the origins of the species-theory of cognition. As it turns out, a
sensible species and a species in medio are the same in name alone; other than the name
which they share, a species in medio and species in the mind are as similar as chalk and
cheese. In this final section, I want to explore this answer.
Now, if we want to go down this road, we will need to provide some other motivation
for the postulation of a form or species in the mind which necessarily mediates between
the percipient and the perceived object (albeit such that it is not itself perceived). One,
obvious, motivation involves a commitment to an Aristotelian analysis of change. In fact,
this motivation can motivate in two directions.
The first direction is this. According to Aristotle, as Aquinas and others interpreted
him, cognition is passive: it is the passive alteration of a cognizant subject owing (some-
how) to the object as efficient cause. On this view, cognition involves the reception of
form in the trivial sense that any change involves the reception of form. Now, Durand
rejects this analysis of cognitive change at length in Sent. II-A 3.5. On his view, cognition
is not at all to be analyzed as the passive alteration of a cognizant subject owing to the
object as its efficient cause. Hence, on his view cognitive change does not necessarily
involve the reception of form. So one strike against this move here is that provided an al-
ternative theory of cognitive change—which Durand thinks he has at hand—one doesn’t
need to even posit a species or form in order to explain how it is that a cognitive act
comes about.
However, and moreover, the details of this debate won’t, in fact, matter much to us
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here, for the fact that a form is received in the mind might be true or it might be false,
depending on what view one takes about the causal mechanism which goes into producing
a cognitive act, but an account of the causation of a cognitive act is not an account of
the representational nature of a cognitive act. Indeed, Durand is careful to distinguish
these two issues in his discussion in Sent. II-A 3.5. After his refutation of several theories
about how it is that thoughts and sensory perceptions come about in us—including of
course the species-theory of cognition—and having established his alternative ‘sine qua
non’ theory of cognitive change, he closes the first article with the following note:
Through what, however, is the sense object presented to sense and the intel-
ligible object present to the intellect? Is this through a species or through
something else? An answer won’t be given here, since I intend to discuss this
elsewhere. But this alone should be held from what has been said: the species
is not required as what elicits the act per se but only, if it is ever required, as
what represents the object. (23)
In the second article, he goes on to argue that, regardless of how it is that a species got
into the mind—in the case of angelic cognition, for instance, the proponent of the species-
theory of cognition holds that such species are ‘co-created’ with the angel and so put into
the angel by God—one still can’t hold that a species is up to the job of explaining what
it is that a thought is about,51 and, moreover, a species as a representation is under-
motivated, for, as we saw, sensory perception and human thought do not require species
as representations.
The second direction—which might be viewed as the flipside of the last direction—is
this: thought as an action (as opposed to a passion) requires a species. To quote Aquinas
at some length:
It ought to be said that the intelligible species is related to the intellect as
51. See Chapter 5.
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that by which the intellect thinks, which is shown as follows. Since there are
two kinds of actions, as Aristotle tells us in Metaphysics IX, those that remain
within the agent, e.g., vision and thought, and those that pass outside into the
external thing, e.g., heating and cutting, and since both of these are in accord
with a form, it follows that since the form in accord with which an action
that passes into the external thing comes about is a likeness (similitudo) of
the object of that action (e.g., heat in the thing producing heat is a likeness
of the heat in the thing made hot), so too, therefore, the form in accord with
which an action that remains within the agent comes about is a likeness of
the object. Accordingly, the likeness of the visible thing is the form in accord
with which the sight sees and the likeness of the intelligible thing (i.e., the
intelligible species) is the form in accord with which the intellect thinks. (ST
I.85.2)
One thing that Aquinas seems to be saying here is that, granted that thought is an
action, and granted the further premise that every action comes about in accord with
a distinctive form in the agent, it follows that thought comes about in accord with a
distinctive form in the agent. A distinctive form because, even though the intellect is
itself a form in the agent, it is not distinctive enough to do the job, for otherwise all our
thoughts would be the same in kind just as much as all the acts of burning which the fire
elicits in accord with the form of heat are the same in kind. Hence, since every action is
in accord with some form, and since different thoughts are different, and since thought
is an action, therefore it is in accord with some distinctive form.
This is an interesting thesis, but it hardly seems necessary. In fact, Hervaeus Natalis,
Durand’s erstwhile teacher and a staunch advocate of the Angelic Doctor, alluding to
the above-quoted passage, tells us that this isn’t the sort of argument he would use to
motivate the thesis that cognition is by way of species or forms in the mind.
And so I didn’t posit above that there is a species distinct from the act of
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understanding which is necessary for thought owing to the fact that this
operation (i.e., to think) is an immanent operation [. . . ] and so requires some
form in the knower in addition to the act of understanding through which the
knower is actualized; but I posited this based on some other motivation [see
below]. (DIS 149)
What bothers Hervaeus with this sort of answer is that thought (as opposed to calefac-
tion) is not a real action. Hence, it is true that a real action is in accord with a real form
which is in the agent, but it is not true (or at least not obviously true) that a mental
action is in accord with a (mental) form which is in the mental agent.52 Durand rejects
this sort of answer, as we saw in Chapter 1, for a different reason: it treats us as insuf-
ficient cognitive agents, committed as it is to the claim that in order to elicit its act the
mind must acquire some species or form beforehand conceived of as a causal disposition.
Quite the contrary, the mind is fully able to pull off the feats that it was designed to pull
off, just as much as heat is.
In sum, an appeal to causation—in either of these two ways—won’t land us with a
necessary argument that all cognition is by way of a form in the cognizer.
Of course, 13th- and 14th-century authors put forward a wide variety of arguments
in defense of species in one or another cognitive domain. For instance, a popular enough
argument, notably pursued by Duns Scotus, is based upon the idea that the primum
obiectum of the intellect is a universal and so a species is necessary as a representation.53
But, of course, this is a limited victory, for Durand’s criticism is against the thesis that a
species is involved in each and every cognitive act from vision on up to our most abstract
thoughts—and, moreover, it is against the idea that direct perception might somehow be
52. DIS 148–9: “[. . . ] ita dico de intelligere et uidere, quod licet non conueniant nisi enti in actu,
non tamen oportet quod conueniant illi enti in actu cuius sunt operationes, puta intelligenti et uidenti,
per aliquam formam sibi inhaerentem, aliam ab actu intelligendi et uidendi, ad hco quod possit dici
intelligens et uidens operari siue operans, quia ut dictum est supra, tale operari siue tale agere non est
causare actum, sed habere actum.”
53. See footnote 15 above.
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necessarily mediated by unperceived representations.
Hervaeus Natalis appeals to the fact that imagination clearly involves species and
infers from this to the conclusion that all forms of cognition involve species.54 But
this doesn’t seem like a well-founded inference, since Durand would admit that during
imagination a species (or something like it) is involved. But this doesn’t seem to entail
that during direct perception a species is also involved. Why should we think that direct
perception is mediated by species as representations?55
Another line of argumentation, most notably pursued by Peter Auriol, appeals to what
we would nowadays call the argument from illusion. Curiously, Peter doesn’t himself use
such arguments to support the species . Auriol pointed to a whole host of optical illusions
which show that something other than the thing is what one is cognizing during an
illusion. He inferred from this to the conclusion that in every cognitive act there is
54. DIS 142: “Quantum ergo ad primum uidetur mihi quod possit probabiliter teneri quod in intellectu
sit aliqua species intelligibilis, diuersa ab actu intelligendi. Hoc autem probabiliter potest persuaderi
et ratione et auctoritate. Ratione sic, quia qua ratione aliqua potentia cognitiua passiua a suo obiecto
requirit aliquam similitudinem obiecti sibi impressam quae sit ratio cognoscendi et sit alia ab ipsa
cognitione, eadem ratione uidetur hoc debere conuenire omni potentiae cognitiuae passiuae ab obiecto.
Sed in imaginatiua oportet ponere aliquam similitudinem obiecti, diuersam ab actu imaginandi, quae
sit ratio ipsi imaginatiuae quod imaginetur. Ergo oportet ponere in omni potentia cognitiua passiua ab
obiecto aliquam similitudinem obiecti, praeter actum cognoscendi, quae sit ratio cognoscendi. Et per
consequens sequitur quod haec debeat poni in intellectu possibili.”
55. Hervaeus does, however, push upon what would seem to be an important blind-spot in Durand’s
theory. If, as Durand holds, species stored in the brain are what explain memorative and imaginative acts,
then, it would seem, our memorative and imaginative acts would be about those species and not about
something else outside. DIS 142–3: “Sed adhuc posset aliquis dicere quod similitudines sensibilium, quae
remanent ab entibus sensibilibus, non sunt in imaginatiua, uel quaecumque alia uis cognitiua interius
existente, sed sunt in aliqua parte cerebri sicut in subiecto, in qua nulla est uis cognitiua; et quod
tales species existentes in tali parte cerebri mouent uirtutem imaginatiuam ad actum imaginandi, sicut
species in speculo mouent uisum ad actum uidendi, ita quod in imaginatiua nihil imprimitur nisi actus
imaginandi. Sed hoc non sufficit, quia si tales species existentes in alia parte cerebri ab imaginatiua,
mouerent eam ad imaginandum, sicut species existens in speculo mouet uisum ad uidendum, tunc, sicut
uisio terminatur ad speciem, quae est in speculo, sicut ad obiectum uisum, nec terminatur ulterius ad rem,
cuius illa species est similitudo, ut ipsam rem cuius est similitudo uideat, ita etiam tunc imaginatiua
uteretur illis speciebus ut obiectis imaginatis. Hoc autem est falsum, quia experimur in nobis quod
quando imaginamur siue memoramus, non memoramur aliquas species, sed magis aliquam rem prius
sensatam. Ergo oportet quod illa species rei prius sensatae, per quam aliquis imaginatur rem absentem,
non sit in alia parte ceerebri ab illa in qua est uirtus imaginatiua, et se habeat ut obiectum extrinsecum
mouens, sed oportet quod sit in ipsa imaginatiua ut ratio imaginandi aliquid aliud a se.” However, it
seems to me that Durand’s theory makes perfect sense of the phenomenon: if, as he puts it, cognition
stops at the species and doesn’t treat it as an image of something else, then we are deceived, taking the
images inside to be things outside.
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a special sort of entity somehow distinct from the thing; it just so happens that in a
veridical cognitive act we don’t notice this other item since it is indiscernible from the
thing.56
The problem with this line of defense is that, granted an alternative theory which
also explains illusions yet doesn’t force us to draw the entailment that Auriol draws, why
should we, therefore, commit ourselves to species involved in direct veridical perception?
Does Aquinas think the species is even a representation?
It might be worth batting down an objection here which would be, were it true, completely
devastating to Durand’s line of attack: Aquinas doesn’t in fact think that a species is a
representation. On this line of interpretation, Aquinas is a direct realist.57 As Claude
Panaccio characterizes the view:
Why so many commentators see Aquinas’s theory of intellectual cognition as
a brand of direct realism is straightforward. [. . . ] The upshot would seem
to be that when cognition takes place, it is the very same nature, the very
same essence which is in the cognized thing on the one hand, and in the
56. On the problem of illusions in medieval debates, see Pasnau, Theories of Cognition, ch. 5 and Do-
minik Perler, Zweifel und Gewissheit: Skeptische Debatten im Mittelalter (Frankfurt am Main: Kloster-
mann, 2006). Durand rarely discusses the problem of illusion, and he doesn’t discuss Auriol’s cases at
all. See Sent. II-C 7.3–4, Sent. IV-C 1.4 (on demonic manipulation) and Sent. C Prol. q. 3 (on cognition
of non-existents). In Auriol, see Sent. I 3.14. For discussion see Tachau, Vision and Certitude, ch. 4,
D. Denery, Seeing and Being Seen in the Later Medieval World. Optics, Theology, and Religious Life
(Cambridge: CUP, 2005), ch. 4, D. Denery, “The Appearance of Reality: Peter Aureol and the Experi-
ence of Perceptual Error,” Franciscan Studies 55 (1998): 17–52, Joe¨l Biard, “Intention et pre´sence: la
notion de presentialitas au XIVe sie`cle,” in Perler, Ancient and Medieval Theories of Intentionality, 270–
7, Dominik Perler, “What Am I Thinking About? John Duns Scotus and Peter Aureol on Intentional
Objects,” Vivarium 31, no. 1 (1994): 72–89, Russell Friedman, “Peter Auriol on Intellectual Cognition of
Singulars,” Vivarium 38 (2000): 177–93, the introduction to Rega Wood, “Adam Wodeham on Sensory
Illusions. With an Edition of Lectura Secunda, Prologus, Quaestio 3,” Traditio 38 (1982): 213–52. See
also, of course, Ockham, Ord. I 27.3.
57. See, e.g., Kretzmann, “Philosophy of Mind,” 138–9 (the section is titled “Intellect—Aquinas’s
Direct Realism”), G.E.M. Anscombe and Peter Geach, Three Philosophers (Oxford: Basil Blackwell,
1963), John Haldane, “Brentano’s Problem,” Gazer Philosophische Studien 35 (1989): 1–32, Anthony
Kenny, Aquinas on Mind (London: Routledge, 1993), and Joseph Owens, “Aristotle and Aquinas,” in
The Cambridge Companion to Thomas Aquinas, ed. N. Kretzmann and E. Stump (Cambridge: CUP,
1993), 38–59 (among others)
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cognizer on the other hand, except that in the latter this nature is abstracted
from the individuating conditions which singularize it within the material
cognized objects. [. . . ] What more direct form of realism could one hope for
than such a doctrine which says that the very nature of the external thing—its
essence—comes to exist in some way within the cognizing subject? (“Aquinas
on Intellectual Representation,” 186–7)58
In support of this line of interpretation, we can point to quite a number of passages
in Aquinas. For instance, in Summa contra gentiles, Aquinas writes that “the actually
understood forms come to be one with the actually understanding intellect” (SCG I.44:
“[. . . ] formae autem intellectae in actu fiunt unum cum intellectu actu intelligente”).59
The problem with this line of interpretation, as many have pointed out,60 is that
the textual evidence suggests that Aquinas did think of species as representations. For
instance, in De ueritate:
An item is cognized as it is represented (repraesentantum) in the cognizer
and not as it exists in the cognizer. (II.5: “[. . . ] aliquid cognoscitur secun-
dum quod est in cognoscente repraesentatum, et non secundum quod est in
cognoscente existens.”)
Or, again, in his commentary on De Anima:
58. This line of interpretation often appeals to Aquinas’s debt to Avicenna’s doctrine that an essence
can be either considered in itself, in the singulars, or in the mind. On this point, see Deborah Black,
“Mental Existence in Thomas Aquinas and Avicenna,” Mediaeval Studies 61 (1999): 45–79. See also
Pasnau, Theories of Cognition, ch. 6 for a discussion of Aquinas and the interpretation that he is a
direct realist. Pasnau and Panaccio argue against this interpretation.
59. See also, e.g., DEE III.5: “Ipsa enim natura humana in intellectu habet esse abstractum ab omnibus
indiuiduantibus.” It is hard, however, to find an actual proponent of this interpretation of Aquinas who
also handles the scholastic material. For instance, Cummins, Meaning and Mental Representation, 3–4
characterizes scholastic and Aristotelian positions along these lines. An exception is John Haldane. See,
e.g., John Haldane, “A Return to Form in the Philosophy of Mind,” Ratio 11 (1998): 253–77, John
Haldane, “Putnam on Intentionality,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (1992): 671–82,
John Haldane, “Whose Theory? Which Representation?” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 74 (1993):
247–57.
60. See, e.g., Brower and Brower-Toland, “Aquinas on Mental Representation,” Pasnau, Theories of
Cognition, Panaccio, “Aquinas on Intellectual Representation.”
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However, the soul isn’t the thing as they claim since the stone is not in the
soul but the species of the stone and it is in this way that the intellect in act
is said to be the item understood in act—insofar as the species of the item
understood is a species of the intellect in act. (In DA III.7)
Moreover, the identity thesis must be able to make sense of the fact that Aquinas tells
us that the species in me is not the same in number as the species in you.
However, the intellect’s object is not the intelligible species but the quiddity
of the thing [. . . ] and so the intelligible species are distinct in number in you
and in me. (Comp. Theol. 85)
And, of course, there is the rather devilish passage from his Sentences:
Between the cognizer and the cognized a likeness (similitudo) which is in
accord with the sameness in nature isn’t required but rather a mere likeness
as representation (secundum repraesentationem), for it is agreed that the form
of the stone in the soul is quite distant from the nature of the form of the
stone in the matter—yet insofar as it represents it it is a principle directing
towards its cognition. (Sent. IV 49.2.1 ad 7)61
Such passages, and many others, compel us to think that Aquinas held that a species
is a kind of representation, albeit, of course, of a special sort. But, as Durand points out,
why should we think that direct cognitive acts require such representational species in
the first place?
4.4 Conclusion
On Durand’s view, our theory of cognition should conform to our intuitions about what it
is to see, think, hear, and so on. But if we look at our intuitions, then it would seem that
61. I will return to this passage in Chapter 5. See also QDV II.5 ad 5: “Ad cognitionem non requiritur
similitudo conformitatis in natura sed similitudo repraesentationis tantum, sicut per statuam auream
ducimur in memoriam alicuis hominis.”
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there is no such thing as a representation involved in at least our direct cognitive activi-
ties about external objects. Of course, overt acts of memory and imagination will involve
representations, and so too will indirect forms of cognition, but direct acts of perception
do not seem to involve representations. We have this intuition because we do not expe-
rience a representation when we engage in such forms of cognition, for a representation
is something that is experienced, e.g., a statue in the courtyard, the word ‘Hercules’, or
a picture on the wall; such items are perceived before whatever it is that they represent
is cognized. Hence, we must motivate the thesis that during direct forms of cognition
about external objects there are special representations—representations that represent
something to the percipient even though they are not themselves perceived; moreover,
we must motivate the thesis that there are even such things as special representations in
the first place. As we saw, an appeal to natural species (the entities identified and talked
about in the species-theory of optics) won’t suffice, for, as Durand points out, such enti-
ties as they exist, so to speak, in the wild—in the air in a room with no percipient—are
not representations. Hence, we must motivate this thesis in some other way, and Durand
is confident that there is no decent argument forthcoming from the proponent of the
species-theory of cognition.
It is better, then, and more simple, to hold that when object is present to the per-
cipient, and all conditions such as lighting and so forth are right, that object will be
perceived. A species, it is true, might be said to exist as part of these background con-
ditions (in the air and even in the eye), but such a species is not involved in perception
as a representation of the external object any more than the air or a functioning eyeball
is involved in perception as a representation of the external object. It is only in the case
of an overtly indirect form of cognition, e.g., an act of remembering or imagining some-
thing, that a species (or something like it) functions as a representation. But no one ever
doubted that overt acts of remembering or imagination involve representations; what is
up for debate is whether all forms of cognition involve, indeed, require representations,
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and, for Durand, our answer to this question is an emphatic ‘no’.
5 Durand of St-Pourc¸ain and aboutness
Most mental states are such that they have intentionality, that is, most mental states are
about something else. When I think about Felix, my mental state is about Felix, and when
I think about how much Felix weighs, my mental state is about Felix’s weight.1 An account
of intentionality or aboutness ought to tell us how it is that a mental state—as opposed
to some other state—is able to be about something else. I will call this the General
Question of Intentionality: In general, what is it that makes mental states (as
opposed to non-mental states) such that they have aboutness? Further, an adequate
account of intentionality ought to answer what I will call the Specific Question of
Intentionality: In virtue of what is a mental state about whatever it is about, rather
than something else? In virtue of what, for instance, is my thought about cats, rather
than, say, dogs; St. Nicholas, rather than, say, Hercules?2
In this chapter, I aim to provide Durand’s answer to these questions.
5.1 Those that came before. . .
The previous chapters will have put us in something of a position to recognize the sort
of answer that Durand’s opponents might give to the specific question of intentionality.
According to Durand’s interpretation of their theory, the proponent of the species-theory
of cognition—the view that cognition comes about owing to the reception of a form,
distinct from the cognitive act, which is a kind of likeness (similitudo) of the thing—
1. ‘Most’ because pain, for example, and anxiety do not seem to have an intentional character; such
mental states do not seem to be about anything at all. In what follows, I take this proviso as assumed.
2. For some recent discussion of this issue in the 13th and 14th centuries, see King, “Rethinking Repre-
sentation,” Giorgio Pini, “Two Models of Thinking: Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus,” in Klima,
Intentionality, Cognition and Mental Representation in Medieval Philosophy and Brower and Brower-
Toland, “Aquinas on Mental Representation.” For less recent, although still quite good, discussion, see
Perler, Theorien der Intentionalita¨t im Mittelalter and Martin Tweedale, “Mental Representations in
Later Medieval Scholasticism,” in Historical Foundations of Cognitive Science, ed. J. Smith (Dordrecht,
1990), 35–51. For a recent discussion of the issue in the medieval Arabic tradition, see Black, “Arabic
Theories of Intentionality and their Impact in the Latin West.”
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holds that a mental state (the cognitive act) is about whatever the species is about; and
the species is about whatever it is about because it somehow resembles or shares the
same form as whatever it is about. Similarly, Godfrey of Fontaines, who denies species
as distinct from acts, still maintains that a cognitive act is a kind of form or likeness of
the thing, and so he too can be seen as holding that a mental state (the cognitive act)
is about whatever it is about because it somehow resembles or shares the same form as
whatever it is about.3 Indeed, one of the motivations behind the thesis that the object
is at least an efficient cause (somehow) of either the thought or the species (against the
view that it is a mere sine qua non cause) is because otherwise no similitudo would come
about in the intellect.4 As Nicholas Medensis puts the point:
As to his [i.e., Durand’s] position, it ought to be said that the presence of
a thing is not sufficient provided there is no likeness (similitudo) of knower
with known. But he gives us a reason for the presence but not the likeness.
And so his position is not sufficient. (Evid. II.12 412)5
On both views, it is some form inherent in the mind which explains the aboutness
of thought. On the one view, this form is the cognitive act itself whereas on the other
view it is a species somehow distinct from the cognitive act, but in both cases there is a
3. Godfrey, as mentioned (Chapter 1, fn. 22 tells us that we can even call the act itself a species.
See, e.g., Godfrey, Quodl. IX.19 275: “Et quia huismodi condiciones conueniunt formae et speciei, ipsum
intelligere etiam potest dici species siue forma.” See also, e.g., X.12 361: “[. . . ] sed bene dicit [sc.
Aristoteles -PJH] ipsum actum intelligendi quandam speciem in quantum est quaedam similitudo rei
per quam etiam intellectus dicitur rei assimilari et quodam modo secundum hoc fieri res ipsa; prout
intellectus dicitur fieri intelligiblia in quantum efficitur actu intelligens illa. Et secundum hoc dicit
Philosophus quod lapis non est in anima sed species lapidis. Id autem quod de lapide est in anima
constat quod est ipse actus intelligendi. Et quia actus intelligendi non est ipse lapis secundum esse reale
quod habet extra, ideo respectu talis esse dicitur esse species eius.”
4. I labeled this the ‘intentionality objection’ in Chapter 3. See, e.g., Duns Scotus, Ord. I 3.3.3 n.
490: “[. . . ] quia tunc actus non esset similitudo obiecti.” See also Lect. I 3.3.2–3 n. 360 and Quodl. 15 n.
9. Another argument is that were the intellect totally active, then we would not be able to individuate
our cognitive acts. See, e.g., Duns Scotus, Ord. I 3.3.3 n. 490: “[. . . ] quia nec distingueretur essentialiter
propter distinctionem obiecti, quia essentialis distinctio non est ab eo quod non est causa.” See also
Lect. I 3.3.2–3 n. 361 and Quodl. 15 n. 9.
5. For similar criticisms of Durand’s position, see, e.g., Peter Auriol, Sent. I 35.1, Hervaeus Natalis,
Quodl. III.8, Gregory of Rimini, Sent. II 7.2–3, and John Capreolus, Sent. II 3.2.
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form that the mind takes on in virtue of the causal activity of the object which somehow
factors into an account of the aboutness of mental states.6 As Durand puts it at one
point:
Some people claim [. . . ] that the conformity between intellect and thing is
to be analyzed in terms of an item that is in the intellect as in a subject,
e.g., the species of the thing (which is a likeness (similitudo) of the thing), or,
for those who would deny species , the act of thinking itself (which is also a
likeness of the thing). But this view does not seem right. (Sent. I-C 19.2.5–6
§3.1 [= Sent. I-A 19.3 §3.1])
Let’s call the species theorist’s answer to the specific question the Object Theory
of Intentionality and the act theorist’s answer the Adverbial Theory of Inten-
tionality.7 According to the object theory, intentionality is an intrinsic property of a
privileged class of objects that exist in the mind which are not themselves the same as
the cognitive act itself.8 According to the adverbial theory, intentionality is an intrinsic
property of the cognitive act itself—the form that the mind takes on.9 On the first view,
6. In fact, the qualification “in virtue of the causal activity of the object” can usually be dropped,
since most authors accepted the idea that, in principle, God can cause the thought directly rather than
the object and, moreover, that in the case of angels the species are placed into the angel’s mind by God
(not the object). Both of these considerations suggested that the primary item that fixes the content
is the species and not the causal relation. On angels, see below, fn. 34. On God ’s intervention, see
Chapter 1, § 1.3 and Chapter 3, fnn. 1 and 2.
7. Susan Brower-Toland, “Ockham on Judgment, Concepts, and the Problem of Intentionality,” Cana-
dian Journal of Philosophy 37, no. 1 (2007): 67–110 and Ernesto Perini-Santos, “La Structure de l’acte
intellectif dans les the´ories ockhamiennes du concept,” Vivarium 45, no. 1 (2007): 93–112 use the same
taxonomy in their discussion of William of Ockham’s theory of intentionality. The taxonomy is con-
temporary, of course. See, e.g., Wilfred S. Sellars, “The Adverbial Theory of the Objects of Sensation,”
Metaphilosophy 6 (1975): 144–60 and Frank Jackson, “The Existence of Mental Objects,” American
Philosophical Quarterly 13 (1976): 33–40. See also the introduction in Jonathan Dancy, Perceptual
Knowledge (Oxford: OUP, 1988).
8. This isn’t to say that the species is the object of cognition. It is rather best to view it as an
uncognized vehicle of cognition, or, in scholastic terms, the species is not that which is cognized but that
by which it is cognized. See Chapter 4, footnote 16 and the surrounding discussion on this distinction.
9. According to Peter King, “Ockham on the Role of Concepts [presentation version]” (2005), http:
//individual.utoronto.ca/pking/, C. Panaccio’s interpretation of Ockham (Panaccio, Ockham on
Concepts, 124) commits Ockham to just such a theory. On my interpretation of Godfrey, the theory fits
him just as well, perhaps better.
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my cognitive act is about cats because it is somehow associated with a likeness of cats
distinct from it, and on the second view, I think about cats in a cat-like fashion and it is
my cognitive act itself which is the likeness of the cat. On both views, some item intrinsic
to the mind is what bears the mark of intentionality. We might take both views, then,
to be committed to a kind of internalism about intentionality.
On Durand’s view, by contrast, the aboutness of a mental act can’t be explained by
appeal to a ‘form’ or ‘likeness’ in the mind (be these the same as acts or held to be
distinct). Durand, of course, rejects species, but he does so in part because he rejects the
thesis that form reception is necessary for cognition.10 Hence, he must reject whatever
theory of intentionality is associated with such views, that is, views which hang the
intentional upon some form in the mind. Durand also must reject the adverbial theory of
intentionality. On Durand’s view, as we saw from Chapter 3, a mental act is, ontologically,
a relational property and not a non-relational property—it is a relation founded upon the
mind and not an absolute form inherent in the mind. Durand can’t, in short, embrace
what we might call a traditional ‘conformality’ theory of intentionality, that is, any
theory which insists that when the mind is engaged in a mental act it has or takes on
a distinctive form, which is a likeness (similitudo), in virtue of which we can claim that
it is about whatever it is about. I do not think cat-like thoughts nor is there a cat-like
mental representation in the mind when I think about cats.
Durand, of course, recognizes that even if one has no good reason to postulate a
species or form in the mind as necessary for the causation of a cognitive act, one might
still want to postulate such an entity as necessary for the representationality of a cognitive
act, that is, as a necessary element in one’s account of the aboutness of a mental act.
Hence, setting aside issues having to do with causation, what are Durand’s reasons for
10. Not only does Durand reject acts (conceived of as forms) and species in the mind, he also rejects
two other sorts of commonly posited mental entities, namely, habitus (TDH)—which he argues are not
in the intellect or the will, but in the body—and mental words, conceived of as produced or expressed
forms (Sent. I-AC 27.2)—which he argues are to be identified with intellections.
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rejecting such internalist pictures of aboutness—views which analyze the conformity of
the mind to the thing in terms of a form, called a likeness, in the mind?
5.1.1 Durand’s rejection of internalist theories of aboutness
Durand rejects the idea that a form in the intellect (be it the act or the species) might
be said to be that in virtue of which the mental state is about whatever it is about in
both his first redaction (Sent. II-A 3.5 a. 2) and his third redaction (Sent. II-C 3.6). His
focus in these texts is on the idea that the species , as a similitudo of the thing, might be
taken to be a representative of the thing. However, as we will see, his attack also covers
the alternative theory that the act itself (conceived of as a form in the mind) is itself a
similitudo and so representative of the thing. (With this in mind, we can simplify our
exposition by talking about the species—be it the act or something distinct from the
act.)
So, in virtue of what does the species represent whatever it represents? Durand argues
that the only plausible answer to this question is that the species bears what I will call
a real formal identity with what it represents: the species is really a form which is really
the same in kind as the form which it (supposedly) represents.
Any such species representing something and the form represented immedi-
ately through it are of the same specific kind (eiusdem rationis secundum
speciem) even though they differ in terms of their modes of existence. (Sent.
II-A 3.5 27: “[. . . ] omnis talis species aliquid repraesentans et forma per ip-
sam immediate repraesentata sunt eiusdem rationis secundum speciem, licet
differant in modo essendi.”)11
However, Durand argues, the real formal identity thesis seems to be problematic, for the
11. See also Sent. IV-C 49.2 n. 13: “Species repraesentans et essentia per ipsam immediate reprae-
sentata sunt eiusdem rationis secundum speciem, licet differant in modo essendi.” Sent. II-C 3.6 n.
17: “Species repraesentans rem aliquam et res cuius est species sunt eiusdem rationis specificae, licet
differant in modo essendi.”
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intelligible species , at least, is really an incorporeal accidental form, and so it can’t be
really formally identical with a substantial form or a corporeal accidental form.12 Hence,
if what a thought is about is a matter of a real formal identity that obtains between
the species and some other form, then none of our thoughts could be said to be about
substantial forms or corporeal accidental forms. Yet we do think about these items all
the time, don’t we?13 The same line of reasoning applies to Godfrey’s view which holds
that one should not posit a species in addition to the cognitive act itself. On his view,
the cognitive act just is what (on the alternative view) the species is, and so it too, as
an accidental form, won’t be able to represent what it is supposed to represent.
But why should we believe Durand when he tells us that a species must be really
formally identical with whatever it represents? For that matter, what is real formal
identity? Let’s answer the second question first.
Durand, drawing from Aquinas’s discussion of images, argues that there are two
necessary conditions of an image. First, an image bears a causal relationship of some
sort to that of which it is an image. Second, an image bears a resemblance relationship
of some sort to that of which it is an image. This latter relation is a relation that obtains
between some property (or set of properties) in the image and some property (or set of
properties) in that of which it is an image.14 Hence, X is an image of Y if and only if (1)
12. Sent. II-A 3.5 27: “Sed nihil existens in mente angeli potest esse eiusdem rationis specificae cum
quidditatibus rerum nec secundum genus, cum illae sint substantiae, haec autem quaedam accidentia.”
See also Sent. I-A 19.3 §3.1: “[. . . ] omne, quod est subiectiue in intellectu, est accidens; res autem
exterior est quandoque substantia materialis; inter haec autem non potest esse similitudo uel conformitas
in essendo, cum sint diuersorum generum.” See also Sent. I-C 19.2.5–6 §3.2: “[. . . ] omne, quod est
subiectiue in intellectu, est accidens; res autem exterior est quandoque substantia materialis, uel, si
sit accidens, est accidens corporeum; inter haec autem non potest esse similitudo uel conformitas in
essendo, cum sit diuersorum generum.” See also Sent. II-C 3.6 n. 17: “Sed nulla species existens in
intellectu angeli, cum sit accidens, potest esse eiusdem rationis specificae cum substantiis rerum tam
spiritualium quam corporalium, quas angelus intelligit.” ibid., n. 20: “Et per eandem rationem non
intelligit accidentia rerum corporalium per speciem, quia in angelo, qui est substantia mere spiritualis,
non potest esse aliquod accidens eiusdem rationis cum accidentibus corporalibus.”
13. This seems to be what Brower and Brower-Toland, “Aquinas on Mental Representation” call the
‘quiddity objection’.
14. Sent. I-C 3.2.1 n. 5: “Quantum ad primum est intelligendum quod ‘imago’ importat duo. Pri-
mum est ‘similitudo ad id cuius est imago’ (non quaecumque, sed secundum ea, quae demonstrant rem
expressius, ut apud sensum color et figura). Et hoc patet in his quibus uulgariter nomen ‘imaginis’
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X bears a causal relation to Y and (2) X bears a resemblance relation to Y. As Durand
and Aquinas put it: one egg isn’t an image of another egg and a worm isn’t an image
of a human being. In the first case, this is because there is no causal relation between
the two eggs (even though there is a resemblance relation); in the second case, this is
because there is no resemblance relation between the worm and the human being (even
though there is—disturbingly enough!—a causal relation). (A less revolting example: a
sunburn isn’t an image of the sun.)15
Durand admits that there are at least two sorts of resemblance relations which might
obtain between an image and that of which it is an image, which I will call strict
and liberal. A strict resemblance relation obtains between two items that ‘participate’
in the same species or nature or specific nature. Judging by the examples, this would
seem to mean, roughly, two tokens of the same type, e.g., a father and his son, two
eggs, or two instances of red.16 A liberal resemblance relation obtains between two
attribuimus. Si enim alterum desit, non dicimus esse completam imaginem. Sed quia istud non sufficit
(multa enim sunt sibi similia in colore et figura et in his quae rem expressius repraesentant, quorum
unum non est alterius imago, sicut ouum, quantumcumque sit alii ouo simile, non dicitur eius imago),
ideo requiritur secundum, scilicet quod sit similitudo ab imaginato expressa, actiue uel exemplariter.
Dicitur enim imago quasi imitago, quia fit ad alterius similitudinem uel imitationem, modis quibus dic-
tum est—exemplariter quidem, sicut pictor facit imaginem Herculis uel Sortis inspiciens et considerans
ad Sortem tamquam ad exemplar; actiue autem, sicut pater generat filium sibi similem.” Cf. Aquinas,
In DA II.7, ST I.93.1–2, and Sent. I 28.2.1. For discussion, see Pasnau, Theories of Cognition, ch. 3.4.
Durand recognizes two causal relations: either the image is caused by that of which it is an image (e.g.,
a son is caused by his father), or an image is as it were made in the image of that of which it is an
image by something else which uses whatever it is of which it is an image as a kind of ‘exemplar’. On
this latter causal relation, see Durand’s discussion of divine ideas in Sent. I-C 7.1, 8.2, 35.2, 36.3–4, 38.1,
44.2, 45.2, Sent. III-C 31.1, Sent. IV-C 49.3. I take it that the causal condition is supposed to capture
the asymmetric nature of representations: representation is asymmetric whereas resemblance is symmet-
ric. On the symmetric/asymmetric distinction see Sent. I-C 48.1 n. 2 and n. 8. For some discussion on
the causal aspect of a similitudo in Aquinas, see Andre´ Hayen, L’intentionnel selon saint Thomas, 2nd
edition (Paris: Descle´e de Brouwer, 1954), 210–26 and J. Jacobs and J. Zeis, “Form and Cognition: How
to Go Out of your Mind,” The Monist 80, no. 4 (1997).
15. ibid., n. 6: “Et sic duo sunt de ratione ‘imaginis’, scilicet ‘similitudo’ (quantum ad ea, quae expres-
sius rem repraesentant), et ‘quod exprimatur ab imaginato actiue uel exemplariter’. Propter primum,
uermis non dicitur imago hominis, licet originetur ab homine, quia non est similis; propter secundum,
ouum non est imago oui, licet sit simile, quia non exprimitur ab eo, nec exemplariter nec actiue.” Cf.
Aquinas, ST I.35.1 and ST I.93.1–2.
16. Admittedly, this would seem to leave things a bit vague. Couldn’t we claim that the spoken
utterance ‘weasel’, the written utterance ‘weasel’, and the mental concept |weasel| are tokens of the
same type? I take it that ‘participate in the same nature’ is doing some real work here. The spoken
utterance ‘weasel’ does not, seeing as it is a spoken utterance, participate in the same nature as the
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items which do not ‘participate’ in the same species/nature/specific nature; rather, the
image ‘participates’ in some species/natura/specific nature which is ‘demonstrative’ of the
species/nature/specific nature of that of which it is an image. Judging by the examples
he gives, I take it he means that a liberal resemblance relation is a proportion that obtains
between a set of properties in the image and a set of properties in that of which it is
an image, e.g., the color and shape of a statue of Hercules and the color and shape in
Hercules.17 Hence, the relation of real formal identity is the relation of strict resemblance:
X is really formally identical with Y just means that X and Y are two individuals of the
same species.18
But why does Durand think—especially in light of his distinction between two kinds
of images—that a species must be a strict image? It is true that a species is a similitudo
in virtue of which the knower comes to be assimilated with the known, as Aristotle
suggests, but this cognitive assimilation thesis doesn’t need to be cashed out in terms
of strict resemblance—the species and that of which it is a species need not be really
formally identical—for it can be cashed out in some other way. Durand is aware of this
written utterance ‘weasel’, much less the mental concept |weasel|. I owe these questions to Peter King.
My solution is my own.
17. Sent. II-C 16.1 (C ) n. 4: “Circa primum sciendum quod cum imago dicat perfectam repraesenta-
tionem eius cuius est imago, hoc potest fieri dupliciter. Vno modo participando eamdem (eamdem] in
idem C ) speciem, sicut filius simillimus patri, dicitur imago patris. [. . . ] Alio modo dicitur aliquid imago
alterius, non quidem participando eamdem speciem, sed alteram (speciei tamen demonstratiuam), sicut
imago Herculis dicitur aliquid sculptum in lapide uel pictum in pariete, quod, licet sit alterius naturae
a natura Herculis, tamen Herculem demonstrat uel repraesentat.” See also n. 6: “Hoc autem sit non
participando eamdem naturam secundum speciem [. . . ] sed participando aliam naturam [. . . ] tamen
naturae repraesentatiuam.” See also Sent. I-C 3.2.1 n. 8: “Ad primam rationem in oppositum dicendum
quod aliquorum potest esse species indifferens dupliciter. Vno modo participando eamdem naturam se-
cundum speciem, sicut filius simillimus patri dicitur imago patris. [. . . ] Alio modo dicitur aliquid imago
alterius, non quidem participando eamdem naturam secundum speciem, sed alteram (speciei tamen
demonstratiuam), sicut imago Herculis dicitur aliquid sculptum in lapide uel pictum in pariete, quod,
licet sit alterius naturae, tamen Herculem repraesentat.” See also Sent. I-C 48.1 n. 4: “Cum quaerimus
de conformitate uoluntatis nostrae ad diuinam, aut quaerimus de conformitate earum secundum esse
reale uel in essendo, prout quaelibet est quaedam res secundum se[. . . ]. Haec autem conformitas non est
participando eamdem naturam specificam, sed in participando aliam (speciei tamen demonstratiuam),
sicut expositum fuit supra distinctione 3a.” See also ibid., n. 7: “Ad primum argumentum dicendum
quod non omnis conformitas est secundum paticipationem eiusdem formae specificae inhaerentis uel
non-inhaerentis, sed secundum plures alios modos[. . . ].”
18. Hence, as we saw, Durand’s various formulations (fn. 11 above): “eiusdem rationis secundum
speciem”, “eiusdem rationis specificae”.
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sort of objection.
If someone were to say that the representational species is the same in kind
(eiusdem rationis) as the thing represented but not really (in essendo) but
as a matter of representation (in repraesentando), then he would speak in
vain. (Sent. II-A 3.5 28: “Si quis autem dicat, quod species repraesentans est
eiusdem rationis cum re repraesentata non in essendo sed in repraesentando,
uane loquitur.”)19
Speak in vain he might, but this is precisely the answer that Hervaeus Natalis will give
to Durand’s objection in Quodl. III.8.20 On his view (more on this below, §5.7.2), an
intelligible species represents whatever it represents not because it is the same in kind
(i.e., a strict image) of whatever it represents, but rather owing to some other relation.
I will call this the quasi-formal identity thesis: a species is formally identical with what
it represents but not really formally identical.21
19. See also Sent. IV-C 49.2 (C ) n. 14: “[. . . ] illud, quod dicitur quod ex quo species repraesentat
naturam rei specificae ut sola ratio cognoscendi (cognoscendi] cogendi C ), ideo uidetur esse eiusdem
speciei cum ipsa re, non ualet[. . . ].” ibid., n. 18: “Quod autem tertio additur—quod sufficit quod
species repraesentans sit eiusdem naturae specificae cum re repraesentata in repraesentando et non in
essendo—friuolum est et sola fuga difficultatis quoad hominem.” See also Sent. I-A 19.3 §3.1 and Sent.
I-C 19.2.5–6 §3.2. See also Nicholas Medensis (who is presenting Durand’s position), Evid. II.12 402: “Si
autem dicatur quod est eiusdem rationis in repraesentando et non in essendo, uane dicitur.” I’ll discuss
Durand’s answer to this vain ‘fuga’ below in 5.7.2.
20. Quodl. III.8 67–68: “Ad tertium dicendum, quod species requiritur ut similitudo informans intel-
lectum et mouens ipsum ad cognoscendum, et non ut medium cognitum, prout una res cognita ducit in
cognitionem alterius. Ad probationem, quae adducitur in contrarium, dicendum quod illa ratio peccat
in duobus. Primo, quia procedit de similitudine in esse, nos autem loquimur de similitudine, quae est se-
cundum esse repraesentatiuum, prout similitudo existens in intellectu repraesentat intelligibile. Secundo
deficit, quia procedit utendo simili ut medio cognito ad probandum alterum, sicut si probaretur aliquid
de niue alba in eo, quod alba, et ex hoc concluderetur, quod conueniret lapidi albo. Nos autem loquimur
de similitudine, quae est ratio cognoscendi, non ut medium cognitum.” See also Nicholas Medensis,
Evid. II.12 409: “Ad rationem probationis dicendum est quod est perfectae similitudinis non essendo
sed in repraesentando.”
21. See, e.g., Nicholas Medensis, Evid. II.12 407: “Aduertendum tamen est quod non requiritur omni-
moda similitudo inter species et res, quas repraesentant, puta generis uel speciei, sc. quod sint eiusdem
generis uel speciei, quia nec species, quae sunt in imaginatione nostra, quas non est facile negare, isto
modo [non] assimilantur rebus repraesentatis per eas. Immo, quanto magis potentia cognitiua perspi-
cacior fuerit, tanto minorem similitudinem requirit. Cuius ratio est: Nam, in hoc conueniunt ratio
cognoscendi et medium cognitum, quod utrumque ducit in cognitionem alterius, licet aliquo modo dif-
ferant. Sicut igitur uidemus quod ex medio magis distanti ab aliqua conclusione intellectus subtilior
ducitur in cognitionem ipsius conclusionis, ex quo medio intellectus minus subtilis duci non posset, nisi
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In the last chapter, I discussed one argument Durand made in defense of the thesis
that a species must be really formally identical with that of which it is a species . On
his view, one of the motivations which prompted philosophers to postulate intelligible
species in the first place was because of so-called species in medio. However, a species
in medio is really formally identical with that of which it is a species , even though the
species (of whiteness, say) and that of which it is a species (whiteness on the wall) differ
in their modes of existence, for the former has weak or imperfect existence (and so it
doesn’t terminate the activity of sight) whereas the latter has perfect existence (and so
it does). Hence, an intelligible species should also be held to be really formally identical
with that of which it is a species . However, there are at least two problems with this
line of argumentation. First of all, one might not think that the species in medio is
really formally identical with that of which it is a species .22 Second, one might not buy
Durand’s story about the origins of intelligible species , or, in other words, one might insist
that an intelligible species and a species in medio are chalk and cheese—true enough a
species in medio is really formally identical with the color of which it is a species , but an
intelligible species is not.23
A second independent argument which Durand gives in defense of the claim that an
illud medium magis specificaretur, ita etiam, ex specie, quae est ratio cognoscendi, minus simili et con-
formi rei intellectae intellectus, efficacior ducitur in cognitionem rei alicuius, in cuius cognitionem non
duceretur ex eadem specie intellectus minus efficax. Vnde et rationabliter dictum est quod angelus
superior intelligit per species magis uniuersales, ut patebit in sequenti articulo.”
22. Nicholas Medensis, Evid. II.12 410: “Ad exemplum dicendum est, primo, quod multum est dubium
quod color, in quantum color, in medio et oculo, sint eiusdem rationis.” Walter Chatton, Rep. II 4.1 201:
“Nam communis opinio est quod aliquid causet, sed uertitur in dubium an aliquid eiusdem rationis uel
alterius. Et sunt opiniones multae quod albedo causat in medio formam eiusdem rationis, Durandi et
Hugonis de Nouo Castro, et multorum de Villa.” Gregory of Rimini, Sent. II 7.3 139: “[. . . ] dico quod
illa species non est eiusdem sed alterius rationis ab obiecto extra. [. . . ] [D]ico quod similitudo dupliciter
potest capi: Vno modo pro conuenientia essentiali secundum genus uel speciem, sicut duo homines et
duo indiuidua eiusdem speciei dicuntur esse similia; alio modo pro conuenientia quadam accidentali, qua
imago ei, cuius est imago, similis dicitur.” Gregory is responding to Ockham’s celebrated argumentum
propter repraesentationem. See Ockham, Rep. II 12–13; see also Rep. III 2. See also John Capreolus,
Defensiones II 3.2. For more on this debate, see Maier, “Das Problem der species sensibilis in medio
und die neue Naturphilosophie des 14. Jahrhunderts,” Tachau, “The Problem of the species in medio in
the Generation after Ockham,” and Tachau, “Walter Chatton on Sensible and Intelligible Species.”
23. See the discussion in the last chapter.
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intelligible species must be really formally identical with that of which it is a species
bears upon the thesis that an intelligible species is an uncognized representation (ratio
cognoscendi non cognita) as opposed to a cognized representation (medium cognitum),
that is to say, the thesis that a species represents something to some percipient even
though it is not itself perceived.
Durand argues as follows. If a species is a representation which directs the thinker to
something else, then either it does so as a cognized representation or as an uncognized
representation.24 Now, everyone agrees that a species is not a cognized representation, for
a species is not that which is cognized but that by which the object is cognized.25 How-
ever, the species also can’t be an uncognized representation, because whereas a cognized
representation can represent something else or direct us to think about something else
owing to any number of relations between it and what it represents (liberal resemblance
or opposition, say), an uncognized representation, seeing as it is uncognized, can’t.26
24. Even though a cognized representation can be characterized as a ratio cognoscendi, it is clear from
the texts that Durand means to be drawing a contrast between uncognized rationes cognoscendi and
cognized ones. Durand is explicit elsewhere. See, e.g., Sent. I-C 36.3 n. 12: “[. . . ] nec idea est ratio
intelligendi, quae sic est ratio intelligendi quod non est intellecta, sicut est species secundum ponentes
ipsas[. . . ].” Henceforth, I take this proviso as assumed: a species is an uncognized ratio cognoscendi and
not a cognized ratio cognoscendi a.k.a. medium cognitum.
25. Sent. II-A 3.5 27: “[. . . ] si in angelo essent species repraesentatiuae rerum, ut medium cognitum,
uel solum ut ratio cognoscendi. Non ut medium cognitum: Primo, quia sic non consueuimus uti nomine
‘species’; alioquin diceremus causam esse speciem effectus et e conuerso et habitum speciem priuationis,
quia talia sunt media cognoscendi. Secundo, quia eamdem uicem, quam tenet species in sensu uel in
nostro intellectu, tenet species in mente angeli, licet non accipiatur a re sicut aliae. Sed species in
sensu et intellectu nostro (si qua sit ibi) non habet rationem medii cogniti.” See also ibid., 7: “[. . . ] si
angelus intelligeret per species, aut species esset solum ratio cognoscendi uel esset medium cognitum.
Non potest dici, quod sit solum ratio cognoscendi, [. . . ]. Item nec est medium cognitum, quia medium
cognitum potest ducere in cognitionem alterius ratione cuiuscumque habitudinis, siue ut simile, siue ut
contrarium, uel qualitercumque aliter. [. . . ] Item nullus dicit speciem esse medium cognitum, sed solum
rationem cognoscendi.”
26. Sent. II-A 3.5 28: “Illud, quod est solum ratio cognoscendi et non proprie medium cognitum, non
ducit cognitionem alterius nisi ratione perfectae similitudinis. Vnde et similitudo dicitur per quamdam
expressionem. Medium autem cognitum potest ducere in alterius cognitionem ratione cuiuscumque habi-
tudinis, sc. ut causa uel ut effectus, ut simile uel ut oppositum et qualitercumque aliter, sed species ratione
solius similitudinis, ut dictum est. Perfecta autem similitudo non est differentium secundum speciem.”
See also ibid., 7: “In contrarium arguitur, quia si angelus intelligeret per species, aut species esset solum
ratio cognoscendi uel esset medium cognitum. Non potest dici, quod sit solum ratio cognoscendi, quia
quod est solum ratio cognoscendi, habet rationem perfectae similitudinis cum eo, in cuius cognitionem
ducit. Vnde et similitudo dicitur per quamdam expressionem.” See also Sent. IV-C 49.2 (C ) n. 13: “[. . . ]
alio modo repraesentatur res per medium cognitum et alio modo per medium quod est ratio cognoscendi,
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I take it that part of what Durand has in mind here is the following. A species
has this extraordinary ability to represent an item even though I am not aware of it.
This would seem to put a certain constraint on what it is in virtue of which this species
represents whatever it represents. It can’t represent like a statue, which does so in virtue
of the proportion that obtains between its shape and color and the shape and color in
Hercules, because this, so it would seem, requires some sort of awareness on my part
of that proportion. But a species is supposed to represent a color, say, while we are
unaware of the species. The only representation that could even do this would be a strict
representation: it might be plausible to suppose that one shade of red, A, represents
quia medium cognitum potest ducere in cognitionem alterius ratione cuiuscumque habitudinis, siue ut
simile, siue ut contrarium, siue ut causa, siue ut effectus, uel qualitercumque aliter. Sed medium quod
est solum ratio cognoscendi non ducit in cognitionem alterius, ut uidetur, nisi ratione similitudinis (simil-
itudinis] similitudine C ). Vnde et (et] ut C ) similitudo dicitur per quamdam expressionem. Similitudo
autem non est differentium secundum speciem. Ergo species, quae est medium quo res cognoscitur,
et (et] ut C ) dicitur similitudo rei, non differt secundum speciem a re quam immediate repraesentat.”
See also Sent. II-C 3.6 n. 19: “[. . . ] species non ducit in cognitionem alterius, ut uidetur, nisi ratione
similitudinis. Vnde et similitudo dicitur per quamdam expressionem. Similitudo autem non est dif-
ferentium secundum speciem Ergo species, quae est medium quo res cognoscitur, et dicitur similitudo
rei, non differt secundum speciem a re quam immediate repraesentat.” Cf. Hervaeus Natalis’s presen-
tation of Durand’s position, Quodl. III.8 61: “[. . . ] species aut requiritur ut medium cognoscendi, quo
est cognitum, aut ut similitudo sola cogniti. Non primo modo, ut auctores illius positionis de speciebus
dicunt. Probatio, quod nec secundo modo. Primo: quia talis similitudo, ut dicunt, est eiusdem speciei
cum eo, cuius est similitudo, sicut albedo et similitudo eius in aere, ut dicunt, est eiusdem speciei, licet
habeant diuersum modum essendi. [. . . ] Secundo, quia quando aliquid ducit in cognitionem alterius
ut similitudo, non ducit in cognitionem eius, nisi prout assimilatur sibi.” Cf. also Nicholas Medensis’s
presentation, Evid. II.12 401–2: “[. . . ] nec ut ratio cognoscendi, quia omnis talis species est eiusdem
rationis specificae cum forma repraesentata per ipsam, licet differant in modo essendi. [. . . ] Illud, quod
est solum ratio cognoscendi et non medium cognitum, non ducit in cognitionem alterius nisi ratione
perfectae similitudinis. Vnde et per quamdam expresisonem similitudo dicitur. Medium autem cogni-
tum potest ducere in cognitionem alterius sub quacumque habitudine, uel sicut causa, uel sicut effectus,
uel sicut simile, uel sicut oppositum. Perfecta autem similitudo est secundum rationem speciei.” Sent.
IV-C 49.2 n. 18: “[. . . ] repraesentatio, cum sit habitudo rei repraesentantis ad illud quod repraesentatur,
habet aliquod fundamentum, ratione cuius conuenit ei repraesentare. Et illud non potest esse nisi natura
speciei, non quatenus est effectus rei absolutae, quia multis effectibus non conuenit sic repraesentare.
Deducendo esset in omnibus aliis, numquam inuenitur ratio et fundamentum talis repraesentationis. Non
enim inuenitur in omni re, sed in illa tantum quae est effectus univocus, deficiens tamen in tantum a
perfectione speciei, quod non terminat in actum potentiae, et ita non est obiectum cognitum, ut simile,
sed est solum ratio et medium cognoscendi alterum, ut similitudo. Si enim talis species non esset eius-
dem rationis cum re quam repraesentat, nullo modo posset esse ratio repraesentandi perfecte alterum,
cum ipsa sit quid imperfectissimum; quin potius res quae sunt naturae perfectioris essent perfectioris
repraesentationis.” See also Sent. II-C 3.7 n. 10: “[. . . ] omne reale repraesentatiuum, quod repraesentat
naturaliter aliud, repraesentat ipsum secundum conditionem eius realem. Sed talis species, si esset et
aliquid repraesentaret, repraesentaret ipsum naturaliter. Ergo repraesentaret ipsum quantum ad eius
conditionem realem.”
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precisely some other shade of red, B, such that I grasp B without being aware that I
did so by means of A. We might, then, put to use such a strict notion of representation
in our theory of the mind, if we were so inclined. But we couldn’t put to use anything
short of this, for any representation short of this sort of representation would require us
to be aware of the representation, and so that representation would not be an uncognized
representation (ratio cognoscendi non cognita) but a cognized representation (medium
cognitum).
Hence, we are stuck between two horns. On the one hand, we can claim that the
species is really formally identical with X and so we can also claim that the species is
an uncognized representation; but then species will be unable to represent what they are
supposed to represent (substances and corporeal accidents). On the other hand, we can
reject the claim that the species is really formally identical with X and so we can claim
that a species can represent what it is supposed to represent (substances and corporeal
accidents); but then species won’t be uncognized representations!
In any case, Durand, as we saw in the preceding chapters, has other reasons to want
to hold that nothing in the mind is able to represent something outside the mind, for
he holds that nothing outside the mind can bring about an effect in the mind, be it the
species or the act.27 It is true that he might have, all other things considered, opted for
a thesis like John Pecham’s, wherein the mind itself formulates the species inside itself
in the mere presence of the object.28 But Durand doesn’t think that this sort of view is
coherent: for then the mind would be in essential potential and not accidental potency.29
27. See Chapter 1.
28. John Pecham, Quodl. I.4 10: “Cum tamen pars superior iudicet de eisdem, ergo species immutat
organum corporale et organum immutatum excitat animam ad immutationem sibi consimilem suo modo
quam anima facit in se ipsa de se ipsa. [. . . ] Vnde ita formatur anima a specie quodam modo acsi cera
per impossibile uiueret et propelleret se in similitudinem sigilli. Ita enim anima habet aliquid actiuum
et aliquid materiale quasi passiuum quod est in potentia omnia intellecta et fit actu res intellecta dum
excitatur ab extra et propellitur in eius similitudinem, et hoc naturali colligatione animae cum corpore,
ubi non exigitur praecognitio sed naturalis colligationis ductio.” ibid.: “[. . . ] species illae nascuntur de
se per occasionem excitatiuam, non per causam impressiuam.” See Chapter 3.
29. Another view Durand considers is the view that one species might represent several items. But
then, Durand argues, there would be no reason why someone using that species would think about one of
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5.2 The causal or covaration theory of intentionality
But if there is nothing intrinsic to the mind in virtue of which its mental states are about
whatever they are about, then, well, in virtue of what is a mental state about whatever
it is about?
One option that calls out here is that, perhaps, Durand should be viewed as a kind
of covariationist or causal theorist about representation: a mental state represents X
because it covaries with X. For example, when Felix is present, Socrates will think about
Felix, and when Felix is absent, Socrates will not think about Felix. This suggests an
alternative reductivist answer to the specific question, namely, that representation is
covariation. On this view, an item is about something else just in case it covaries with
something else. X represents Y and not Z because X covaries with Y and not Z.30
But doesn’t Durand’s thesis that the object is not an efficient cause but rather a
sine qua non cause preclude this interpretative option? On Durand’s view, a cognitive
act is not an effect of the object as cause. However, a cognitive act, on Durand’s view,
does covary with a present item, even if it is not caused by that item. Now, the fact
that a cognitive act is not caused by an item but is rather occasioned by an item is a
fine metaphysical point to have made, but it is a difference that doesn’t seem to make a
difference in our account of intentionality. What matters is that an item that is about
something else should covary with that item, and, on Durand’s view, cognitive acts do
covary with present items just as much as, on Godfrey’s view, cognitive states as effects
those items rather than another. Sent. II-A 3.6 f. 172va: “Ergo species in mente cuiuscumque angeli non
potest repraesentare nisi res unius speciei. [. . . ] Angelus inferior intelligit hominem et quaecumque sub
homine continentur per unam speciem. Si angelus superior intelligit plura per unam speciem, oportet
quod intelligat per eam animal et quaecumque sub animali continentur. Et adhuc superior illo intelliget
per unam speciem corpus animatum et quaecumque sub ipso continentur. Et sic usque ad ens. Cum enim
species sint co-aequae sub genere, non potest assignari ratio quare species in mente angeli repraesentans
plusquam hominem sub animali repraesentet quasdam alias species et quasdam non.” (Text is from
Stella, Evidentiae.)
30. See Cummins, Meaning and Mental Representation (who is discussing Locke). See King, “Rethink-
ing Representation” (who is discussing Ockham). See also King, “Ockham on the Role of Concepts
[presentation version]” and Peter King, “Le roˆle des concepts selon Ockham,” Philosophiques 32 (2005):
435–47.
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covary with their efficient causes. Hence, Durand’s theory could be that a cognitive state
is about something else, in general, because it is occasioned by something else, and it is
about something else in particular because it is occasioned by that item.31
5.2.1 The problem with covariation
Covariation theories face an obvious problem: their insufficiency. Not everything that
covaries with something else is a mental representation. Sunburns covary with ultra-
violet radiation, but do not represent ultra-violet radiation, and smoke covaries with fire,
but does not represent fire.32 This might be a reason to suspect that Durand is not a
covariationist: not every effect represents its cause. Indeed, Durand had made precisely
this point in Sent. II-A 3.5. In his rejection of the quasi-formal identity thesis, he had
argued that if conformality isn’t a matter of a relation that obtains between something
the form or species really has and something the object really has, then, well, what is it?
He dismisses the idea that it might be cashed out in terms of efficient causality:
If someone were to say that the representational species is the same in kind
(eiusdem rationis) as the thing represented but not really (in essendo) but as
a matter of representation (in repraesentando), he would speak in vain, for
it represents not because it is the effect of a thing, since, then, every effect
would be a species[. . . ]. (Sent. II-A 3.5 28)33
31. Indeed, Godfrey’s view, too, could be the same; but Godfrey makes explicit his commitment to the
thesis that the act, as effect, is thus a similitudo of the object, as cause; and it is in virtue of its being a
similitudo that it is about whatever it is about. See footnote 22 above. By contrast, William of Ockham
holds that, at least in the case of intuitive cognitions, the act’s being a similitudo has nothing at all to
do with our account of what it is about—see the debate below—and his socius, Walter Chatton, even
goes so far as to declare that an intuitive act is not even a similitudo! Walter Chatton, Rep. II 4.4 219:
“[D]ico quod actus non est similitudo.”
32. Cummins, Meaning and Mental Representation, 36; King, “Rethinking Representation,” 95; King,
“Ockham on the Role of Concepts [presentation version],” 6.
33. See also Sent. IV-C 49.2 n. 18: “[. . . ] repraesentatio, cum sit habitudo rei repraesentantis ad illud
quod repraesentatur, habet aliquod fundamentum, ratione cuius conuenit ei repraesentare. Et illud non
potest esse nisi natura speciei, non quatenus est effectus rei absolutae, quia multis effectibus non conuenit
sic repraesentare.” ibid.: “Si enim species repraesentans dicitur eiusdem speciei cum re repraesentanta
in repraesentando, aut intelligitur, quod illa identitas attendatur quantum ad repraesentationem, ita sc.
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A tempting answer here for someone who wants to defend this line of interpretation
might be to point out that, according to Durand, cognitive states are not effects, strictly
speaking, but rather second states that cognitive faculties are put into in the bare presence
of objects. Hence, there is a difference that might make a difference between smoke and
sunburns, on the one hand, and cognitive states, on the other. Unfortunately, this answer
won’t work. Even if we do admit into the equation this distinction between an effect of an
object as cause and a second state that is occasioned by the bare presence of an object,
we will still have to admit that, say, an oven’s operative state represents the pie, because
an oven’s operative state, as we saw in Chapter 3, is a second state that is occasioned by
a present pie just as much as a cognitive agent’s cognitive state. We will still have cast
the net too wide.
5.3 And so: the general problem of intentionality
Hence, covariation is insufficient, which, I take it, is part of the reason that one might
be motivated to reconsider the object and adverbial theories for these theories recognize
covariation as a perhaps necessary but insufficient condition. The species covaries with
cats but it also resembles or shares the same form as cats, and (on Godfrey’s view) the
cognitive state itself is an effect of cats but it also, as it turns out, resembles or shares
the same form as cats.34
quod [. . . ] unum repraesentat et aliud repraesentatur; sed dicere, propter hoc, esse identitatem secun-
dum speciem inter repraesentans et repraesentatum, est absurdum, quia causa repraesentat effectum et
econuerso etiam in aequiuocis et in multis aliis, quantumcumque genere uel specie differentibus, quae
tamen, propter repraesentationem, non dicuntur unius speciei cum eo quod repraesentant.”
34. In fact, such theories drop the covariation requirement entirely or relegate it to the role of a
contingent or empirical fact of the matter. An angel, for example, will contain species but these are not
caused to exist in it by the object; rather, God put those species in an angel, and so on the species-theory,
at least, covariation is not even a necessary condition. It doesn’t matter how the species got there; what
matters is that it is there and that it look like or is formally identical with something else. On angelic
cognition in Thomas Aquinas, see T. Suarez-Nani, Connaissance et langage des anges selon Thomas
d’Aquin et Gilles de Rome (Paris: Vrin, 2002). For different medieval views, see Stephan Meier-Oeser,
“Medieval, Renaissance, and Reformation Angels: A Comparison,” in Angels in Medieval Philosophical
Inquiry: Their Function and Significance, ed. I. Iribarren and M. Lenz (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008), 187–
200. For Godfrey on the causal condition, see Quodl. X.12. On the possibility of divine deception, see
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However, we must admit that the going alternatives—views that analyze mental rep-
resentation in terms of resemblance or conformality (with or without causality)—will also
have cast their nets too wide, and will also require supplementation. For example, the
species theorist seems to be either committed to the view that a species is unique to cog-
nizant agents or committed to the view that a species is not unique to cognizant agents.
The former thesis makes species mysterious, whereas the latter thesis does not. (Indeed,
it can be viewed as having the laudable goal of naturalizing the intentional.) But the
problem with this view, of course, is that whatever has a species will be intentional: the
air will be intentional and so too a disembodied eyeball.35 Hence, if our particular view
about intentionality is that the intentionality of our mental states can be analyzed in
terms of the intentionality that species have, then we will have to suppose that anything
that possesses a species will be in an intentional state. As Durand put the point (in
connection with the causal role of the species although it would apply here too):
Whatever has a form which is the source (principium) of some action can,
through the form which it has, carry out that action. But the same form (in
kind) which a sense has (sight, say), the medium also has. For the species
that the eye receives is the same sort as the one that the medium receives.
Hence, if this form is the elicitive active principle of some sensitive operation
(so that by means of it the eye would see), then, so too, by means of the same
form the medium would see. Which isn’t true. (Sent. II-A 3.5 11; the Latin
is quoted in Chapter 1, footnote 32)
Air and disembodied eyeballs do possess species and if the possession of a species is all
that intentionality amounts to, then we will have made intentionality very cheap indeed.
A similar point can be made as well with respect to Godfrey’s theory. If a mental state is
Chapter 3, footnotes 1 and 2. Durand, of course, rejects the thesis that an angel has impressed species,
which is his stated goal in Sent. II-A 3.5 and Sent. II-C 3.6.
35. See Chapter 4.
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about something because it is an effect of its cause, then we will have, obviously, cast our
nets too wide. The reason why a mental state as an effect is able to share the same form
as or resemble its cause seems to be because it is a univocal effect, but not all univocal
effects represent their causes (we should hope). For example, the heat which the water
receives from the fire is not just a bare effect but is a univocal effect—it shares the same
form as the form of heat which is in the fire.
Hence, if the covariation theory is victim to the charge that it casts its net too wide,
then so too will the going alternatives be victim to the same charge. And so we must
supplement our theory—no matter what theory it is—with something more. In other
words, we might be able to claim that the specific content of a mental state is owing to
the fact that it was caused or occasioned by X or resembles (in whatever sense) X or is
the same form as the form of X; but we won’t be able to claim that this is the end of the
story, for we need to draw a line in the sand: not all effects (or second acts) are mental
representations and not all likenesses or forms are mental representations.
As far as I can tell there are four ways that one might respond without biting the
bullet, that is, without endorsing the claim that species in medio or combustive acts are
intentional or about something else.36
1. One could endorse covariation or resemblance or conformity but supplement these
theses with some thesis about the kind of thing which possesses the act or species .
36. Robert Pasnau, “What is Cognition? A Reply to Some Critics,” ACPQ 76, no. 3 (2002): 483–90
bites the bullet. ibid., 485: “This is to say that air and water receive intentionally existing forms, which
would seem to imply that they are cognizant. This is a result that no one could accept, and I rejected
it out of hand in my earlier work. But how can we avoid that result, given the rest of Aquinas’s claims?
My own view is that we should understand the capacity for cognition as coming in degrees, so that some
things have enormous amounts of information about the world and so are highly cognitive, whereas other
things have lesser amounts of information about the world and so are less cognitive. Air and water can
take on intentionally existing forms, but they do so in the most minimal way, and thus are not to be
regarded as cognitive at all.” I’m not sure how Pasnau thinks he can get away with the move from the
claim that cognition is a matter of degree (which starts this passage) to the claim that air and water are
not cognitive at all (which closes this passage)! For some discussion on this point, see John O’Callaghan,
“Aquinas, Cognitive Theory, and Analogy: A Propos of Robert Pasnau’s Theories of Cognition in the
Later Middle Ages,” ACPQ 76, no. 3 (2002): 459–61.
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2. One could supplement these theses with some thesis about the kind of possession
involved.
3. One could abandon the reductivist approach entirely and insist that an intelligible
species (say) represents whatever it represents as a kind of brute or primitive fact
of the matter.
4. One could supplement these theses with functionalism, the view that a mental
representation is an effect (or occasioned act) which is a representation inasmuch
as it functions as a representation within the cognitive or intentional organism as
a whole.
Let’s look at these seriatim.
5.4 Special kinds of possessors
On this view, a species or an act is an ordinary act or form possessed in an more-or-less
ordinary way (e.g., in the way that other, non-cognitive agents possess it) but by an
extraordinary subject. Hence, the species as it exists in the air is not about something
else but the same species as it exists in the animate eye or the mind is about something
else. Or a second act in fire is not about something, but a second act in a human being
is.
However, as we saw in the last chapter, I’m not so convinced that this view, upon
reflection, will turn out to be very satisfying. In virtue of what is the mind the right
kind of possessor and the air not? In virtue of what is fire’s second act not intentional
and Socrates’ second act intentional? In virtue of what is the effect of fire in Socrates
(called a sensitive act) intentional whereas the same effect of fire in the air (called a
species in medio) not? We might appeal to the fact that the recipient in the one case
is immaterial whereas the recipients in the other cases are not, but, as I argued in the
last chapter, immateriality is mysterious; indeed more mysterious than intentionality,
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and so we will have wound up explaining the obscure with the more obscure. Moreover,
not just immaterial things exhibit aboutness, for, at least I should hope, Fido’s sensory
perceptions are also about whatever they are about.
Of course, we could simply stand tall and declare that the mind is special, but then
we won’t be reductivists about the intentional; we won’t be analyzing intentionality in
terms of something more familiar but rather we will declare it a brute fact.
5.5 Intentional possession
The second option is to insist that cognitive acts or species are ordinary items received
in ordinary recipients but in an extraordinary way. The air doesn’t receive the species in
the right way; fire’s second act isn’t quite the same thing as Socrates’ second act; and so
on.
This view seems to share the same problem as the last view: what makes for an
extraordinary possession? Is it just that the possessor is a mind in the one case and not
a mind in the other case? Moreover, in the case of a view like Godfrey’s or the species-
theory, where the idea is that an ordinary form is possessed in an extraordinary way, it
would seem that this view is either incoherent or mysterious. If intentional possession is
like ordinary possession, then, it seems incoherent, for I can think about two contradictory
things at once which would imply that I possess two contradictory forms at once—but I
can’t possess two contradictory forms at once. On the other hand, if it isn’t like ordinary
possession, then, well, what is it like?37
37. This objection is the one raised by Brower and Brower-Toland, “Aquinas on Mental Representa-
tion,” 223 and King, “Rethinking Representation,” 85. Durand also raises it. See, e.g., Sent. IV-C 49.2 n.
14: “[. . . ] formae contrariae non compatiuntur se simul in eodem subiecto. Sed si species repraesentans
et essentia repraesentata essent eiusdem rationis specificae, contraria essent in eodem subiecto.” See also
Sent. II-C 3.8 n. 5 [= Sent. II-A 3.8]: “Haec opinio ponit quod angelus intelligat per species, quod prius
improbatum est. Et adhuc improbari potest communi ratione, quae talis est: Sicut corpus non potest
simul figurari diuersis figuris, sic, ut uidetur, nec intellectus noster uel angelicus potest simul informari
diuersis speciebus. Nec ualet si quis dicat quod non sunt ibi in actu simpliciter, nec simpliciter in poten-
tia, sed medio modo, sc. in habitu, quo modo nihil prohibet plures species esse in eodem, quia quantum
ad actum informandi omnes species sunt simpliciter in actu siue intellectus consideret actu siue non.”
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5.6 General complaint about both intentional possession
and intentional possessors
My general complaint is this: If we wish to remain a reductivist, but we also want to
be stingy about mental representation, then, it seems, we will be forced to admit that a
mental representation is something which exhibits feature A, and, once we recognize that
other items also exhibit feature A, we will then drum up some feature B which those items
do not exhibit. But, as it turns out, feature B is just unique to mental representations
anyway, and so we will have run ourselves around in a circle. For example, we might
insist that, true enough, species in medio are intentionally possessed by the air, but a
mental representation is not just a species , and not just a species which is intentionally
possessed, but also a species which is intentionally possessed by the mind. But it was the
species which was supposed to confer intentionality to the mental state to begin with,
and so we will not have come up with a reductivist answer at all.
Recall from the beginning of the chapter the two questions, which I called the specific
and the general question of intentionality. It is true that a species (or whatever) might
explain the specific content of a mental state, but granted that species (or whatever) are
not limited to mental states, we don’t seem to have an answer to the general question:
in virtue of what is a mental state about something at all (as opposed to a non-mental
See also QLA 3, Sent. II-ABC 38.3, and the fourth argument reported by Hervaeus Natalis in Quodl.
III.8 (discussed in Chapter 3, fn. 29). Durand, in fact, offers a kind of solution to this problem, for he
holds that, although there are no such things as intelligible species (and, in general, cognitive species),
there are such things as species in medio and species in organo (see Chapter 4), and the problem is
relevant there too. Imagine a well-lit room (with no visual agent in it) which has a black west wall and
a white east wall and two mirrors, one on the north wall and one on the south wall. At the very center
of this room, it would seem that a species of white and a species of black should coexist. One solution
that Durand offers appeals to an analogy with the hot and the cold in water. What occurs here is a
‘mixed quality’ which ‘virtually contains’ both the hot and the cold. So too in the case of the species
in medio. See, e.g., Sent. IV-C 49.2 n. 16: “Qualiter duae species (sc. albi et nigri) cum sint contrariae,
possint simul esse in eadem parte medii? Et ad hoc dicendum est quod non sunt ibi distinctae naturae
contrariae, nam sicut calidum et frigidum in eodem subiecto non causant calorem et frigus, quae sunt
contraria, sed causant tepidum, quod est qualitas media, uno impediente puram actionem alterius et
econuerso, sic album et nigrum causant in eadem parte medii speciem mediam continentem uirtualiter
utrumque, sicut tepidum continet calidum et frigidum.” For a more extended discussion, see QLA 3.
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state)?
To return to Durand’s theory, it might also seem that the same dialectical situation
confronts us. He can either make intentionality cheap, and so anything which is oc-
casioned by something else is about something else (and so ovens will be about present
pies and so forth), or he can make intentionality expensive, but at the cost, it seems to
me, of explanatory traction. He will have to tell us what it is about a cognitive state
which makes it different from an oven’s operative state, and it doesn’t seem that any
non-circular account will be any more available to Durand than to his opponents. (It
is because cognitive states are states of minds and, well, minds are special and ovens
aren’t.)
5.7 The primitive-intentionality theory
Perhaps, then, we should not be reductivists about intentionality at all; perhaps we should
not analyze intentionality in terms of some more basic concept (resemblance, say) but
rather take it to be a kind of primitive or unanalyzable concept.
In a recent article, Jeffrey Brower and Susan Brower-Toland argue that Aquinas’s the-
ory of intentionality should be described as a kind of ‘primitive nonrelational theory’. For
both textual and philosophical reasons, the authors decide that Aquinas cannot endorse
any reductivist theory of intentionality. “As we have seen, what all reductive interpreta-
tions share in common is the assumption that Aquinas’s account of the intentionality of
concepts is committed to an analysis of intentional likeness in terms of two more basic
relations: a relation of sameness (which concepts bear to the objects they represent)
and a relation of intentional possession (which concepts bear to the mind)” (“Aquinas on
Mental Representation,” 205). After canvassing the various ways of cashing out these two
relations, which in practice turns out to be only three ways of cashing out the relation of
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sameness—identity, formal sameness, and resemblance—38the authors conclude that none
of these reductivist approaches will work, and so propose an alternative—“what appears
to be the only alternative—namely, an interpretation that takes Aquinas’s notion of in-
tentional likeness as primitive or basic” (225). They call this the ‘primitive-intentionality
theory’, and it comes in two different colors, the primitive nonrelational and the prim-
itive relational theory. In either color, intentionality is an “unanalyzable feature of its
possessors,” in this case concepts, which the authors end up identifying with intelligible
species .39
For instance, the fact that a species is called a likeness (similitudo) might be sugges-
tive, and might even suggest that it can be analyzed in terms of likeness, but, the authors
point out, Aquinas insists that it is sui generis and so not analyzable in terms of normal
likeness. This, at least, is how they interpret this selection from Aquinas:
The likeness holding between two things can be understood in two ways. In
one way, it can be understood as an agreement in nature. This sort of likeness
is not required between cognizer and cognized. . . . In another way, however,
it can be understood as representation (secundum repraesentationem)—and
this sort of likeness is required between cognizer and cognized. (QDV II.3 ad
9; tr. “Aquinas on Mental Representation,” 227)
38. What the authors take to be the identity thesis is what I called the identity thesis in the last
chapter, §4.3.3. What the authors take to be the formal sameness thesis is what I called above the real
formal identity thesis. And what the authors take to be the resemblance these is just one way of cashing
out what I called a quasi-formal identity thesis.
39. Brower and Brower-Toland, “Aquinas on Mental Representation,” 226: “Finally, at least as we
shall be developing it, this theory assumes that intentional likeness is not only a primitive feature of
intelligible species but also an internal (or essentially possessed) feature of them.” On the identity of
concepts with species (which the authors qualify), see ibid., 194, fn. 2: “Aquinas’s notion of intelligible
species is roughly the same as the contemporary notion of a concept, especially insofar as the latter is
taken to include mental representations [. . . ]. Since Aquinas thinks that intelligible species are the only
such mental representations to have their intentionality nonderivatively, it will be convenient hereafter to
speak as if they exhaust the class of concepts. Strictly speaking, however, this is an oversimplification.
Aquinas actually recognizes two classees of mental representations that would qualify as concepts in
the contemporary sense—intelligible species and another class for which he introduces the Latin term
‘conceptus’.”
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According to the authors, Aquinas means to be distinguishing intentional likeness (like-
ness as representation) from ordinary notions of likeness rather than reducing it to them
(228).40
The authors recognize that this sort of position is open to the charge that intentional
likeness or aboutness is, seeing as it is an unanalyzable primitive, mysterious. However,
on their view, the mystery objection which one could raise against, say, the intentional
possession view, is not the same as the mystery objection that the primitive intentionality
thesis faces (229). On the authors’ view, the latter mystery objection is less problematic
than the former mystery objection. The reductive approaches all aim to analyze inten-
tional likeness in terms of something else which is even more mysterious than intentional
likeness. “By contrast, our interpretation simply claims that such intentionality does not
admit of genuine analysis. Granted, this leaves us with a cetain amount of mystery, but
no more than we started with” (229).
I dwell on these points not because I’m particularly interested in the proper interpre-
tation of Aquinas, but because, at this point, it looks as if our interpretation of Durand’s
view might have to make the same move. If intentionality is not grounded in intentional
possession, resemblance, conformality, or covariation, then, well, what is it grounded in?
Perhaps, this is a wrong-headed approach. Rather than reduce intentionality to some-
thing else, more basic, we should take intentionality as itself basic. Of course, as I will
argue, Durand’s view, if it were compatible with this line of thought, would have to be a
relational and not a non-relational primitive, and it couldn’t be a primitive property of
the species , but it would be a primitive property all the same.
Before I take up this option, I can’t resist putting forward an objection to their
interpretation of Aquinas. This objection is derived, of course, from Durand. Recall our
discussion of what I called the quasi-formal identity thesis above. As we saw, Hervaeus
40. For an alternative interpretation of this passage, see Pasnau, Theories of Cognition and Panaccio,
“Aquinas on Intellectual Representation.”
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Natalis (and others) had insisted that Durand’s interpretation of the notion of a similitudo
in terms of real formal identity was dead wrong. In Quodl. III.8, for instance, Hervaeus
writes that Durand’s objections to the species made in Sent. II-A 3.5 are based upon
the assumption that similitudo is to be analyzed in terms of what I called real formal
identity (similitudo secundum esse uel in essendo); quite the contrary, Hervaeus declares,
the similitudo here is as representation (similitudo secundum esse repraesentatiuum).41
Durand, as we saw above, argues variously for the thesis that the similitudo here must
be interpreted as real formal identity. One further argument he makes (found in Sent.
IV-C 49.2) appeals to authority. He writes:
And this line of reasoning is the one that brother Thomas pursues in book
four, distinction 49 where he expressly says that a similitudo secundum speciem
is required between the representans and the representatum even though both
don’t have to have the same mode of existence. And the structure of this en-
tire argument (upon which he bases his position) makes it obvious that he
meant this to be a specific identity in reality (in essendo) and not as a mat-
ter of representation (in repraesentando), for otherwise his reasoning would
not be worth a single piece of straw. He says that it is owing to this that
the divine essence can’t be represented through a species since every created
similitudo differs from the divine essence secundum genus and is not the same
as it except secundum analogiam. Indeed, if he meant this to be a real differ-
ence, then his thesis stands; but if he meant this to be a conceptual difference
as a matter of representation, then he begs the question, since one can say
that, howevermuch the species differs secundum genus in reality, still it is the
same secundum speciem as a matter of representation, since it perfectly rep-
resents the divine essence inasmuch as the divine essence is perfectly seen by
41. See footnote 20 above.
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a created intellect. (Sent. IV-C 49.2 n. 19)42
Aquinas argues that a species is not involved as a representation in at least one case: the
beatific vision, a mental act about God. Durand’s interpretation of his argument for this
conclusion commits Aquinas to the premise that all representations are really formally
identical with what they represent. Hence, if Aquinas weren’t committed to this claim,
then his argument in defense of a species-less beatific vision would be, as he put it, not
worth a single piece of straw.
Of course, John Capreolus is quick to point out that one shouldn’t read too much into
Aquinas’s (youthful) Sentences commentary and that we should rather focus on what he
says in, e.g., De ueritate.
It should be known that sometimes St. Thomas does seem to say that a species
42. Sent. IV-C 49.2 n. 19: “Et istam rationem assignat frater Thomas 4 lib. dist. 49 ubi expresse dicit,
quod similitudo secundum speciem requiritur inter repraesentans et repraesentatum, quamuis non sit
idem modus essendi utrobique, et per totam deductionem illius rationis in qua fundat positionem suam,
apparet quod ipse intendit de identitate specifica in essendo et non in repraesentando, alioquin ratio
eius non ualeret unam festucam. Dicit enim quod propter hoc diuina essentia non potest repraesentari
per speciem, quia omnis similitudo creata differt ab essentia diuina secundum genus et non conuenit ei
nisi secundum analogiam: si enim intelligat de differentia rei habetur propositum, si uero de differentia
rationis in repraesentando petit principium, quia potest dici quod quantumcunque species differt secun-
dum genus in essendo, conuenit tamen secundum speciem in repraesentando, quia repraesentat perfecte
diuinam essentiam inquantum perfecte uidetur ab intellectu creato.” Cf. Aquinas, Sent. IV 49.2: “Con-
stat enim quod omne quod recipitur in aliquo, est in eo per modum recipientis: et ideo similitudo diuinae
essentiae impressa ab ipso in intellectu nostro erit per modum nostri intellectus. Modus autem intellectus
nostri deficiens est a receptione perfecta diuinae similitudinis. Defectus autem perfectae similitudinis
potest tot modis accidere, quot modis dissimilitudo inuenitur. Vno enim modo est deficiens similitudo,
quando participatur forma secundum eamdem rationem speciei, sed non secundum eumdem perfectionis
modum; sicut est similitudo deficiens eius qui habet parum de albedine, ad illum qui habet multum.
Alio modo adhuc magis deficiens, quando non peruenitur ad eamdem rationem speciei, sed tantum ad
eamdem rationem generis; sicut est similitudo inter illum qui habet colorem citrinum, et illum qui habet
colorem album. Alio modo adhuc magis deficiens, quando ad rationem eamdem generis pertingit, sed
solum secundum analogiam; sicut est similitudo albedinis ad hominem in eo quod utrumque est ens; et
hoc modo est deficiens similitudo quae est in creatura recepta respectu diuinae essentiae. Ad hoc autem
quod uisus cognoscat albedinem, oportet quod recipiatur in eo similitudo albedinis secundum rationem
suae speciei, quamuis non secundum eumdem modum essendi: quia habet alterius modi esse forma
in sensu, et in re extra animam. Si enim fuerit in oculo forma citrini, non dicetur uidere albedinem;
et similiter ad hoc quod intellectus intelligat aliquam quidditatem, oportet quod in eo fiat similitudo
eiusdem rationis secundum speciem, quamuis forte non sit idem modus essendi utrobique. Non enim
forma existens in intellectu uel sensu, est principium cognitionis secundum modum essendi quem ha-
bet utrobique, sed secundum rationem in qua communicat cum re exteriori. Et ita patet quod per
nullam similitudinem receptam in intellectu creato potest sic Deus intelligi quod essentia eius uideatur
immediate.”
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and that of which it is a species are, indeed, the same in kind although distinct
in terms of their modes of existence, as is clear from, e.g., Sent. IV.49.2.1.
Indeed, Albert the Great in Super Porphyrium 2.6 admits this and supposes
that the same essence of a universal nature is according to real presence in
the soul and also in the singular; he says the same thing in his De Anima III
and his treatise De intellectu et intelligibili. But on this score, he is not in
concord with St. Thomas. (Defensiones II 3.2 304)43
5.7.1 Is intentionality a primitive relational property?
The second kind of primitive intentionality which Brower and Brower-Toland describe
is primitive relational intentionality.44 On their view, however, Aquinas shouldn’t be
taken to be committed to this sort of primitivist thesis, since, on their view, according
to Aquinas, “we can have intellectual cognition, and hence concepts, of things that don’t
exist” (231–2).45
Be what may about Aquinas, the primitive relational theory of intentionality looks
to be a good fit in the case of Durand.46 Durand, of course, holds that a cognitive act
just is the relation between the mind and a present item. In his disputatio, for instance,
as we saw in the Chapter 3, Durand argues that were thought a nonrelational property
added to the intellect, then it would be possible to think of the thought and not think
43. Capreolus appeals to, e.g., QDV VIII.11 ad 3 and II.3 ad 9, in order to make his case. On Albert
the Great, see Spruit, Species Intelligibilis I, ch. 2, §1.5 and Tachau, Vision and Certitude, 31.
44. Brower and Brower-Toland, “Aquinas on Mental Representation,” 231: “There are, however, two
different ways in which the theory can be further developed: one can say that the primitive feature is
either a relation (a dyadic or two-place property) or a genuinely monadic (one-place) property. According
to the first—call it “primitive relational theory”—concepts are entities that by their very nature stand
in a relation to the objects they are about. According to the second—call it “primitive nonrelational
theory”—concepts are by their very nature about other things, but their aboutness consists, not in any
relation in which they stand, but rather in a monadic or nonrelational feature they possess.”
45. In Aquinas, see DEE I. For discussion, see John Wippel, “The Reality of Nonexisting Possibles
according to Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Ghent, and Godfrey of Fontaines,” Review of Metaphysics 34
(1981): 729–58.
46. In a recent book on Thomas Reid’s theory of perception, which shares many of the essential features
of Durand’s own theory of perception, R. Nichols (Ryan Nichols, Thomas Reid’s Theory of Perception
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2010), ch. 2) argues for a similar interpretation of Reid.
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of its object, e.g., a thought about cats without thinking about cats.47 Hence, Durand
takes the aboutness of thought to at least be an essential feature of the thought. The
reason that Durand can claim that, on the view that thoughts are relations, one can’t
help but think about the object of some thought were one to think about the thought is
because the thought is a relation, and when one thinks about a relation, one can’t help
but think about something else. (By contrast, one can think about an absolute item full
stop, so to speak, i.e., on its own without thinking about something else.) Durand makes
this very clear in the fourth argument, present in Peter of Palude’s presentation of his
position. Durand here argues that, on the alternative view that thought is a monadic
property, we would have to claim that thought is related to its object merely secundum
dici and not secundum esse, because an absolute item is related to some other absolute
item secundum dici and not secundum esse. For instance, Socrates is related to Plato
secundum dici. In such a case, we can think about Socrates and not think about Plato
(and vice versa). But in the case of relative entities, whose very existence, as Durand
puts it, is reference (esse est referri), we can’t think about that entity without thinking
about something else.48
In Sent. I-C 27.2 and Sent. I-A 27.2, Durand takes up the vexed issue of whether a
47. DQ 1 38–9: “Vlterius arguitur ad principale sic: Omnis forma absoluta quae est fundamentum
relationis potest intelligi sine relatione. Sed intelligere est huiusmodi, quia est fundamentum relatio-
nis referentis ad obiectum, ut ponebat Respondens. Ergo poterit intelligi sine relatione ad obiectum.
Ergo possum intelligere ipsum intelligere absque hoc quod cognoscam obiectum, quod falsum est. Ergo
intelligere est relatio sola, et sic non facit realem compostionem cum intellectu, nec est res absoluta
superaddita intellectui. Maior patet, quia possum creaturam intelligere sine relatione ad Deum.” See
Chapter 3, footnote 15.
48. This is the fourth argument found in Peter of Palude, Sent. II 3.3–5 20–21: “Quarta ratio sumitur
ex habitudinem istorum actuum ad sua obiecta, quia si intelligere sit aliquid absolutum faciens com-
positinem cum intellectu, tunc intelligere et intelligibile erunt relatiua secundum dici tantum et nullo
modo secundum esse, quia relatiuum secundum esse est illud, cuius esse est referri et essentia est relatio,
quod non conuenit alicui absoluto. Ex hoc sic arguitur: Relatiua secundum dici non claudunt se mutuo in
intellectu suo, sicut si Sortes sit filius Platonis, in intellectu quidem patris clauditur filius et e contrario;
sed in intellectu Sortis non includitur Plato nec e contrario, quia pater et filius sunt correlatiua secundum
esse, eo quod paternitas et filiatio sunt essentialiter relationes, Sortes uero et Plato sunt relatiua solum
secundum dici. Intelligere autem et sentire necessario includunt intelligibile et sensibile. Ergo intelligere
et sentire non sunt relatiua secundum dici, nec per consequens sunt aliquid absolutum additum super
sensum et intellectum, faciens cum eis compositionem.”
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mental concept or word (conceptus mentis; uerbum mentis)49 is to be identified with the
cognitive act or taken to be a form really distinct from the cognitive act. It won’t be
surprising to learn that Durand opts for the former.50 In this discussion, he makes certain
comments about representation, or, as he calls it, manifestation (manifestatio). On his
view, that in virtue of which a thought represents or manifests some other item to the
mind is, well, that’s the sort of thing it is: thoughts manifest items to the mind. He
writes:
A word is able to manifest something (manifestatiuum). Now, there must be
a first word (primum uerbum), that is, a word that manifests something but
not in the way that a sign or a species or an image manifests something, as
others suppose, for otherwise there would be an infinite regress. Hence, there
must be something that is able to manifest something by its very essence,
and so the [mental] word just is the manifestation of the thing to the mind
(manifestatio rei apud intellectum); yet the manifestation of the thing to the
mind just is the cognition of the thing—for a thing is not manifested unless
it is cognized. (n. 26)
A mental word, which Aquinas, by the way, calls a similitudo, is, on Durand’s view,
nothing but the manifestation of a thing to the mind; which, in turn, is to be analyzed as
the cognition of the thing by the mind. What Durand seems to be driving at is the thesis
that intentionality can’t be analyzed in terms of something else (in terms of signification,
49. Also called an expressa forma (in contrast to the species which is an impressa forma).
50. A thesis which, incidentally, cuts across various models of mind, for thinkers as disparate as Du-
rand, John Duns Scotus, and Godfrey of Fontaines opted for the identity thesis. Thomas Aquinas and
Hervaeus Natalis, by contrast, defended the distinction thesis. On Hervaeus Natalis, see C. Trottmann,
“Verbe mental et noe´tique thomiste dans le De verbo d’Herve´ de Ne´dellec,” RT 97 (1997): 47–62. On
Aquinas, see Panaccio, “Aquinas on Intellectual Representation” and John O’Callaghan, “Verbum men-
tis: Philosophical or Theological Doctrine in Aquinas?” ACPAP 74 (2001): 103–19. On Duns Scotus, see
Cross, “The Mental Word in Duns Scotus and Some of His Contemporaries.” On Durand, see Friedman,
“Peter Auriol versus Durand of St. Pourc¸ain on Intellectual Cognition.” For more general discussion,
see Giorgio Pini, “Species, Concept, and Thing: Theories of Signification in the Second Half of the
Thirteenth Century,” Medieval Philosophy and Theology 8, no. 2 (1999): 21–52.
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like signs, or resemblance, like images, or real formal identity, like species), but it ought
to be taken as basic, or original, an essential and not a derivative feature of thoughts
themselves.51
5.7.2 The problem with primitivism
However, I’m not sure that Durand would, at the end of the day, wish to align himself
with such an antireductivist strategy. Consider, for instance, his objection to the quasi-
formal identity thesis. In Sent. II-A 3.5 Durand is brief in his dismissal of this proposal.
If formal identity isn’t a matter of a real sameness in form, then, well, what is it a matter
of? What other relation can we appeal to? If the species represents some thing, this
can’t, to be sure, be because it is the effect of that thing, because then any effect would
represent its cause.52 Nor can, as we saw in the passage above, the mental word represent
a thing in the manner of a sign, or an image. In Sent. IV-C 49.2, Durand returns to the
proposal and provides us with a little more argumentation. Perhaps what quasi-formal
identity—that is, the thesis that the species and the representatum are the same in kind
but not really but as a matter of representation (in repraesentando)—amounts to is the
thesis that a real formal identity obtains between two representations which represent the
same thing. But then, Durand demurs, we will still need some thesis about the relation
between a given representation and the thing itself. Indeed, he writes, this thesis of
quasi-formal identity seems to be nothing short of the claim that the species represents A
and A is represented by the species because the species represents A and A is represented
by the species .
51. See also Sent. I-C 27.2 n. 27: “Et confirmatur: quia omne quod dicitur tale denominatione ex-
trinseca, ut signum uel causa, reducitur ad aliquid quod est tale per essentiam, sicut sanum dictum
de urina ut signum et de medicina ut de causa reducitur ad sanum dictum de animali quod sanum est
per essentiam, ita quod sanitas animalis est sanitas per essentiam et non signum uel causa sanitatis.
Similiter in proposito manifestatiuum dictum de uerbo uocis ut signo et de specie uel imagine ut causa
uel qualitercumque aliter reducitur ad manifestatiuum per essentiam, quod est ipsa cognitio rei, quae
ob hoc habet rationem primi uerbi.” See also Sent. I-C 19.2.5–6 and Sent. I-A 19.3)
52. See fn. 33 above.
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If the representing species is said to be of the same species with the thing rep-
resented as a matter of representation (in repraesentando) either this means
that this identity is attended to with respect to the representation, that is,
such that one item represents some thing and so too another item represents
the same thing [. . . ] or it means that one item represents and another item is
represented.53
I take it that what Durand is driving at here is that such an answer is circular. In virtue
of what does the species represent what it represents? Well, it is because it is formally
identical with what it represents. In virtue of what is a species formally identical with
what it represents? Well, it is because. . . it represents it!
5.8 Functionalism
The fourth option on the table is functionalism, the view that X acquires its specific
content from the item which caused it—covariation—and X is considered a representation
(at all) because X performs a certain functional role (representation) within the cognitive
system as a whole. Could Durand be another ‘medieval functionalist’? Peter King, in a
recent series of articles, interprets William of Ockham as a ‘linguistic-role’ functionalist.54
According to Ockham, mental acts can be taken to be mental signs which perform certain
53. Sent. IV-C 49.2 (C ) n. 18: “Si enim species repraesentans dicitur eiusdem speciei cum re repraesen-
tata in repraesentando, aut intelligitur, quod illa identitas attendatur quantum ad repraesentationem,
ita sc. quod sicut unum repraesentat aliquam rem, ita aliud repraesentat eamdem rem secundum speciem
(speciem] spaciem C ), et ista identitas non potest poni (poni] ponitur C ) inter speciem repraesentan-
tem et rem repraesentatam per ipsam; aut intelligitur quod unum repraesentat et aliud repraesentatur;
sed dicere, propter hoc, esse identitatem secundum speciem inter repraesentans et repraesentatum, est
absurdum, quia causa repraesentat effectum et econuerso etiam in aequiuocis et in multis aliis, quan-
tumcumque genere uel specie differentibus, quae tamen, propter repraesentationem, non dicuntur unius
speciei cum eo quod repraesentant.” See also in his analysis of Aquinas’s argument (quoted above
footnote 42): “[. . . ] si uero de differentia rationis in repraesentando petit principium, quia potest dici
quod quantumcumque species differt secundum genus in essendo, conuenit tamen secundum speciem in
repraesentando, quia repraesentat perfecte diuinam essentiam inquantum perfecte uidetur ab intellectu
creato.”
54. King, “Rethinking Representation,” King, “Ockham on the Role of Concepts [presentation ver-
sion],” King, “Le roˆle des concepts selon Ockham,” Peter King, “Two Conceptions of Experience,”
Medieval Philosophy and Theology 11 (2005): 203–26.
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linguistic-roles in mental language. A mental sign has a certain syntactic structure and it
acquires its specific content from the world—covariation—and it is a representation (at
all) owing to how it combines with other mental signs as a syntactic unit in the language
of thought.55
The virtues of this sort of approach to the intentional are legion, as well as its prob-
lems,56 but at first sight it doesn’t look as if Durand can make the requisite moves to
be classed as a bona fide functionalist—for a number of conditions must be met in order
for someone to be viewed as a functionalist about intentionality. First of all, they must
develop an allergic reaction to resemblance as a viable solution to the specific question of
intentionality.57 This much, to be sure, as we have seen, Durand does do. But, further,
they must suppose that the units which function as mental representations in the cogni-
tive system must function as units within the cognitive system; that is to say, they must
somehow interact with other units within that cognitive system. This, however, looks
to be something Durand’s view on the ontological status of mental acts would prohibit,
for Durand holds that mental acts (the most obvious candidates for being units in the
mind) aren’t anything absolute superadded to the mind, but rather mere relations. But
how can a mere relation perform a functional role in a cognitive system?58
55. King, “Rethinking Representation,” 95–96: “What is relevant to our purposes is the suggestion
that a concept represents what it does—it is the concept it is—only if it is connected to other contentful
concepts in the appropriate ways, as words in a language are. Roughly, Socrates’s concept |sheep|
represents a sheep in virtue of its having the right (linguistic) role: it is subordinate to |animal| and
|living creature|, able to be the subject in propositions, a constituent of the belief that sheep are edible,
and the like. Anything that plays this complex role is ipso facto the concept |sheep|, that is, represents
sheep. [. . . ] Although [covariation] and [linguistic role] are distinct, their combination is powerful. It is
no less than a medieval version of functionalism, the idea that determinate content is fully specified by
inputs (covariance) and outputs (linguistic role).” ibid., 97: “Thus Ockham epitomizes the philosophical
struggles of his generation in bringing psychology to a new functionalist paradigm in place of the old
conformality and likeness theories.”
56. See, e.g., Ned Block, “Troubles with Functionalism,” in Perception and Cognition: Issues in the
Foundations of Psychology, ed. C. Savage, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 9 (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1978) and J. A. Fodor, The Mind Doesn’t Work that Way. The Scope
and Limits of Computational Psychology (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000).
57. See Mark Rowland, The New Science of the Mind: From Extended Mind to Embodied Phenomenol-
ogy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2010), 33: “For now, we can note the general explanatory profile—
attenuation of the role of representation coupled with augmentation of the role of action.”
58. S. Harnad calls this the symbol-grounding problem. See S. Harnad, “The Symbol Grounding
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Consider Robert Cummins’s example of a primitive cognitive system called LOCKE:
Consider, then, the mechanical device LOCKE [. . . ]. LOCKE is equipped
with a TV camera hooked up to some input modules [. . . ], which in turn are
hooked up to a card punch. When the TV camera is pointed at something, a
punch card called a concrete idea of sense or a percept is produced. Percepts
are fed into a sorter, which compares them with a stack of master cards called
abstract ideas or concepts. When a percept matches a concept—i.e., when the
percept contains at least all the holds the concept contains—LOCKE displays
the term written on the back of the concept. Any word can be written on
the back of any concept; that is a matter of convention. But once the words
are printed on the concepts, everything else is a matter of physics. (Meaning
and Mental Representation, 37)
What is important here is that the punch cards must have a distinctive qualitative
structure in order to function as percepts in LOCKE. It doesn’t matter, of course, what
their qualitative structure is—the punch cards need not look like cats—but it is important
that cat-percepts have a distinctive qualitative structure of some sort in contrast to, say,
dog-percepts.
However, it might be that we can avoid this demand—that a unit which functions as
a mental representation have some distinctive qualitative structure—and instead insist
on a more spartan thesis: the unit need not even have a distinct qualitative structure; all
that it needs is the capacity to interact with other units in the system in terms of cause
and effect.59 Could Durand be a functionalist in this second, more spartan, sense?
Problem,” Physica D 42 (1990): 335–46 and S. Harnad, “Computation Is Just Interpretable Symbol
Manipulation: Cognition Isn’t,” Special Issue on “What Is Computation” Minds and Machines 4 (1994):
379–90.
59. C. Normore (Calvin G. Normore, “Burge, Descartes, and Us,” in Reflections and Replies: Essays on
the Philosophy of Tyler Burge, ed. M. Hahn and B. Ramberg (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003), 5–6)
calls it a ‘bare concept’. See also T. Burge’s reply to C. Normore in the same collection (Tyler Burge,
“Descartes, Bare Concepts, and Anti-Individualism: Reply to Normore,” in Reflections and Replies:
Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge, ed. M. Hahn and B. Ramberg (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,
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Durand is quite clear that a cognitive act has no distinctive qualitative structure,
of course; but he is also quite clear that one cognitive act can’t directly cause another
cognitive act. Durand rejects this thesis on the grounds that two intellectual acts cannot
coexist in the same intellect at the same time, a thesis which William of Ockham (for one)
rejects.60 Durand, in fact, is rather famous for having defended this thesis, which seems
to have been something of the opinio communis on the matter.61 Since two thoughts
(even about compatible things) can’t coexist in the intellect at the same time, it also
2003), 291–334). This seems to be also the view which P. King (King, “Rethinking Representation”)
attribute to Ockham. See, e.g., ibid., 98 (online version): “Ockham is notorious for his attack on the
intelligible species, arguing inter alia that the intelligible species isn’t needed for the purposes of mental
representation, one of its traditional roles [. . . ]. Although he preserves the traditional terminology,
declaring that ‘the act of understanding (intellectio) is the ‘likeness’ of the object’ [. . . ], it’s clear that
this is an empty formula: as noted [. . . ], ‘the object sufficiently represents itself in a cognition’ [. . . ], a
point Ockham later repeats: ‘[the object] can be present qua object to the intellect, without any species’
[. . . ]. It’s not that Ockham thinks there are no mental events. Rather, there is no need for mental
representation as traditionally conceived. There are mental acts of thinking, but there is no need to
postulate independent contents, or indeed any discernible intrinsic structure to the mental act; it is
what it is in virtue of its functional inputs and outputs, not because of its inner nature. On his mature
theory of mind, Ockham countenances only the spartan ontology of mental acts of thinking, which are
then paired with their external objects directly, not requiring any mediation. In short, Ockham, at least
in his mature view, argues against what is traditionally called a ‘representationalist’ theory of mind and
for what is usually called ‘direct realism.’” See also King, “Ockham on the Role of Concepts [presentation
version]” and King, “Le roˆle des concepts selon Ockham.” For an alternative (standard) interpretation
of Ockham on ‘similitudo’, see Claude Panaccio, “Re´ponse a` mes critiques,” Philosophiques 32 (2005):
449–57, Panaccio, Ockham on Concepts, ch. 7, and Claude Panaccio, “Conceptual Acts,” in Pacheco
and Meirinhos, IIMP, 37–52. Notice that P. King seems to have changed his mind here. See footnote 83
below.
60. For Ockham, see Panaccio, Ockham on Concepts, 32–4. Panaccio writes (33): “Human thought,
for Ockham, is basically compositional.” See also Panaccio, “Conceptual Acts.” On Ockham, see also
Stephan Meier-Oeser, “Mental Language and Mental Representation in Late Scholastic Logic,” in John
Buridan and Beyond. Topics in the Language Sciences, 1300–1700, ed. R. Friedman and S. Ebbesen,
Royal Danish Academy of Science and Letters (Copenhagen: Reitzel, 2004), 248, fn. 37 and Pasnau,
Theories of Cognition, 288, fn. 68.
61. On Durand’s role in the subsequent debate about this thesis, see Friedman, “On the Trail of a
Philosophical Debate: Durand of St. Pourc¸ain vs. Thomas Wylton on Simultaneous Acts in the Intellect.”
Thomas Wylton seems to have been the first to have championed the alternative thesis—a thesis that
in Ockham’s cognitive psychology does some real work. For more information on this debate between
Wylton and Durand, see Koch, Durandus de S. Porciano, 153–9, Prospero Stella, “Le Quaestiones de
Libero Arbitrio di Durando da S. Porciano,” Salesianum 24 (1962): 505–6, Anneliese Maier, Codices
Burghesiani Bibliothecae Vaticanae, Studi e Testi 170 (Rome: Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, 1952), 38,
Anneliese Maier, “Das Quodlibet des Thomas de Wylton,” RTAM 14 (1947): 106–110, and Dumont,
“New Questions by Thomas Wylton.” In addition to the authors quoted there, see also: Nicholas Medens,
Evid. II.16 436: “Et ideo non potest esse nisi unus actus in intellectu simul.” For Durand’s statements
of this thesis, see Sent. C Prol. q. 1 n. 24, 28–9; Sent. I-C 6.2 n. 13; Sent. I-C 38.2 n. 5; Sent. II-C 6.2 n.
5; Sent. II-C 11.2 n. 10; Sent. II-24 1.n. 5; Sent. II-C 34.1 n. 18; Sent. II-ABC 38.3; Sent. II-C 40.3, nn.
3–4; Sent. III-C 31.3, nn. 13–15; Sent. IV-C 44.4 n. 23; Sent. IV-C 49.6 n. 5.
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follows that one thought can’t directly cause another thought, for the simple reason that,
in order for A to directly cause B, A must exist at least at the very instant that B comes
into existence. In QLA 3 Durand addresses two questions: Can several psychological acts
coexist in the same psychological power such that one is the efficient cause of the other?
(Vtrum in eadem potentia libera possint simul esse plures actus intelligendi uel uolendi,
quorum unus sit principium effectiuum alterius). This is a kind of two-birds-one-stone
question, and that’s precisely how Durand handles it. He writes:
This quaestio has two principal parts. The first is: Can two psychological
acts coexist in the same power? The second is: If so, can one of them be the
[proximate] efficient cause of the other? Hence, if a negative answer is given
to the first question—that two acts can’t coexist—then there can be no doubt
about an answer to the second question—“Can one of them be the [proximate]
efficient cause of the other?”—because the [proximate] efficient cause and its
effect must coexist, for if the [purported proximate] efficient cause were to
have dropped out of existence before its effect would have comes about, then
it couldn’t have produced that effect, since an action can’t be attributed to
an item that is not an actual being. Hence, there wouldn’t be an effect. But
if the answer to the first question is affirmative, then there might be some
doubt about an answer to the second question. Therefore, I will take up
the first question alone for the sake of brevity, for it will be shown that two
psychological acts can’t coexist in the same power; and so the second question
will be answered automatically. (QLA 3 488)62
In other words, an intellective act can’t be a proximate efficient cause with respect to
another intellective act because a proximate efficient cause must exist when it efficiently
62. See also ibid., 474: “[. . . ] secundum cursum naturae, de quo nunc loquimur, nec duo actus intelli-
gendi nec duo actus uolendi possunt esse simul, sed adueniente secundo primus cessat. Quare sequitur
quod primus non sit causa secundi, quia causa proxima et immediata, siue sit effectiua siue sit materialis
in qua uel ex qua, simul est cum effectu.”
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causes whatever it efficiently causes. Hence, it must exist at least at the moment its effect
exists. But two intellective acts cannot coexist. Therefore, one intellective act cannot be
a proximate efficient cause with respect to some other intellective act, even if it is true
that one can’t entertain a given intellective act unless one had, beforehand, entertained
some other intellective act.63
Hence, Durand doesn’t seem to be in a position to be a functionalist about mental
representation. But perhaps we are looking in the wrong place. Durand, as mentioned,
holds to a spartan ontology of mind: on his view, the mind is a blank slate before, after,
and even when it thinks; there is nothing absolute added to the mind at all, but rather
the mind comes to enter into certain relations with the world. Hence, it is rather obvious
that Durand can’t be a functionalist, if, that is, a functionalist is committed to the thesis
that the mind has in it certain items which perform certain functional roles in the mind.
But perhaps the mind isn’t the right place to look here. Perhaps, rather, we should look
not in the mind (on Durand’s view, the combination of intellect and will)64 but instead
look in the brain.
Now, I have already alluded to several cases where Durand, so to speak, moves the
mind outside the mind, that is to say, he holds that various aspects of human cognition,
which his contemporaries felt required the postulation of certain entities added to or in
the mind, could be accounted for, more simply, by the postulation of entities inside the
body. For instance, he holds that there is no species in the soul, but does maintain that
there are certain species or impressions in certain corporeal spirits in the body, put to use
63. This discussion connects up with Durand’s arguments against a view about the compositionality of
thought called atomism. On Durand’s view, our simple mental acts are not atomic elements aggregated
together to form complex mental acts, but rather each complex mental act is a whole unit which merely
‘virtually contains’ simpler mental acts. I would submit that atomism is a kind of prerequisite for at least
linguistic-role functionalism, the functionalist view attributed to William Ockham. See Durand, Sent.
I-ABC 38.2. For some discussion here on the compositionality thesis in Durand, Wylton, and Ockham
(among others), see Russell Friedman, “Mental Propositions before Mental Language,” in Le langage
mental du Moyen Aˆge a` l’aˆge classique, ed. J. Biard (Leuven: Peeters, 2009), 95–115; for Ockham, see
Panaccio, “Semantics and Mental Language” and Panaccio, Ockham on Concepts, 53–55.
64. Sent. I-C 3.2.4.
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as the source of remembering.65 He also holds that habitus (both moral and intellectual)
are merely attributed to the intellect or will and in point of fact dwell in a certain organ
inside the body (more on this below). Durand also holds that even if the intellect is
material, it could still engage in universal cognition.
When it is said that if the soul were extended, then it wouldn’t be able to
cognize the universal, it ought to be said that this is false. (Sent. I-C 8.2.3 n.
18)66
Durand does, of course, hold that the intellect is immaterial, which he thinks follows from
its capacity to exist when separated from the body.67 However, until its reunion with a
body, the separated human soul won’t be able to carry out any of its cognitive functions.
It won’t be able to engage in sensory perception, since sensory perception requires an
organ,68 and it won’t even be able to engage in thought, since thought requires a phantasm
65. Sent. II-C 3.6 n. 14: [. . . ] licet in nulla potentia sensitiua uel intellectiua sit species ad repraesen-
tandum ei suum obiectum, tamen in spiritibus corporeis non-sentientibus <nobis> remanent quandoque
species seu impressiones sensibiles abeuntibus sensibilibus, quae dum nobis dormientibus uel uigilan-
tibus obiiciuntur organis interiorum sensuum apprehenduntur, et si in eis sistat cognitio, decipimur
existimantes rerum imagines esse ueras res exteriores, si uero cognitio non sistat in eis, sed apprehen-
dantur ut imagines aliarum rerum non decipimur sed sunt nobis principium memorandi.” See also Sent.
I-C 27.2 n. 30 (quoted below, fn. 82). See also Auct. Ar. 7 n. 85: “Abeuntibus sensibilibus remanent
species eorum in organo sentiendi.” On these ‘corporeal spirits’, see, e.g., Sent. I-C 10.1 n. 4: “[. . . ]
‘spiritus’ non est proprium nomen tertiae Personae, sed appropriatum tantum, idest de communi trac-
tum ad proprium propter aliquam specialem conuenientiam. Sic enim ‘spiritus’ sonat in subtilitatem,
unde subtilia in corporalibus spiritus uocamus, sicut uentum et aerem et corpus subtile quod est instru-
mentum uirium animae; magis etiam proprie spiritus dicuntur omnia incorporalia, sicut dicimus angelos
spiritus. See also Sent. IV-C 44.7.
66. His argument (n. 19) is, roughly, that the fact that what represents the universal is singular doesn’t
prevent it from representing the universal, since, on the species-theory of cognition, the species, which
represents the universal, is a singular. And if the fact that the singularity of the representation doesn’t
prevent it from representing a universal, then a fortiori the fact that the representation is extended
or quantified doesn’t prevent it from representing the universal (“sed singularitas non impedit talem
repraesentationem, ut dictum est; ergo nec quantitas”). See also Sent. I-A 3.5, Sent. I-C 3.2.5, Sent.
II-AC 3.7, and QA III.1.
67. Sent. I-C 8.2.3 n. 14: “[. . . ] anima autem propter sui separabilitatem a corpore non est capax
quantitatis[. . . ].” Durand, however, doesn’t think that a decent argument can be made that establishes
the soul’s capacity to exist as separated from the body. In Sent. II-A 18.3 he rejects the standard
argument (which makes an inference from the fact that the soul carries out an operation that doesn’t
depend upon the body to the claim that the soul itself doesn’t depend upon the body); and in QA II.11
(221) he notes that this argument is merely ‘probable’, i.e., not demonstrative. See Chapter 1, fn. 49.
68. Sent. I-C 8.2.4 n. 15: “Partialis autem causa est quae in suo gradu coexigit aliud ut concausam, sicut
anima est partialis causa recipiendi suas potentias organicas, quia coexigit animam, nec est imaginandum
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in the brain, or, at the very least, some activity on the side of the senses.69 Now, when
Durand claims that thought requires phantasms, or at least some activity on the side of
quod potentiae organicae habeant pro immediato et totali receptiuo animam et materiam pro remoto,
sicut dictum est de colore respectu quantitatis et subiecti, immo habent pro immediato subiecto et pro
immediata ratione receptiua compositum ex materia et forma seu ex corpore et anima, ita quod haec
duo sunt immediate cause partiales supplentes uicem unius totalis cause recipientis immediate predictas
potentias. Et quod ita sit, patet; nam si separaretur quantitas a substantia, sicut fit in sacramento
altaris, in quantitate separata remanebit color, quia quantitas est totale receptiuum eius immediatum.
Si autem separetur anima a corpore, in anima separata non remanebunt potentiae sensitiuae nec in
corpore, quia neutrum fuit totalis causa receptiua talium potentiarum, sed quaelibet fuit partialis et sui
coniunctione supplebant uicem unius totalis cause.” See also Sent. IV-C 44.3, Sent. I-C 3.2.2, and Sent.
I-A 3.3.
69. QA II.11 221; Sent. II-C 3.7 n. 11, Sent. II-A 3.8, f. 173va–b (in the critical apparatus to Evid. II.15
fn. 31); Sent. II-C 3.6 n. 8; Sent. II-A 3.5 24, Sent. IV-C 49.2 n. 24. On the soul after death, see Sent. IV-
C 43–4. Durand does admit that at least one human cognitive act occurs without a phantasm, namely,
the beatific vision. But this is owing to, on his solution to the problem, the fact that God changes the
natural mode of human cognition. Sent. IV-C 49.2 (C ) n. 24: “Tertius modus est quod ad uidendum
Deum clare et manifeste non requiritur species repraesentans diuinam essentiam, ut dicit prima opinio,
nec aliquod lumen creatum eleuans intellectum ut dicit tam secunda opinio quam prima, sed sufficit
quod diuina essentia immediate repraesentetur intellectui creato, quod utique non potest fieri secundum
ordinem naturae, quem (quem] quam C ) experimur, secundum quem nihil intelligimus nisi ex sensatis et
imaginatis, sed potest hoc fieri secundum ordinem diuinae gratiae, et illud potest patere sic: ubicumque
natura et uirtus potentiae se extendunt ad (ad] ab C ) obiectum, praesentato obiecto per se et immediate
et excluso impedimento omni causante aenigma, necessario sequitur cognitio clara et manifesta qualis
est possibilis inter talem potentiam et obiectum secundum quemcumque modum. Sed noster intellectus
de se potest in essentiam diuinam tamquam in obiectum, et totum impedimentum clare et manifeste
cognitionis diuinae essentiae est, quia cognoscitur per medium inferioris gradus, quod est essentia creata,
quod medium potest excludi, ut probabitur. Ergo hoc excluso, et praesentia diuina essentia intellectui
secundum se et immediate, sequitur cognitio clara et manifesta qualis possibilis est intellectui nostro
respectu diuinae essentiae. Maior patet, quia ex quo potentia potest in obiectum de natura sua potest
ipsum cognoscere, et si impedimentum causans obscuram cognitionem excludatur, consequens est, quod
potentia cognoscat obiectum clare quantum est possibile. Minor probatur, quia intellectus noster de
se potest cognoscere essentiam diuinam, nam et philosophi probauerunt Deum esse quandam naturam
subsistentem intellectualem, et habentem omnem perfectionem; quod autem huiusmodi cognitio esset
nobis obscura et eius (eius] eis C ) causa est, quia naturali ordine non cognouerunt, nec nos cognoscimus
Deum nisi ex creaturis, quae, cum sunt inferioris gradus, non repraesentant ipsum clare et manifeste.
Hoc autem impedimentum potest amoueri uirtute diuina, quae potest omne quod non implicat contra-
dictionem. Quod autem intellectus noster, qui secundum ordinem naturae non consurgit in cognitionem
Dei nisi ex creaturis, potest ipsum habere praesentem secundum se, contradictionem <non> implicat,
quia in actionibus naturalibus uidemus quod Deus potest modum agendi immutare. Hoc etiam attes-
tatur omnis opinio circa materiam istam, quia omnes ponunt quod Deus in uisione beata immutabit
illum ordinem quo [non] cognoscimus ipsum ex creaturis, et repraesentabitur intellectui nostro nullo alio
praecognitio (praecognitio] draecognitio C ). Et haec fuit minor. Sequitur, ergo, conclusio. [. . . ] Ex quo
potest sic argui: quod essentiam diuina fit praesens intellectui nostro in ratione obiecti, quae prius non
erat ei sic praesens, oportet quod hoc fit uel ex mutatione sui, uel ex mutatione intellectus; non ex
mutatione sui, quia ipsa est omnino immutabilis; nec ex mutatione intellectus per aliquod receptum,
quod est species uel lumen, quia speciem negant, lumen autem ponitur ut dispositio patriae; ipsi autem
dicunt quod talis potest communicari intellectui habenti solas dispositiones uiae. Oportet, ergo, quod
per hoc solum mutetur intellectus, quia mutatur ordo naturalis quem habet in intelligendo, secundum
quem [non] cognoscit Deum ex creaturis.”
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the senses, he doesn’t mean to be claiming that thought is thus trapped behind a veil
of phantasms; rather, just as no sensory perception can come about unless the sensible
object brings about an effect upon the body, even though this effect is not the object
of sensory perception or involved in sensory perception in any way, so too no thought
can come about without physiological changes, even though, at least in cases of direct
thoughts, the thoughts are about the external thing and not the internal physiological
changes.
Perhaps, on Durand’s view, mental representations aren’t in the mind at all, but
rather in the brain. On this interpretation, a mental representation is a certain item
in the brain which acquires its specific content owing to covariation and performs a
certain function (representation) with respect to other units in the cognitive system as
a whole. It doesn’t, of course, matter what these units are, or even what they look
like, but what matters is rather that these units are connected up with the world via
covariation, connect to other units in the system in terms of either sine qua non causation
or efficient causation, which in turn are connected back down to other units in the system
responsible for behavior output. Less abstractly, the idea is that the specific content of a
thought is to be specified by the item which occasions that thought, be it an extramental
present thing or a phantasm in the brain; these phantasms in the brain (at least) can be
causes or occasions with respect to thoughts and other phantasms in the brain; thoughts
themselves can, in return, causally interact with the phantasms; more precisely thoughts
themselves can direct the nervous system to execute certain actions or the imagination
to change and so present to the intellect some new item or chain of items.70
One piece of textual evidence that might support this line of interpretation is to be
found in Sent. I-AC 27.2 (which concerns the mental word). In his first redaction, Durand
had attacked Hervaeus Natalis’s position as found in Hervaeus’s Tractatus de uerbo. In
70. Even though, as we saw in Chapter 1, Durand believes that upwards causation is impossible, such
that a physical cause can bring about a mental event, seeing as the former is less noble than the latter,
nothing prevents a mental cause from bringing about a physical event.
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reply, Hervaeus Natalis had attacked Durand in Quodl. II.8. Durand, in return, attacked
Hervaeus’s Quodl. II.8 in his third redaction. The issue which is of interest here is
Hervaeus Natalis’s claim that a mental word is (somehow) produced by the mind.71 One
objection which Durand had raised against this thesis appealed to the thesis (which
Hervaeus also endorses) that the intellect can have but one act at a given time.
The cause of this express concept (which you posit) is either the intelligible
species alone or the species together with the confused thought. Not the
intelligible species alone, since then the effect would be more noble than its
cause. Not the species together with the confused thought, because then two
thoughts would coexist, because the confused thought would coexist with the
express species , since a [proximate] cause coexists with its [proximate] effect;
but the express thought coexists with the express species ; therefore, from first
to last: the confused thought will coexist with the express thought and so
two thoughts will coexist. (Sent. I-C 27.2 n. 16)72
In Quodl. II.8, Hervaeus takes up Durand’s challenge,73 and attempts a solution.
71. Hervaeus, Quodl. II.8 and TDV , e.g., 4.2.1 f. 22ra: “Dicendum quod ut ex dictis patet duo sunt de
ratione uerbi unde uerbum est. Vnus et primum est quod sit repraesentatiuum rei et hoc ei conuenit ut
est similitudo uel exemplar ipsius rei cognitae. Secundum est quod sit productum ab aliquo intelligente.”
72. Compare: Hervaeus, Quodl. II.8 (H ) f. 49va: “Secundo sic, quia istius conceptus expressi quem tu
ponis aut sola species intelligibilis est causa aut species cum actu confuso; non sola species intelligibilis,
quia tunc effectus esset nobilior sua causa; nec species simul cum actu confuso, quia tunc essent simul
duo actus intelligendi quia simul esset actus intelligendi confusus cum specie tali expressa, quia simul est
causa cum effectu; sed cum tali specie expressa siue conceptu expresso est actus intelligendi expressus;
ergo a primo ad ultimum: cum actu intelligendi expresso erit (erit] est H ) actus intelligendi confusus et
sic erunt duo actus intelligendi simul.” Compare also: Sent. I-A 27.2 [= Paris Bibl. Nat., lat. 14454] f.
75ra. Notice that Hervaeus, in Quodl. II.8, quotes from the text as found in Durand’s third redaction;
this text is, as is clear from the transcription above, not the text found in the first redaction. J. Koch
(Koch, Durandus de S. Porciano, 64–67) provides other passages in Quodl. II.8 where Hervaeus quotes
from Durand’s first redaction.
73. ibid., ff. 49vb–50ra: “Ad secundum dicendum quod quando dicitur ‘aut sola species, etc.’, dicendum
primo quod posito quod sola species esset causa immediata illius conceptus expressi; nullum tamen
inconueniens sequitur. Et quando dicitur quod immo, quia effectus esset nobilior sua causa, dicendum
quod idem sequitur de actu intelligendi confuso, quia nobilior est quam sit species quae ponitur eius causa
ab omnibus qui ponunt species. Dicendum igitur quod non est inconueniens effectum esse nobliorem sua
causa immediata dummodo illa causa immediata agat in uirtute alicuius nobilioris concurrentis cum ista
causa ad effectum producendum; et sic ponitur in proposito de intellectu agente et specie; sicut etiam
ponitur a negantibus speciem de intellectu et phantasmata respectu actus intelligendi confusi. Vnde ista
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Under the assumption that two thoughts can’t coexist, I say that, since a
human achieves every thought by the mediation of a phantasm, the confused
thought is said to be the [proximate] cause of either the word or the express
thought insofar as the object, by the mediation of such a confused thought,
causes a desire (amor) for such an express thought; and this desire is the
[proximate] cause of a change in the phantasm; and when this change has
been finished (which doesn’t occur in an instant) the intellect is then changed
to the word or the express thought. Therefore, when it is said that the
confused thought coexists with the word or the express thought, since it is its
cause, it ought to be said that this is not necessary in the case of something
which is the cause of something else by the mediation of some other change,
as is obvious in the case of someone who shoots an arrow. In the case at
hand, however, it is such that the confused thought is the cause of the word
or the express thought by the mediation of a successive change which occurs
in the phantasm. (f. 50ra)74
Hervaeus’s solution to the problem is, as is clear, to appeal to certain physiological
changes in the brain which mediate between the two thoughts. A confused thought
ratio non compellit ad ponendum quod intelligere sit causa uerbi producti sed quod aliud est quod magis
intelligat et quod plus aliquo modo praeintelligat illud de quo formatur uerum ut probatum est supra.
Et quando ulterius dicitur quod hoc posito sequitur quod duo actus intelligendi sint simul, dico quod ista
difficultas aequaliter currit contra ponentes uerbum esse actum intelligendi sicut contra non-ponentes;
et similiter contra ponentes uerbum non produci per actum intelligendi confusum, sicut contra ponentes
uerbum produci per talem actum, quia cum omnes concedant quod ad actum intelligendi expressum
attingitur immediate actu confuso intelligendi, et per consequens quod actus intelligendi confusus est
eius causa qualitercumque et per consequens simul erunt.”
74. ibid., f. 50ra (H ): “Ad istam difficultatem posset faciliter dici secundum illos, qui ponunt quod
non est inconueniens duos actus intelligendi ordinatos adinuicem simul esse. Sed posito quod duo actus
intelligendi non possunt simul esse, dico quod, cum homo ad omnem actum intelligendi phantasmate
mediante attingat quod intelligere ipsum confusum dicitur causare uel uerbum uel intellectionem expres-
sam inquantum obiectum mediante tali actu causat amorem talis intellectionis expressae et amor talis
est causa motionis phantasmatis qua quidem motione facta, quae non fit in instanti, mouetur intellec-
tus ulterius ad uerbum uel ad expressam notitiam. Quando ergo dicitur quod intelligere confusum stat
cum uerbum siue cum notitia expressa cum sit causa eius dicendum quod non oportet de eo quod est
causa alterius mediante aliquo alio moto (moto] motiuo H) sicut apparet de sagittante. Nunc autem
ita est quod notitia confusa est causa uerbi siue notitiae expressae mediante motione successiue facta in
phantasmate.” The text in italics is quoted verbatim in Sent. I-C 27.2 n. 17.
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about X causes a physiological change in the brain and once this physiological change
has finished a mental word about X occurs (which in turn causes an express thought
about X). Since the physiological change takes time, the confused thought has a chance,
so to speak, to drop out of existence before the express thought comes into existence,
and so we can claim that the confused thought (somehow) caused the express thought
even though it doesn’t exist at the very moment that the express thought comes into
existence.
Durand, in turn, in his third redaction, offers the following response to this solution
to the problem. First of all, it isn’t always the case that express thoughts follow upon
confused thoughts. For instance, if someone has developed a certain scientific disposition
(habitus scientiae), she will at once elicit an express thought in the presence of the object
of that disposition with no prior confused thought.75 Second, even if we do assume that
every express thought is consequent to some confused thought, it still doesn’t follow
that the confused thought is (somehow) the cause of the express thought because the
confused thought should be treated as, rather, a necessary antecedent condition and not
an efficient cause of the express thought.
For instance, in the generation of an animal, the semen is first soft and then
hard [. . . ] and yet softness isn’t the efficient cause of hardness. Likewise in
the case of confused and express thoughts in the generation of a scientific
habit. In general, if something changes from a less perfect state to a more
perfect state, the less perfect state is prior to the more perfect state and yet
it is not its efficient cause (ibid., n. 18)
At the end of his discussion in Sent. I-C 27.2, Durand takes up the issue again:
An express enuntatitiua thought (for the sake of which it is said we form a
75. ibid., n. 18: “Instantia autem illa non ualet, quia non semper peruenitur ad cognitionem expressam
mediante confusa, quia habens habitum scientiae proposita conclusione cuius habitum habet statim
intelligit eam expressam et clare nullo actu confuso praecedente.”
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[mental] word) is either a clearly true thought or it is a thought that comes
after a confused thought. The first can’t be right, since some enuntiationes
appear as clearly true right away as soon as their terms are cognized, e.g., de
quolibet esse uel non esse or omne totum est maius sua parte; and so too with
calor calefacit or albedo disgregat to those who have experienced this; nor is it
necessary, in order to have a clear thought of such things, that one should have
some other representative than the thought of the terms and, consequently,
it is not necessary, on account of them, that such a word is formulated of
the sort which they posit. But if it were said that the word is required just
for the sake of a clear thought with respect to which a confused thought is
prior, against: According to them, we do not achieve an express thought
from a confused thought except because the object, by the mediation of such
a confused thought, causes a desire (amor) for such an express thought; which
desire changes the imagination (phantasia), and when this change has been
finished, an express thought occurs. And from this it is argued: An express
thought does not follow from a new change in the imagination (phantasia)
except because some phantasm representing something to the intellect de novo
appears through which the truth of the ‘enuntiatio’ [roughly: proposition]
appears as evident and express which, before, did not appear as evident and
express. But just as this is necessary, so too it is sufficient without anything
else. Now, this ‘representative through the phantasm’ is a representative
either as cause, effect, like (simile), opposite, antecedent, or consequent,76
for from any of these the truth which before did not appear as evident and
express but rather appeared as confused might appear as evident and express.
Therefore, for the sake of this, it is not necessary to cook up a certain form
produced or understood, as they say about the word. And it is remarkable,
76. On this list, see the discussion above concerning strict vs. liberal images in 5.1.1.
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this fiction, since this is a purely physical issue (materia sit mere physica),
yet no physicist ever posited in our intellect some form necessary in order to
have a thought no matter how express.77
Durand, then, seems to think that Hervaeus’s move—to appeal to physiological
changes in the brain—is, in fact, a rather useful move; but, pace Hervaeus, we shouldn’t
think that these physiological changes are merely necessary and not sufficient in order to
explain the causation of express thoughts. Quite the contrary, such physiological changes,
seeing as they result in a new image which presents or represents an item to the mind, are
sufficient. Hence, we don’t need to suppose that a mental word is also produced somehow
distinct from the express thought itself. Rather, the intellect is newly related to a new
object, albeit in the brain and not in the world, which functions as a representative.
This debate is striking. For one thing, Durand tells us here that issues having to do
with what we might nowadays call concept formation ought to be, so to speak, oﬄoaded
from the mind to the body. On Durand’s view, this is a purely physical affair. Durand,
of course, isn’t a physicalist, in the contemporary sense of the term, for, he holds that
the mind (the conjunct of intellect and will) is immaterial.78 However, he seems to be
committed to a kind of broadly physicalist or naturalist methodology: we should only
appeal to entities which, so to speak, aren’t countenanced by our best physics when
absolutely necessary. In order to explain the causation of a thought, however, no matter
77. ibid., n. 25 (C ): “Si uero dicatur quod uerbum requiritur solum propter claram cognitionem quam
praecedit confusa cognitio, contra: quia secundum istos ad cognitionem expressam non peruenimus
ex confusa, nisi quia obiectum mediante cognitione confusa causat amorem cognitionis expressae, qui
amor mouet (mouet] monet C ) phantasiam, qua motione (motione] monitione C ) facta sequitur cognitio
expressa. Et <ex> hoc sic arguitur: ex noua motione (motione] monitione C ) phantasiae non sequitur
cognitio expressa, nisi quia de nouo apparet aliquod phantasma repraesentans aliquid intellectui per
quod apparet euidens et expressa ueritas enuntiationis quae non apparebat prius, et sicut hec necessario
requiritur, ita et sufficit sine quocunque alio; sed illud repraesentatiuum per phantasma est causa uel
effectus, simile uel oppositum, antecedens uel consequens. Ex omnibus enim his apparet euidens et
expressa ueritas quae prius non apparebat aut confuse apparebat. Ergo propter hoc non oportet fingere
quamdam formam productam uel intellectam, sicut isti dicunt de uerbo, et mirum est de hac fictione,
quia cum haec materia sit mere physica, nullus physicorum umquam posuit in intellectu nostro aliquam
talem formam ad habendam quamcumque cognitionem quantumcumque expressam.”
78. Albeit with some reservation. See Chapter 1, fn. 49.
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what sort of thought it is, one doesn’t need to appeal to a mental form, for one can
simply appeal to the physical facts.79
To return to the issue of what we might call physical functionalism (as opposed to
mental functionalism), the point I want to make here is that Durand seems to want to
move most of the processing outside the mind and into the body. This is even more
clear in his discussion of habitus, but before I turn to that discussion I want to highlight
one more passage from Sent. I-C 27.2 (not found in the first redaction). Durand, here, is
responding to an argument in defense of the mental word which appeals to an analogy
with the senses (sicut est in sensu, ita suo modo est in intellectu). Now, in the case of
the senses, there is a good reason to suppose that there is such a thing as a form in which
the thing is sensed, which form is not identical with the act of sensory perception, for,
as Aristotle points out, we sometimes use certain images (imagines; idola) which are in
the sense-organs as images of things.80 In response, Durand writes:
Neither in the exterior senses nor in an interior sensitive power is there some
form which is the first object of cognition and that in which or through which
some other thing is cognized, since, either no sensitive power is able to reflect
upon its own acts or itself or something which is in it, or, if it is able to
reflect, nevertheless no sensitive power with a direct act [can cognize such
a form]. In fact, the intellective [power] can’t tend into such items [with a
direct act], as was proved before.81 As to what is spoken of in De memoria
79. Reid, Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense, 12: “All that we know of
the body, is owing to anatomical dissection and observation, and it must be by an anatomy of the mind
that we can discover its powers and principles.”
80. ibid., n. 3: “In contrarium arguitur quia, sicut est in sensu, ita suo modo est in intellectu; sed
in sensu est dare formam in qua res cognoscitur, nec est notitia rei; ergo similiter est <in> intellectu;
illa autem forma dicitur esse uerbum; ergo, etc. Probatio minoris, quia secundum Philosophum in libro
De memoria et reminiscentia quandoque homo utitur imagine existente in sensu siue tali idolo ut medio
ducente in cognitionem alterius, quandoque ut re cognita, sicut quando in somnis apprehendunt homines
ipsas imagines ut quasdam res. Hoc autem non esset nisi in sensu esset dare aliquod idolum quod non
est notitia rei, sed est imago in qua res cognoscitur; ergo, etc.”
81. The earlier proof is the following (Sent. I-C 27.2 n. 21): “Tertio sic: intellectus nec se nec habitus
suos nec actus intelligit actu recto; sed uerbum est aliquis actus intellectus; ergo non est uerum quod
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et reminiscentia, this isn’t against us, since the impressions of sense objects
which persist in us when the sense objects have gone away and when we do
not [in fact] sense do not persist in sense-organs, since then they would either
always or never be sensed; but they persist in [corporeal] spirits in other parts
[of the body], and when they are moved, from whatever cause, and put in
front of the organ of imagination (phantiasia), be this while asleep or when
awake, there come about these appearances (apparitiones) about which the
Philosopher talks there and in De somno et uigilia where he expressly posits
what has been said. Whence, such images aren’t in the sense as in a subject,
as they assume. (n. 30)82
The picture that is emerging here, I want to suggest, is a spartan model of mind which
moves representations outside the mind (and indeed, outside even the sensitive powers of
the soul) and into the body (certain ‘spirits’ in ‘other parts’ which aren’t in the sensitive
powers as in a subject).
Durand sticks to the same methodological principle when he takes up habitus. In fact,
Durand’s analysis of habitus supplements what I have been calling physical functionalism
sit primum cognitum obiectiue et actu recto.” [= Sent. I-A 27.2 f. 75rb] Hervaeus, Quodl. II.8 f. 50ra:
“Secundo sic: quia illud cuius actus cognoscatur actu recto et ipsum cognoscitur actu recto. Sed secun-
dum te uerbum, quod est actus mentis, cognoscitur actu recto. Ergo et ipsa mens cognoscit seipsam
actu recto.” Sent. I-C 27.2 n. 21: “Et confirmatur, <quia> qui intuitiue uidet picturam tabulae, uidet
et tabulam; sed si uerbum sit talis forma in intellectu qualis ab istis ponitur, tunc uerbum se habet ad
intellectum sicut quaedam pictura uel imago ad tabulam; ergo si intellectus uideret intuitiue uerbum
suum, sicut necesse est, et si sit primo obiectiue cognitum, necesse est uel saltem possibile quod eodem
actu uideat seipsum, et sic intellectus poterit seipsum cognoscere actu recto; quod est falsum.”
82. n. 30: “Ad rationes principales respondendum est. Ad primam per interemptionem minoris, quia
neque in sensu exteriori neque in potentia sensitiua interiori est aliqua forma quae sit primo obiectiue
cognita et in qua uel per quam res alia cognoscatur, quia uel nulla potentia sensitiua est reflexiua super
actum suum uel super se uel super aliquid quod sit in ipsa, uel si est reflexiua, tamen actu recto nulla
potentia sensitiua, immo nec intellectiua, potest tendere in talia, ut prius probatum fuit. Et quod dicitur
in libro De memoria et reminiscentia non est contra hoc, quia impressiones sensibilium quae manent in
nobis abeuntibus sensibilibus et nobis <non->sentientibus non manent in organis sensuum, quia semper
sentirentur uel numquam, sed manent in spiritibus aliarum partium, et quando mouentur, quacumque
ex causa hoc fiat, et obiiciuntur organo phantasiae, siue in somno siue in uigilia, fiunt illae apparitiones
de quibus Philosophus loquitur ibi et in libro De somno et uigilia, ubi expresse ponit hoc quod dictum
est. Vnde tales imagines non sunt in sensu subiectiue, sicut isti assumunt.” On the corporeal spirits, see
fn. 65 above.
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so as to avoid what I think would be a rather tragic flaw in his model of mind. Consider
the following objection.
Assuming that the above story about covariation coupled with physiological func-
tionalism is true, then, one might object, we will have no explanation of how it is that
humans (and certain higher-order animals) seem to engage in thoughts that can’t pos-
sibly be explained by appeal to such a model. On this model, all thought would seem
to be limited to singular cognition about either the things themselves as present or their
sensory representations in the brain.
Recall, for starters, Durand’s appeal to experience and scientific dispositions (habitus
scientiae) above. What I want to argue for here is that Durand interprets habitus as
acquired competencies or skills,83 which, when coupled with the story we have been
83. King, “Two Conceptions of Experience,” King, “Ockham on the Role of Concepts [presentation
version],” King, “Le roˆle des concepts selon Ockham” argues that Ockham understands habitus along
these lines. King, “Ockham on the Role of Concepts [presentation version],” 11–2: “Ockham, I think,
appreciated this point, and that is why he threw out all previous ‘mentalist’ theories of mind as unhelpful.
Instead, Ockham proposed an account of mental activity that used a bare minimum of internal machinery
and introduced a new way of talking about our competence in interacting with the world, namely through
forms of acquired expertise (habitus), a matter of complex interlocking abilities. Having dispensed with
causal mechanisms, as noted above, Ockham can talk directly about our skills in getting around in
the world without being tempted to give reductive explanations how this comes to pass. Furthermore,
Ockham’s talk of habitus (skills) is usually cashed out in terms of abilities to do things, including
recognizing and identifying singular items or kinds of items. For this they don’t have to be ‘in the
head’ in any interesting way; they are competencies of the whole person as much as they are specifically
mental. Take, for instance, Ockham’s discussion of universals. What he says amounts to noting that
human beings learn to get around in the world by dividing things up into groups in pretty much the
same ways, depending on the kind of past experience each person has had. This is not explained by the
grasp of some recondite primitive metaphysical maximal similarity at work in each of us. Rather, it is
something most humans do at an early stage in cognitive development, in almost exactly the same ways.
If we want to talk about such abilities, we can do so in linguistic terms; but Ockham’s point is that
having a concept is no more than being competent in getting around in the world in a certain regard.
Our expertise in sorting things into kinds is remarkable, to be sure, but no more remarkable than many
other things we do. If we are interested in the whole phenomenon of skilled competence, there is no
particular reason to try to work out a reductive account of this particular skill, which explains why
Ockham seems uninterested in doing so.” Notice that P. King seems to have abandoned his previous
interpretation of Ockham as a linguistic-role functionalist (King, “Rethinking Representation,” which,
despite its publication date, comes earlier [indeed, cited in King, “Ockham on the Role of Concepts
[presentation version]”].) If P. King has not abandoned his earlier interpretation, then he owes us some
explanation about the connection between the two—to my mind—conflicting models of mind, for one
can’t be both Bob Brandom and Jerry Fodor, even uirtute diuina. On habits in Ockham, see also Oswald
Fuchs, The Psychology of Habit According to William Ockham (St. Bonaventure, NY: The Franciscan
Institute, 1952) and Panaccio, Ockham on Concepts, ch. 1.
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telling so far, offers a richer view of human cognition.
Unfortunately, my comments here will have to remain speculative because, if I’m
right, then the text where he would have made this claim explicit is one which we have
lost, namely, his discussion of habitus in his first redaction. However, we can speculate
about what he might have said there based upon (a) Peter of Palude’s discussion in
Sent. III 23.1–2; (b) Nicholas Medensis’s Evid. III.30, (c) Durand’s Tractatus de habitibus
and (d) an anonymous treatise against Durand’s Tractatus .84 In the Tractatus Durand
defends the peculiar thesis that intellective virtues (cognitive habitus) and moral virtues
are not in the intellect or the will as in a subject but rather these are attributed to the
will or intellect. In fact, such virtues are at base something in a (non-cognitive) organ
(called variously the ‘ostensive’, ‘presentative’, or ‘representative’ organ).85 This organ
is not cognitive as such—that is, it does not think, see, or hear and so on, nor does
it even imagine or remember—and its function in the cognitive system is to store and
present sense images to the intellect and presumably other inner sensitive powers, such
as the imagination and the memory.86 These sense images are, of course, combinations of
sensory impressions which were in fact made upon the various outer sensitive organs and
so are acquired. The more the mind thinks about a sense image, the more the ostensive
84. Durand’s Tractatus was composed after 1312 (Prospero Stella, “La data delle Quaestiones de
habitibus di Durando di S. Porciano,” Salesianum 32 (1970): 407–23). For discussion, see Koch, Durandus
de S. Porciano, 129–142.
85. TDH 4.8 50: “[. . . ] in potentia quae ostendit obiectum intellectui[. . . ].” ibid.: “[. . . ] in eadem
potentia repraesentatiua[. . . ].” ibid., 53: “[. . . ] in potentia ostendente seu proponente obiectum[. . . ].”
ibid., 57: “[. . . ] in eo quod repraesentat obiectum[. . . ].”
86. TDH 4.8 50 (emphasis mine): “[. . . ] in intellectu non sit aliquis habitus nec in aliqua potentia cog-
nitiua ut sic, et multo minus in appetitiua, ut probatum fuit supra, sed solum in potentia, quae ostendit
obiectum intellectui, siue sit cognitiua siue non—et hoc dico quantum ad habitus pure speculatiuos—uel
in eadem potentia repraesentatiua cum dispositione corporali acquisita quantum ad habitus practicos et
morales, ut sunt prudentia et uirtutes morales.” ibid., 57: “Propter quod habitus est ponendus subiec-
tiue in eo, quod repraesentat obiectum et non in illa potentia, propter cuius actum quaeritur, nisi solum
attributiue.” See also Anonymous, Quaestio, “Vtrum habitus acquisitus. . . ” 71 (emphasis mine): “[. . . ]
nec in intellectu nec in aliqua potentia cognitiua, ut cognitiua, est aliquid habitus subiectiue, et multo
minus in appetitiua, sed habitus intellectuales et morales dicuntur esse in intellectu et appetitu solum
attributiue, subiectiue autem sunt in potentia, quae obiectum intellectui offert, quantum ad habitus
intellectuales, uel in eadem potentia obiecti praesentatiua cum dispositione corporali acquisita quantum
ad morales.” Recall, as well, Durand’s remarks on the ‘impressiones’ which exist in certain ‘corporeal
spirits’. See above 65 and 82.
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organ is put to use in presenting that sense image, and so it comes to acquire a kind
of facilitas at presenting that sense image. Hence, there is no reason for postulating a
cognitive or speculative habit in the intellect because of the facilitas with which we think
about something. Moreover, the mind has control over this organ such that it can cause
it to present one image after another to it and so this organ can be trained so that it
presents a series of sense images to the intellect in a certain order just as a horse is trained
to trot.87 Further it can somehow (the details get a bit murky at this point) be trained
to associate certain values to various sense images (or chains of sense images: “ordinata
formatio specierum in uiribus sensitiuis apprehensiuis interioribus”)88 just as a dog is
trained to fear bread presented to it in the right hand.89 Hence, even moral habits can,
87. Peter of Palude, Sent. III 23.1 f. 116vb–117ra (presenting Durand’s view): “Debemus ergo imaginari
quod sicut equus docetur ambulare inquantum <ex> consuetudine sic ambulandi efficitur (efficitur] sit
S ) pronus ad consimiliter ambulandum, nec ex hoc efficitur (efficitur] fit S ) in eo aliqua res absoluta, sed
solum talis modus consuetudinalis et pronitas talis, sic ex consuetudine talium (talium] om. P) actuum
bonorum uel malorum fit in nobis quaedam pronitas ad consimiliter agendum, eo quod consuetudo
(consuetudo] consuetuduo P) inclinat quasi (quasi] om. P) per modum naturae.” (S = Stella, Evidentiae,
III.30; P = Paris, 1517.) See also Nicholas Medensis, Evid. III.30 905 (reporting on Durand’s position):
“Dicit ergo, pro opinione sua, quod sicut equus docetur ambulare ex sola consuetudine sic ambulandi
absque eo quod fiat in eo aliqua res absoluta, sed solum quidam modus consuetudinalis et pronitas ad
sic ambulandum, sic ex sola consuetudine talium actuum bonorum uel malorum fit in nobis quaedam
pronitas ad sic agendum.”
88. Anonymous, Quaestio “Vtrum habitus acquisitus. . . ” 71.
89. TDH 4.5 26–7: “Mediantibus autem actibus imperatis potest iudicium potentiae aestimatiuae et
cognitiuae uariari ad hoc, ut concorditer iudicet cum ratione, quae alias iudicaret contra rationem Et hoc
potest fieri dupliciter, sc. ex uariatione circa obiectum et ex alteratione dispositionis nostrae. Primum,
quod est ex uariatione circa obiectum, commune est nobis et brutis, quae assuescunt quibusdam operibus
a ratione hominis imperatis; quod patet: Canis enim esuriens secundum se appeteret panem et ipsum
acciperet, per quamcumque manum sibi porrigeretur, dexteram uel sinistram; et tamen assuescit sic
accipere a dextera manu, quod nullo modo a sinistra propter uariationem factam circa obiectum per
actum imperatum a ratione hominis, per quem obiecto delectabili iungitur triste superhabundans; v.
gr. quando cum pane porrecto cani sinistra manu, quem canis uult accipere, percutitur grauissime in
ore et dentibus, quando autem porrigitur per manum dexteram, non percutitur, sed permittitur libere
accipere, ex frequentia talium actuum formatur aestimatiua canis, quod accipere panem a sinistra manu
est laesiuum et inimicum naturae, et memoria firmatur; propter quod talis canis semper sic aestimat,
ut expertus fuit in actibus praecedentibus, et assuescit facere, quod ratio hominis imperat.” See also
ibid., 4.9 66: “Sed in habentibus solum alterum appetitum potest circa unum actum proponi ratio mali
cum bono et e conuerso, ut patet de brutis. Proponitur enim cani esurienti panis, qui est ei delectabilis,
cum baculo, quo consueuit percuti, quod est ei triste, et ideo nec prosequitur sine timore nec dimittit
sine tristitia, et utrobique est uoluntarium mixtum eo modo, quo bruta agunt uoluntarie, ut dicitur
3 Ethicorum. De angelis autem, utrum quid tale possit eis proponi, latet nos. Sed certum est quod
in nobis ex hoc solo, quod per intellectum proponitur uoluntati ratio boni cum malo circa eumdem
actum, sequitur uoluntarium mixtum, etiamsi per possibile uel impossibile non concurreret appetitus
sensitiuus.”
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although attributed to the will, be located in this ostensive organ.90
What is the upshot of all of this? Well, we might be able to assign to these items in
the ostensive organ the role of representation in the cognitive system: such sense images
acquire their specific content from what caused them and they function as representations
in the cognitive system as a whole in terms of the relevant output (behavior) of the
cognizant animal.
5.8.1 Conclusion
Durand clearly refuses to think about the intentional in traditional terms: the aboutness
of a mental state is not a matter of resemblance or conformality; but neither is it totally
a matter of causation, since not every effect represents its cause. Of course, on Durand’s
view a mental state isn’t an effect of the object as efficient cause—he rejects affectionism
(Chapter 1)—but the same problem can be posed to his own account: an oven’s operative
state or second act is not about the pie as sine qua non cause. Hence, Durand would
seem to be either committed to the thesis that intentionality is a primitive concept,
not to be analyzed in terms of covariation, resemblance, or conformality, or anything
else, or committed to an even more odd theory, what I have been calling physiological
functionalism. But maybe this even more odd theory isn’t that much more odd than
the theory it was meant to replace. To be sure it has its mysteries, but these will be
different mysteries, and in my view, more interesting mysteries than the mysteries which
90. TDH 4.5 27–8: “Et consimiliter est de omnibus aliis, in quibus bruta animalia disciplinantur per
hominem. In nobis etiam consimiliter; iudicium enim cognitionis sensitiuae secundum se de delectabili se-
cundum tactum, puta de adulterio, est, quod adulterium esset prosequendum; quod est contra rationem.
Fit autem, ut aestimatiua iudicet, quod adulterium est malum et fugiendum, in quo concordat cum ra-
tione; quod fit, quia cum adulterio delectabili proponitur aliquod triste superhabundans sibi annexum;
et idem dico de furto: v. gr. aliquis uidet frequenter uel audit ab aliis uel legit, quod adulter fustigatur,
diffamatur, et quod fur suspenditur; et ex hoc formatur aestimatiua, quod furtum uel adulterium ratione
adiuncti, quod est interemptiuum naturae uel priuatiuum maioris boni quam sit delectatio adulterii uel
utilitas furti, est fugiendum tamquam malum. Ex frequentia autem eorumdem actuum firmatur memo-
ria, in qua manent impressiones huiusmodi actuum. Ratio autem et uoluntas imperant memoriae, et ipsa
oboedit immediate huic imperio quoad motum localem spirituum, in quibus sunt tales impressiones: quo
facto repraesentantur potentiae cognitiuae aestimatiuae actus illi coniunctim, ut prius fuerant sensati,
et iudicatur de his similiter ut prius, sc. concorditer rationi.”
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tag along with the conformality theory of content.
6 Bio-bibliography
6.1 Biographical sketch
Durand of St.-Pourc¸ain (Durandus de Sancto Porciano) was probably born at Saint-
Pourc¸ain-sur-Sioule in Auvergne in the early 1270s and he died on September 10, 1334.
Around 1294, he entered into the Order of Preachers at Clermont. We do know that he
was at Saint Jacques in Paris on June 26, 1303, which would have been a pretty good
year to be in Paris, since both John Duns Scotus and Hervaeus Natalis are supposed to
have been lecturing on the Sentences and Godfrey of Fontaines delivering his Quodl. XV
at Paris during this year. In any case, Durand is also known to have been in Paris on
November 17, 1307, since he participated in the process against the Templars. We also
know that Durand became master in Paris in 1312 and was regens actu magister until
1313 when he was called to Avignon by Clement V to become lector sacri palacii. In 1316
he was the papal ambassador and chaplain and on August 26, 1317 he was appointed to
the bishopric of Limoux (previously Narbonne) as a result. He was transferred to the
see of Le Puy-en-Velay on February 13, 1318. In July, 1318 he took an oath renouncing
temporal jurisdiction over his canons and clergy. In 1326 he was transferred to the see of
Meaux. We also know that during this year he presided over the trial of William Ockham
at Avignon.1
1. For more on Durand’s life, see Thomas Jeschke, “Seligkeitsdebatten um 1308,” in Speer and Wirmer,
1308, 340–69, Courtenay, “The Role of University Masters and Bachelors at Paris in the Templar Affair,
1307–1308,” Iribarren, “L’antithomisme de Durand de Saint-Pourc¸ain et ses pre´ce´dents,” Russell Fried-
man, “Durandus of Saint-Pourc¸ain (bibliographic update),” in Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2nd, vol. 3,
ed. Donald M. Borchert (2006), 148–9, Iribarren, “Durandus and Durandellus: The Dispute behind the
Promotion of Thomist Authority,” Russell Friedman, “Durand of St. Pourc¸ain,” in Gracia and Noone,
A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages, 249–53, R. Friedman’s introduction in Schabel, Fried-
man, and Balcoyiannopoulou, “Peter of Palude,” G. Cremascoli, “Sul processo al Libellus de visione
Dei di Durando di S. Porziano. Personaggi e testi,” in Studi sull’Umbria medievale e umanistica, ed.
M. Donnini and E. Menesto`, In ricordo di Olga Marinelli, Pier Lorenzo Meloni, Ugolino Nicolini (Spo-
leto: Centro Italiano di studi sull’alto medioevo, 2000), 189–204, Lowe, The Dominican Order and the
Theological Authority of Thomas Aquinas: The Controversies between Hervaeus Natalis and Durandus
of St. Pourcain, Lowe, The Contested Theological Authority, Decker, Die Gotteslehre, Anneliese Maier,
“Literarhistorische Notizen u¨ber P. Aureoli, Durandus und den Cancellarius nach der Handschrift Ripoli
77bis in Barcelona,” Gregorianum 29 (1948): 213–251, de Guimara˜es, “Herve´ Noe¨l,” Josef Koch, “Ein
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6.2 Critical Editions, Manuscripts and Early Modern Print-
ings
6.2.1 Sentences - Status Quaestionis
Russel Friedman2 provides a recent status quaestionis on Durand’s Sentences. Durand
authored three commentaries on Peter of Lombard’s Sentences. The date, place, and
form of the first redaction is a matter of some debate: Hervaeus Natalis in Quodl. II.8 is
the first author we know of to quote from it, and this fact establishes a terminus ad quem
of either 1308 or 1309. Most scholars, following Anneliese Maier’s suggestion, have agreed
that it is connected with lectures Durand gave at some provincial Dominican studium
outside of Paris.3 No manuscript to date has been found containing book III; however,
neuer Zeuge fu¨r die gegen Durandus de S. Porciano gerichtete Thomistische Irrtumsliste,” in Bormann,
Kleine Schriften, 119–25, Josef Koch, “Zu der Durandus-Hs. der Biblioteca Antoniana in Padua,” DT
20 (1942): 409–414, Josef Koch, “Jakob von Metz O.P., der Lehrer des Durandus de S. Porciano O.P,” in
Bormann, Kleine Schriften, 133–200, Koch, Durandus de S. Porciano, Josef Koch, “Die Verteidigung der
Theologie des hl. Thomas von Aquin durch den Dominikanerorden gegenu¨ber Durandus de S. Porciano
O.P.,” in Bormann, Kleine Schriften, 127–63, Koch, “Die Magister-Jahre des Durandus de S. Porciano
O.P. under der Konflikt mit seinem Ordinem,”
2. Friedman, “The Sentences Commentary.” See also, even more recently, Jeschke et al., “Durandus
von St. Pourc¸ain und sein Sentenzenkommentar: Eine kritische Edition der A- und B-Redaktion.”
3. Maier, “Literarhistorische Notizen.” However, Courtenay, “The Role of University Masters and
Bachelors at Paris in the Templar Affair, 1307–1308,” 176–177 challenges this thesis, and argues that
Durand was in fact in Paris: “This proves, contrary to what has sometimes been written, that Durand
was at Paris in the academic year 1307–1308, not at some other studium of the Dominican order, but
he was not yet formally lecturing on the ‘Sentences’ at Paris, since unlike some of the others, the
title of bachelor was not applied to him. Yet he was considered important enough to be mentioned as
attending the Templar confessions, and that in itself is significant. He may have been lecturing on the
Bible and/or preparing himself to read the ‘Sentences’ in the following year. Josef Koch dated the first
version, version A, of Durandus’ commentary to 1307–1308, and its description in the censure of 1314
as a quaternus originalis that the author did not intend for circulation suggests that it was a pre-lectura
version. If written in 1307–1308, then written at Paris, which would explain Herveus Natalis’ access
to that early version.” Note that if W. Courtenay is correct, then de Guimara˜es, “Herve´ Noe¨l,” 47–8,
57 proposal that Hervaeus’s Quodlibet II should be dated to Easter 1309, in order to give Hervaeus
enough time to respond might be right. See Friedman, “Dominican Quodlibetal Literature” 434, fn.
101: “Guimaraes was attempting to show there, pace Koch, that Durand’s Sentences lectures began in
September 1308; in order for Hervaeus to have had enough time to have responded in his Quodl. II to
Durand’s work, Guimaraes postulated the Easter 1309 dating for Quodl. II. The proposal appears to
be otiose in this context, however, since Hervaeus was not responding to Durand’s Sentences lectures,
but rather to the written commentary that he composed between 1304 and 1307/8.” I’m inclined to
side with Courtenay/Guimaraes on this issue. First of all, as mentioned in chapter three, there is the
fact that the text that Hervaeus quotes from in Quodl. III.8 looks to be a report rather than the written
form, which is the text that Peter of Palude and Durandellus comment on. This suggests that Hervaeus
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we do have manuscripts which contain books I-II and IV. We also have the so-called
additiones, or at least a fragment of it, to the first book, dist. 3 (on the agent intellect).
This is without doubt an addition to A, and I call it Sent. I-A 3.5.
After the negative reaction his first redaction received, Durand then lectured on the
Sentences a second time, sometime before 1312, when he became master. Friedman
argues that there is also a written ‘ordinatio’ version associated with these lectures (pace
Maier who had supposed that they must be a mere reportatio).4 We have manuscripts
which contain books II-IV but not book I.
Durand left Paris in 1313 for Avignon. He is supposed to have written his third and
final (‘C’) Sentences commentary between 1317 and 1327. It is this version that was
published numerous times in the early modern period. Most of the fifty manuscripts
which contain some version of Durand’s Sentences contain this one.
Durand’s third redaction can be found in numerous printings: Paris (1508, 1515, 1533,
1539, 1547, 1550); Lyons (1533, 1556, 1560, 1569, 1595); Antwerp (1567, 1576); Venice
(1571 [Reprinted in 1964 by the Gregg Press, Inc., Ridgewood, New Jersey], 1586). I use
Venice, 1571. Books I–IV of this printing can be found online via SIEPM. A searchable
version of Book I of this printing with a partial critical apparatus is available online at
the Durandus Projekt.
There is no complete modern critical edition of any of Durand’s three redactions.
would have also used a report of the first redaction in Quodl. II.8 as well. Second of all, there is the fact
that Durand’s Sent. II-A 3.5 bears such a close resemblance in a number of spots with passages in Duns
Scotus’s Quodl. 13 (which is 1306/7). This suggests to me, at least, that Durand lectured on the first
redaction in 1307/8 and began writing it sometime shortly afterwards. Hence, the fact that Hervaeus
Natalis’s Quodl. II.8 contains a reference doesn’t tell us whether or not it is a reference to the written
version or a reported version.
4. Maier, “Literarhistorische Notizen.” Friedman argues that we must be dealing with a ordinatio for
otherwise one couldn’t explain the fact that, e.g., on the question Vtrum angeli sint in aliquo magno
numero (Sent. II-AC 3.4) A and C are identical whereas B (Sent. II-B 3.2) the text (approx. 1400 words)
varies from the other two redactions by just fifty words added or substituted in four specific spots
“obviously with the intent of ameliorating criticism of other positions” (Schabel, Friedman, and Bal-
coyiannopoulou, “Peter of Palude,” 189, n. 9). On this point, see also V. Heynck, “Die Behandlung der
Lehre von dem Wiederaufleben der Taufe in den Sentenzenkommentaren des Durandus de S. Porciano,”
Franziskanische Studien 42 (1960): 45–49 and Lother Ullrich, Fragen der Scho¨pfungslehre nach Jakob
von Metz, O.P. (Leipzig: St. Benno-Verlag, 1966), 95.
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However, several individual questions have been edited or at least transcribed. What
follows is a list of these editions / transcriptions.
6.2.2 Sentences Critical Editions
Sent. I-AB 19.3 (ed. von Perger, 2004) in von Perger, “Der Wahrheitsbegriff.”
Sent. I-AB 19.2.5–6 (ed. von Perger, 2004) in ibid.
Sent. I-ABC 38.3 (ed. Schabel et al., 2001) in Schabel, Friedman, and Balcoyiannopoulou,
“Peter of Palude.”
Sent. II-A 3.5 (ed. Koch, 1935).
Sent. II-A 30.2 (ed. Martin, 1930) in Martin, La controverse, 158–164).
Sent. II-B 30.2 (ed. Martin, 1930) in ibid., 325–338.
Sent. II-A 31.1 (ed. Martin, 1930) in ibid., 164–169.
Sent. II-A 31.3 (ed. Martin, 1930) in ibid., 169–170.
Sent. II-A 32.1–2 (ed. Martin, 1930) in ibid., 170–178.
Sent. II-A 33.1–2 (ed. Martin, 1930) in ibid., 178–183.
Sent. III-B 29.2 (ed. Jeschke, 2009) in Jeschke, “U¨ber natu¨rliche und u¨bernatu¨rliche Gottes-
liebe. Durandus und einige Dominikaner gegen Jakob von Viterbo. (Mit einer Textedition
von In III Sententiarum, D. 29, Q. 2 des Petrus de Palude),” 176–198.
Sent. IV-AB 49.5 (ed. Jeschke, 2011) in Jeschke, Deus ut tentus uel uisus, Appendix F.5
6.2.3 Sentences Manuscripts
What follows is my own list of available manuscripts drawn mostly from Jeschke et al.,
“Durandus von St. Pourc¸ain und sein Sentenzenkommentar: Eine kritische Edition der A-
und B-Redaktion,” except for book III, which I have drawn from T. Ka¨ppeli, Scriptores
Ordinis Praedicatorum Medii Aevi, 4 vols. (Rome: S. Sabina, 1970–1993), vol. 1, #927.
5. I would like to thank Thomas Jeschke for giving me an early version of this work. Since I haven’t
had access to the published version, page references will have to be corrected.
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Book I-A: Auxerre Bibl. municipale 26 ff. 1r–52r; Florence Bibl. Medicea Laurenziana,
San Marco 440 ff. 1r–86v; Melk Stifts. 611 ff. 1r–193v; Nu¨rnberg, Stadtbibliothek,
Cent. III 79 ff. 1r–67v; Paris Bibl. Nat., lat. 12330 ff. 1r–55v; Paris Bibl. Nat., lat.
14454 ff. 1r–115r; Saint-Omer Bibl. de l’agglom. de St-Omer 332 ff. 1r–254v6
Book I-B: No MSS / Never existed.
Book II-A: Magdeburg Domgymnasium 91 (now in Berlin’s Staatsbibliothek) ff. 77r–137r;
Vaticanus Chigi., lat. B VIII 135 ff. 163r–215v.
Book II-B: Auxerre Bibl. municipale 26 ff. 53r–87v; Florence Bibl. Medicea Lauren-
ziana, San Marco 440 ff. 89r–148v; Melk Stifts. 611 ff. 194r–312v; Mu¨nchen, Bayerische
Staatsbibl. Clm. 26309 ff. 121r–163v; Nu¨rnberg, Stadtbibliothek, Cent. III 79 ff. 68r–
129r; Saint-Omer Bibl. de l’agglom. de St-Omer 333 ff. 1r–126r;7 Saint-Omer Bibl.
de l’agglom. de St-Omer 337 ff. 1r–251r;8 Paris Bibl. Nat., lat. 12330 ff. 56r–101v.
Book III-A: No MSS / Never Existed.
Book III-B: Auxerre Bibl. municipale 26; Mu¨nchen, Bayerische Staatsbibl. Clm. 26309;
Naples Bibl. nat. VII.C.22; Paris Bibl. Nat., lat. 12330; Melk Stifts. 611; Saint-
Omer Bibl. de l’agglom. de St-Omer 559; Venice Bibl. Naz. Marciana Cod. Z 104
[2004].
Book IV-A: Vaticanus Borgh. lat. 247 ff. 25v–48v;9 Venice Bibl. Naz. Marciana Cod. Z
104 [2004] ff. 76r–196v.
Book IV-B: Auxerre Bibl. municipale 26 ff. 129r–174v;10 Erlangen-Nu¨rnberg Univ.
Bibl. 256 ff. 2r–103v; Klosterneuburg Stiftsbibl. 346 ff. 1r–107v; Oxford Bodleian
Library, Laud. Misc. 737 ff. 1r–109; Paris Bibl. Nat., lat. 12330 ff. 150r–224v; Paris
6. Contains dd. 1–2. Saint-Omer Bibl. de l’agglom. de St-Omer 338 contains dist. 25–48, although
it is uncertain if this is the first redaction.
7. d. 22, q. 3 – d. 44.
8. dd. 1–25.
9. d. 1, q. 1 – d. 45, q. 2. The order of the distinctions are mixed-up: dd. 1–23; dd. 43–45 (q. 2); dd.
24–27. It is missing: dd. 28–42 and distictions about d. 45, q. 2.
10. d. 10 q. 3 – d. 45, q. 2.
Chapter 6. Bio-bibliography 234
Bibl. Nat., lat. 12331 ff. 84r–150r;11 Saint-Omer Bibl. de l’agglom. de St-Omer 335 ff.
1r–321v;12 Saint-Omer Bibl. de l’agglom. de St-Omer 336.13
6.2.4 Quodlibeta - Status Quaestionis
Russell Friedman14 also provides a recent status quaestionis on Durand’s Quodlibeta.15
In 1927, J. Koch had identified five Quodlibeta, two in Paris and three in Avignon.
Durand’s two Paris Quodlibeta occurred when he was magister actu regens (1312–1313);
his three Avignon Quodlibeta while he was lector sacri palacii (1313–1317). Quodlibet
Parisiensis (QP) I is found in two redactions. The first redaction is a reportatio of
Durand’s first quodlibetal disputation, probably held in Easter, 1312.16 The second
redaction is an ordinatio which Durand wrote after 1317.17 The second redaction of QP I
contains six questions, the first four of which have been edited by T. Takada. Quodlibet
Parisiensis (QP) II is a reportatio and it remains unedited. It was disputed likely at
Christmas 1312 (or perhaps Easter 1313). Quodlibeta Avenionensia (QA) I-III were
held during Christmas in 1314, 1315, and 1316 respectively. P. Stella has edited all three.
6.2.5 Quodlibeta Critical Editions
Quodlibeta Avenionensia [QA] I–III (ed. Stella, 1965).18
Quodlibet Parisiensis [QP] [first redaction] I (unedited).19
11. dd. 1–43, q. 1.
12. dd. 14–42.
13. dd. 43–50.
14. Friedman, “Dominican Quodlibetal Literature” 449–51.
15. See also Koch, Durandus de S. Porciano, 93–128.
16. Hervaeus Natalis in Reprobationes excusationum Durandi (late 1314) and Guy Terrena in Quodl. I
(1313) both make use of the first redaction of this Quodlibet.
17. In Quodlibet Aven. III Durand refers to Quodlibet Aven. I as his “first Quodlibet” and in Vaticanus
lat. 1075 the second redaction of QP I is called Quodlibet IV, coming after Quodlibeta Aven. I-III. Hence,
Durand would have revised it when working up his three Avignon Quodlibeta.
18. Since P. Stella, several more manuscript witnesses have been found: Mu¨nster, Universita¨tsbibl.
175 ff. 216va–217vb (QA I.8); Pamplona Biblioteca de la Catedral 28 ff. 88v–93r (QA III.5–6); ff. 159v–
160v (QA III.5); Peplin Bibl. Sem. Duchownego 53/103 ff. 225ra–23v (QA III.1); Siena Bibl. Comm.
degli Intronati G VII 40 ff. 94ra–101vb (QA III.1).
19. Vaticanus lat. 1076.
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Quodlibet Parisiensis [QP] [second redaction] I, qq. 1–4 (ed. Takada, 1968).20
Quodlibet Parisiensis [QP] I, qq. 5–6 (unedited).21
Quodlibet Parisiensis [QP] II (unedited).22
6.2.6 Miscellanea
Quaestio “Vtrum sit ponere intellectum agentem partem animae” = Sent. I-A 3.5 = Addi-
tiones ad comment. I Sent.23
Disputatio de quolibet [DQ 1] “Vtrum intelligere sit aliquid additum intellectui cum eo
faciens compositionem realem” (ed. Koch, 1929) in Josef Koch, Durandi de S. Por-
ciano O.P. Quaestio de natura cognitionis (II SENT. (A) D. 3, Q. 5) et Disputatio
cum anonymo quodam nec non Determinatio Hervei Natalis O.P. (QUOL. III Q. 8), 1st
edition, Opuscula et textus 6 (Mu¨nster: Aschendorff, 1928/9), 33–42.
Disputationes de quolibet [DQ 2] “Vtrum duo habitus possint causare unum effectum” (ed.
Koch and Takada, 1965).
Excusationes (lost).24
Quaestio vesperiarum “Vtrum liberum arbitrium sit potentia uel actus uel habitus” (ed.
20. The title of questions 1–4 are:
1. Vtrum omnia illa quae differunt realiter in eodem supposito faciant compositionem
2. Vtrum sex ultima praedicamenta dicta de Deo uel de creaturis dicant aliquid absolutum uel dicant
solum respectum
3. Vtrum relatio dicat perfectionem formaliter
4. Vtrum ratio boni sit absoluta uel respectiua
21. Vaticanus lat. 1076 ff. 17r–18 and Tortosa Arch. Cap. 43 f. 85va. The titles of questions 5–6
are:
5. Vtrum numerus ternarius personarum diuinarum uel creaturarum sit aliquid unum realiter
6. Vtrum motio ultimi finis et motio efficentis sint motiones eiusdem rationis, supposito quod finis
et efficiens sint idem realiter
See Friedman, “Dominican Quodlibetal Literature.”
22. Paris Bibl. Nat., lat. 14572 ff. 5ra–7va. The titles are contained in Glorieux, La littere´rature
quodlibe´tique de 1260 a` 1320.
23. Erfurt Allgemeinbibl. der Stadt, Ampl. F 369 76ra–77rb. An almost complete transcription can
be found by collecting together Jeschke, “Die Ablehnung des ta¨tigen Intellekts bei Durandus,” Stella,
Evidentiae, I.4, and Koch, Durandus de S. Porciano, 44–9.
24. See ibid., 88–9 and Martin, La controverse, 343–6.
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Stella, 1962) in Stella, “Le Quaestiones de Libero Arbitrio di Durando da S. Porciano,”
451–4.25
Quaestio in aula “Vtrum potentia pure passiua possit esse libera” (ed. Stella, 1962) in ibid.,
454–5.26
Quaestio in Aula resumpta “Vtrum potentia pure passiua possit esse libera” (ed. Stella,
1962) in ibid., 457–61.27
Quaestiones de libero arbitrio [QLA] (ed. Stella, 1962) in ibid., 471–99.28
Tractatus de habitibus [TDH] qq. 1–3 (ed. Takada, 1963).
Tractatus de habitibus [TDH] q. 4 (ed. Koch, 1930).
Tractatus de habitibus [TDH] q. 5 (corrupt).29
For Durand’s other works not mentioned in this dissertation, see Ka¨ppeli, Scriptores Ordinis
Praedicatorum Medii Aevi vol. 1, #924–960.
6.3 Primary Sources Bibliography
Note: Early modern print editions are identified with city, year. Modern critical editions,
by contrast, are usually identified with editor, year, sometimes with the comission (e.g.,
Leonine Commission), year.
Multi-Author
Peter of Palude, John of Naples et al. Articuli nonaginta tres extracti ex Durandi de S.
25. Vaticanus lat. 1086 f. 164ra–5ra. On the vesperies (uesperiae), see Koch, Durandus de S. Por-
ciano, 160–8 and Friedman, “Dominican Quodlibetal Literature” 201. The evening before the promotion
to magister, two masters would challenge the candidate to a dispute on a certain number of pre-arranged
questions—in Durand’s case, these concerned freedom of choice. We do not yet know who the anonymous
masters were (Peter and Thomas). The next day, in the hall (aula) of the bishop of Paris’s residence,
the candidate took over the dispute and determined it as master.
26. Vaticanus lat. 1086 f. 165ra–6ra. On the quaestiones in aula see the footnote above.
27. Vaticanus lat. 1086 f. 171va–3ra.
28. Vaticanus lat. 15875 71ra–3vb and Tortosa Arch. Cap. 43 86ra–90rb.
29. See the introduction in Josef Koch, Durandi de S. Porciano O.P. Tractatus de habitibus. Quaes-
tio quarta [De subiectis habituum] addita quaestione critica anonymi cuiusdam, Opuscula et textus 8
(Mu¨nster: Aschendorff, 1930). We can reconstruct this quaestio based upon at least Peter of Palude,
Sent. III 23.1–2 and Nicholas Medensis, Evid. III.30.
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Porciano O.P. Primo Scripto Sententia et examinati per magistros et baccalarios Ordinis
(ed. Koch, 1973) in Koch, “Die Magister-Jahre des Durandus de S. Porciano O.P. under
der Konflikt mit seinem Ordinem” 53–71.
John of Naples, James of Lausanne et al. Articuli in quibus magister Durandus deuiat a
doctrina uenerabilis doctoris nostri fratris Thomae (ed. Koch, 1973) in ibid., 72–118.
Anonymous
Quaestio “Vtrum habitus acquisitus intellectualis uel moralis sit ponendus in illa potentia
subiectiue, cuius actum primo et immediate respicit” (ed. Koch, 1930) in Koch, Tractatus
de habitibus, 70–80.
Quaestio “Vtrum beatitudo consistat in intellectu agente” (ed. Beccarisi, 2004).
Ps.-Durand, Quaestio “Vtrum sensus sit uirtus passiua” (ed. Pattin, 1988) in Pattin, Pour
l’histoire du sens agent, 19–20.
Dominic of Clavasio(?), Quaestio “Vtrum sensus sit uirtus passiua (ed. Pattin, 1988) in
ibid., 278–290.
Thomas Wylton(?), De sensu agente (ed. Pattin, 1988) in ibid., 338–355.
Quaestio, “Vtrum sensus sit uirtus actiua uel passiua (ed. Pattin, 1988) in ibid., 359–372.
Quaestio, “Vtrum praeter potentiam receptiuam actus sentiendi et speciem sensibilem sit
ponere aliquam uirtutem actiuam sensationis et hoc sonat tantum utrum sit ponere sen-
sum agentem” (ed. Pattin, 1988) in ibid., 376–390.
“Magister Thomas Anglicus”. Quaestio magistrorum in aula “Vtrum, ut potentia sit libera,
necessarium sit quod moueat seipsam, id est quod sit ratio mouendi” (ed. Stella, 1962) in
Stella, “Le Quaestiones de Libero Arbitrio di Durando da S. Porciano,” 520–2.30
Quaestio 30 “Vtrum uelle et nolle sit in potestate nostra” (ed. Stella, 1962) in ibid., 463–7.31
Aristotle
30. Vaticanus lat. 1086 f. 166ra–vb.
31. Vaticanus lat. 14572 f. 170va–1va.
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De anima (uersio Moerbekiana) in Sancti Thomae. Sentencia libri de Anima (Opera Omnia
XLV, 1984).
Metaphysics (uersio Moerbekiana) in Aristoteles Latinus XXV. Metaphysica. Recensio et
translatio Guillelmi de Moerbeka (ed. Vuillemin-Diem, 1995).
Physica in Sancti Thomae. Commentaria in octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis (Opera
Omnia II, 1884).
De generatione et corruptione (uersio antiqua) in Averrois commentaria (Venice, 1574).
De memoria et reminiscentia (uersio antiqua) in ibid.
De sensu et sensato (uersio antiqua) in ibid.
Augustine
De libero arbitrio (P.L. 32, 1945).
De Genesi ad litteram (ed. Zycha, CSEL 28, 1894).
De Musica (ed. Jacobsson, 2002).
Averroes
Commentarium magnum in Aristotelis De anima [Comm. De Anima] (ed. Crawford, 1953).
In Aristotelis Physica [Comm. Phys.] (Venice, 1574 [Reprint: 1962]).
In Aristotelis Metaphysica [Comm. Meta.] (Venice, 1574 [Reprint: 1962]).
In Aristotelis De coelo [Comm. De Coelo] (Venice, 1574 [Reprint: 1962]).
In De sensu et sensato (Venice, 1574 [Reprint: 1962]).
Bartholomew of Bruges
De sensu agente (ed. Pattin, 1988) in Pattin, Pour l’histoire du sens agent, 46–94.
Bernard of Auvergne
Reprobationes Henrici de Gandavo Quodlibet V, Q. 9 et Quodlibet VI, Q. 1 [Reprobationes]
(ed. Friedman, 2007) in Friedman, “Dominican Quodlibetal Literature” 481–488.
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Boethius
Consolatio Philosophiae (ed. Moreschini, 2000).
Cajetan
See Thomas de Vio.
Durandellus
See Nicholas Medensis.
Francisco Sua´rez
Commentaria una cum quaestionibus in tres libros Aristotelis De anima [Comm. DA] (ed.
Castellote, 1979, 1981, 1991).
Giles of Rome
Quodlibeta [Quodl.] (Leuven, 1646 [Reprint: 1966]).
Quodlibet II.12 (ed. Pattin, 1988) in Pattin, Pour l’histoire du sens agent, 5–7.
Quaestiones de cognitione angelorum (Venice, 1503 [Reprint: 1968]).
Commentaria in octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis [In Phys.] (Venice, 1502 [Repr. 1968]).
Godfrey of Fontaines
Quodlibeta [Quodl.] in Les Philosophes Belges (Leuven: Institut Supe´rieur de Philosophie
de l’Universite´). Vol. 2: Les quatres premiers Quodlibets de Godefroid de Fontaines (ed.
de Wulf et al., 1904); Vol. 3: Les Quodlibets cinq, six et sept (ed. de Wulf et al., 1914); Vol.
4: Le huitie`me Quodlibet, Le Neuvie`me Quodlibet, Le dixie`me Quodlibet (ed. Hoffmans,
1924, 1928, 1931); Vol. 5: Les Quodlibets onze et douze, Les Quodlibets treize et quatorze
(ed. Hoffmans, 1932, 1935); Vol. 14: Le Quodlibet XV et trois Questions ordinaires de
Godefroid de Fontaines (ed. Lottin, 1937).
Quaestiones disputatae [DQ], q. 12 (ed. Wippel, 1973) in John Wippel, “Godfrey of Fontaines:
Disputed Questions 9, 10, and 12,” Franciscan Studies 33 (1973): 351–72.
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Gonsalvus of Spain
Quaestiones disputatae [DQ] et Quodlibet [Quodl.] (ed. Amoro´s, 1935).
Gregory of Rimini
Sentences [Sent.] (ed. Trapp, Marcolino, Santo-Novas, 1979).
Guy Terrena
Quodlibet [Quodl.] I, q. 14 (ed. Friedman, 2009) in Friedman, “On the Trail of a Philosoph-
ical Debate: Durand of St. Pourc¸ain vs. Thomas Wylton on Simultaneous Acts in the
Intellect,” 458–461.
Quodlibet [Quodl.] II, q. 13 (ed. Nielsen and Trifogli, 2009) in Lauge Nielsen and C. Trifogli,
“Guido Terreni and His Debate with Thomas Wylton,” DSTFM 20 (2009): 586–612.
Quodlibet [Quodl.] III, q. 3 (ed. Nielsen and Trifogli, 2009) in ibid., 612–636.
Henry Bate
Speculum diuinorum et quorundam naturalium (ed. Steel, 1993).
Henry of Ghent
Many of Henry of Ghent’s works have been edited in Henrici de Gandauo Opera Omnia
(Leuven: De Wulf-Mansion Centre).
Quodlibeta [Quodl.] (Paris, 1518 [Reprint: 1961]). II in Opera Omnia VI (ed. Wielockx,
1983); IX in Opera Omnia XIII (ed. Macken, 1983); X in Opera Omnia XIV (ed. Macken,
1981); XIII in Opera Omnia XVII (ed. Decorte, 1985).
Summa quaestionum ordinarium [SQO] (Paris, 1520 [Reprint: 1953]). Art. 31–34 in Opera
Omnia XXVII (ed. Macken, 1991);
Henry of Lu¨beck
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Quodlibeta [Quodl.] (ed. Perrone, 2009).
Hervaeus Natalis
Reprobationes excusationum Durandi [Reprobationes] (unedited).32
Correctiones supra dicta Durandi de Sancto Porciano in Primo Quolibet [Correctiones]
(ed. Stella, 1965) in Prospero Stella, Magistri D. Durandi a Sancto Porciano Ordinis
Praedicatorum. Quolibeta Avenionensia tria additis Correctionibus Hervei Natalis supra
dicta Durandi in Primo Quolibet, Textus et studia in historiam scholasticae cura pontificii
athenaei salesiani 1 (Zu¨rich: Pas Verlag, 1965).
Defensio doctrinae Divi Thomae [Defensio] (ed. Piccari, 1995) in P. Piccari, “La Opinio de
difficultatibus contra doctrinam fratris Thomae di Erveo di Ne´dellec. Edizione critica,”
Memorie Domenicane 26 (1995): 5–183.
De intellectu et specie [DIS] (ed. Stella, 1959) in Stella, “La prima critica di Hervaeus
Natalis O.P. alla noetica di Enrico di Gand: Il De intellectu et specie del cosiddetto De
quatuor materiis.”
De articulis pertinentibus ad IV libros Sententiarum Durandi [De articulis] art. 1–5 (ed.
Takada, 1974) in Takeshira Takada, “Die gegen Durandus gerichtete Streitschrift des
Herveus Natalis De articulis pertinentibus ad primum librum Sententiarum Durandi (Art.
1-5),” in Sapientiae procerum amore, ed. T. Ko¨hler (Rome, 1974), 439–55.
Tractatus de uerbo [TDV] (Venice, 1513 [Reprint: 1966]).
Quodlibeta [Quodl.] (Venice, 1513 [Reprint: 1966]).
Quodlibet [Quodl.] I, qq. 12–13 (ed. Yamazaki, 1969).
Quodlibet [Quodl.] III, q. 8 (ed. Koch, 1929) in Koch, Quaestio de natura cognitionis (1st
ed.), 43–61.
Sentences [Sent.] (Paris, 1647 [Reprint: 1966]).
32. Reims Bibl. de la ville 502, ff. 112v–116v and 128v–113v. Martin, La controverse, 373–390 edits ff.
114vb–116ra “Circa Dist. 33. . . ”.
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Jacob of Duaco
Quaestiones super libro De anima (ed. de Raedemaeker, 1962).
James of Metz
Sentences [Sent.] (part. ed. Decker, 1967) in Decker, Die Gotteslehre.
James of Viterbo
Disputatio prima de quolibet [Quodl.] (ed. Ypma, 1968).
John Baconthorpe
Sentences (Cremonae, 1618)
John Buridan
Expositio et quaestiones in Aristotelis Physicam ad Albertum de Saxonia attributae (ed.
Patar, 1999).
Expositio et quaestiones in Aristotelis De coelo (ed. Patar, 1996).
Subtilissimae quaestiones super octo Physicorum libros Aristotelis [In Phys.] (Paris, 1509
[Reprint: 1964]).
Quaestiones super decem libros Ethicorum Aristotelis ad Nicomachum (Paris, 1513 [Reprint:
1968]).
In Metaphysicen Aristotelis quaestiones argutissimae (Paris, 1588 [recte 1518] [Reprint:
1964]).
Quaestiones et decisiones physicales insignium uirorum [. . . ] Buridani in tres libros De
anima [. . . ] [QDA] (Paris, 1516).33
33. Known as the first redaction and edited by B. Patar in B. Patar, Le traite´ de l’aˆme de Jean Buridan
[de prima lectura], Philosophes me´die´vaux 29 (Leuven: Peeters, 1991). The texts which I quote from are
from Pattin, Pour l’histoire du sens agent, 267–273.
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Quaestiones longae (ed. Pattin, 1988) in Pattin, Pour l’histoire du sens agent, 241–260.34
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6.4 Abbreviations
Abbreviations for primary sources are listed in the bibliography above. I have also used
the following abbreviations for secondary sources:
1277 Nach der Verurteilung von 1277. Philosophie und Theologie an der
Universita¨t von Paris im letzten Viertel des 13. Jahrhunderts. Studien
und Texte
ACPAP American Catholic Philosophical Association Proceedings
ACPQ American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly
AFP Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum
AHDLMA Archives d’histoire doctrinale et litte´raire du Moyen Aˆge
BGPTM Beitra¨ge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters
BPFSMA Biblioteca franciscana scholastica medii aevi
CHLMP The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy. From the Re-
discovery of Aristotle to the Disintegration of Scholasticism, 1100–1600
CIMAGL Cahiers de l’institut du Moyen-Aˆge grec et latin
CPTMA Corpus philosophorum teutonicorum medii aevi
CUA Catholic University of America
CUAP Catholic University of America Press
CUP Cambridge University Press
DSTFM Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale
DSP Duns Scot a` Paris, 1302–2002. Actes du colloque de Paris, 2–4 septem-
bre 2002
DT Divus Thomas
HUMA L’Homme et son univers au Moyen Aˆge. De septie`me congre`s interna-
tionale de philosophie me´vale. 30 Aouˆt - 4 Septembre 1982
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IIMP Intellect and Imagination in Medieval Philosophy. Actes du XIe congre`s
international de philosophie me´die´vale de la Socie´te´ Internationale pour
l’E´tude de la Philosophie Me´die´vale (S.I.E.P.M.), Porto, du 26 au 31
aouˆt 2002
JHP Journal of the History of Philosophy
OUP Oxford University Press
PACPA Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association
PDP Philosophical Debates at Paris in the Early Fourteenth Century
PSMLM Proceedings of the Society for Medieval Logic and Metaphysics
PUP Princeton University Press
RSPT Revue des sciences philosophiques et the´ologiques
RT Revue thomiste
RTAM Recherches de the´ologie ancienne et me´die´vale
RTPM Recherches de the´ologie et philosophie me´die´vales
STGM Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters
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